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The thesis begins by examining the philosophical underpinnings of
Foucault's 'constitutionalist' methodology. It argues that the archaeological
method of The Order 0/ Things derives principally neither from
phenomenology nor structuralism, but from a philosophical and scholarly
tradition (that of Kant, Cassirer, Duhem, Koyre) in which mathematics, the
scientific revolution of Galileo et al, and an a priori conceptualism are
paramount. It suggests that the rigid gathering of conceptual energies into the
notion of episteme finds an echo in the subsequent genealogical work on
pnsons. The thesis challenges the widely-held view that Foucault is a
Nietzschean thinker, maintaining that his overstatement of the constitutionalist
powers of 'discipline' is conditioned as much by a strong Cartesianism as by
his residual structuralism. The thesis shows how the Classical theme of order
informs Foucault's attempt to develop a modern theory of the constitution of
the subject in discourse. It postulates that the much-traduced first volume on
sexuality, which introduces time into his theory and embraces many of the
truisms of twentieth-century theoretical science, exhibits a less rigid
understanding of constitutionalist powers. The penultimate chapter addresses,
in the context of accusations of Eurocentrism levelled at Foucault's work, some
of the shortcomings of theoretico-political work which fails to think through
the 'deconstitution' of power, the play between order and disorder. Finally,
a profound continuity is posited between the archaeological method of The
Order of Things and his treatment of sexuality. Rejecting the suggestion of an
epistemological break, the thesis discovers the strategic invocation, in the final
two volumes, of a very traditional understanding of reason. Diverging from
those critics who only hear in Foucault the insistent theme of specificity and
the persistent denunciation of reason and (technological) rationality, the thesis
maintains that his writings effect a constant appeal to logos as order and
reason.
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1INTRODUCTION
In the opening words of an article on the history of psychology
published in 1957, Foucault writes: 'Nineteenth-century psychology inherited
from the Enlightenment a concern to align itself with the sciences of nature
and to rediscover in man the prolongation of the laws governing natural
phenomena. ,1 This alignment rested on two philosophical postulates: the first,
that the truth of man is exhausted in his natural being; the second, that the way
(chemin) of all scientific knowledge must pass through the determination of
quantitative relations, the construction of hypotheses and experimental
verification, Even in this early foray into the history of a savoir, Foucault
insinuates into the positivists' method, into their chemin, their way of
proceeding (the Greek methodos means 'pursuit of knowledge '; meta is 'with,
after', hodos, 'way'), the word construction? The presence of 'construction'
is enough calmly to expose the positivist ruse which facilitates the fraudulent
I 'La Psychologie de 1850 h 1950', in Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits 1954-1988, ed, by
Daniel Defert and Francois Ewald, 4 vols (paris: Editions Gallimard, 1994), Vol. I: 1954-1969,
pp.l20-137 (p.120) (first publ. in Histoire de la philosophie europtenne. T6me 2. Tableau de
la philosophie contemporaine, ed. by A. Weber and D. Huisman (Paris: Fischbacher, 1957),
pp.591-6(6). I have elected to refer to English translations where they exist. Unless otherwise
indicated, all other translations are my own.
2 Foucault makes the following distinction between savoir and connaissance: 'By
connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern
it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type
of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated'
Translator's note in Michel Foucault, The Archae%gy of Know/edge, trans. by A.M. Sheridan
Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972; repro Routledge, 1994), p.l5.
2combination of a powerful prejuge de nature, the belief in natural man and in
a natural means of knowing man, with a man-made approach, the construction
and testing of hypotheses, the work of the mind and the deployment of
technology, of tekhne.
In other texts, he will fall more critically on the work of construction
and the prejuge de nature. The work, not the mere fact of the work. That
individuals are the material of conjecture, imagination and fictionalization at
the hands of others is the banal starting point for Foucault's explorations of the
how. Such explorations take him from the personal vagaries of a doctor
diagnosing a patient whose bile has 'dried up in its passages and turned into
melancholy', to questions concerning the system of knowledge within which
this idea of melancholy may function, to institutional. political and social
questions. to considerations of architecture, space and tekhne.3 And with these
explorations comes the conviction (Lacan and a certain historical moment are
never far from the scene) that individuals are constituted even down to 'their'
individuality and condition as subjects.
Construction is to be understood, therefore. both as thought and as
tekhne. The latter. which Foucault sees applied malevolently in the guise of
an objectifying gaze, a medical intervention, an architectural arrangement. will
always remain vital to him. His work communicates remarkably the sense of
power's physical, material 'grip'. to use one of his omnipresent metaphors.
Foucault's active involvement in the practice of psychology and psychiatry
3 Michel Foucault,The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans.
by A.M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1973; repro Routledge, 1991), p.24.
3doubtless allows him to draw on an important emotional as well as intellectual
reservoir. However, it is neither the new psychology nor the new anthropology
of Mead, Benedict and Luton (both disciplines are mentioned in 'La
Psychologie de 1850') that will provide me with the route into Foucault's
work. Philosophical, social, linguistic and natural scientific thought will guide
me through a study of Foucault's oeuvre, which, following Husserl, and for
reasons I shall explore in due course, I prefer to call 'constitutionalist' rather
than 'constructionist' thinking. Starting from the premise (which risks the
banality of the truism) that one cannot begin to evaluate what Foucault says
about the mad, about les choses, about prisons, power and sexuality without
an understanding of the way he 'pursues' them, the thesis examines the
formation and functioning of Foucault's constitutionalist method.
Edward Said writes, I think correctly, that in the English-speaking
world more attention has been paid to Foucault's methodologies than to his
histories.' Yet I would offer three reasons, in addition to the most obvious of
them all - namely, the methodological exigency of the structuralist moment
itself - for renewing this engagement, Firstly, there is Foucault's own
preoccupation with questions of method. Said himself, in the same tribute,
mentions Allan Megill's contention that The Archaeology of Knowledge
represents a parodic re-writing of Descartes' Discours de la methode. One
may add to this Foucault's The Order of Discourse; the insistence in The
Order of Things on the primacy of archaeology; the inclusion of a chapter on
..Edward Said, 'Michel Foucault. 1926-1984', inAfter Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge,
Postmodern Challenges, ed. by Jonathan Arae (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1988), p.9.
4method in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction; the methodological
revisions of the final two volumes on sexuality; the raging polemics, first for
archaeology, then for genealogy, in a plethora of articles and interviews over
a twenty-year span. Foucault described himself on one occasion as 'a
merchant of instruments, a maker of recipes, an indicator of objectives, a
cartographer, a reader of plans, an armourer'.' The critical attention to
method is motivated at least in part by something in the texts of Foucault.
Still no excuse for ignoring his histories.
Secondly, has the critical attention devoted to Foucault's methodologies
been illuminating? There certainly exist perspicacious and telling critiques
(which Ihighlight where appropriate), but Isubmit that much critical response
to them is naively trusting of the writer's own accounts of the innovations
wrought by his methods. Thus Lois McNay: 'Foucault's rejection of the
"literary turn" of much recent philosophy, his corresponding insistence on the
historical specificity of his categories [...] and his retention of a notion of the
acting self, distances his work from that of other French philosophers. ,6 I
shall contest these and other articles of faith concerning what Foucault
purportedly managed to reject or retain. Is it satisfactory, for instance, to
accept that Foucault inherited the mantle of Nietzsche and, to a lesser degree,
Heidegger? Or can it be said that his work is un-Nietzschean and un-
Heideggerian in very significant respects.
, Michel Foucault, 'Sur la Sellette: Michel Foucault', Les Nouvelles litteraires, 3 March
1975, p.3.
6 Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self (Cambridge: PolityPress. 1992).
p.l93.
5Thirdly, the thesis is only partly about the work of Foucault; its concern
is also with the Foucaultian moment, with its principal theme - the relationship
between power and knowledge -, with its sapient insights, its impassioned
overreachings and its faith regarding the critical idiom of 'construction' and
'constitution'. In short, what Maria Daraki has called 'the Foucault
phenomenon' demands more scrutiny. In certain academic circles 'Foucault'
has become a by-word for a variety of problematics, including those of
institutionality, power, the subject, and discourse. Likewise (despite having
virtually nothing to say about the phenomenon), Foucault has been hailed as
one of the divas ofpostmodernism. 'Foucaldism' has passed successfully into
contemporary academic discourse with an ease that betokens what various
commentators consider to be its historical timeliness.' Throughout the thesis,
I shall examine the extent to which this timeliness may be attributed to the
capacity of Foucault's work to withstand a Popperian falsifiability (whereby
it would answer more questions than competing theories) and the degree to
which it not only modifies but also responds to the general conditions
surrounding the act of knowing which currently prevail in Western academe.
The thesis develops as follows: Chapter one deals with a Heideggerian
convergence in The Order of Things. Contrary to those attempts (which
contain important germs of truth) that petition for the text to be read as an
iconoclastic critique of phenomenology and/or Kantianism - in particular their
7 In contrast to Nietzsche's 'untimely' meditations. Cf. Maria Daraki, 'Michel Foucault's
Journey to Greece', Te/os, 67 (Spring 1986),87-110 (p.87 and pp.l08-11O); Jean Baudrillard,
Oublier Foucault (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1977), pp.12-15; Allan Megill, Prophets of
Extremity - Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley and London: University of
California Press, 1985), p.190.
6recourse to the transcendental subject - the work, which is indebted to a
tradition that assigns a vital role to mathematics and the scientific revolution
of Galileo et al, may be understood as belonging (though never slavishly) to
an even longer-established tradition firmly believing in the adequation between
conceptual form and subject matter (the episternewould thus be a configuration
of knowledge which emerges from things themselves). No less important is
the work of the episterne on the order of things themselves. Important in
Chapter one but also throughout the thesis, for it is argued that the model of
constitution developed in The Order of Things, and the particular management
of constitutionalist powers (in this case conceptual) found therein, reappear in
the genealogical texts treating of social subject matter.
Chapter two examines Discipline and Punish and the Nietzschean
dimension of Foucault's work. It investigates that text's important rewriting
of the second essay from Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals (this much is
uncontentious), but argues that Discipline and Punish also bears the traces of
what I have called, in an infelicitous phrase, a technological Cartesianism,
which would allow the carceral machine of power to function in too uniform,
too un-Nietzschean a mode. Would allow. In fact the disciplinary machine
exhibits a curious malfunction, a systemic defect the congenitality of which
ensures that the carceral network's constitutionalist powers be aporetic, that the
prime subjects of disciplinary power necessarily escape subjection.
Chapter three represents a reprise of both archaeological and
genealogical moments. It focuses on Foucault's theory of discourse as act,
especially the theory of the enonce which he elaborates principally in The
7Archaeology of Knowledge. It suggests that the combination of a formalist
archaeological theory applied to a genealogical understanding of the production
of knowledge in social institutions results in a seductive but problematic theory
of subject-positions. Foucault speaks of a decalage between the author of a
text and the subject of the enonce, while I perceive a certain calage, a wedging
or chocking. Formalist it may appear, but the stakes of the debate enunciated
in The Archaeology of Knowledge are potentially of the highest political order.
If to speak is to assume a certain subject-position within an institutional, social
field of power, might not the motility of subject-positions itself be enough to
set to work the movement of refusal and resistance? I explore this question
in relation to the debate - which does not end in 1972, Derrida publishing a
further piece in 1992 - between Foucault and Derrida over Histoire de la folie.
Chapter four postulates that the first volume of the history of sexuality
is the theoretical milestone of Foucault's oeuvre. It marks the place where
constitutionalist powers are thought more plurally, to the point where the very
notion of constitution is to a certain extent deconstituted. Resistance enters the
scene it had never left; likewise time, which literally provides the basis for a
less closed, less structuralist formulation of power(s). The chapter has
recourse to twentieth-century theoretical science in order to demonstrate how
Foucault is but one contributor to much more widespread theoretical
machinations concerning order/chaos, system/event, determinism/chance. It
also observes that Foucault's move away from the general and the universal
to the local and the specific is not without its problems, that, as the compass
of LA Yolonte de savoir itself reveals (the emphasis on populations being the
8most obvious instance), the micro without the macro is strictly inconceivable.
Chapter five punctuates the time of the thesis and is the odd man out.
It interrupts the sense of a development across Foucault's work and does not
concentrate on anyone particular text. Instead it takes from Chapter two the
model of the 'carceral', together with the part played in it by guilt; from
Chapter three, the theory of subject-positions; and from Chapter four, the
insights concerning order/disorder, determinism/chaos. It examines the
accusation levelled at Foucault according to which his work is Eurocentric,
mustering a defence against that charge. It does this in order to develop an
agenda of its own, namely, the exploration of the potential pitfalls of a
constitutionalist analysis which would imbibe the lessons of the disciplinary
careeral network, and of multiple subject-positions, yet precisely ignore the
lessons of La Yolonu de savoir in order to condemn unequivocally the power
of Europe and the West. Although the chapter defends Foucault against
charges of Eurocentrism, it does suggest that his own disjunctive ecruure
furnishes an idiom and an ethos for the kind of accusation subsequently
levelled at him.
Finally, Chapter six examines the part played by abstraction in
Foucault's work, arguing that it is a less successful role when played out in the
work on sexuality (roughly commensurate in its failure with the
constitutionalist powers which philosophy would like to bestow upon itself,
and which Foucault would like to bestow upon philosophy). Foucault's final
two published volumes of the history of sexuality, which in one sense
represent a pronounced shift in perspective - embracing as they do a (formerly
9absent) autonomous, self-fashioning human subject -, may also be regarded as
marking a profound continuity with the earlier work, and this in two ways.
Firstly, constitutionalist powers again exercise themselves in demiurgic fashion
(if they did so in the shape of the episteme in The Order of Things and if they
took the form of 'the carceral' in Discipline and Punish, in The Use of
Pleasures and The Care of the Self they resurface in the guise of the human
individual). Secondly, despite the widespread thematics of specificity, micro-
powers, tekhne and practice (which stand in opposition to and condemnation
of theory and, above all, the universal), I argue that from the work on
archaeology through to the late work on sexuality there is constant recourse to
a very traditional theme of the logos, reason or order which presides over the
world. If his texts can apparently condemn this demiurgic reason, the narrative
narrating is also quite capable of setting it to work for its own purposes. (In
question is Godliness.)
The risks that attend my project may be stated quite simply. How to
avoid repeating the determinism which I find in Foucault's work? Prefacing
his essay on Husserl, "'Genesis and Structure" and Phenomenology', Derrida
writes of the dangers of a debate which appears to be not so much an
'attentive scrutiny' as a 'putting into question, that is, an abusive investigation
which introduces beforehand what it seeks to find, and does violence to the
physiology proper to a body of thought'," I can only hope to scrutinize
attentively.
8 In Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978;
repro 1985), pp.154-168 (p.154). The name 'Derrida' will never be far from the scene. The
thesis is not a work of deconstruction but certainly operates in its hinterland.
10
CHAPTER 1
MENTE CONCIPERE: METHOD AND TRADITION
IN THE ORDER OF THINGS
Introduction
It is a matter of little contention that Foucault the social thinker (of
prisons, of the normalization of the mad, of sexuality, and. above all. of
power) is the more feted Foucault, the Foucault that commands most attention,
though to a perhaps unfortunate degree when one can speak of a critic' s focus
on Foucault's early work as 'regretful'.' This chapter chooses to begin,
though, with the more sober, more arcane Foucault of The Order 0/ Things.
Not that its analysis of that text represents a thorough-going attempt to do
justice to it. It should be stated unequivocally from the outset that the concern
is not to offer a full and rigorous account of the book's undoubted richness
(and in fairness much of the brilliance lies in the detail); we are concerned,
rather, with examining the archaeological method and its presuppositions in
order to suggest that, despite the repudiation to which Foucault later subjected
both archaeology in general and The Order of'Ihings in particular, the method
I The regret, aimed at Karlis Racevskis, belongs to Jonathan Arac, 'The Function of
Foucault at the Present Time', Humanities in Society, 3:1 (Winter 1980), 73-86.
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deployed in that text is of capital importance for an understanding of the later
work, especially in what concerns constitutionalist thinking. To that end, the
chapter will scrutinize Foucault's archaeological method by reading The Order
of Things alongside Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. We shall concentrate
on the first part of the book, that is to say, on the passage from the
Renaissance to the Classical episteme, in the belief that it constitutes an
exemplary moment in Foucault.
Broadly speaking, the chapter postulates three things. First, that
Heidegger provides a direct source for The Order of Things, especially in what
relates to Foucault's binding together of the theme of mathesis, the concept of
the episteme and the questioning of the subjectum, a nexus of concerns which
arguably take their cue from Heidegger on what he calls the mathematical. It
is for this reason that a cluster of phenomenological themes which obviously
exceed Heidegger (above all in the direction of Husserl) is rather schematically
gathered around his name. Heidegger is hardly the origin of The Order of
Things, but he is a crucial pre-text. Second, that Foucault's book is an attempt
to trump Heidegger's interpretation by historicizing the emergence of Kant's
transcendental subject and questioning in the process the constitutive powers
accorded the subject in the modern phenomenological tradition. At the root
of his critique lies a fierce aversion to the notion of the 'thing in itself', a
rejection which will direct Foucault's thinking in subsequent books. Finally,
that Foucault practises a strong misreading of Heidegger. To that extent, we
see the laying of anew, axiomatic and deterministic ground, upon which
Foucault hopes to build his archaeological theoretical edifice.
12
The deficiencies and overreachings which beset The Order of Things
(the overstatement of discontinuity, the totalizing drive of the episteme, to
name but two) are common knowledge. The contention that the book's
methodology is axiomatic will thus surprise few. The chapter is path-marking
rather than path-breaking. If it has any claim to opening up a new route, this
perhaps lies, paradoxically in view of the asserted novelty of archaeology, in
its insertion of Foucault into a tradition. If it is the case that we can already
discern in Foucault's interpretation of mathesis as order rather than
measurement the beginnings of a move away from the logico-mathematical to
the social, it seems to me that this move is itself made according to a very
traditional logico-categorical schema.
The constitution of archaeology
Foucault's archaeological method is directly concerned with forging a
new way to pursue knowledge.' The question of whether it is a matter of
lighting upon or constructing the way or road is germane to our concern with
method in this first chapter.
Strictly speaking, the most explicitly methodological text of Foucault's
is The Archaeology of Knowledge, though that work is altogether less
2 Aristotle begins his Physics with 'method' understood as 'research'. It is also worth
signalling at this early stage that Kant, in a text which will assume importance for us in due
course, binds the question of mathematics to that of the way as path or road (Weg): 'In the
earliest times to which the history of human reason extends, mathematics, among that
wonderful people, the Greeks, had already entered upon the sure path of science. But it must
not be supposed that it was as easy for mathematics as it was for logic - in which reason has
to deal with itself alone - to light upon, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road'
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (Houndsmi11:
Macmillan, 1929; repro 1992), p.l9.
13
concerned than the 1966 text with practising what it preaches. The Order of
Things, on the other hand, foregrounds and performs the archaeological method
at length. In the preface, Foucault announces a new method which departs
from the history of ideas or of science. His project consists (and the Kantian
phrase 'conditions of possibility' will assume the dimensions of a slogan) in
bringing to light
the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart
from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective
forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that
of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility. 3
The fledgling method is baptized 'archaeology'. A footnote reads: 'The
problems of method raised by such an "archaeology" will be examined in a
later work' (p.xxii). This suggests that such problems receive no examination
in the current project. And this is very nearly the case. For Foucault, in this
text, it is not archaeology that raises problems of method: archaeology is a
corrective to the problematical methods of others. There is thus little place
(though not no place) for doubt in this text, especially self-doubt: Descartes,
as Georges Canguilhem points out, gets less space than Don Quijote.'
The word archaeology is manifestly not new to The Order of Things.
Aside from designating an autonomous scholarly and practical tradition,
Foucault explains elsewhere - in an acrimonious exchange with George
Steiner, who attributes Foucault's usage to Freud - that he took the word from
1Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London:
Tavistock Publications, 1970; repro 1985), p.xxii; Les Mots et les choses: une archeologie des
sciences humaines (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1966).
4 Georges Canguilhem, 'Mort de l'homme ou epuisement du cogito?', Critique, 24:242
(July 1967), 599-618 (p.600).
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Kant's Fortschritte der Metaphysik? Etymologically, the word has more
ancient roots: combined form of the Greek arkhaios, ancient or primitive (from
arkhe, beginning) and logia, discourse. Lastly, archaeology is not new to
Foucault's 1966 text since it had already figured in the preface to Folie et
deraison: histoire de lafolie a /'age classique? However, with the revised and
re-titled 1972 edition, Histoire de la folie a l'dge classique, comes the
suppression by Foucault of the original preface, and the first appearance of the
word in that text now comes in an important passage dealing with the process
of internment in the mid-seventeenth century of all those tarred with the brush
of unreason (collectively the asociaux, not just the insane).' Here the word
archaeology appears in a passage in fact far more expressive of the nature of
the project than was the now suppressed preface. Although we must guard
against using the presence of the same word to assimilate the differing methods
of Histoire de la folie and The Order of Things, this early appearance
5 George Steiner, 'The Order of Things', New York Times Book Review, 28 February 1971,
p.8. Foucault, 'Monstrosities in Criticism', trans. by Robert J. Matthews, Diacritics 1 (Fall
1971),57-60. The word also appears in Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,
a book translated by Foucault, in a section on signs and geology (,On the Power of Using
Signs'). As Sartre is quick to point out, Foucault also adopts a geological metaphorics. Jean-
Paul Sartre, 'Jean-Paul Sartre repond', L 'Arc, 30 (1966), 87-96 (p.87). But where Foucault's
archaeology is a means of arriving at something, Kant's is the thing to be arrived at, an
'ancient state of the world' which is an 'archaeology of nature' (Kant, Anthropology, p.66).
Kant's Fortschritte is What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time
of Leibniz and WoljJ? in English.
6 Paris: PIon, 1961. 'The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason on
madness, could be established only on the basis of such a silence. Ihave not tried to write the
history of that language but, rather, the archaeology of that silence' (pp.x-xi). Jacques Derrida
charges Foucault with failing in that text to look closely enough at the very meaning of the
word Foucault will claim for the name of his project. 'Cogito and the History of Madness',
in Writing and Difference, pp.31-63.
7 Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1972. Given that the English translation is a drastic
abridgement of the original, I shall refer to the French text throughout and provide my own
translations.
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illustrates well a simultaneous broaching and breaching of the question of
method. Foucault has just concluded that the gesture of internment (which
marks a new attitude on the part of the authorities toward the asociaux: now
they are to be hidden from public view) has 'created' alienation (we shall have
cause later to examine the link between constitution and creation). He
continues:
In this sense, to rewrite the history of this process of banishment is
to attempt the archaeology of an alienation. It is not a matter of detennining
what pathological or police category was therein involved, which would still
take this alienation as a given; but it is necessary to know how this gesture
was achieved. that is to say, what operations are balanced in the totality that
it forms. from what disparate horizons emerged those who were together
removed by the same act of segregation, and what experience Classical man
had of himself at a time when certain of his most familiar features were
beginning to lose their familiarity and their resemblance to any recognizable
image of himself. If this decree has a meaning. by which modem man
designated in the madman his own alienated truth. it is insofar as a field of
alienation was constituted [constitutJ, well before the madman takes hold of
and symbolizes it, in which the madman found himself banished, among so
many other figures who for us no longer have any kinship with him. This
field was circumscribed in reality [rtellement] by the space of internment;
and the way in which it was formed should show us how the experience of
madness was constituted. (p.94)
One can already see at work in this passage, albeit with a social as opposed
to narrowly epistemological slant, the tell-tale semantics of two Foucaultian
concerns. On the one hand, the thing-in-itself cannot be entertained. As
Foucault states, in examining the process by which the undesirables were
excluded it is not a matter of determining what pathological or police category
was therein applied. because to do so would take that alienation as given - just
what is being challenged. On the other hand, the language of constitution, So,
if there is any meaning to the 1656 decree, it is inasmuch as a field of
alienation was therein 'constituted', In other words, the fact of the alienation
of the mad and associated undesirables is no natural fact at all and thus should
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not be regarded as somehow marking a natural and simple division between
reason and madness. Rather, this alienation, or better, this field of alienation,
was in a sense produced or constituted by a whole series of authoritative
bodies and powers: a field become a force field."
This early relationship between archaeology and constitution deters one
from positing the rarefied epistemology of The Order of Things as the cradle
of Foucault's method (a fact already suggested by the essay on the history of
psychology). However, the later text does represent a much more concerted
effort than the earlier work to dwell on questions of applied constitutionalist
method and to work out a position - particularly in its joust with
phenomenology - the logic of which will reverberate throughout Foucault's
more popular attempts to carry philosophical musings on constitution into
social history.
Before examining that position along a Foucault-Heidegger axis, it is
important to underscore briefly the place of constitution in the philosophy of
Husserl, for we are persuaded that the real object of Foucault's criticism in The
Order of Things is the more classical phenomenology of a Husserl or a
Merleau-Ponty and that Foucault is in fact using Heidegger as a stepping stone
to take him out of phenomenology altogether," In a lucid and, for our
purposes, extremely apposite book, Robert Sokolowski shows the elaboration
8 The constitution trope is repeated in relation to madness in The Archaeology, p.32.
9 The Archaeology, p.203, binds the idea of transcendental constitution to the names Kant,
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, declaring its own aim to be that of freeing history from the 'grip'
of phenomenology, a metaphor we shall have cause to highlight in due course.
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and development of Husserl' s concept of constitution across his work.'?
Interestingly, in view of our concern with mathematics, Sokolowski
demonstrates how the first stirrings of constitutionalist thinking in Husserl can
be found in Husserl's Philosophy ofArithmetic, in which he explains the origin
of groups by means of the mental acts which constitute them," (Though
Husser! does not yet actually use the word 'constitution', Sokolowski argues
that the same paradox is at work here as in the later Logical Investigations,
where constitution is fully elaborated.) A group of books thus assuredly has
an objective existence, but does not exist qua group until it is formed by a
mental act of 'collecting'. The paradox lies in the fact that something
objective exists only by virtue of subjective mental processes. In the Logical
Investigations, the word and concept 'constitution' come into their own,
Husserl seeking to explain how subjectivity 'constitutes' objectivity (the
German verb is Konstituieren). According to Husserl's theory of the
phenomenological reduction, which finds its elaboration in Ideas I, an
objectivating act establishes an intentional relationship to an object and thereby
establishes that object as an object of consciousness. Likewise with meaning,
which is constituted through an 'intending'.
Sokolowski links Husserl's use of the word 'constitution' to a certain
Kantianism, claiming that Husserl took the term from the neo-Kantians, and
10 The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964).
IIAccording to Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserts 'Origin O/Geometry' : An Introduction.
trans. by John P. Leavy, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1978; repro 1989). the
mathematical object is the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding HusserJ's
reflection.
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more particularly from Paul Natorp, a major influence on Husserl. In the
tradition of the neo-Kantians, constitution designates the process by which
subjectivity forms objectivity by virtue of its own activity. However, an
important difference distinguishes Husserl's use of the term from that of the
neo-Kantians:
the Kantian tradition maintained the idea of fixed subjective categories that
are imposed upon sensation, while Husserl never accepted this. For the neo-
Kantians, strictly speaking, it is the categories that constitute the object, and
this process of constitution takes place in subjectivity; for Husserl, on the
other hand, subjectivity itself constitutes the object. In his conception of
constitution, whatever categories are constituted are the result of encounter;
they are never found before encounter and imposed on it. Husserl's
subjective apriori is not as rigid as the Kantian system of apriori elements
is. (Sokolowski, p.216)
That said. Sokolowski makes a concerted effort to emphasize that
Husserl's transcendental epoche does not posit an all-powerful subjectivity at
the expense of a lost reality. Reality is retained in Ideas I as 'constituted', in
the sense that it cannot be conceived apart from consciousness. Sokolowski
argues that this is not idealism, that subjectivity is not the source of all
meaning and sense. He claims that in Husserl,
The objects and senses which are given as intentionally constituted are
simply accepted as given; their origins or sources are not explained totally
by subjectivity. There is a certain givenness or facticity in them which is
not entirely the work of consciousness. If this is the case, it must be so
because the contents of meanings or objects cannot be accounted for by
means of subjectivity. Consciousness does not 'create' them; it allows them
to emerge as real, but does not make them. In other words, it is a necessary
condition for them, but not an all-pervading, sufficient cause. (pp.138-139)
Consequently, Husser! will seek to maintain the irreducibility of both terms in
the paradox (consciousness and transcendent reality), and in fact will concede
that the work of intentionality remains mysterious: "'Between consciousness
and reality there yawns a true abyss of sense'" (p.135).
Even if Husser! points to an attenuated subjectivity. this will not be
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enough to convince Foucault that the constitutional powers of the subject are
not still being grossly overstated by phenomenology. Take a passage like the
following from Husserl, which indeed anticipates many of the questions asked
by Foucault:
But then new questions impose themselves in regard to this
mankind: are the insane also objectifications of the subjects being discussed
in connection with the accomplishment of world-constitution? And what
about children [?] [...]. And what about animals? There arise problems of
intentional modifications through which we can and must attribute to all
these conscious subjects - those that do not cofunction in respect to the
world understood in the hitherto accepted (and always fundamental) sense,
that is, the world which has truth through 'reason' - their manner of
transcendentality, precisely as 'analogues' of ourselves. [...] Further, there
are the problems of birth and death and of the transcendental constitution of
their meaning as world occurrences, and there is the problem of the sexes.
And finally, concerning the problem of the 'unconscious' that is so much
discussed today [...J this is in any case a matter of occurrences in the
pregiven world, and they naturally come under the transcendental problem
of constitution, as do birth and death. As something existing in the world
common to all, this sort of thing has its manners of on tic verification, of
'self-giving: which are quite particular but which originally create the ontic
meaning for beings of such particularity. Accordingly, within the absolutely
universal epocbe, in respect to beings having this or any other kind of
meaning, the appropriate constitutional questions have to be posed."
New questions (newer than those of Husserl) and the question of newness will
often be at stake in Foucault. But if, for Foucault, the new questions remain
'constitutional', if it remains a matter of world-constitution and objectification,
the problems encountered therein are not to be resolved transcendentally.
Herein an important difference between Husserl and Foucault. The latter will
bring reserves of circumspection and scepticism to bear on the constitutional
powers of the subject and on the process of objectification. The tone of his
assault on the subject's powers will be set by disavowal and destruction rather
12 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:
An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. by David Carr (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press. 1970), pp.187-188. The German word Husserl uses is
Konstitution; I shall return to this presently.
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than by attenuation. For Foucault, both the questions and the problems must
be posed anew and the recasting will bear heavily on method.
It is interesting, though, how The Order of Things appears in one
respect to depart from phenomenology while at the same time assuming a
typically Husserlian point of departure. In his later work, HusserI moves
towards a genetic constitutional analysis in which objectivity is now conceived
as the solidifying of a part of our intentional life in a judgement, it being
understood that this solidification is always a perilous moment in the midst of
a process, a flow of consciousness. This does not therefore suppose ready-
made structural elements which are simply adequate to an object or meaning,
but entails a sibylline 'pre-predicative' encounter (which is what we take
HusserI to mean by the phrase 'self-giving' in the above passage). Husserl's
notion of Lebenswelt, life-world, is what issues directly from pre-predicative
encounter. 'It is the complex of primitive meanings that are constituted before
any scientific conceptualizing is carried out on the world, and thus serves as
the basis on which such scientific theorizing is founded' (Sokolowski, p.184).
In The Order of Things, Foucault proffers his own enigmatic description of a
'fundamental' 'domain', lying half-way between the codes which govern the
way we perceive, the way we use language, and those regulating the higher-
level scientifico-philosophical reflections. This domain is more 'confused' and
'obscure' than the other two regions; in it a culture finds that there are things
which are in themselves orderable, which belong to a certain mute order; in
short it finds that 'there is order'. As with Husserl, there is something like an
attempt to explore this difficult 'self-giving'. By the same token, this is not
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the Lebenswelt of Husserl, precisely insofar as there is order at bottom. If I
understand Foucault correctly in this dense and perforce enigmatic passage, it
is not the subject that constitutes order, and even less does it give it; 'if y a de
l'ordre'. It (and the problem of nomination is capital, though Foucault solves
it presently by means of the word episteme) is that which, enigmatically,
resists the first (broadly speaking perceptual) codes; reveals them as codes;
provides the foundation upon which conceptual reflection builds its theories
(the Husserlian resonance is striking here); and, finally, ensures that a culture
finds itself before the 'brute being of order' (xxii; trans. mod.). To anticipate
our argument, and so provide a bridge into Heidegger, we might reasonably
ask: how does one know that 'il y a de l'ordre'? And for that matter, how
does one conceive of an order in which the subject would itself be given, as
opposed to being that which gives (the) order?
Foucault and Heidegger
To examine what binds together Foucault's understanding of
constitution, order and the subject, I propose to compare Part I of The Order
of Things with a section from Heidegger's What Is a Thing?, though references
will be to the version which appears under the title of 'Modem Science,
Metaphysics, and Mathematics' in the Basic WritingsP Generally speaking,
t3 What Is a Thing?, trans. by W.B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1967). The book is the text of a lecture course from 1935-1936 which was not
published until 1962; Basic Writings. ed. by D. Farrell Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1978), pp.247-282. I use this version because the Greek is in modem script. Apart from
minor changes in the translation there are also five passages from the original which have been
omitted. All five are concerned with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and in fact the whole
purpose of the section (entitled 'The Modem Mathematical Science of Nature and the Origin
of a Critique of Pure Reason' in the book) is to show 'precisely that formation of modem
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Heidegger furnishes a peculiar admixture of methodological and conceptual
concerns the pertinence of which to Foucault's own practices has been
insufficiently appreciated. What Is a Thing? in particular dwells in exemplary
fashion on a certain way of 'taking' the objects and practices upon which
attention is brought to bear, a concern shared by Foucaultian archaeology,
which is preeminently concerned with both the task of understanding how it
is that we apprehend the most apparently fundamental things and the nature of
that epistemological order which lifts such objects up to be known.
At an earlier stage of Foucault's intellectual career the influence of
Heidegger remains unambivalent It is well known that Foucault's interest in
existential analysis or phenomenological psychiatry passed by way of Ludwig
Binswanger, for the translation of whose Traum und Existenz Foucault penned
an introduction as indebted to Heideggerian Daseinanalyse as the Binswanger
text was itself." Indeed, even in a later interview Foucault is still content
simply to say that he was 'a Heideggerian' .IS The adjective requires some
comment, however, for while it has been suggested that Foucault was in
general reticent to reveal his dominant intellectual influences, in fact I am not
sure this is the problem." One often finds Foucault acknowledging the
metaphysical thought in whose train something like the Critique of Pure Reason could and had
to arise' (p.96).
14 Foucault, 'Introduction' to Ludwig Binswanger, Le R~e etl' existence, trans. by Jacques
Verdeaux (Paris: Deselee de Brouwer, 1954), pp.9-128.
IS Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori, trans. by
R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), p.72. The title of
this collection is a misnomer: on Marxism would be more appropriate, if still inadequate.
16 Richard Wolin, 'Foucault's Aesthetic Decisionism', Telos, 67 (Spring 1986), 71-86
(p.72).
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influence of figures such as Sade, Bataille, Artaud, Roussel, Sollers and,
especially, Canguilhem, Bachelard, Nietzsche and Deleuze. The problem
relates, rather, to the lack of expatiation in Foucault's major texts on the detail
of influence, since acknowledgements usually take the form of a simple roll-
call of proper names. This economy with influences reaches its apogee in the
first volume on the history of sexuality where Foucault dispenses almost
entirely with bibliographical details. As one might half expect, then, Foucault
provides little assistance on the question of any supposed Heideggerian
influence on The Order of Things. That the text bears the mark of Nietzsche
is acknowledged." However, nowhere does he refer to a Heideggerian
connection. When he comments on his general debt to Heidegger, calling him
'the essential philosopher', we are treated to a morsel of information ('I do not
know Heidegger well enough: I hardly know Being and Time nor what has
been published recently. My knowledge of Nietzsche certainly is better than
my knowledge of Heidegger') and proper names are left to do the rest."
Critical opinion of The Order of Things has generally divined the heavy
17 See, for example, Michel Foucault, 'Deuxieme entretien avec Michel Foucault: sur les
facons d'ecrire l'histoire', with Raymond Bellour in Let/res francaises, IS June 1967.
18 In Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-
1984, ed. by Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp.242-254 (p.2S0; trans.
mod.). This is a reprint of what has become known as the 'Final Interview', trans. by Thomas
Levin and Isabelle Lorenz in Raritan (Summer, 1985), p.8 (tirst publ. in Les Nouvelles (June
28, 1984». The passage in which he discusses the influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger is
ambiguous. For example: 'My entire philosophical development was determined by my
reading of Heidegger, I nevertheless recognize that Nietzsche carried the day [I 'a emportlJ'·
Similarly, I take it that Foucault's statement that he had tried to read Nietzsche in the tifties
but 'Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me - whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a
philosophical shock!' means not that he in fact read Nietzsche tirst (which would contradict
the dates he furnishes), but that his tirst encounter with Nietzsche had taken place in ignorance
of the specitic texts Heidegger devoted to the interpretation of Nietzsche. Which complicates
his rotund 'I am simply Nietzsehean'.
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imprint of structuralism and the no less weighty rejection of a subject-centred
tradition stretching from Kant through to phenomenology." Gerard Lebrun
argues that the book is inspired by an ardent refusal of Husserl and the
interpretation of the latter propounded by Merleau-Ponty, whose lectures at the
Ecole nonnale between 1947 and 1949 Foucault had, according to Eribon,
followed assiduously." Lebrun is emphatic, though, that the book owes
nothing to Heidegger. Now despite Lebrun, I follow those critics who take it
as read that Heidegger was important for Foucault. Jiirgen Habennas sees an
affinity between Foucault's archaeology and Heidegger's critique of
metaphysics." Alan Megill opines on the issue of Foucault's
Heideggerianism in general that it seems 'almost wilfully concealed', adding
that commentators have maintained 'an equally deafening silence', broken only
by Dreyfus and Rabinow (Megill, p.185).22
I have found no reference either by critics or by Foucault himself to
What Is a Thing? Dreyfus, Megill himself (Megill, p.230) and then During
(During, p.l02) have pointed to the Heidegger essay 'The Age of the World
19 Merleau-Ponty gives credence to the existence of such a tradition, referring to the
phenomenological conception as a new definition of the Kantian a priori. Maurice MerJeau-
Ponty, Phenomenotogie de la perception (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1945), p.255.
20 Lebrun, 'Notes on Phenomenology in The Order of Things', in Michel Foucault:
Philosopher, trans. by Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp.20-
37. Lebrun states that the book was not viewed as the beginnings of a new method but as an
act of aggression against phenomenology (p.20). But the two things are hardly mutually
exclusive; Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), p.49.
21 The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. by Frederick
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p.266.
22 Cf. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), p.38.
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Picture' as an important source for Foucault, and with good reason."
However, as During observes, 'The Age of the World Picture' is but one
formulation of a theme which occupied Heidegger repeatedly - both in a series
of lectures on Nietzsche in the late thirties and in subsequent work. Indeed,
in order to avoid postulating The Order of Things as the fruit of just one prior
text, the question of a precise source-text necessarily remains open.
Nevertheless, the decision to work with What Is a Thing? in preference to 'The
Age' imposes itself because the latter essay from 1938 (published in 1950)
does not dwell on the detail of the 'revolution' in thought, except, that is, for
its analysis of Descartes' contribution, which is already to be found in the
earlier/later piece. What Is a Thing? also offers a more extended contribution
to Heidegger's ongoing reflection on Kant that began in Being and Time and
continued in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.'l4 And it is important not
to lose sight of the Kantian context in which Heidegger's thought is embedded.
Heidegger and the mathematical
Before turning to Heidegger, and certainly before reaching Kant, we
need first of all to state something quite unequivocally. When Heidegger
posits in What Is a Thing? the existence of a veritable revolution in thought
which took place in European natural science during the sixteenth and
23 In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp.115-154. Bizarrely, especially given the title of the
article, Dreyfus claims that 'Foucault is not interested in how things show up but exclusively
in people's actions' (Hubert Dreyfus, 'On the Ordering of Things', in Michel Foucault:
Philosopher, pp.80-95 [p.S1)).
24 The point is Heidegger's. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
trans. by Richard Taft, 4th edn enlarged (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p.xix.
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seventeenth centuries (which precisely looms large in The Order of Things),
he thereby follows a well-trodden path. Likewise, it should be clear that the
explanation Heidegger adumbrates to account for the revolution - viz, that it
was due to the mathematization of nature - itself belongs to a certain tradition,
one which includes Duhem, Cassirer, Koyre, Husser! and, of course, Kant
before them.25 In that same tradition, which finds its powerful modern
expression in phenomenology, we find certain accompanying themes that will
be of importance to us in the context of our discussion of Foucault. These
themes include: the place of mathematics, the enabling power of abstract
thought (and the role of construction), the concomitant relegation of
experience, the power of the human mind (often expressed in the form of
outright Platonic idealism). For its part, The Order of Things may be regarded
as an attempt to follow this traditional path only so far, as a 'yes' to the first
three and a refusal of the last. Without denying Foucault's challenge to that
tradition (these pages represent a mini defence of The Order of Things on the
subject), our attention will be brought to bear more on the power of that
~ Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena: an Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from
Plato 10 Galileo, trans. by Edmund Doland and Chaninah Maschler (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1969); originally 'UlZEIN TA ~AINOMENA: Essai sur la notion de theorie
physique de Platon AGalilee', Annates de philosophie chrttienne 79/156 (ser. 4, vi) (1908),
113-138,277-302,352-357,482-514,576-592; Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos
in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. by Mario Domandi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963);
originally Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927); Alexandre
Koyre, Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1968); Edmund Husserl, The Crisis. I am grateful to Julian Jimenez Heffernan for the
above suggestions. Foucault mentions Duhem fleetingly in his 'Introduction' to Canguilhem's
On the Normal and the Pathological, trans. by Carolyn R. Fawcett (Dordecht D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1978), pp.ix-xx, wrote a review of Koyre's La Revolution astronomique:
Copernic, Kepler, Borelli for La Nouvelle Revue Francoise, 108 (December 1961), 1123-1124,
and covered with praise the French translation of a Cassirer text ('Un article de Michel
Foucault dans la "Quinzaine" en 1966: Ernst Cassirer, La Phitosophie des Lumieres", La
Quinzaine litteraire, 421, 16-31 July 1984, 23·24; rust published as 'Une Histoire restee
muette', La Quinzaine Iittlraire, 8, 1 July 1966).
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tradition's allure. But we shall come to Foucault in good time. The
immediate task is to dwell on the detail of Heidegger's expose. It will take us
close to what is at stake in Foucault's practice of archaeology.
For Heidegger, the fundamental characteristic of modem science, what
he calls 'the manner of working with the things and the metaphysical
projection of the thingness of the things', lies in its mathematical quality. The
mathematical is not to be understood here as deriving from mathematics,
'because mathematics itself is only a particular formation of the mathematical'
(p.249). (This reversal of a causality that one would otherwise expect is a
tactic that will become germane to The Order of Things.) The word
mathematical, Heidegger explains, stems from the Greek expression ta
mathemata, which means both what can be learned and what can be taught.
Manthanein means to learn. whereas mathesis is the teaching. in the dual sense
of both studying and learning. and then the doctrine taught. For Heidegger,
learning is a certain kind of taking:
The mathemata [what is learnable] are the things insofar as we take
cognizance of them as what we already know them to be in advance, the
body as the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal,
the thingness of the thing, and so on. This genuine learning is therefore an
extremely peculiar taking, a taking where he who takes only takes what he
basically already has. (p.2S1)
The mathematical. then. as the taking of what one already knows. This allows
Heidegger to argue. phenomenologist that he is. that what we know of things
does not simply emerge from things, but inheres in the positing. He can thus
argue that number is something mathematical not because of the simple
objective existence of. say, three chairs. but only because we already know
'three', and thereby expressly recognize 'something which, in some way, we
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already have' (p.252).26
The mathematical is the evident aspect of things according to which we
experience them as things at all. Heidegger recounts how Plato put over the
entrance to his Academy the words: Ageometretos medeis eisito! 'Let no one
who has not grasped the mathematical enter here!'." This is not designed to
suggest that one study only geometry (which we know was the Greek form of
mathematics par excellence); it signals that, in the eyes of Plato, 'the
fundamental condition for the proper possibility of knowing is the knowledge
of the fundamental presuppositions of all knowledge and the position we take
based on such knowledge' (p.254). Of course, the ramifications of discerning
Heidegger's own sentiments here, that is, the possibility that Heidegger is
articulating his own belief vis-a-vis modem learning, are considerable. For
this would mean that Heidegger locates among the ancients a principle that
apparently belongs to later, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thought, thereby
blurring the distinction between epochs and throwing into doubt the
revolutionariness of the 'revolution'. His next step, though, is to argue that the
26 For many, mathematics would not be a taking of what one already has at all, but a
process of transformation producing new concepts and patterns of thought, which in turn
produce new problems. See the entry in The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, ed. by
Alan Bullock, Oliver Stallybrass and Stephen Trombley, 2nd edn (London: Fontana Press,
1988), pp.509-510. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, theories of mathematics
generally divided into three camps: Logicism, Formalism, Intuitionism. Since then, the first
two have gained the ascendancy. See The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.23, pp.595-633
and Stephen F. Barker, Philosophy ofMathematics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-HalI,lnc.,
1964). Morris Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture (London: Penguin Books, repro 1990),
pp.20-29, describes mathematics in numerous ways: postulational, creative, a practical tool, the
rational organization of natural phenomena. product of curiosity, the search for beauty, a
symbolic language, beacon light to the sciences.
21 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari adapt this expression apropos of the International
Psycho-Analytic Association: 'Let no one enter here who does not believe in Oedipus'. Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R.
Lane (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), p.45.
29
basis of modem thought and knowledge may be said to be essentially
mathematical for a slightly different reason, namely, because the natural world
itself, not just learning, is given in advance. How is this so?
In the Aristotelian conception, the motion of bodies is kath' auta,
according to them, themselves. That is to say, a body moves according to its
nature, by virtue of qualities or forces which have their basis in the body itself.
'This basis is arche, which has a double meaning: that from which something
emerges, and that which governs over what emerges in this way' (p.260). So,
what is the difference introduced by Newton? Heidegger's argument runs as
follows, starting from an abridged form of Newton's first principle, his First
Law of Motion: 'Every body left to itself moves uniformity in a straight line.'
Newton's axiom begins with corpus omne ('every body'), underlining that the
universe is no longer, as in Aristotle, divided between the earthly and the
celestial realms, and that all natural bodies are essentially of the same kind.
Accordingly, motions are now not determined by a body's nature, but by that
fundamental universal law of motion itself. Motion is henceforth seen as a
change of relative position, as distances between places. 'Therefore the
determination of motion develops into one regarding distances, stretches of the
measurable, of the so and so large.' The difference between natural and
against nature (the bia, violence) is similarly eliminated, since violence is now
only a measure of the change of motion and no longer special in kind. As a
consequence the concept of nature in general changes:
Nature is no longer the inner principle out of which the motion of the body
follows: rather. nature is the mode of the variety of the changing relative
positions of bodies. the manner in which they are present in space and time.
which themselves are domains of possible positional orders and
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determinations of order and have no special traits anywhere. (p.264)
This change in the concept of nature corresponds closely, as we shall see, to
the passage in Foucault from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme.
Heidegger then moves on to deal with the paradox that in speaking of
the body which is left to itself, modem science comes up against the fact that
there is no such body. Modem science, which is supposed to be based on
experience, is thus left with a law that speaks of a thing that does not exist, a
law demanding 'a fundamental representation of things which contradict the
ordinary'. And here is where Heidegger turns to the mathematical. For the
mathematical, it transpires, is based precisely on 'the application of a
determination of the thing which is not experientially derived from the thing
and yet lies at the base of every determination of the things, making them
possible and making room for them' (p.265). In this respect, Galileo's
(proverbial?) experiment with falling bodies at the leaning tower of Pisa is
instructive." For Galileo maintained that all bodies fall equally fast, and that
any differences in the time of fall are due to air resistance, not to different
inner natures of the bodies. So, despite the fact that bodies of different
weights did not take precisely the same time to fall, and therefore really
against the evidence of experience, Galileo upheld his proposition, thereby
antagonizing perplexed witnesses even more. Galileo and his opponents saw
the same 'fact' but made this same happening visible to themselves in different
ways. Where did Galileo see this fact? The following proposition, which
28 In fact Koyre is adamant that Galileo never performed and certainly never mentioned
any such experiment. 'Galileo's Treatise De Motu Gravium: the Use and Abuse ofImaginary
Experiment', in Metaphysics and Measurement, pp.44-88 (first publ. in Revue d'histoire des
sciences, 13 (1960), 197-245).
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Heidegger says may be considered the antecedent of Newton's First Law, is
crucial for Heidegger. Galileo says in his Discorsi (1638): Mobile ... mente
concipio omni secluso impedimenta. "'I think in my mind of something
moveable that is left entirely to itself.''':
This 'to think in the mind' is that giving oneself a cognition about a
determination of things. It is a procedure of going ahead in advance, which
Plato once characterized regarding mathesis in the following way: analabon
autos ex autou tin epistimln (Meno 85d), 'bringing up and taking up -
above and beyond the other - taking the knowledge itself from out of
himself.' (p.267)
This is what Heidegger understands by the essence of the mathematical, though
of course he is here giving expression to an old idea in philosophy, according
to which one cannot ask what something is unless in a sense one already
knoWS.29
The mathematical is a project of thingness which 'skips over the
things' . Barton and Deutsch provide a footnote, quoting from Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason, on the meaning of the word project IEntwurj]:
'When Galileo experimented with balls whose weight he himself had already
predetermined, when Torrecelli caused the air to carry a weight which he
had calculated beforehand [...J they learned that reason only gains insight
into what it produces itself according to its own projects [was sie selbst nach
ihrem Bntwwfe hervorbringt); that it must go before with principles of
judgment according to constant laws, and constrain nature to reply to its
questions, not content merely to follow her leading strings' (B XIII). (What
Is, pp.88-89)
In fact, Heidegger is very close to Kant at this juncture, who also touches on
the 'revolution'. And this moment, and the sense of projection here outlined,
will be crucial for Foucault. In this projection things are in a sense evaluated
beforehand. 'Such evaluation and taking-for is called in Greek axioo. The
29 See Paul Grice, 'Postwar Oxford Philosophy', in Studies ill the Way of Words
(Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1989). Grice calls this kind of thought
'conceptual analysis'.
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anticipating determinations and assertions in the project are axiomata:'
Whence Newton's section title Axiomata, sive leges motus (The Axioms or
Laws of Motion)." As axiomatic, the mathematical project anticipates the
structure of every thing and its relation to every other thing. Nature is now the
realm of the uniform space-time context of motion. And 'mathematics' in the
narrow sense is born because the project establishing a uniformity of all bodies
also makes possible and requires a universal uniform measure as an essential
determinant of things, that is, numerical measurement. Heidegger restates the
'reversal' from ancient to modem natural science: 'The new form of modern
science did not arise because mathematics became an essential determinant.
Rather, that mathematics, and a particular kind of mathematics, could come
into play is a consequence of the mathematical project' (p.269).
Heidegger says that the mathematical project is only truly grasped,
though, as a deeper 'execution and consequence of a mode of historical
Dasein, of the fundamental position taken toward Being and toward the way
in which beings are manifest as such, i.e., toward truth' (p.271). Here is
where Heidegger's signature impresses itself on the debate and where we
perceive a seemingly fundamental difference between his project and the later
one of Foucault, unless, of course, one thought that the word episteme was a
differently inflected variant of Dasein. The new mode of historical Dasein in
question entails a detachment from revelation as the first source of truth and
30 Hussett rehearses the same argument on Galilean physics: 'Things "seen" are always
more than what we "really and actually" see of them. Seeing, perceiving, is essentially having-
something-itself [Selbslhaben)and at the same time having-something-in-advance [Vor-haben),
meaning-something-in-advance [Vor-meinen].' His unease, though, is that this method comes
to usurp the place of true being. that the life-world assumes a (fallacious) geometrical aspect
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis. p.S1.
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a 'rejection' (though given the capacity of Descartes and of the Enlightenment
to juggle with both science and God, perhaps it would be better to say
'questioning') of tradition, of the tradition of the Church, as the authoritative
means of knowledge." (Heidegger suggests these rejections are negative
consequences of the mathematical project, not vice versa.) If, in the tradition
of divinatio, it was the case that natural knowledge did not have its own
grounds for itself, and less still from out of itself, the mathematical project, on
the other hand, gives itself just such a 'self-grounding'. As a result, 'he who
dared to project the mathematical project put himself as the projector of this
project upon a base which is first projected only in the project.' For
Heidegger, there is not only a liberation in the mathematical project, but also
a new experience and formation of freedom itself, that is, 'a binding with
obligations which are self-imposed'. Foucault, in contrast, will highlight the
other side of the project, according to which these obligations do not come
simply from the self, but are demanded by the mathematical itself.
Foucault and matheau
Now at this juncture, where Heidegger has just determined to show
how modem natural science, modem mathematics, and modem metaphysics
all sprang from the same root of the mathematical in the wider sense, we turn
to Foucault. There are strong parallels with his account of the same
'revolution' (always understood that Foucault's reach will take him beyond
31 Kenneth Clarle speaks of mathematics becoming 'the religion of the finest minds of the
time'. Civilisation: A Personal View (London: BBC & John Murray, 1969), p.208.
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natural science), though the revolution becomes, in Foucault's idiom, the
supersession of the Renaissance episteme by the Classical configuration from
which sprang three disciplines - natural history, the analysis of wealth, and
general grammar - sharing a common root. Across the next three sections, I
shall highlight three aspects of the Foucaultian project, the first two of which
are Heideggerian elements, the third being the attempted step beyond
Heidegger. They are: 1. The reversal of an expected causality; 2. The question
as to what determines the basic movement of knowledge; 3. A radicalization
of the Heideggerian position. At stake in all three, as we shall see, are the
fortunes of the subject, that awkward creature with which Foucault will
maintain a turbulent relationship throughout the next decade. The following
sections will show how this subject comes to be constituted and the role played
in that constitution by a would-be axiomatic thought.
In order to demonstrate Foucault's treatment of the passage from the
Renaissance to the Classical episteme, we may take one exemplary encounter,
that of a non-meeting of naturalists, Ulisse Aldrovandi, a Renaissance naturalist
and physician from Bologna and Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, a
French eighteenth-century naturalist. Buffon, Foucault explains, was baffled
at how a naturalist like Aldrovandi could mix so indiscriminately in his study
of creatures such apparently diverse aspects of the object of his attention. In
Aldrovandi's Historia serpentum et draconum, the chapter 'Of the Serpent in
General' proposes to deal with, among other things: meanings of the word
serpent, anatomy, death and wounds caused by the serpent, monsters, gods to
which it is dedicated, miracles, historical facts, dreams, use in food. The
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question, then, is how could this pot pourri possibly be considered scientific
knowledge? To answer this question, let us reconstruct Foucault's argument
apropos of the Renaissance episteme.
In the second chapter of The Order of Things, 'The Prose of the
World', Foucault concentrates on a Renaissance episteme predicated on the
reign of resemblance. He elects to comment on four of the essential figures
by which things might resemble one another. Convenientia designates the
proximity of one thing to another, whereby influences, passions and properties
are communicated. Aemulatio is a sort of 'convenience', but freed from the
law of place, such that things imitate each other across the universe. Analogy
superposes the former two, with the power to offer up an infinite number of
relationships (of living creatures to the world they inhabit, of blemishes on the
skin to the body which they mark). Finally, there is the play of sympathies.
Nothing in this is predetermined. Sympathy ranges freely and instantaneously
across the greatest spaces, exciting the movement of things in the world and
drawing the most distant together, attracting what is heavy to the heaviness of
the earth, making 'the great yellow disk of the sunflower tum to follow the
curving path of the sun' (p.23). To prevent sympathy from collapsing things
into a tyrannical 'featureless form of the Same', it is balanced by antipathy,
which maintains every species 'within its impenetrable difference and its
propensity to continue being what it is' (p.24), and thereby prevents their
assimilation. The sympathy-antipathy couple gives rise to all other forms of
resemblance, it is the sovereign of them all.
In order to rein in what appears to be an infinitely indeterminate play,
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Foucault explains that the circle of resemblances would remain open and
entirely elusive were it not for some mark which would betray the trace of
kinship. 'Would we ever know that there is a relationship of twinship or
rivalry between a man and his planet. if there were no sign upon his body or
among the wrinkles on his face that he is an emulator of Mars or akin to
Saturn?' (p.26). There must, then, be a visible mark of invisible analogies.
No resemblance without a signature. From which it follows that knowledge
is based on the unearthing and the decipherment of these signatures. the world
to be known forming a great open surface composed of images and words, a
crossing of sight and language.
The 'indefinite zigzag' of resemblances produces a Renaissance
knowledge which is at once plethoric and absolutely impoverished. For one
resemblance leads to another which leads to another which... But here is
where the microcosm comes into its own. As a category of thought. it
guarantees that each thing will find its mirror in the higher macrocosm (and
that the order of the highest spheres will be reflected on earth). As a general
configuration of nature, it establishes real limits to that otherwise indefatigable
to-and-fro of similitudes and allows nature to close in upon itself somewhat.
One does not really need to be an archaeologist. though, to see that in this
theological order the relations of macrocosm and microcosm appear as a mere
'surface effect', necessary to curtail the endless spiral of signs and similitudes.
It is now possible to appreciate why Renaissance thought was able to
embrace both magic and erudition in the same movement. This is not
attributable to illogic but to the fact that the underlying figures of resemblance
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called forth quite logically the two hermeneutics of divinatio and eruditio. Be
they marks of nature or graphisms of the Ancients, 'the truth of all these marks
- whether they are woven into nature itself or whether they exist on
parchments and in libraries - is everywhere the same: coeval with the
institution of God' (p.34).32 Deposited in the world by God, language is
fundamentally written, there to be read and deciphered." Inscribed in things
themselves, it calls forth a knowledge which makes no distinction between
what one sees and what one reads in a nature which is a 'single, unbroken
surface in which observation and language intersect to infinity'. And to return
to the non-meeting of naturalists, it is precisely this entrecroisement which is
at work in Aldrovandi. We can now appreciate why, when Buffon says of
Aldrovandi's work: "'There is no description here, only legend"', Foucault
simply says, yes indeed, 'for Aldrovandi and his contemporaries, it was all
legenda - things to be read' (p.39).34 This is because nature is an
uninterrupted tissue of words and marks, discourse and forms. Writing about
a serpent, then, involves collecting together in a single form of knowledge all
that has been seen and heard on the one hand, all that has been recounted by
tradition on the other.
Foucault draws from this comparison the following conclusion, which
32 Not only the Christian God. Compare the Jewish tradition of the Cabbala. Jorge Luis
Borges, 'The Kabbalah', appendix to Jaime AJazraki, Jorge Luis Borges (Madrid: Taurus,
1976), pp.S4-61.
33 Jacques Derrida's chapter, 'The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing', Of
Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1976), pp.6-26, examines the same phenomenon but not to proclaim epochal relativism.
:u He returns to 'legend' in Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, trans. and ed. by James
Harkness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.22.
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simultaneously eschews and embraces evaluation, and as such is the
quintessence of the archaeological project:
Aldrovandi was neither a better nor a worse observer than Buffon; he was
neither more credulous than he, nor less attached to the faithfulness of the
observing eye or to the rationality of things. His gaze was simply not linked
to things by the same system, nor the same arrangement of the episteme.
For Aldrovandi was meticulously contemplating a nature which was, from
top to bottom, written. (p.40)35
Quite simply, the two belong to different systems, to different epistemological
arrangements. But the question remains as to how this is so. What has
supervened between Aldrovandi and Buffon? Let us follow Foucault's version
of the shift from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme. We will see that
the idea of mathesis plays an important part in the new configuration, though
Foucault pushes hard at Heidegger's understanding of it with a view to
reinflecting that phrase of Heidegger's, according to which 'he who dared to
project the mathematical project put himself as the projector of this project
upon a base which is first projected only in the project'. In the process,
Foucault questions both the (for him) inflated place assigned to the subject and
Heidegger's belief that there is a new experience and formation of freedom in
the mathematical project.
Foucault argues that whereas since stoicism the system of signs in the
West had been essentially ternary (signifier, signified and 'conjuncture'), from
the beginning of the seventeenth century this arrangement becomes binary.
Instead of the spiral of entrecroisement, a little more order makes itself felt:
35 This refusal of progress places Foucault squarely in the tradition of thinkers like
Canguilhem, for whom that which hangs over the conception of the 'progress of the human
mind' is the 'mirage of a defmitive state of learning (savoir)'. Quoted in Dominique Lecourt,
Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault (London: New Left Books,
1975), p.171.
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Things and words were to be separated from one another. The eye was
thenceforth destined to see and only to see, the ear to hear and only to hear.
Discourse was still to have the task of speaking that which is, but it was no
longer to be anything more than what it said. (p.43)
'New arrangement', 'immense reorganisation of culture'. What does Foucault
say about the onset of modem knowledge (again, it is not exclusively a matter
of science)? He says that Descartes' analysis is premissed on identity and
difference. In the analysis the act of comparison is universalized and has two
forms: that of measurement and that of order. Measurement of sizes or
multiplicities both presuppose that one is able to analyse such things according
to a common unit. Comparison by measurement thus comes down to the
arithmetical relations of equality and inequality. The comparison of order is
established without reference to an external unit. One cannot know the order
of things in their isolated nature, but only by first discovering the simplest
entity and then working up gradually to the most complex. One thereby
establishes a series where the first, and simplest, term is a 'nature that we may
intuit independently of any other nature' (p.53) and where the other terms are
established according to increasing degrees of difference. Now arithmetical
measurements can always be ordered in a series and herein is the advance of
this method, since it permits every measurement to be brought into a series
which makes differences appear as degrees of complexity. Yet, because this
order is established only on the basis of the linking process in knowledge, as
a result 'the absolute character we recognize in what is simple concerns not the
being of things but rather the manner in which they can be known' (p.54).
A new eplsteme thus takes shape, one in which the activity of the mind
consists in discerning identities and differences. And by virtue of the place of
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discernment history and science are separated out. On the one hand there is
erudition, the reading and weighing up of scholarly opinions; on the other
stand those assured judgements which alone constitute science. This completes
the new arrangement.
The written word ceases to be included among the signs and forms of truth;
language is no longer one of the figurations of the world. or a signature
stamped upon things since the beginning of time. The manifestation and
sign of truth are to be found in evident and distinct perception. It is the task
of words to translate that truth if they can; but they no longer have the right
to be considered a mark of it. Language has withdrawn from the midst of
beings themselves and has entered a period of transparency and neutrality.
(p.56; trans. mod.)
This phenomenon, he says, is more general than the singular fortunes of
Cartesianism. Despite the fact that for the last six pages Foucault has been
summarizing a particular text by Descartes (Regulae ad directionem ingenii,
1701) and not Cartesianism or seventeenth-century culture in general, it is
important to grasp that this thing is not reducible to Descartes.
Foucault then repeats the move made by Heidegger. Historians of
ideas, he says, bandy around incantatory expressions like 'Cartesian influence'
or 'Newtonian model' and in fact simply confuse the rise of mechanistic
thought and the efforts at a mathematization of the empirical with the more
fundamental relationship which Classical knowledge enjoyed with mathesis,
understood as a universal science of measurement and order. Now what is at
stake in this relationship?
Since, we recall. the problems of measurement can always be reduced
to those of order, this relation of knowledge to mathesis presents itself as the
possibility of establishing an ordered succession between things. For that
reason, analysis quickly assumes the value of universal method. And along
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with the search for a mathesis there appear a number of new empirical
domains which. though all dependent on Analysis in general. have as their
particular instrument not the algebraic method but the system of signs. The
idea here is that in the seventeenth century the domain of the sign is
distributed entirely. according to Foucault. between the certain and the
probable. (That breathing designates life is certain, while pallor is only
probably a sign of pregnancy.) Which means that there can no longer be an
unknown sign or a mute mark, for there is only ever a sign from the moment
one knows of the possibility of a relation of substitution between two already
known elements. 'The sign does not wait in silence for the coming of
someone capable of recognizing it: it can be constituted only by an act of
knowing.'
This. of course. marks the break with divinatio. The latter presupposed
signs which were anterior to it. signs plump with knowledge which God had
previously distributed across the face of the earth. But now the sign begins to
signify within, rather than point to, knowledge itself, and it is from that same
knowledge that it will borrow its certainty or probability." In order to
function. this sign must at once be part of what it signifies and distinct from
it. For it to be a sign at all it must be given to knowledge at the same time
as that which it signifies. Condillac remarks that for a child a sound would
never become a verbal sign of a thing unless the child had heard it at least
once before while perceiving the object. But for one element of a perception
36 Denida would say that the tradition and trajectory of the cipher continue. I shall return
later to this differance between the theoretical account a culture gives of itself and the
functioning of its practice.
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to become the sign of it, it must be distinguished qua element from the overall
impression with which it is linked. The constitution of the sign is thus
inseparable from analysis.
The tradition of the mathematical
At this point, it is appropriate to interrupt the discussion of Foucault in
order to remark upon the existence of a tradition of mathematics and mathesis
which predates the Classical era. Before turning, then, to comment on the
place and role of the subject in Foucault's scheme, which will be the burden
of the next section, brief consideration of this tradition will help to
contextualize the important relationship between experience and the a priori.
Ernst Cassirer's The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance
Philosophy preempts Foucault's attempt to drive a wedge between the
Renaissance and the Classical epistemes. Although in one sense Cassirer
perpetuates the desire to see a fundamental break: between the two world
views, he nevertheless pushes the break: back in time by making Nicholas
Cusanus, a scholar from the mid-fifteenth century. 'the first modem thinker'.
Cassirer argues that although Cusanus does not overtly criticize the teachings
of Nee-platonic, Christian medieval learning, according to which the cosmos
is a fundamentally and strictly graduated order in which the infinite heavens
lie over the finite world of man and matter, Cusanus does refrain from positing
the opposition dogmatically. For Cusanus the opposition must, rather, be
conceived of through the conditions of human knowledge. 'This position
towards the problem of knowledge makes of Cusanus the first modem thinker.
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His first step consists in asking not about God, but about the possibility of
knowledge about God' (p.10). Cassirer's account of Cusanus' critique of
Aristotelian scholasticism repays attention, albeit here in a much bastardized
form.
Cusanus holds that all knowledge presupposes comparison, which in
turn presupposes measurement. Since, and in accordance with the classical
position, the absolute object (God) must by definition lie beyond the possibility
of measurement, and thus of knowledge, 'rational' theology, that is, Scholastic
theology, is of little use. Cusanus replaces this logical theology with a
mystical theology, albeit a mysticism informed by knowledge since, for him,
no-one should have blind faith in something about which he has absolutely no
knowledge. This mystical theology Cusanus incorporates under the umbrella
of his principle of docta ignorantia, 'knowing ignorance'. Furthermore, if the
distance between the sensible world and God is infinite, as Scholasticism
suggests, then for Cusanus all finite differences are annihilated, every element,
every natural being is equally distant from and equally near to that origin.
Since the truly perfect cannot be encountered as such, the earth cannot be
determined with absolute mathematical precision. And since the earth shares
this fate with all other existents, it may no longer, as was the case in the
Scholastic tradition, be considered base and detestable. This is part of the
attempt by Cusanus to give new value to humanitas. We shall return to this
shortly."
37 See the wonderful pages on Cusanus' arguments concerning the reciprocal worth of God
and man, the interdependence of the universal and the particular (pp.28-33, 36-37); on
redemption (p.40); on the power of the human intellect and the emergence of something like
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If Cusanus accords maximum value to measurement and, above all,
proportion (Cassirer argues that the concern with proportion is at the same
time a speculative-philosophical, a technical-mathematical and an artistic
concern, and that this convergence makes the problem of form central to the
Renaissance), it is, not surprisingly, mathematics which is to provide the means
by which we raise ourselves above the sphere of mystical feeling into
intellectual vision. Again, since the spiritual remains unattainable in itself, we
can only hope to approximate it by means of a sense-image or symbol. But,
for Cusanus, we may at least demand that the symbol contain nothing unclear.
'This is the novelty: he requires of the symbols in which the divine becomes
graspable by us not only sensible fullness and force but also intellectual
precision and certainty. With that, the character of the relationship between
the world and God, between the finite and the infinite, undergoes a complete
transformation' (p.53). As a result, if Cusanus uses the metaphor now familiar
to us from Foucault of nature as God's book, he demands by the same token
that it be investigated and deciphered rigorously and systematically.
While at one level this example obviously confirms Foucault's point
about divinatio and eruditio, especially in what relates to tradition and to the
Book, it also suggests the stirrings of scientia long before the advent of the
Classical episteme. While one does not need to proclaim the arrival of a
science unencumbered either by scriptural or doxographical tradition (on those
grounds the claim would be difficult to maintain even, and especially, for
Descartes), the evidence adduced by Cassirer, Koyre and Duhem does suggest
a subject (PAl).
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that the spirit of scientia was already at work in Cusanus, Leonardo, Galileo
and Kepler (and perhaps the absence of French names is significant here).
Koyre, for one, insists on the sheer disdain felt by Leonardo, and especially by
Galileo, for the lay, unscientific opinions expressed by the uninitiated. For
both thinkers, nature must be understood logically and in this respect
mathematics furnishes an unequivocal standard of logic over and against the
arbitrariness and uncertainty of opinions. IfGalileo continues to adhere to the
tradition of revelation, it is principally to the tradition of works rather than
words, 'for the word is something of the past and of tradition, whereas the
work, as something at hand and enduring, stands before us, immediate and
present, ready to be questioned' (Koyre, p.55).
But we risk missing the essential. The expressions 'at hand and
enduring, stands before us, immediate and present' evoke the priority of
experience and experiment." Crucially, however, one should guard against
believing here that scientia emerges from, is the natural product of, unmediated
experience. For this appeal to experience, according to Cassirer, Koyre and
Duhem, is itself mediated by a still older tradition - that of Platonism.
According to Cassirer (and neither Koyre nor Duhem would dissent), Cusanus
and the 'great empiricists'
saw no contradiction between 'apriorism' and 'empiricism'; because what
they seek in experience is necessity - it is reason itself. When Leonardo
refers to experience, it is to discover there the eternal and unchangeable
order of reason. His true object is not experience itself but the rational
principles, the ragioni that are hidden and, so to speak, incorporated in
experience. And he emphatically states that nature is full of 'rational
38 In the Romance languages the words experience and experiment are normally
encapsulated in the same word, deriving from the Latin experiri. The Archaeology, p.16,
mistranslates experience as 'experiment' rather than 'experience'.
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principles' that have not yet been part of experience: la nature e piena
d'irfinite ragioni che non furono mai in isperienza. Galileo follows the
same path. Though he considered himself a champion of experience, he
nevertheless emphasized that the mind can only create true, necessary
knowledge by its own principles (da per se). (p.S8)
Reason is the immanent, unbreakable law governing nature. And only thought,
the work and the imagination of thought, rather than sensation, proves capable
of grasping the eternal and immanent laws of nature. 'The creative power of
the artist, the imagination that creates a "second nature", does not consist in his
inventing the law, in his creating it ex nihilo; it consists in his discovery and
demonstration of the law' (p.163). Creative power and imagination. We are
back with Galileo and the mind's eye. This time Cassirer:
Every experiment, every questioning of experience, presupposes an
intellectual 'sketch' of the thought, a mente concipio, as Galileo calls it,
within which we anticipate a regularity within nature. Then we raise the
'sketch' to certainty by testing it through experience. Objective regularity,
i.e., the permanent, basic measurements that determine and govern all natural
phenomena, are not simply taken from experience; rather, they are placed at
the base of experience as 'hypotheses', to be confirmed or refuted by it. The
whole science of nature, according to Galileo, rests upon this new
relationship between understanding (discorso) and sense, between experience
and thought. (p.164)
Cassirer's expression 'not simply taken from experience' holds out the
possibility of an interaction between the hypothesis and experience which
seems denied by others. Kant was adamant that no a priori should be
contaminated by experience, even if it had necessarily to alight on an empirical
content. He states that the expression 'a priori' is often loosely used to refer
to empirical knowledge which, while not derived from experience as such, is
derived from a universal rule which is itself borrowed from experience. The
example he provides bears (like so many of his examples) on the activity of
building, though here it is more a matter of demolition:
Thus we would say of a man who undermined the foundations of his house,
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that he might have known a priori that it would fall, that is, that he need not
have waited for the experience of its actual falling. But still he could not
know this completely a priori. For he had first to learn through experience
that bodies are heavy, and therefore fall when their supports are withdrawn.
(Kant. Critique, p.43)
Given this misapplication, Kant insists that he will reserve the expression a
priori knowledge, not for knowledge independent of this or that experience,
but for knowledge 'absolutely independent of all experience' (p.43).
It is difficult to see how any knowledge in the domain of natural
science could ever be a priori according to these criteria. Be it rolling balls
down slopes or removing building supports, would not every experimenter
have had to learn something about the phenomena through experience (that
bodies fall, say)? I suspect that Kant's building comparison harbours an
archaeology of its own, a discourse of origins which maintains the
independence of the a priori only by circumscribing experience as something
belonging to the past (for instance learning once upon a time that bodies are
heavy) but which somehow does not impinge on the present scene of intuition.
Thus, in the case of Galileo we can acknowledge that he has already conducted
experiments before and even that he has learnt from these experiences. But
when confronted with a particular instance in which Galileo actually comes to
cast his weights into the diaphanous Pisa air, Kant will want to block out that
past and that experience: at this moment and in this place Galileo knows what
will happen in advance, therefore experience counts for nought. It is telling
that Kant describes the Greek discovery of the mathematical road to science
in the singular (a single revolution, a single thought, a single man, a single
experiment, a single path, a single science), attributing it to a 'revolution
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brought about by the happy thought of a single man, the experiment which he
devised marking out the path upon which the science must enter' (p.19). No
less telling is a footnote from the passage on Galileo and Torrecelli (the
passage, we recall, reproduced by the editors of Heidegger's What Is a
Thing ?): 'I am not, in my choice of examples, tracing the exact course of the
history of the experimental method; we have indeed no very precise knowledge
of its first beginnings' (p.20). Beginnings plural.
For his part, and perhaps the spirit of Kant looms large here, Koyre is
even more of a purist, insisting on the temporal and logical precedence of the
a priori: 'Experience is useless because before any experience we are already
in possession of the knowledge we are seeking for. ,39 Putting it thus rather
undermines Koyre's purpose, for he gives the impression with this phrase that
the effort of thought is no effort at all, that we truly, comfortably, and even
unquestioningly already know what we seek to know. And again, even the
following more forthright invocation of the power of thought sells thought
short precisely, and paradoxically, by lauding its purity: 'it is thought, pure
unadulterated thought, and not experience or sense-perception, as until then,
that gives the basis for the "new science" of Galileo Galilei' (Koyre, p.13).
On the contrary, it would be the very fact that thought was impure and
adulterated, inevitably contaminated by tradition and the doxa, that would
make Galileo's intellectual agonism all the more powerful, would allow scope
for individual creativity and talent within the tradition.
39 'Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century'. in M elaphysics and
Measurement. pp.1-1S (p.l3) (first publ. in The Philosophical Review, 52 (1943). 333-348).
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It is precisely the emergence of humanitas, the rekindling of the
creative powers and capacities of the human being after the slumber of
Scholasticism and Averroism, fruit of the long theological debate over
determination versus freewill, that Cassirer sees as the pivotal factor in the
scientific revolution. The following from Cassirer (apropos of Pico della
Mirandola's In astrologiam libri XII) condenses all that Foucault would find
most objectionable:
the astrological vision of the world was overcome, essentially, neither by
empirical and scientific reasons, nor by new methods of observation and of
mathematical calculation. The decisive blow had fallen before these methods
were completely perfected. The agent of liberation was not the new view of
nature but the new view of the value of humanity. The power of Fortuna
is confronted with the power of Virtus; destiny is confronted with the self-
confident and self-trusting will. What may be really and truly called the
destiny of man does not flow to him from above, from the stars, but rather
arises from the ultimate depths of his innermost self. We ourselves make of
Fortune a goddess and raise her to the heavens; whereas, in truth, destiny is
the daughter of the soul: sors animae filia. (p.l20)
Man - the measure of all things. A variation on Protagoras' claim, Cassirer
finds the topos already at work in Cusanus. As Cassirer puts it: 'Mens and
mensura belong together; whoever has understood the nature of measurement
has also seen the true meaning and depth of the mind' (p.177).
Quite simply, Foucault tellingly recasts Cassirer's narrative and the
measurement trope, invoking experience and experiment while gesturing to a
form of apriorism, drawing attention instead precisely to the tradition of the
individual (and this is also why the target of the book is a tradition of greater
compass than phenomenology). And if he shares with Hannah Arendt a
fundamental mistrust of everything merely given, his interest lies in a different
constitution, though in both cases it will be a question of creation versus
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discovery."
The subjectum and the 'historical a priori'
We are now in a position to remark on a certain absent presence in
Foucault's presentation of the Classical episteme and to divine what is at stake
in this relationship to mathesis. Maria Daraki, giving voice to one of the
prime criticisms levelled at Foucault, describes the work as a 'tour de force
which treats Cartesianism without mentioning the subject; [...] explicating the
Port-Royal Logic and forgetting that it was the first psychological reflection
cognition' (sic). The Order of Things, she continues, is animated by 'a firm
will to remove the subject's right to exist'. It is true that thus far in the
chapter on 'Representing', the word subject has appeared on just three
occasions, though in none of these does it refer to res cogitans. Yet despite
this absence of thinking 'subjects' (the word subjectivity is also completely
absent), these pages are filled with descriptions of acts of cognition, with the
semantics of a certain decisive power of the mind. (,Act of comparison', 'to
consider', 'to analyse', 'intuition', 'the activity of the mind', 'to discern',
'evident and distinct perception', 'the sign [...] is constituted only by an act of
knowing', 'the mind'.) A fact that has not escaped Daraki:
40 'Our new difficulty is that we start from a fundamental distrust of everything merely
given, a distrust of all laws and prescriptions, moral or social, that are deduced from a given,
comprehensive universal whole. This difficulty involves the sources of authority of law and
questions the ultimate goals of political organizations and communities; it forces us not only
to find and devise new laws, but to find and devise their very measure, the yardstick of good
and evil, the principle of their source. For man, in the sense of the nature of man, is no longer
the measure, despite what the new humanists would have us believe. Politically, this means
that before drawing up the new constitution of the body politic, we shall have to create - not
merely discover - a new foundation for human community as such.' Hannah Arendt, Burdens
of Our Time, pp.435-436. I am indebted to Richard King for this passage.
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Cognition displays the mental operations of the subject Foucault refuses to
name. Neither Classical science nor contemporary science will wrest from
him one word on the subject. The approach which grounds the human
sciences is transformed into an animistic fairy tale. (Daraki, p.91)
The following archaeological moment would seem to support Daraki. Foucault
is arguing that it is the very system of signs in the Classical age which
introduces such things as probability, analysis and combination into thought.
At the level of a history of opinions one would doubtless get stuck in a
discussion of the individual parts played by Hobbes, Berkeley, Leibniz,
Condillac, and the 'Ideologues'. But at the archaeological level, that is to say,
at the level of what made it possible, these new forms - probability, analysis,
combination, etc. - emerge as a 'single network of necessities. And it was this
network that made possible the personalities we call Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume,
or Condillac' (p.63; trans. mod.). Deliberately scandalous, this is an example
of the type of Heideggerian reversal of causality encountered earlier. But it
represents a departure from the Heideggerian path in its radical refusal to dwell
on the merits and powers of individual thinkers. In order to understand how
such a reversal has come about and why the question of subjectivity should
suddenly occupy centre stage in a discussion of mathesis, a return to Heidegger
is demanded, for the final two subsections of that part of What Is a Thing?
which we were following closely form a steely exposition of an argument
whose logic underpins Foucault's own, but upon which Foucault does not
elaborate in his treatment of the Classical episteme.
The penultimate subsection is called 'Descartes: Cogito Sum; "I" as a
special subject'. In it Heidegger rejects the usual image we have of Descartes
as the philosopher who issues in the I-viewpoint of modem times and its
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subjectivism. For Heidegger, Descartes' work appears on the contrary in the
midst of an era in which, for a century, mathematics had been embarking on
a new assault upon reality, seeking to ground itself and also to explicate itself
as the standard of all thought. Whence the two-fold nature of Descartes'
fundamental philosophical position: a reflection on mathematics and on
metaphysics. Heidegger opts to pursue this position in Descartes' Regulae ad
directionem lngenii, the text Foucault follows in The Order of Things.
If Regulae means basic and guiding propositions, ad directionem
ingenii implies, for Heidegger, laying the foundation of the mathematical in
order that it become the measure of the inquiring mind. Heidegger's
discussion is a rich rehearsal of many of the themes we have already touched
on in relation to Foucault (science versus doxa, the importance of method, the
ordering and arrangement of that upon which the mind falls), but we shall
confine ourselves to the essential point. If mathematics, as mathesis
universalis, is to ground and form the whole of knowledge, then it requires the
formulation of special axioms, which must be 'absolutely first, intuitively
evident in and of themselves', and must also establish in advance 'from where
and how the thingness of things is determined.' Until that time. tradition had
dictated that this happen along the lines of the proposition. The proposition
was what offered itself of itself, at the same time containing something of that
about which it speaks.
But for a mathematical position there can be no pregiven things. The
proposition cannot be arbitrary, but must itself be the basic principle.
One must therefore fmd such a principle of aU positing. i.e .• a proposition
in which that about which it says something, the subjectum (hypokeimenon),
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is not just taken fromsomewhereelse. That underlyingsubjectmust as such
first emerge for itself in this originalpropositionand be established. Only
in this way is the subjectum efundamentum absolutum, purely posited from
the propositionas such, a basis and groundestablishedin the mathematical.
(p.278)
If anything is given at all, then, it is only the proposition, that is, the positing,
in the sense of a thinking that asserts. In other words, the positing has only
itself as that which can be posited. And insofar as positing directs itself
towards itself, it finds that over and above the question of what is asserted, this
asserting and thinking is always an '/ think':
Thinking is always an 'I think,' ego cogito, Therein lies: 1 am, sum.
Cogito, sum - this is the highest certainty lying immediately in the
propositionas such. In'1 posit' the 'I' as the positer is co- and pre-posited
as that which is already present, as the being. The Being of beings is
detennined out of the '1 am' as the certainty of the positing. (pp.278-279)
Heidegger adds that the formula which the proposition sometimes has,
'Cogito ergo sum', suggests the misunderstanding that it is a question of
inference. But the sum is not a consequence of the thinking; rather, it is the
fundamentum or ground of thinking. The proposition 'I posit' has the
peculiarity of first positing that about which it makes an assertion, the
subjectum, in this case the 'I'. The I is the subjectum of the very first
principle. 'The I is therefore a special something which underlies
[Zugrundeliegendes] - hypokeimenon, subjectum - the subjectum of the
positing as such.' For this reason the 'I' has been called the 'subject'.
Heidegger then draws the following conclusion, which encapsulates well
Foucault's argument about the Classical episteme:
That the 'I' comes to be defined as that which is already present for
representation (the 'objective' in today's sense) is not because of any 1-
viewpoint or any subjectivistic doubt, but because of the essential
predominanceand the defmitelydirectedradicalizationof the mathematical
and the axiomatic.
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Until Descartes every thing at hand for itself was a 'subject'; but because now
they first receive their thingness only through the founding relation to the
highest principle and its 'subject' (I), 'they are essentially such as stand as
something else in relation to the "subject," which lie over against it as
objectum. The things themselves become "objects'" (p.280).41
Returning to Daraki' s criticism, we can perhaps now see that Foucault
is not denying the activity of thinking and the power of the mind. He is
suggesting, rather, that there is something more fundamental, a project or order
which constitutes the subject (his argument is precisely about constitution).
This is really the substance of the section of The Order of Things, 'Duplicated
Representation', which immediately follows the last words we quoted from
Foucault (,And it was this network that made possible the personalities we call
Hobbes ... '), and in which he explicates the fundamental property of Classical
signs. He quotes from the Logique de Port-Royal: "'The sign encloses two
ideas, one of the thing representing, the other of the thing represented; and its
nature consists in exciting the first by means of the second'" (p.63). To
become a true sign, it must represent, but also that representation must itself
be represented in it. It is therefore no surprise, Foucault remarks, that the first
example of a sign furnished in the Logique de Port-Royal should be that of the
drawing, as map or picture, since 'the tableau has no other content in fact than
that which it represents, and yet that content is made visible only because it
41 Whence the importance given by Heidegger in 'The Age of the World Picture' to the
verb vorstellen, 'to represent', which means precisely 'to set out before oneself and to set forth
in relation to oneself. Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', p.132. It should be
remembered that Nietzsche had already formulated this critique in volume two of The wiu to
Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values, trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici, vol. II
(Edinburgh: TN. Foulis. 1913),481-485.
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is represented by a representation.' Representation is thus at once a relation
to an object and a manifestation of itself," Hence Foucault's forbidding
phrase: 'From the Classical age, the sign is the representativity of the
representation in so far as it is representable' (p.65). Thus, one of the
consequences of this arrangement, and this is really the crux of the matter, is
that a theory of signification is excluded. As Foucault says, if phenomena are
only ever given in a representation which, in itself and by its own
representability, is wholly a sign, then signification cannot constitute a
problem. What is more, it does not even appear:
All representations are interconnected as signs: all together, they form, as it
were, an immense network: each one posits itself in its transparency as the
sign of what it represents: and yet - or rather, by this very fact - no specific
activity of consciousness can ever constitute a signification. (p.80. My
emphasis)
As we saw earlier, Foucault nowhere denies the role of the mind; he
simply rejects the capacity of consciousness to itself constitute meaning.
Meaning can never be more than the totality of signs arranged in a chain one
after the other; 'it will be given, it will give itself, in the complete table of
signs' (p.80; trans. mod.). And this tableau strives to represent as clearly and
distinctly as it can a pre-existing order of things determined by universal laws
which together determine the possibilities of human thought At least,
Foucault would say, such was how Classical thought theorized its own activity.
42 F~ois Wahl suggests that Foucault's version of Classical representation contains
echoes of Husserl's account of the sign (as index and expression). In this important critique,
Wahl argues that Foucault, across all eptstemes, ultimately defers to representation, to the 'vecu
representatif' (p.349), which he attributes to the book's pervasive phenomenology. A
phenomenology which is ultimately less Husserl and more Merleau-Ponty. Wahl omits to ask
the extent to which Husserl's account of the sign itself echoes Classical deliberations on
representation. 'La Philosophie entre l'avant et l'apres du structuralisme', in Ouecot et al
Qu'esl-ce que le structuralismei (paris: Editions du SeuiI, 1968), pp.301-441 (esp. pp.335-
350).
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The parallel with structural linguistics is not lost on Foucault, who ends the
section with the following meditation:
It was also necessary that Saussure, rediscovering the project of a general
semiology, should have given the sign a definition that may have seemed
'psychologistic' (the linking of a concept and an image): this is because he
was in fact rediscovering the Classical condition for conceiving of the binary
nature of the sign. (p.St; trans. mod.)"
Alan Megill is therefore in error when he charges that Foucault's
account of the distinction between representation and signification remains
unclear, 'even after one has gone to the considerable effort of learning his
somewhat idiosyncratic terminology and of grasping the architectonics of the
book' (Megill, p.209); the exposition is clarity itself. The question is whether
the respective systems actually functioned in such apparently distinct ways.
If we accept the theoretical difference, and if we believe that Western culture
did later evolve an episteme in which the subject would itself constitute
signification, we will see the logic - an axiomatic logic - of Foucault's claim
that man in the seventeenth century did not exist. The point about such a
claim, and about the reversal of causality it implies (the 'single network of
necessities [.,,] that made possible the personalities we call Hobbes ..,'), is that
~3 Fran~ois Wahl objects that, for all the talk of epistemological breaks, Foucault fails to
distinguish adequately between Classical representation and modern semiology: what
distinguishes the modem signifier from the Classical idea is that 'we shall never find the
signified in it'. We must accept the disappearance of any paraUel between the sign and the
order of the idea (p.326). But Foucault never said that modem semiology still took the realm
of ideas as its model. In addition, Wahl concludes that Foucault foUows Saussure in offering
a pyschologistic theory of the sign and that the pair of them are thus presaussurean. But what
emerges from all this - from Wahl's insistence that langue be conceived as a 'logical machine
[...] the laws of which one would search for in vain in an analysis of psychic acts alone'
(p.330); from his belief in the incommensurability of structuralism and the C17th psychological
theory of representation - is that the misunderstanding is Wahl's. For not only is Foucault not
arguing that structuralism is psychological (he says that Saussure gave a definition which might
have seemed psychologistic), he is also arguing that neither were Classical theories of
representation, at least in the sense of being predicated on a founding psyche which would
bestow meaning independently of the functioning of the system. In striving to point up a clear
difference, Wahl ends up demonstrating a certain unsuspected affinity between the models.
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it strikes a blow at crude anachronism: the deployment onto one era of a
concept of man and the subject belonging to a later age. This is the Foucault
claimed by New Historicism.
Be that as it may, it is time to draw together some of the threads of the
comparison between Foucault and Heidegger. When Heidegger discusses the
fundamental characteristic of modem science he attributes it to the
mathematical manner of working with things. The mathematical project is not
born all at once and does not come from nowhere ('Its beginnings stir during
the later Scholasticism of the fifteenth century; the sixteenth century brings
sudden advances as well as setbacks; but it is only during the seventeenth
century that the decisive clarifications and foundations are accomplished'). He
considers the labours of some individuals more helpful than others, though his
account is not exclusively about individual battles. Newton, Galileo, and their
fundamental efforts at revising the ancient and medieval view of science are
poured into the equation together with a mathematical project that must be
grasped as 'the execution and consequence of a mode of historical Dasein',
With Foucault's Classical episteme on the other hand, Newton read by
Voltaire is just a 'sociological phenomenon', one which did not provoke 'the
slightest alteration' in the history of thought (p.89).44 If Foucault ignores
these personalities, is it not because he is more faithful to that era's thought?
Would not the very framework of his method be remarkably close in spirit to
the thought of that age? Does not the episteme take the form of that which it
aspires to know? Since the episteme, in this Classical age where things no
44 Cf. his parallel treatment of the personnages of the Physiocrats (p.200).
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longer exist and move according to an inner principle, is what 'makes things
possible', it closely resembles Heidegger's mathematical project. Heidegger,
we remember, defmed the mathematical as precisely based on 'the application
of a determination of the thing which is not experientially derived from the
thing and yet lies at the base of every determination of the things, making
them possible and making room for them'. As such, at least in the Classical
age, the concept of episteme - as that set of regulae which, in a historically
determinate period, make things possible - would seem to translate the
presence and functioning of the notion of mente concipere. That attitude of
mind in which there is a prior grasping of what should be uniformily
determinative of each body as such. In this figure of the mathematical
projection which is the episteme is posited, in Heidegger's words, 'that which
things are taken as, what and how they are to be evaluated beforehand'. Such
evaluation and taking-for, we recall, is called in Greek axioo, and the
anticipating determinations and assertions in the project are axiomata.
But because the episteme would only be a prior grasping of what
should be uniformity determinative of each body in a particular historical
epoch (one recalls Foucault's insistence on the episteme as a 'historical a
priori' , integral to his claim that, since he does not deal in universal structures,
he is not a structuralist), it would be the mathematical projection of - to
travesty at least two languages - a historical axiomatics without history.
Therefore, it would seem that Foucault, with his notion of episteme, is
conceptually proximate and faithful to the (Classical) age he describes.
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Something which is not lost on him."
Kant and tbe construction trade and tradition
Thus far our interest has been exclusively in the Renaissance and
Classical epochs. But what happens when Foucault comes to the modern
(Kantian) episteme, when he takes us to a revolution squared by showing how
the first great revolution is in turn subject to a displacement?" Foucault's
intention, in discovering epistemes posterior to and different from the Classical
paradigm, is to radicalize the ground of knowledge by suggesting that the
project of mathesis in the seventeenth century did not mark a once and for all
coming to scientific knowledge - a move which would at the same time sully
the purity of Kant's reason. Furthermore, by coining an expression like
'historical a priori', a 'rather barbarous term' as he puts it in The Archaeology
(p.127), and even more so by immersing the term episteme in post-Classical
waters, Foucault signals his own historical affiliation to a certain tradition of
European thought (though without simply reproducing it) which at once
embraces and pre-dates Kant, a tradition in which, to boot. a very particular
understanding of mathematics is paramount." Before moving to extract some
45 'In a certain way, we come back to the point of view of the seventeenth century, with
this difference: not putting man in the place of God, but an anonymous thought, of knowledge
without the subject, of the theoretical without identity.' Foucault, 'Entretien', La Quinzaine
liueraire, 5, 16 May 1966, p.l5.
46 The language of revolution is not inappropriate with respect to Kant, even before 1789.
He describes his own project as an attempt to 'completely revolutionis[e]' metaphysics (Kant,
Critique, p.2S).
47 Maurice Clavel, Ce que je crois (Paris: Grassel, 1975), believed fervently that with The
Order of Things he was in the presence of a modern Kantianism. Foucault subsequently did
little to refute that judgement, saying of himself (under a pseudonym shared with Francois
Ewald) that if he is inscribed in a philosophical tradition, it is that of the critical tradition of
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conclusions vis-a-vis Foucault on Kant, it will be worth reminding ourselves
of some of the principal tenets of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, especially
since, we recall, the latter half of Heidegger's What Is a Thing? concerns itself
precisely with that work.
As Heidegger is keenly aware, the question of the thing is capital in
Kant's system. What matters for Kant is not so much the objects of
knowledge, as the possibility of an a priori mode of knowing objects.
Heidegger:
We are now not only not directed to the object of the assertion, but
also not to the fonn of the assertion as such, but rather to how the object is
the object of the assertion, how the assertion represents the object in
advance, how our knowledge passes over to the object, transcendit, and how,
thereby, and in what objective detennination the object encounters. Kant
calls this way of considering transcendental. (What Is a Thing?, pp.178-179)
In short, one must always already have a knowledge of what an object is,
which Kant calls synthetic knowledge. And one must have it in advance, that
is, a priori. As Heidegger says: 'Objects could never confront us as objects
at all without synthetic judgments a priori; by these objects we "then" guide
ourselves in particular investigations, inquiries, and proofs, in which we
constantly appeal to them' (p.180).
One of the things to which Kant constantly appeals in order to illustrate
a priori knowledge is mathematics. He writes in the Introduction to the
Critique of Pure Reason that if an example of a pure a priori judgement from
the sciences be desired, 'we have only to look at any of the propositions of
mathematics' (p.44). This is then formalized into a rule: '1. All mathematical
Kant Maurice Florence, 'Foucault', Dictionnaire des philosophes, ed. by D. Huisman (Paris:
Presses Universitaire de France, 1981), vol. 1, pp.942-944 (p.942).
61
judgements, without exception, are synthetic' (p.52), and promptly followed by
exempla from arithmetic and geometry (pp.52-54). Further on, pure
mathematics is made an exemplary example, a 'brilliant example' of such
knowledge (p.80). Barely three pages in to the Preface to the Second Edition,
an important connection is made between geometry and construction. Kant is
discussing the Greek demonstration of the properties of the isosceles triangle.
Note that the word 'construction' refers not to the geometrical figure but to the
mental representation of the figure formed in the mind:
The true method, so [the first to demonstrate the properties] found, was not
to inspect what he discerned either in the figure, or in the bare concept of
it, and from this, as it were, to read off its properties; but to bring out what
was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a priori,
and had put into the figure in the construction by which he presented it to
himself. If he is to know anything with a priori certainty he must not
ascribe to the figure anything save what necessarily follows from what he
has himself set into it in accordance with his concept. (p.19)
With this sense of mental representation we touch once more on the subjectum
which Foucault wants to disavow.
To say too much in too short a space, it is with Kant's fourth group of
principles (the postulates of empirical thought). which correspond to the
categories of modality, that one reaches the heart of the matter. The categories
of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity), as opposed to the remaining three
groups of principles (axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, and
analogies) corresponding to the categories of quantity, quality, and relation, do
not belong to the factual nature of an object; they assert something concerning
the modes according to which the existence of the object is to be determined.
The modalities are a synthesis. 'They put the object into a relationship to the
conditions of its standing-against (Gegen-stehen). These conditions, however,
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are also those very ones of the letting-stand-against (Gegenstehenlassen) of
experience, and, therefore, of the actions of the subject' (Heidegger, What Is,
pp.240-241). This is the heart of the Kantian system and needless to say it is
what Foucault would find most objectionable. Heidegger continues:
The postulates, too, are synthetic principles, although not objective, but only
subjectively synthetic. This is to say that they do not put together the
content of the object, but they put the whole nature of the object as
determined by the three first principles into its possible relations to the
subject and to its modes of intuitively-thought representing. The modalities
add to the concept of the object its relation to our cognitive faculty. (p.241)
Itwill be Foucault's task in The Order of Things to wrest this 'ground-
laying' out of the hands of any transcendental subject whatsoever, Kantian or
phenomenological. to insist that the subjective a priori is only the result of an
anterior and more determining historical episteme - even if we suspect that the
episteme assumes the constitutive powers of which Husserl speaks apropos of
the transcendental subject of'phenomenology." In this question of foundations
the metaphorics of the construction trade assume due importance. (The
critique of Kant would presumably not stem from objecting to his wanting to
establish foundations per se. If one is to build an edifice. the desire for
foundations is understandable.j'? Heidegger says in Kant and the
48 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. by
Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p.8S: 'Every sort of existent itself, real
or ideal, becomes understandable as a "product" of transcendental subjectivity, a product
constituted in just that performance.' In a later interview Foucault intimates that his
historicization will not have done away with the transcendental: 'I try to historicize to the
utmost in order to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental. I cannot exclude the
possibility that one day I will have to confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact,
the transcendental.' 'An Historian of Culture' I in Foucault Live, p.79.
49 Cf. Kant, Critique, p.46.
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Problem of Metaphysics that the meaning of the expression 'laying the ground'
(Grundlegung) is best illustrated if we consider the building trade. He
continues:
It is true that metaphysics is not a building or structure [Gebaude] that is at
hand, but is really in all human beings 'as a natural construction or
arrangement.'" As a consequence, laying the ground for metaphysics can
mean to lay a foundation [Fundament] under this natural metaphysics, or
rather to replace one which has already been laid with a new one through a
process of substituting. However, it is precisely this representation which we
must keep out of the idea of a ground-laying. namely, that it is a matter of
the byproduct from the foundation [Grun/agenJ of an already-constructed
building. Ground-laying is rather the projecting of the building plan itself
so that it agrees with the direction concerning on what and how the building
will be grounded. Laying the ground for metaphysics as the projecting
[Entwelj'en] of the building plan. however, is again no empty producing of
a system and its subdivisions. It is rather the architectonic circumscription
and delineation of the inner possibility of metaphysics, that is, the concrete
determination of its essence. All determination of essence, however, is first
achieved in the setting-free of the essential ground. (p.2)
Strictly speaking, Kant is a good deal more ambivalent than Heidegger on this
point. It is not necessarily, for Kant, a choice between an already-constructed
edifice versus a project for a building. In the Critique of Pure Reason he
speaks of the task of 'clearing' and 'levelling what has hitherto been
wasteground' (p.14).
The significance of the metaphorics of the building trade emerges in
Aristotle's distinction between divine and human knowledge (already seen in
Cusanus) which exercises Heidegger and Kant before him. For Kant, all
knowledge is intuition. The difference between infmite intuition (that is,
divine knowledge) and finite intuition (human knowledge) consists in the fact
that the former
first brings [the] being into its Being, helps it to its coming-into-being
(orlgo). Absolute intuiting would not be absolute if it depended upon a
being already at hand and if the intuitable flfSt became accessible in its
50 The footnote is to Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2d ed., p.21.
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'taking the measure' of this being. Divine knowing is representing which,
in intuiting, first creates the intuitable being as such," But because it
immediately looks at the being as a whole, simply seeing through it in
advance, it cannot require thinking. Thinking as such is thus already the
mark of finitude. Divine knowing is 'intuition (for all its knowledge must
be intuition and not thinking, which always shows itself to have limits)'."
(Heidegger, Kant, pp.16-17)
For Kant, finite knowledge is noncreative intuition. The being must already
have been 'at hand' in advance. 'Finite intuition of the being cannot give the
object from out of itself. It must allow the object to be given' (Heidegger,
Kant, p.l7). Hence, a certain receptivity always characterizes finite, that is
human, intuition.
Human thought, though, is 'productive' in another sense. It produces
concepts which allow us to extrapolate from a particular being and understand
it, for example, as one of a species. Finite knowledge reveals the being which
shows itself, that is, the appearance. Humans must content themselves with
the appearance of the object since for them to claim to know the thing in itself
would be to put themselves in the place of God as the absolute creator.
Infinite knowing does not merely know an already-existing object, it is that
which allows the being itself to stand forth. 'Absolute knowing discloses the
being [in the act of] letting-stand-forth and possesses it in every case "only"
as that which stands forth in the letting-stand-forth' (Heidegger, Kant, pp.20-
21).
This takes us to an ambiguity at the heart of Foucault's practice of
archaeology in The Order of Things. On the one hand it wants to historicize
" A footnote refers to Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 72. The phrase 'taking the
measure' will be encounteredlater in Foucault.
52 A footnoterefers to Kant, Critique, B 71.
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Kant and the phenomenological patrimony, to suggest that the idea of a
transcendental subject constitutes a historically local and contingent way of
asking about the world, one which, moreover, is on the verge of
disappearing." It thereby refuses Kant's suggestion that there might be a
'fundamental constitution [Grundbeschaffenheit] of knowledge in general' and
more specifically seeks to divest the subject of the constitutional powers that
Kant bestows upon it.54 Foucault wants to situate that figure of man which
would have us believe it is the result of a gradual self-revealing of its essential
groundedness in itself." Foucault's critique of Kant is thus directed precisely
at the idea of finitude. For Foucault, the modem episteme is characterized by
the circularity implicit in a knowledge in which man is both subject and object.
On the basis of the positive forms of his body, his desire and his language,
man learns that he is finite, and this very fmitude will be able to provide a
foundation for the positivity of things. (It should be said that Foucault's
exposition of how this analytic of finitude underlies the practice of the three
disciplines of biology, economics and philology is mightily impressive. By the
end of it, it is hard not to believe in the existence of epistemes.) But when
Foucault argues that the three modem disciplines of ethnology, psychoanalysis
53 In the Critique of Pure Reason (in the Preface to the first edition), Kant speaks of 'the
natural constitution [Naturbestimmullg] of our reason' (p.lO). Foucault will work precisely to
disqualify that noun-adjective combination.
54 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.82. for an exemplary passage. The repetition of
'constitution' is actually the translator's approximation to Beschaffenheit.
55 Compare Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part I, trans. by
Helen Zimmem (London: Allen & Unwin, repro 1924), 2, p.15: philosophers see man as an
aeterna veritas. 'But everything that the philosopher says about man is really nothing more
than testimony about the man of a very limited space of time.'
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and linguistics all work to erode the limits and finitude of man, since their own
respective domains are themselves subject to imprecise frontiers, he erodes the
finitude and equanimity of the transcendental subject.
On the other hand, the transcendental subject is only made possible in
the first place by an episteme which works according to analogy and
succession. Despite arguing for historical contingency, Foucault deploys the
notion of episteme as a general concept applicable to all eras, even if it seems
to correspond closely to Classical mathesis." Since each episteme is a
historically specific configuration, the axioms would not be universal. Yet
what is conserved across the changing epistemological configurations is a
positing of the essentially axiomatic character of the mode of questioning and
the cognitive determination of nature.57 How far has Foucault managed to
avoid the 'surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world
of idealities for the only real world' that Husserl sees as the insidious legacy
of physicists since Galileo?:
It was a fateful omission that Galileo did not inquire back into the original
meaning-giving achievement which, as idealization practiced on the original
ground of all theoretical and practical life - the immediately intuited world
(and here especially the empirically intuited world of bodies) - resulted in
the geometrical ideal constructions. He did not reflect closely on all this: on
how the free, imaginative variation of this world and its shapes results only
in possible empirically intuitable shapes and not in exact shapes; on what
sort of motivation and what new achievement was required for genuinely
56 Gillian Rose argues that Foucault construes modern thought as a kind of post-modern
mathesis and that his thought is deeply allied to Marburg neo-Kantianism. Dialectic of
Nihilism, pp.180-188.
51 Sartre says that Althusser and Foucault prefer concept to notion because it smacks of
atemporality. 'At bottom, behind this whole current of thought, one finds once more a very
Cartesian attitude: there is the concept on one side, the imagination on the other. It's a charge
a fonds against time. They don't want any overtaking (d~passement).' Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Jean-
Paul Sartre repond', p.94.
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geometric idealization. (Husserl, The Crisis, pp.48-49)58
How far does the episteme avoid seeming not the logos of arche promising
bedrock truths but a fabulous construction more geometrico't"
In fact - and this will be an observation made more than once
throughout the thesis - in the deployment of his conceptual apparatus,
Foucault is never far from a certain (one might even say mathematical)
idealism which has to do with the elaboration of an extremely sophisticated
theoretical armature and the concomitant insinuation that such an armature in
some way corresponds to the materia prima under scrutiny. Pierre Duhem' s
To Save the Phenomena repays close attention in respect of this idealist
tradition and especially in what concerns the activity of constructing
explanatory schemata in order to 'save the phenomena'. This last, Platonic
phrase (which Duhem shows recurring time and again throughout the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance, and therein lies the book's brilliance) refers to the
already mentioned argument according to which, and in the view of someone
like Proclus, astronomy cannot grasp the essence of heavenly things, since such
knowledge can only belong to God. Instead it merely furnishes us with
(necessarily inexact) images of them. The best it can hope for is to provide
a geometrical hypothesis which goes some way to furnishing conclusions that
conform to observation. When such geometric 'constructions' have, for
58 TheArchaeology, pp.188-189, discusses mathematics and ideality, warning against a too
fond embrace of them (though the question remains as to whether Foucault heeds his own
advice).
S9 Malcolm Bowie relates Freud's fascination with archaeology to two drives: Freud the
seeker of bedrock truths; Freud the inveterate constructor of theories. Freud, Proust and
Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), p.26.
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instance, assigned each planet a path which conforms to its visible path, its
hypotheses are then said to have 'saved the appearances, the phenomena' (To
Save the Phenomena, p.6). (It would be worth looking at the words, or the
variants of, 'construct' and 'constitute' in Duhem's study. From Plato to
Copernicus, from Ptolemy to Galileo, there is hardly a use of the expression
'to save the phenomena' which is not marked by the co-presence of 'construct'
or 'constitute'.) But, Duhem insists, and the insistence is Platonic, the
geometric contrivances we use to save the phenomena are neither true nor
likely; they are purely conceptual." On the other hand, and challenging the
Platonic line, stands Aristotle, and in particular the Averroist appropriation of
Aristotle. This tradition maintains that the geometric principles one uses
should actually describe how the heavens are. Duhem's argument is that the
likes of Copernicus, Galileo, Leonardo and Kepler, while forming the richest
vein of Renaissance mathematics and cosmology, and together practising a
Platonic apriorisrn in their scientific experiments (largely in opposition to the
Scholastic old guard), all make the mistake of believing themselves renovators
of the Aristotelian line, whereas they were merely (if brilliantly) saving the
phenomena (see pp.115-117). Does Foucault belong to that Aristotelian
tradition, not least by virtue of the vital role played in his system by
'constructs' (conceptual, historical, social, legal, etc.), but also because of the
failure to scrutinize their adequacy?"
150 Cf. Kant. Critique. p.46: contradictions can be avoided. 'if we are careful in our
fabrications - which none the less wiD still remain fabrications'.
61 According to Sokolowski. Husserl would be in a similar position. Husserl certainly does
not believe that in apprehending phenomena we nonetheless leave the thing in itself untouched.
The world that we intuit. the world that we constitute. is the real world. not just a concept or
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Episteme en chantiel2
As far as Foucault is concerned, it would be idle to talk of the
concealed capacities of bodies or individualities since the realm of nature
requires a mode of access appropriate to the axiomatically predetermined
objects. Whence Foucault's repeated reversals of an expected causality. They
are not idle semantics; they form the rhetorical and conceptual markers of an
axiomatic thought which, in order to signal a new manner of proceeding, will
always be accompanied by a reminder of the inadequacy of 'traditional
opinions and concepts'. 63 The most revealing passage in this respect is the
famous gibe at Marxism. With calculated malice, Foucault opines that at an
archaeological level there is little difference between Ricardo's pessimism and
Marx's revolutionary promise. 'Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought
like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else' (p.262).
Foucault is correct, of course, to say that Marxism, at a strictly archaeological
epistemological level, shared in a configuration comprising the historicity of
economics. the finitude of human existence and the fulfilment of an end to
history/" It is also perfectly logical. from an archaeological standpoint, to
appearance. In other words, the theory of knowledge and the theory of being are inseparable.
See the footnote from Levinas (Sokolowski. p.134).
62 In The Archaeology, p.135, he says that he has 'set about constructing a whole series
of notions'. The French expression is mis en chamier, 'set to work'. Chamier also means
'building site'. 'roadworks'.
63 See The Order of Things, pp.31. 63 and 89.
64 Francois Wahl prefers Louis Althusser's conviction that there was a coupure between
Ricardo and Marx. Once one realizes that Marx' s problematic was different from the
Economists', one has to concede that the two were dealing with different objects. Whence the
object of Capital: 'not need, or even labour, or even production, but the combination among
them 0/ different elements of production' (p.36I). Which in turn leads to a structure without
depth. Which is what Foucault. according to Wahl. failed to realize, preferring to remain at
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claim that Marxism had neither the intention to disturb nor the power to
modify that epistemological arrangement. But then neither would any form of
knowledge, as Foucault is well aware. If an episteme determines the
emergence of certain savoirs, it follows that those forms of knowledge could
never be disruptive of the episteme, since no knowledge which was not in
harmony with the basic configuration could ever have been produced in the
first place. In epistemes there are only fish in water. The sarcasm of the
passage is aimed at those who have not realized this; it could not be a
criticism of Marxism as such. Since, archaeologically speaking. no knowledge
could by definition possibly disturb the peace of the episteme, there can be no
upbraiding of any particular knowledge as such for its subservience. If one
accepts the notion of episteme, then the question of ethical valorization and
responsibility has no place in archaeology.
Yet valorization is what is at stake. And it is not, let it be said. a
valorization which, in order to pronounce, retreats to a discrete, say, ethical or
political ground. Instead, the judgements are made purely at the level of
epistemology. Thus while one may incline towards a favourable view of the
Classical episteme, which held out the possibility of a demotic natural history
a level of inquiry concerned with depth, interiority, and foundations, that is, at an ideological
level.
For its part, structuralism, as Wahl defmes it, is precisely the practice which guards
against all those pitfalls. against the return of ontology, empiricism and depth. And what calls
our attention here is a certain lexical cluster. A cluster which wants to signal the particular
difference and scientificity of the structuralist discourse, and therein explain the degree to
which Foucault's project in The Order of Things falls short, is en deca, of this ideal. Yet a
cluster which marks a stmnge resemblance between: (1) Wahl's structuralism and Foucault's
project; (2) Wahl's structuralism and Classical thought: 'By designating along each of its
borders the irreducibility of an episleme of structuralism, we have at least posed the limits on
the basis of which the production of an ensemble of regular utterances - axiomatized and
deductive - on the sign becomes possible' (Wahl, p.3TI; my emphasis).
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in which any individual should be able to produce the same description of the
ordered world, Foucault does not. His evaluation of both the Classical and the
modem epistemes is inferred negatively from his marked empathy with the
Renaissance configuration. And this is where his archaeology rejoins
traditional continuist, non-relativist, evaluative histories of ideas - in those
same intimations that a new order would correspond more faithfully to the
being of language and knowledge.
In truth, and as Foucault says, the archaeologist cannot ignore opinions.
His only means of access to a past culture will be through the texts of that
time, together with subsequent commentaries: no doxa, no archaeology.
Indeed, the engagement with tradition and learning is the very condition of the
possibility of intelligibility, that is to say, the possibility of achieving some
kind of proximate understanding of previous epistemes. And this should be
borne in mind when it comes to Foucault's own discourse regarding the taking
of one's object of study, in particular when it is a question of the cut.
Foucault wants to be on the verge of a new episteme; the brilliant practice of
The Order of Things (which exceeds the theory) violates this separatist wish.
The archaeologist is bound to the doxa in a further sense. His labour
entails reconstructing the conditions of possibility of thought from what a
culture bequeaths to us. In order to systematize sufficiently what a culture
thinks, one first has to assume that those thoughts which were made possible
were the same as those thoughts which actually got thought, which means
collapsing the difference between what a culture thinks and what a culture
thinks it thinks. This implies a great act of faith, a preparedness to take a
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culture at its word and a corresponding preparedness to believe in the capacity
of words to represent faithfully the act of thought - hallmarks of a
doxographical habit," Occasionally he queries this faith, as when he declares
that Classical thought was wrong in believing it had successfully excluded
resemblance. If things were either wholly identical or wholly different, he
says, there would be neither memory nor imagination, no chance of founding
a common noun and no language."
Strictly speaking, the notion of episteme is not in itself sufficient to
radicalize anything; what counts is its functioning. For the most part, it
operates in a semantic field of rupture suggestive of its radical radicality. Only
thus can it open onto, and close off, the question of historical relativism, the
incommensurability of epochs." A prime example of these semantics is
found in the opening paragraph of 'The Limits of Representation', at the
beginning of the second part of the book, where Foucault is recapping the
epistemological break between the Classical and the modem ages. A list will
have to suffice: 'broken' (rompues). 'discontinuity' (discontinuite) x 2,
'smashed' (brise), 'dislocated' tdisloquees), 'to corne undone, to disintegrate'
65 Cf. Foucault, The Order of Discourse, p.65: 'Ever since the sophists' tricks and
influence were excluded and since their paradoxes have been more or less safely muzzled, it
seems that Western thought has taken care to ensure that discourse should occupy the smallest
possible space between thought and speech.'
66 Derrida applies a similar logic to criticize the very notion of the 'mythical episteme',
His book is ostensibly about Condillac but may also be read, from the first epigraph to the last
words of the last page, as a critique of Foucault's archaeology. Jacques Derrida,
L'ArcMologie du frivole (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1973; reproParis: DenoWGonthier, 1976),
especially p.2S.
67 See Foucault's 'Introduction' to Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and the
Pathological, p.xiii: for Canguilhem, marking discontinuities is a '"way of doing", a process
which is an integral part of the history of science because it is summoned by the very object
which must be treated by it'.
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(se dejaire), 'new space' (espace nouveau), 'tearing' (dechirement), 'suddenly'
(brusquement). Foucault then asks the archaeologist's question:
What event, what law do they obey, these mutations that suddenly decide
that things are no longer perceived, described, expressed, characterized.
classified, and known in the same way, and that it is no longer wealth,living
beings, and discourse that are presented to knowledge in the interstices of
words or through their transparency, but beings radically different from
them?' (p.217; my emphasis).
They are radically different because they must always obey some law or other
which determines them as objects for thought but which will not always be the
same law. Whence the only true law: there is always a law, but that law will
not be for always. Foucault's episteme offers itself as an instrument of critique
of the thing-in-itself, which would exist independently of any mediating
relation or practice.68 But because he proffers no cause of the episteme, no
explanation of how one episteme mutates into another, as that which is without
origin or cause the episteme would become the causa sui par excellence."
One can derive fascinating insights from the book's historical analysis
of the differences between, say, natural history and modern biology, but the
radicality of these differences is overstated. He speaks of the modern
disciplines filling the space 'left blank' by Classical knowledge. And again:
'The object of knowledge in the nineteenth century is formed in the very place
where [la ou] the Classical plenitude of being has fallen silent' (p.207; trans.
68 A variant of this rationale is behind the change of title from the 1954 Ma/adie mentale
et personnalite to the 1962 Maladie mentale et psych%gie. See Hubert Dreyfus, 'Foreword
to the California Edition', Michel Foucault, Menta/Illness and Psychology, trans. by Alan
Sheridan (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1987), p.xxx.
CI9 David Carroll, in saying that Foucault makes the episteme into the subject. makes a
similar point 'The Subject of Archaeology or The Sovereignty of the Episteme', Modern
Language Notes, 93 (1978),695-722.
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mod.)." Absolute 'muteness' of the past is certainly not as for-giving as
'mutation', the word he uses earlier." To be sure, if one maintains the radical
incommensurability of the 'la ou', then the question of the comparative value
of knowledges from one episteme to another is at once radicalized and
volatilized. This is precisely what Foucault does when comparing the systems
of Aldrovandi and Buffon." Moreover, this allows Foucault to take his
distance from Heidegger on the issue of freedom. Heidegger, we recall,
conceives of the mathematical project as not only a liberation (from the
authority of the Church and tradition), but as 'a new experience and formation
of freedom itself'. For Foucault, it is a matter of passing from the clutches of
one tradition to those of another. A sense of freedom would be but the
clearest sign of enslavement. 73
There has been a near evangelical campaign to save Foucault from
accusations of totalizing in regard to the episteme. Robert Young provides a
70 Cf. Heidegger, 'Science and Reflection', in The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays, pp.155-182: 'The objectness of material nature shows in modem atomic physics
fundamental characteristics completely different from those that it shows in classical physics.
The latter, classical physics, can indeed be incorporated within the former, atomic physics, but
not vice versa. Nuclear physics does not permit itself to be traced back to classical physics
and reduced to it' (p.l72). But note what does not change: 'the fact that nature has in advance
to set itself in place for the entrapping securing that science, as theory, accomplishes' (pp.l72-
173).
71 Foucault had suggested earlier, in the context of medicine, that the break from the
Classical to the modem era was not absolute. Although the gaze was 'ordered in a new way',
the naturalist model 'remained active'. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, p.89.
72 Cf. Georges Canguilhem: 'Before putting two distances on a road end to end, it is
advisable to be sure that it really is the same road.' Cited in Lecourt, Marxism and
Epistemology, p.168.
73 Cf. Foucault's 'Introduction' to Binswanger's Le Reve et l'Existence where he is much
more lyrical about the freedom to be had through the 'oneiric experience' (pp.64-66).
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recent instance of this.74 Young writes that the episteme does not offer a new
way of describing a historical period, since the concept articulates 'only the
structure of certain specific forms of knowledge rather than some single
overarching principle'. The episteme delineates instead what Foucault calls a
'cluster of transformations' . Young cites a lengthy passage from Foucault,
where the latter stresses that the episteme is a 'space of dispersion', 'an open
field of relationships and no doubt indefinitely specifiable', 'a simultaneous
play of specific remanences' (young, White Mythologies, p.76; Foucault's
emphasis). The problem here is that in defending the Foucault of The Order
of Things, Young takes his cue from a later article. 'Reponse a une question'
(1968), in which Foucault qualifies and justifies the earlier book." And we
are asked to make the hasty assumption that the episteme described in this
reply to criticisms of his thought was all along identical with the notion
evoked by Foucault in the pages of his earlier work. Young makes the
assumption that Foucault's thought and the episteme are unified entities or
ideal truths independent of the discourse in which they are articulated. and that
people plain failed to grasp them first time round." We might say that
74 White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge. 1990), ch.S.
James Bernauer provides another, slightly ambivalent case. Although he suspects Foucault of
trying to re-write the history of what was an obviously totalizing approach, he still concedes
that Foucault's archaeology is in the business. albeit at a particular rather than a general level,
of discerning 'ruptures'. The door is thereby still held open to a relativism. James Bernauer,
Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought (New Jersey: Humanities
Press International, 1990), esp. p.llS and p.217, n.141. O'Farrell is suitably sceptical on
Foucault's change of mind over the meaning of episteme. Clare O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian
or Philosopher? (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.59-62.
7S Young actually refers to the English translation, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse',
Ideology and Consciousness, 3 (Spring 1978), 7-26.
76 Cf. The Order of Discourse precisely on philosophy's promotion of a 'ideal truth as the
law of discourse' (p.65).
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Foucault displays a will to totality, even if the instrumentality of the concept
will always resist totalizing.
Alongside intimations of the episteme' s sovereignty, another lexicon
('disposition', 'configuration') undermines such visions of homogeneity. And
indeed The Order of Things itself acknowledges that the status of
discontinuities is problematic. The section called 'Order' from the chapter
'Representing' contains an astute meditation on the partage and the limite. A
dividing-line or limit 'may perhaps be no more than an arbitrary division in a
constantly mobile whole', conjuring up a suspect 'unitary system'. Where, in
that case, would the cause of its existence lie or even that of its disappearance?
What does it mean, no longer being able to think a thought? But there is a
telling withdrawal from these liminal musings. Perhaps, he says, it is not yet
time to pose this problem:
perhaps we should wait until the archaeology of thought has been established
more firmly, until it has better got the measure [pris la mesure] of what it
is capable of describing directly and positively. until it has defined the
singular systems and internal connections it has to deal with, before
attempting to encompass thought and to investigate how it contrives to
escape itself. For the moment, then, let it suffice that we accept these
discontinuities in the simultaneously manifest and obscure empirical order
where they present themselves. (pp.5I-52; trans. mod.)
Perhaps archaeology is sufficiently frank to know that it is not yet assured
enough to interrogate thought on the way in which it escapes itself. Indeed,
perhaps archaeology knows its own limits. But would that not be a kind of
assuredness in itself? In fact. although it has not yet defined those singular
systems, perhaps archaeology's assuredness lies in the knowledge firstly, that
they exist, and secondly, that it is to them that it will direct itself. (The
Archaeology of Knowledge speaks of the notion of discontinuity as
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'paradoxical' because it is both an analytical instrument and a property of the
field or domain under scrutiny.) Archaeology's 'empiricism' would thus
finally not reside in its having definitively got, or taken, the measure of what
it is able to describe directly and positively; but, like Newton, Galileo and
Descartes, in a certain way of knowing in advance what it is that it is looking
for.
Constituting and encountering the thing
When one is concerned with method and persuaded that the manner of
taking the thing determines its nature, the quiddity of the thing can easily fall
from view. In this final section, and by way of a bridge into the next chapter,
which deals with the prise or 'grip' of a power that does more than take the
measure of the body, it is worth recalling that other task of phenomenological
thought, and of thought influenced by that tradition, which lies in approaching
'the thing' from another angle. That is to say, inquiring about that which
encounters us prior to its objectification into an object of experience. In The
Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault's stance towards 'things' hardens.
Rejecting the phenomenological thematic of the search for an immediate grasp
of the object, he ends up not only suppressing the stage of 'things themselves'
(p.48), but rendering 'things' too beholden to discourse, as when he speaks in
the same book of the discourses on madness each constituting their object and
working it to the point of 'transforming it altogether' (p.32). At other
moments the text is more equivocal. It speaks of substituting for the
'enigmatic treasure of "things" anterior to discourse, the regular formation of
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objects that stand out, take shape, are traced [se dessinent] only in discourse'
(p.47; trans. mod.). At bottom, though, the ground is provided by regulae:
'The "given", the datum [donne] of language is not the mere rending of a
fundamental silence [...] but, before all - or in any case before it (for it
depends on them) - the conditions according to which the enunciative function
operates' (p.112).
But a minimum appreciation of the thingness of the thing remains
important for Heidegger. In 'The Thing', where it is certainly not a question
of returning to 'things in themselves', Heidegger argues that one must think
the possibility that a thing things. This dimension of the thing which touches
us has been obscured by our particular understanding of the thing. The
Romans called a matter for discourse res. Res publica therefore means that
which concerns everyone and is hence deliberated in public. Heidegger shows
how this idea of concern or bearing upon becomes buried, only for the thing
to come to mean something-in-itself without reference to the human act of
representing, that is, 'without the opposing "ob-" by which it is first of all put
before this representing act'." Heidegger is obviously still interested in the
relation between human beings and things, but concerned to allow for a certain
phenomenality of the thing.
Strictly speaking. Foucault does not ignore this aspect of the thing. In
the preface to The Order of Things he writes of the dual task of applying a
'prior fprea/ab/e] criterion' to things but also of letting oneself be led by
77 Martin Heidegger, 'The Thing'. in Poetry, Language, Thought. trans. by Albert
Hofstadter (New YOlk: Harper and Row. 1975), p.ln.
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'qualities and forms':
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given, gives itself [se
donne] in things as their inner law, the secret network according to which
they in some way look at one another, and that which exists only through the
grid of a gaze, an attention, a language. (p.xx; trans. mod.)"
Certainly it is not a matter of a naive empiricism. The use of se donne, with
its simultaneously passive and reflexive possibilities, and the problems of
translation it poses, prevents that.79 And even if the thing were to give itself,
HusserI on retention and protention would go some way to disrupting the self-
presence, the self-presencing of the object and, by extension, the neatly-
periodized giving implied by the episteme." However, the word attention,
which means 'attention', 'examination' but also 'care', rediscovers something
of that subjective, concerned dimension to which Heidegger alludes, and it is
this 'ordering', as an activity, that will consume Foucault's attention. (The
distance that this marks from the earlier piece on Binswanger, where man is
the object, is apparent.") This is why we dissent from Paul Veyne's
conviction that Foucault's central insight is that things are the correlates of
78 The official translation rthe hidden network that determines the way they confront one
another') is too decisive here, coming down more on the side of order giving itself.
79 Derrida explores this in his piece on 'the Gift'. Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1.
Counterfeit Money, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
80 Husserl, Crisis, p.160.
81 Foucault writes of '8 form of analysis [...J whose principle and method are, in a word,
determined from the beginning only by the absolute privilege of their object: man or rather,
Being-man. the Menschsein' (p.10). If there is to be a detour through '8 more or less
Heideggerian philosophy', it should be clear that although such philosophical problems are
indeed present. 'they are not prior to [this man)' (p.14). The point about the Daseinanaiyse
is that it does not seek to apprehend a positivistic homo natura (p.lO). If its theme is to be
the human 'fact'. this is to be understood as 'the real content of an existence which is lived
and experienced, and is recognized or lost in a world that is simultaneously the plenitude of
his project and the "element" of his situation' (p.ll). Foucault,' Introduction' to Binswanger,
Le Rive et /' existence.
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practices, an object is only an object for the practice which objectivizes it:
practice and object are one," In Foucault practice wants to precede object.
In What Is a Thing? Heidegger talks about the Neo-Kantian
depreciation of intuition and its privileging of concepts. The Marburg school,
he says, went so far as to eliminate intuition altogether as a foreign body alien
to .the project of pure reason. Opposing this doctrine, Heidegger argues that
in fact we often only grasp that which precedes the thing after taking account
of some of the most obvious qualities of the thing. 'In the order of explicit
apprehension, what objectively precedes is later' (p.166). Likewise, in 'The
Origin of the Work of Art' Heidegger questions our ordering of things:
What could be more obvious than that man transposes his propositional way
of understanding things into the structure of the thing itself? Yet this view,
seemingly critical yet actually rash and ill-considered, would have to explain
first how such a transposition of propositional structure into the thing is
supposed to be possible without the thing having already become visible.
The question as to which comes first and functions as the standard,
proposition-structure or thing-structure, remains to this hour undecided. It
even remains doubtful whether in this form the question is at all
decidable,"
For Husserl, too, according to Derrida, the facticity of things remains
important:
Bodies, transcendent and natural things, are others in general for my
consciousness. They are outside, and their transcendence is the sign of an
already irreducible alterity. Levinas does not think so; Husserl does, and
thinks that 'other' already means something when things are in question.
Which is to take seriously the reality of the external world.M
Merleau-Ponty addresses the same theme in Phenomenologie de la perception:
Even then the thing presents itself to that same someone who perceives it as
12 Paul Veyne, 'Foucault revolutionne l'histoire', in his Comment on ecrtt t' histoire suivi
de Foucault rlvolutionne I'histoire (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978), p.218.
13 In Basic Writings, pp.l43-212 (p.l50).
14 Derrida. 'Violence and Metaphysics', p.l24.
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a thing in itself and poses the problem of a veritable in-itself-for-us. We do
not usually take any notice of it because our perception, in the context of the
things with which we busy ourselves, falls on things just enough to find once
more their familiar presence and not enough to rediscover the inhumanness
that hides there. But the thing ignores us, it rests in itself. (p.372)
Derrida, reading Husserl against Levinas, considers it a matter of refusing the
opposition between 'constituting' versus 'encountering' the other. To say, with
Sartre, that "'One encounters the Other, one does not constitute it'" (Being and
Nothingness), is, Derrida writes, 'to understand the word "constitution" in a
sense that Husserl often warns his readers against'.
Constitution is not opposed to encounter. It goes without saying that
constitution creates, constructs, engenders, nothing: neither existence, nor the
fact, which is evident, nor even meaning, which is less evident but equally
certain, provided that one takes some patient precautions, and provided that
one distinguishes the moments of passivity and activity within intuition, in
Husserl's sense, and the moment in which the distinction becomes
impossible. That is, in which the entire problematic opposing 'encounter'
to 'constitution' is no longer meaningful, or has only a derivative or
dependent meaning. [...J Let us simply recall this warning of Husserl's,
among so many others: 'Here too, as concerns the alter ego, the "constitution
of consciousness" (Bewusstseinleistung) does not mean that I invent (erfinde)
and that I make (mache) this supreme transcendence.' (In question is God.)
Inversely, does not the notion of encounter - a notion to which one
must refer, if one rejects all constitution, in the Husserlian sense of the term
- aside from being prey to empiricism, let it be understood that there is a
time and an experience without 'other' before the encounter? The
difficulties into which one is driven can be imagined. Husserl's
philosophical prudence on this matter is exemplary. The Cartesian
Meditations often emphasize that in fact, really, nothing precedes the
experience of Others."
This is an important passage. In the next chapter, and in others besides, it will
be seen that the relationship of constitution to encounter, which Foucault will
tend to construe precisely as an opposition, comes to occupy a critical position
in his thinking. For Foucault, going beyond Husserl, the impetus will indeed
lie with human inventing and making, with constitutional powers, not with that
which encounters. (In question is godlikeness.)
85 Derrida, 'Violence', pp.31S-316, n.44.
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The most brute thing encountered in The Order of Things is language.
The modem, Kantian episteme is to be superseded by a new Renaissance-like
arrangement in which the 'proper existence of language', 'this brute being'
forgotten since the sixteenth century, would be recaptured in a movement led
by the counter-discourse, literature. Megill is correct to say that this idea of
language owes much more to Mallarme and Blanchot than to Saussure. It is
language which, refusing easy referentiality, instead coils up on itself into a
'capsule' or pocket of energy." There is a sense in which a brute ontological
realm is being gestured to, a Heideggerian thematic in which language and the
experience of being are yoked together," The fundamental characteristic of
this literature would be precisely that nothing rules and determines its basic
movement. Not even itself. It would seem to offer itself, in other words, as
a non-axiomatic configuration. Language as the ontogenetic work of art. One
would need to question Foucault's tendency to think of literature in the
singular, as if there were but one and as if the being of avant-garde literatures
would always and everywhere produce the same definable effects. One would
also need to query - especially since it operates in our own time - what Megill
calls Foucault's metabasis, which consists in transferring on to areas other than
avant-garde literature, 'where everything is indeed at the call of our creativity
and our language' (Megill, p.l77), the peculiar effects wrought in that space.
The invocation, rather than the being, of literature functions
86 See Tom~ Abraham, Los senderos de Foucault (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Visi6n,
1989). In a piece called 'L'Arriere-Fable', in L'Arc, 29 (1966), 5-13, Foucault writes that it
is the 'ardent games' of fiction which restore to language the disequilibrium of its sovereign
powers (p.ll).
11 Wahl also highlights the parallel with Heidegger (Wahl, p.320, n.6).
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strategically in the book, a 'yes, yes' to a non-realm in which man is
dissolved. As with the call to literature in Histoire de la folie, it responds to
the obvious question 'what next?' with an answer which would appear to avoid
prescription while gesturing with Nietzschean affmnation to a beyond-man.
Foucault is conscious that an inquiry into the new order is, archaeologically
speaking, impossible, since no culture is capable of circumscribing the general
system of its knowledge. This is why, together with the call to literature, the
end of The Order of Things takes the fonn of speculation: 'if... then might
not ..1'. If this language is now emerging with ever greater insistence in a
unity which we must think but which, as we know, we cannot yet think, is this
not the sign that the entire current configuration is about to topple and that
man is in the process of perishing? But these are questions to which answers
cannot be given. They are an opening, though, onto a future thought
(p.386).88 As yet the disappearance of man announced by this new unity of
language cannot be thought, must remain the object of speculation. Yet this
is precisely what will have been thought and affirmed. Not just thought and
affirmed here but also in future projects, even where, apparently abandoning
archaeology, Foucault has supposedly given up his concern with that future
unity of language. The disappearance of the subject becomes a working
B8 Foucault's famous image of man being erased like a face in the sand finds an obvious
precursor in the Nietzschean overcoming of present day man and merest glimpse of the
overman, specifically in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book/or Everyone and No one, trans. by
RJ. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1969), p.4l: '00 you want to be the ebb of this great tide,
and return to the animals rather than overcome man?' Derrida is similarly engaged in
articulating the thinking of the closure of the age of the sign: the need to 'designate the crevice
through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be glimpsed' (Derrida, 0/
Grammatology, p.l4). I think an important difference between Foucault and Derrida relates
to their respective attitudes towards thinking the end. I shall return to this point in Chapters
3 and 4.
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assumption, one of those things that Foucault will take in advance. The risk,
then (and I repeat that the book's detail and weave are much richer than its
theory), consists in laying down a method in The Order of Things that seems
concerned with a way of proceeding, where way is understood as a path
already known in advance, not as movement opening up an unknown one."
Foucault more or less knows the way, is already on the way. in position to see
clearly and distinctly those things which he has already pictured in his mind's
eye.90
Robert Sokolowski stoutly defends HusserI from the suggestion that
mathematical entities and categorical objects form the basic model for
constitution. He argues that although such objects did represent the first
instance of constitutional analysis, the schema which dominates Husserl's first
systematic conception of constitution is that of sense data apprehended or
interpreted by intentions, sensory 'matter' animated by intentional 'form'
(Sokolowski, p.202). It is thus incorrect, he continues, to say that HusserI first
develops his theory of constitution for categorical objects and then expands it
from them to all reality. Such an opinion would suggest that Husserl tries to
treat all of reality in a manner analogous to the way he treats logical, and
89 Cf. Heidegger on philosophy: 'It spreads only indirectly, by devious paths that can never
be laid out in advance' (cited in Megill, p.l77). Megill points to the titles of three of
Heidegger's more important essay collections: Holzwege (Woodpaths); Wegmarken (Trail
Markers); and Unterwegs zur Sprache (On the Way to Language).
90 Compare Pierre Riviere, who writes his account long after his murderous deeds but
underlines that his memoirs were 'already completely written in advance in his head'. Michel
Foucault, 'Les Meurtres qu'on raconte', in Moi, Pierre Riviere, ayant ~gorg~ma mere, ma
soeur et mon frere ...: Un cas de parricide au xi:t steele, ed. by Michel Foucault et al (Paris:
Editions Gallimard/Julliard, 1973), pp.265-275 (p.267).
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among them mathematical, entities. No such expansion occurs.
In the next chapter, I shall examine Foucaultian genealogy, the
methodological treatment of sociological as opposed to narrowly
epistemological subject matter. Exploring what might be involved in the
difference between constitution and construction, I shall suggest that a certain
'expansion' of constitutionalist analysis, such as that denied by Sokolowski
apropos of Husserl, does in fact take place in Discipline and Punish, extending
its reach from the narrowly conceptual to 'reality' as a whole.
86
CHAPTER2
DISCIPLINE, THE MACHINE, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF
BECOMING NIETZSCHEAN
Introduction
I sought to show in the first chapter that what underwrites Foucault's
theory of archaeology in The Order of Things is a form of apriori
conceptualism. The present chapter moves away from archaeology to
Foucault's practice of genealogy, though one of its contentions will be to
suggest that the movement from one to the other is far from simply 'away'.
If,with a book like Discipline and Punish, we appear to have stepped out of
the epistemological narrowly defined and into a form of social epistemology,
the work of constitutionalist thinking becomes, for Foucault, all the more
urgent. In the first chapter, I used Heidegger to gain a purchase on Foucault.
In this chapter, it will be Nietzsche. The chapter will consider Discipline and
Punish in the light of Nietzsche's thought, especially the second essay of his
Genealogy of Morals, which represents an obvious source-text for Foucault's
book. It will look particularly at the relationship that Foucault's text traces
between power and the body in the constitution of subjects. Perhaps
'construction' is the more appropriate term. For there are strong grounds for
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believing that Discipline and Punish represents a literalization of the guiding
metaphor of modem social 'constructionism'. Foucault's text takes the
figurative sense of a 'construct' as defined by a mentalist tradition and seeks
to literalize the metaphor, suggesting that bodies and individuals are
themselves constructed, in the sense of made or fabricated, not merely
imagined, and that much less does this construction take place in the mind.
Nonetheless, if Foucault's depiction of the disciplines is structured by the
modem conceptual and semantic horizon of construction (with all its
connotations of the architectural and of geometricity), it is also marked by two
older traditions: 1. By a Classical thematics which accords the eye an undue,
but,for the maintenance of its logic, necessary, privilege (and this emerges
most strongly in his treatment of the Panopticon); 2. By the inescapable
tradition of logos. In other words, Foucault's literalization of constructionism
is figured precisely by the metaphor of the machine, albeit a machine with a
necessarily congenital flaw. Paradoxically, by analysing the theme of
exemplarity I shall show how the machine can function only on condition that
the principal example of disciplinary subjection, namely, prisoners, be in
reality the least exemplary.
In all of the above, I shall also be questioning the extent to which
Foucault's practice might accurately be termed Nietzschean. Is Foucault, as
Said maintains, the 'greatest of Nietzsche's modem disciples'?' An early
reply would be to suggest that the word 'disciple', and specifically the
I Edward Said, 'Michel Foucault, 1926-1984', in After Foucault. p.1.
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'discipline' which being a disciple would entail, is precisely at issue.' (The
mathematical, as taking and learning, has not left the scene.) I shall argue that
despite marked affinities, Foucault diverges from Nietzsche in certain very
significant respects. My main argument towards the end of the chapter will
be that Foucault practises a laundering of Nietzsche, such that the Nietzsche
who said many (for our refined sensibilities) shocking things about many
social groups (the French were one of the few groups to emerge relatively
untouched), can suddenly be appropriated for the ends of a 'socialist sympathy'
which Nietzsche, whose expression this is, would have scorned. At the root
of this laundering, I detect an Apollonianism in Foucault which cannot think
the plural demands and the variegated effects of discipleship and discipline,
which cannot brook the suggestion made by Nietzsche that 'the essential and
invaluable element in every morality is that it is a protracted constraint'. Of
course, in one respect Foucault would not want to be Nietzschean. He would
say that his theory of disciplinary technology goes beyond Nietzsche's idealist
conception of the formation of consciousness. The question I shall address
throughout this chapter, though principally in the [mal section, is whether this
modification, this updating of the Nietzschean apparatus, merits the patent.
Does Foucault even want to be Nietzschean and if so why? What is
at stake in being, or better in becoming, Nietzschean? If it will take the length
of the chapter to answer the second question, the first one is more
straightforward. Although hardly garrulous about influences, as we saw in
2 Disciple is from the Latin disc;pulus 'leamer', from discere 'to learn'. Discipline is from
the Latin disciplina, itself from discipulus.
89
Chapter one, Foucault unambiguously lays claim to Nietzsche's mantle. In
'Prison Talk', he speaks of giving his general project the title of 'the genealogy
of'morals'.' In another interview, he specifies that the Nietzschean texts which
most appeal to him are The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Moralsf
Likewise, when he aims at a 'genealogy of the modem "soul''' in Discipline
and Punish, the Nietzschean strain is unmistakable.S The essay 'Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History' is perhaps the greatest rallying cry of all and as such
offers itself as an obvious point of entry into a Nietzsche-Foucault
comparison." What the essay certainly makes clear is that it is not Nietzsche
tout court who holds Foucault's attention but Nietzsche qua genealogist ('Why
does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (Ursprung), at least on those
occasions when he is truly a genealogist?'}. No less clearly it stakes out the
opposing historiographical traditions: that is, the pursuit of the origin (' an
attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and
their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence
of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession'
[p.78]) versus the practice of genealogy, which is
to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the
accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals - the
3 Foucault, Power/Know/edge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 37-54 (p.53).
• Michel Foucault, 'An Historian of Culture', in Foucault Live: (Interviews, 1966-84),
trans. by John Johnston, ed. by Sylvere Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), pp.73-88
(p.77) (first publ. as 'Un Dibattito Foucault-Preti' in II Bimestrein (1973».
5 Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison (Editions Gallimard, 1975); Discipline and
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1977; repro 1986), p.29.
6 In The Foucault Reader, pp.76-100.
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errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those
things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth
or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the
exteriority of accidents. (p.St)'
The essay, with its proliferating oppositive structures and powerful eloquence,
moves to the rhythm of the manifesto and it becomes difficult to imagine how
anyone could ever have believed in stable continuities, could ever not have
been a genealogist. As Foucault says of the search for descent, 'What
convictions and, far more decisively, what knowledge can resist it?' (p.82).
But for all its suasive power, the essay limits itself to speaking about
something it does not itself practise," And for that reason, and in order to
offer a respectful resistance to genealogy, a resistance it thrives on, Ileave the
essay in favour of Foucault's most explicit practice of genealogy, that is,
Discipline and Punish, though not without first guarding against the decidedly
ungenealogical position of reducing the genealogical method to a pure origin
and proper name 'Nietzsche'. 9
Nietzsche, Foucault and the example
Let us remind ourselves of the content of Discipline and Punish.
Foucault's basic contention in that text is that the nature of punishment
underwent profound change around the end of the eighteenth, beginning of the
, A footnote shows Foucault is glossing Nietzsche, Genealogy, III, 17.
I Rabinow remarks alongside his reproduction of the essay that 'its importance, in terms
of understanding Foucault's objectives, cannot be exaggerated' (The Foucault Reader, p.76).
Fine. But Foucault would say that objectives and practice are different matters.
9 Dominique Lecourt shows that at least one other influence on Foucault could just as well
be considered a philosopher of the descent of concepts: Georges Canguilhem. Lecourt,
Marxism and Epistemology, pp.176-177.
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nineteenth, century and not only in France. This change could not be
attributed neatly to any process of humanization but implied, rather, an altered
tactics of power and a mutation of the very target of punishment. (That said,
there is arguably not a word Foucault pronounces on the subject of prisons and
punishment which does not have as its aim the amelioration, the rendering
more humane, of both these things.)" The disappearance of the supp/ice
('torture', 'public execution' or 'scaffold') in France is but one sign that the
body also disappeared as the major target of penal repression. The body is
subsequently replaced by the soul and 'the expiation that once rained down
upon the body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the
heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations' (p.16).
But this throws up the obvious problem: if this new regime was so
preoccupied with the idea of making an example of offenders, why does it
witness the virtual takeover of the prison, that '''place of darkness in which the
citizen' s eye cannot count the victims, in which consequently their number is
lost as an example'" (p.115)?11 The answer, traced out across more than a
hundred pages, is precisely genealogical: only from that point of view which
mistakenly assumes the prison to have evolved naturally and strictly from
within the penal system does there look to be a sudden break and an
irreconcilable logic of the prison form and the example. In point of fact, the
prison form takes shape outside the judiciary apparatus; it is born of the
10 And especially the abolition of the death penalty in France. See Michel Foucault, 'Les
Deux Morts de Pompidou',Le Nouvel Observateur,4 December 1972, pp.56-57.
II Foucaultquotesfrom C.E.Dufriche deValaz~, Des lois penates (1784), pp.344-345.
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formation of a disciplinary society, a generalization throughout the social fabric
of disciplinary techniques for seizing, classifying, observing and working on
the body. This, then, is his third regime of punishment, which returns once
more to the body. The great difference from the punishments imagined by the
Reformers, and also, as we shall see, from Nietzsche's narrative of the
formation of memory and conscience through punishment,
is to be found in the procedure of access to the individual. the way in which
the punishing power gets control over him [se donne prise sur lUll. the
instruments that it sets to work: in order to achieve this transformation; it is
in the technology of the penalty. not in its theoretical foundation (p.l27)
Now, the majority of this chapter will concern itself with questions of
this procedure and this technology. But before I move to explore those aspects
at length, I should like to highlight what I believe is a sleight of hand on
Foucault's part regarding the division of punitive regimes. This will involve
analysing the theme of the 'example' as it runs its course and meets its
untimely demise in the chapter called 'The Spectacle of the Scaffold'. It will
also entail an initial approximation to Nietzsche's second essay from the
Genealogy of Morals, "Guilt," "Bad Conscience," and the Like', though it
should be noted that in the book Foucault refers neither to this text nor to any
other by Nietzsche."
Nietzsche's essay throws the discussion of souls, conscience and
memory back beyond the point at which Foucault takes up the cudgels, back
to a primeval scene. Nietzsche's argument is that the development of the
conscience can be attributed to two processes: that of forgetfulness as an active
12 The Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic. trans. by Horace B. Samuel (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1910; repro 1923).
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power allowing a temporary shutting of the doors and windows of the mind,
so as to make room for the more noble functions such as foresight and
predetermination: and that of memory as a check on forgetfulness, ensuring
that where promises are made there arises an active refusal to get rid of the
indented impression. Nietzsche surmises:
How thoroughly, in order to be able to regulate the future in this way, must
man have first learnt to distinguish between necessitated and accidental
phenomena, to think causally, to see the distant as present and to anticipate
it, to fix with certainty what is the end, and what is the means to that end;
above all, to reckon, to have power to calculate - how thoroughly must man
have first become calculable. disciplined. necessitated even for himself and
his own conception of himself, that, like a man entering into a promise, he
could guarantee himself as a future. (pp.62-63)
But this is the end of the process, the sovereign, wilful. dominating individual.
For Nietzsche the anterior problem was how a memory was to be made for the
animal-man. '''How is an impression to be so deeply fixed upon this
ephemeral understanding, half dense, and half silly. upon this incarnate
forgetfulness, that it will be permanently present?" (pp.65-66). Though
Nietzsche is silent on this point. were this question articulated by a
contemporary of animal-man itwould itself betray the workings of a thinking,
calculating being who was already, paradoxically, a later man. It would thus
not be the natural birth of man's conscience that was at stake in this already
differentiated social field. but its formation by virtue of a deployment of tactics
and a strategy of power. Which is why Nietzsche will be of such importance
to Foucault. Man was not born with a conscience, Nietzsche is saying; one
was fashioned for him. But to return to the question of making a memory.
something must be burnt in. Nietzsche says, 'only that which never stops
hurting remains in his memory' (p.68).
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In Foucault's scheme, memory is certainly in play, but with an
important difference. Let me select certain elements of 'The Spectacle of the
Scaffold', since they will help us to understand the equivocation in that chapter
on the question of the example. The supplice must, firstly, produce a certain
amount of regulated pain, such that there is a correlation between the pain
inflicted and the gravity of the crime. The supplice must also make its mark
both on and around the victim's body and on the memory of those present.
In addition, the truth of a crime must form part of the ceremony of the
supplice, that is to say, the criminal must proclaim his crime and publically
confess his guilt, It is important to grasp that because the law represents the
direct extension of the sovereign's will, in every offence 'there was a crimen
majestatis and in the least criminal a potential regicide' (pp.53-54), which
means that the supplice is therefore to constitute reparation for the sovereign
as much as the immediate victim. The execution of the sentence is thus not
supposed to be a measured extraction of pain in proportion to the original
injury caused; it should be a display, a theatrical enactment, of dissymmetry
and excess, an emphatic affirmation of the sovereign's natural superiority and
physical force. The body is thus simultaneously the point of application of the
punishment and the locus of extortion of the truth. However, the interpretation
of this procedure offered by the jurists of the eighteenth century ('if severe
penalties are required, it is because their example must be deeply inscribed in
the hearts of men') Foucault describes as 'restrictive' and "rnodemist'". In
fact, he says, what had underpinned the practice of the supp/ice was not an
economy of example. as the ideotogues would have understood it. but a policy
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of terror - to make everyone aware of the unrestrained presence of the
sovereign." But a few pages later the example is allowed back in. For the
theatre must have an audience. In fact Foucault suggests that in the
ceremonies of the supplice the people were the main actors. An execution in
secret would scarcely have had any meaning: 'The aim was to make an
example, not only by making people aware that the slightest offence was likely
to be punished, but by arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power
letting its anger fall upon the guilty person' (p.58).
Three things suggest themselves. First, to insist on this aim of making
an example of the condemned is to target the workings of some kind of
internal process, a basic calculation, a triggering of memory or a process of
reasoning redolent of Nietzsche's 'conscience'. Second, despite the workings
of a lexical network in the chapter around the mass and bodyliness of the
corps supplicie (note especially the adjectives 'real', 'immediate', 'corporal',
'material'), it is not simply a matter of a brute, zero-degree body in isolation,
but of a spectatorial apprehension of it (Nietzsche writes that ancient man
'only knew how to find a meaning in suffering from the standpoint of the
spectator'. Whence, too, the importance of the eyes of God as bestowers of
meaning on the process of suffering [p.77].) Third. then. the point of
application of the penalty and the point at which the effects of punishment are
aimed are not the same. If anyone's soul is in play, it is the soul of others.
13 Nietzsche makes a similar point about rewriting the past in the light of modern concerns.
For him, punishment has historically been overloaded with utilities, which 'makes it all the
more permissible to eliminate one supposed utility, which passes, at any rate in the popular
mind, for its most essential utility' (p.9S), namely, punishing in order to excite 'bad
conscience', guilt, remorse.
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And that difference is decisive. Foucault is describing a body-for-others:
Damiens is executed so that others may be terrified, so that the memory of
others may be sharpened.
This is important for Foucault's case concerning reform. For the
people's role in the supplice was ambiguous. In this festive spectacle there is
always room for identification with the condemned, there is always the
possibility of satumalian carnival and of revolt. And it is the suppression of
this possibility, Foucault argues, that will in part determine the movement for
reform. Hence, the critique of the supp/ice is rooted first and foremost not in
a movement of humanization (though he does not deny this factor), but in an
economic principle: the old regime was irregular, arbitrary, lacunary,
unpredictable; it was at core a poor economy of power. In the face of a rising
tide of illegalities the issue was thus: 'Not to punish less, but to punish better;
to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more
universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the
social body' (p.82).
In this altered punitive economy it is a matter of calculating the
punishment with a view to preventing a repetition of the crime. Now, this
'exemplary function' of punishment had been around for centuries:
But the difference is that the prevention that was expected as an effect of the
punishment and its spectacle - and therefore of its excess [d~mesure] - tends
now to become the principle of its economy and the measure [mesure] of its
just proportions. One must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition.
(p.93; trans. mod.).
This passage makes it clear that there is no quantum leap involved in the shift
from one punitive regime to another. It is, rather, a matter of measure and
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proportion, of economy. 'The example,' he writes, 'is no longer a ritual that
manifests; it is a sign that serves as an obstacle.' What he calls 'The rule of
sufficient ideality' elucidates the link between sign and economy:
If the motive of a crime is the advantage expected of it, the effectiveness of
the penalty is the disadvantage expected of it. This means that the 'pain' at
the heart of punishment is not the actual sensation of pain, but the idea of
pain. displeasure. inconvenience - the 'pain' of the idea of 'pain'.
Punishment thus has to set to work not the body, but representation. Or
rather, if it sets the body to work, it is insofar as it is less the subject of a
pain than the object of a representation: the memory of pain must prevent a
repetition of the crime, just as the spectacle, however artificial it may be. of
a physical punishment may prevent the contagion of a crime. (p.94; trans.
mod.)
There is thus a displacement in the point of application of this new power: no
longer the body but the mind (/'esprit) or rather 'a play of representations and
signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of
all' .14 The sign-obstacles must be as natural, intelligible and calculable as
possible such that the mere idea of the offence will be enough to arouse the
sign of the punishment in the mind of he who dreams of the crime. Whereas
formerly the example rested on terror, it now rests on the lesson, the discourse,
the decipherable sign, the reactivation of the code.
All well and good, but if this regime was so preoccupied with the
example, why does it witness the rapid spread of the prison, that place where
the example is, by definition, lost from sight? When Foucault looks at three
early models of punitive imprisonment, he sees that the three (the maison de
force at Ghent, the English model, the Walnut Street Prison, Philadelphia)
evinced a number of characteristics little different in general terms from the
punishments imagined by the reformers: importance of the work ethic;
14 Cf. The Order of Things (p.l46) onClassical representation.
98
techniques of isolation to foster remorse; strict timetabling and surveillance of
activities. But what he also sees, as we have noted, is the disparity at the level
of the technology of correction. Not signs and representations, then, but an
altogether different apparatus. 'The point of application of the penalty,' he
writes, 'is not the representation, but the body, time, everyday gestures and
activities; the soul, too, but in so far as it is the seat [siege] of habits.' And
to achieve this control over the prisoner, not signs but timetables, compulsory
movements, silence, good habits, observation. All of which not only renders
the dimension of the spectacle useless: it excludes it. In fact the prison's
coercion of individuals gains in efficiency and consistency in proportion to the
secrecy and autonomy of its workings.
Now to take stock, the purpose of including a discussion of the
reformers' 'soul' is perhaps twofold. First, it allows him to stress the
importance of economy and thereby counter the argument of humanization and
progress: they were not being more humane, just aiming, for reasons of
efficacy, at a different target. Second. it drives a wedge between the two eras
in which the body is targeted and thereby suggests a fundamentally different
technology of power. However. the difference between the reformers' aim and
that of the new disciplinary technology is aggrandized by a sleight of hand
regarding bodies and souls. The body in fact never disappeared as the target
of punishment: people continued to be chastised. shackled and manhandled
during the reforms. Foucault simply speaks. makes the reformers speak. of
another object. that is, the souls of those on whom punishment is not exercised
directly. To say that the point of application of the penalty was signs and
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representations is to pass over the one who is punished while taking his body
as an object for others (if the body is set to work, 'it is insofar as it is less the
subject of a pain than the object of a representation'). Naturally the 'soul'
rises to prominence here, but the soul of others, more economically targeted
in a two-for-the-price-of-one deal, whereby the authorities not only punish the
offender but also allow the effects of that punishment to work on others.
Small wonder that the example is at the heart of this regime. The difference
in the new regime, therefore, is not that the body is suddenly, albeit
differently, targeted once more, but that the point of application of the penalty
and the effects of that application are to fall on the body and soul of the same
person, that is, on the punished one himself. In other words, the prisoner is
made an example for himself, this time it is his memory and his conscience
which are brought into play. And if, as a result, the question of the example
for others disappears almost completely from the book, it is not that the
example disappears de facto from punishment. In speaking of codes, writing
and lessons, Foucault has already shown wherein lies the example for others;
representation does not disappear, it coexists with the new technology. It is
simply that it is put in abeyance, Foucault preferring to concentrate on the
body-for-itself in an advanced form of the constitution argument which holds
that the new punitive technology itself produces a new object.
Discipline and the body
The question of exemplarity, and of a telling break in the circuit which
would otherwise hold apart the example for himself from the example for
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others, will be taken up at a later stage. For now, the question of discipline
imposes itself. The new, disciplinary mode of operating on the body forms the
main substance of the book and marks Foucault's distance from Nietzsche. It
is not that Nietzsche shows no interest in the body. In the section entitled 'Of
the Despisers of the Body' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he writes:
But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely,
and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body.
The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war
and a peace, a herd and a herdsman.
Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call 'spirit', is also
an instrument of your body, a little instrument and toy of your great
intelligence.
You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this
- although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence,
which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'.IS
It is, rather, that when it comes to the means of taming the body's 'great
intelligence', Nietzsche will firstly place much heavier stress than ever
Foucault does on the realm of ideas; 16 and secondly, when he does speak of
the work of social forces and organizations, as in the Second Essay from the
Genealogy (pp.99-104), it will be without the attention to detail that Foucault
insists is proper to the disciplines, without an exploration of the precise
'technology' of subjection. Strictly speaking, though, the difference between
the two thinkers is not conftnable to the difference between an idealist and a
materialist theory of subjection.
I shall cover in five schematic points what I take to be the central
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book/or Everyone and No One, trans.
by RJ. HoUingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1961; repro 1969), pp. 61-62.
16 'THE GOLDEN MAXIM:- Man has been bound with many chains, in order that he may
forget to comport himself like an animal... these chains, however, are, as I repeat again and
again, the ponderous and significant errors of moral, religious, and metaphysical ideas.'
Nietzsche, The Wanderer and his Shadow in Human. All-Too-Human: A Book/or Free Spirits,
trans. by Paul V. Cohen, 2 vols (London: Allen and Unwin, repro 1924), II, 350, pp.362-363.
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features of Foucault's argument in the section 'Discipline', which stands as a
great genealogical tapestry, a complex constitutional weave: of power, of
knowledge, of subjects. 1. The section has the odour of brico/age. Foucault
eschews the discourse of pristine origins and historical continuity. He will
assert repeatedly the contingent, opportunistic nature of the new technology
which, to gain a purchase, borrows 'whatever is at hand' (in Levi-Strauss'
phrase). Thus, the eighteenth century's disciplinary methods, Foucault is quick
to concede, had long been in existence. Their peculiarity, however, lies in
their capacity to increase the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility)
while diminishing those same forces (in political terms of obedience).
Likewise, the 'invention' of this new 'political anatomy' should not be
understood as a sudden discovery, but grasped as 'a multiplicity of often minor
processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap [...]
converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method' (p.138).
These processes were already at work in secondary education, then in primary
schools, hospitals, military organizations. Again, the 'detail' of the disciplines
had long since been a category of theology and asceticism (in the eyes of God,
no detail is insignificant), but the laicized version of discipline values detail
'not so much for the meaning that it conceals within it as for the hold [prise]
it provides for the power that wishes to seize it' (p.140).11 This colonization
of life's mundane details reads like a cynical, if brilliant, variation on
Nietzsche's aphorism that the priest and metaphysician's reverence for the
17 Cf. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989) on the move of Christian asceticism out of the monastery and its methodical
penetration of the 'market-place of life' (p.154).
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most important things does not stop us thinking the despised everyday things
more Important."
2. The methodological presupposition is anti-Cartesian, challenging
that tradition's tendency to purify notions of the body and the soul, to
demarcate thing from consciousness, object from subject. For Foucault,
process and object are correlatives. An object does not lie around in stately
autarky, but is in some sense 'produced' by the process seeking to apprehend
it. The influence of work in the history of sciences on objectification is telling
here. And also the opposition to phenomenology. Husserl speaks of having
objects 'solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them'
(Cartesian Meditations, p.37). Foucault reinscribes the words 'correlate' and
'correlative' between objects and practices rather than between objects and
consciousness. This methodological tenet already informs The Order of
Things; here, however, the practices are invested by power and techne as much
as by theory." Thus he says that the distribution of individuals in space, the
assiduous control of their activities, and the whole disciplinary apparatus of
observation, recording and training 'fabricates' individuals. In short, the body
itself is directly involved in a political field; 'power relations effect [operent]
an immediate hold [prise immediate] upon it' (p.25; trans. mod.). I shall
comment later on the use of the verb prendre - to seize, hold, grip, catch - to
18 Nietzsche, The Wanderer and his Shadow, S, p.18S.
19 Lecourt writes that Gaston Bachelard stressed that contemporary sciences contain a
technique for the production of phenomena - 'phenomeno-technics' - which 'enables us to
understand in what sense the word "production" is to be understood: not only the "theoretical"
production of concepts, but indissociably the material production of the object of theoretical
labour; of what can no longer be called its "data" or "givens" (donnles), but rather its
"material": Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology, p.l37.
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describe the action of power. Again, as in The Order of Things, this touches
on the value of the subject. Power's hold on the body is undoubtedly to do
with the body qua force of production, he says, but the latter is only made
possible if the body is caught in a system of subjection (assujettissement).
Here Foucault tries to cut through what Mark Poster sees as the weakness of
Marx's theory of labour, namely, his adoption of the Hegelian subpremise
according to which the social field consists of subjects (labourers) and objects
(matter). Even if, in Marx's theory of alienation, the labourer under capitalism
becomes the object of the machine, the model of subject acting upon object
still smacks of a Judeo-Christian creationism and of the idealism characteristic
of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
In that book the slave-worker represents human freedom not so much
because he manipulates things, but because he establishes an idea of what he
wants to make and then produces in the world a material artifact that
represents that idea. The slave-worker in that way derives a sense of his
powers, a confidence that his subjectivity can be the basis for the order of
the world. [...J Things operate much the same way in Marx's texts. One
can argue that the 'materialism' of the labor premise is deceiving, that it has
rather a loud note of idealism, that Marx celebrates and analyzes not the
grime of the body's activity but the power of the mind over it The entire
analysis of the organization and exploitation of labor is subordinate, in one
sense, to Marx's conviction that the subject's freedom to act upon its ideas
is violated under the capitalist mode of production,"
3. Foucault targets Althusser (though he never names him). His
argument (following Althusser) is that the experience of being a subject is
itself produced but that (departing from him) this subjection is neither achieved
simply through violence nor simply through ideology." Not everything need
20 Mark Poster, Foucaull, Marxism and History: Mode of Production Versus Mode of
Information (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), pp.51-52. Cf. Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism',
in Basic Writings, p.220.
21 There is a mistranslation in the English version: 'Cet assujettissement n'est pas obtenu
par les seuls instruments soit de la violence soit de l'ideologie' (Surveil/er, p.31) becomes
'This subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can also
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pass by way of the dichotomy direct repression versus ideology (and we recall
that Althusser placed the prison under the rubric 'Repressive State
Appararuses')." Subjection can be direct, physical, bear on material
elements, yet not be violent; it can be calculated, subtle, and yet remain
physical. The following passage has the name' Althusser' writ large across it.
The 'political technology of the body'
is diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous. systematic discourse; it is often
made up of bits and pieces; it puts to work a disparate set of tools or
methods. In spite of the coherence of its results, it is generally no more than
a multifonn instrumentation. Moreover, it cannot be localized in a
particular type of institution or state apparatus. For they have recourse to
it; they use, select or impose certain of its methods. But, in its mechanisms
and its effects, it is situated at a quite different level. What the apparatuses
and institutions put in to play is, in a sense, a micro-physics of power, whose
field of validity is situated in a sense between these great functionings and
the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces. (p.26; trans.
mod.; my emphasis)
Although Althusser did stress that the ideas making up ideology have a
material existence, so long as ideology continues to be posited primarily as a
'system of representations', as 'images and concepts', what Foucault would
call the 'point of application' of ideology tends, in Althusser, to be 'a human
subject on the lines of the model provide by classical philosophy, endowed
with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize on'." A
consciousness (false or otherwise) which, as the target of control, would at any
rate always have the consolation of at least standing in the relation of executor
..: (p.26).
12 See Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) (paris: Flammarion, 1989), p.50ff for
the friendship between Foucault and Althusser (who taught him).
23 Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an
Investigation)', Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New Left Books. 1971),
p.156; 'Marxism and Humanism', For Marx (London: Penguin Press, 1969), p.233; Foucault,
'Body!Power', Power/Knowledge, p.58.
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to its own body. And consequently the possibility of a different type of work
on the body goes unexplored.
4. Closely allied to the above, power is not secondary; 'power
produces; it produces reality [du reel]; it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth'. This is the famous heart of his argument: power produces
reality (du reel means some, not all). A heart without desire which
nonetheless functions as desire does for Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-
Oedipus." This technology of power produces (in fact he uses the verb
susciter) the next best thing to a heart, namely a soul. And here Foucault
follows Nietzsche, who argues that man's soul is the result both of a massive
internalization, which takes place when he is forced into the constraints of
social organization, and of the ensuing formation of 'bad conscience' or guilt,
Nietzsche is scathing about the modern subject and its soul, both of which
have been believed in, he says, because they make possible to the weak and
oppressed the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom and
something meritorious." Elsewhere he argues that the concept of free will
has been invented by theologians essentially for the purpose of punishment.
'Men were thought of as "free" so that they could become guilty: consequently,
every action had to be thought of as willed, the origin of every action as lying
in the consciousness'. 26 Nietzsche calls this the most rudimentary form of
24 'If desire is productive. it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only
reality' (Deleuze and Guattarl, p.26).
2S Nietzsche, '"Good and Evil," "Good and Bad"', first essay of Genealogy of Morals, 13.
~ Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: or How to Philosophize with a Hammer, trans.
by RJ. HoUingdale (London: Penguin Books. 1990). p.63.
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psychology, that finds support in a metaphysics of language 'which sees
everywhere deed and doer, [...J which believes in will as cause in general'
(Twilight, p.48). He stresses that throughout the better part of human history
no suggestion of having to do with a 'guilty man' manifested itself in the
consciousness of the man who judged and punished. One had merely to deal
with an author of an injury, an irresponsible piece of fate. And the man
himself, on whom the punishment subsequently fell like a piece of fate, was
occasioned no more of an 'inner pain' than would be occasioned by the
sudden approach of some uncalculated event, some terrible natural
catastrophe ('"Guilt"', p.97)27
Foucault adopts this scheme in Discipline and Punish (and in Histoire
de lafolie and the first volume of The History of Sexuality alike). In the penal
system, one judges the individual as much as the crime. This is what he
means when he remarks that 'one punishes acts of aggression, but through
them, aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversion; murders that are also
drives and desires' (p.17). It is difficult. in truth, to see how the criminal
justice system could dispense with the individual and judge solely the crime.
But Foucault's task is to indict the massive abuse of this tendency. That is to
say, the fashioning by a powerful scientifico-juridical complex of an entire
teratology of criminal 'species' - generically gathered under the rubric of the
'delinquent' - with a view to locating the essential origin and explanation of
27Nietzsche argues similarly that throughout the longest part of human history the value
of an action was derived from its consequences. Over the past ten thousand years, on the other
hand, the value of an action has gradually come to be determined by its origin. But a fateful
new superstition took root whereby men came to confuse origin with intention, thinking and
thus valuing the intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action: 'it is under the sway
of this prejudice that one has morally praised, blamed. judged and philosophized on earth
almost to the present day.' Nietzsche suspects, on the contrary, that the decisive value of an
action 'resides in precisely that which is not intentional in it'. And when he continues that 'all
that in it which is intentional, all of it that can be seen, known, "conscious", still belongs to
its surface and skin - which, like every skin, betrays something but conceals still more'
(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. by RJ.
Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1973; repro 1990), p.63), we are not only standing on
the threshold of the extra-moral period, but waiting for Freud and Foucault.
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criminal acts in the will or anatomy (phrenology's famous bumps) of the
individual qua delinquent. The idea of this normalizing, pathologizing order
is to get a hold 'not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what
they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be'. What it manages to get
a hold on is what he calls the 'soul supplement' (supplement d'dme). The
difference from Nietzsche is that this internalization is accomplished by techne.
And he insists, in a remarkable passage of which I cite just a part, that this
soul is real enough:
This real, non-corporal soul is not a substance: it is the element in which are
articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a
certain type of knowledge, the machinery [I' engrenage] by which power
relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends
and reinforces power-effects. On this reality-reference, various concepts
have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out [dlcoupl): pysche,
subjectivity. personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific
techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism. But let there
be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of knowledge,
philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted for the
soul. the illusion of the theologians. The man described for us, whom we
are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more
profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence,
which is itself a factor [piece] in the mastery that power exercises over the
body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul
is the prison of the body. (pp.29-30; trans. mod.)
The remainder of the book is dedicated to showing exactly how that
soul and that disciplinary individual are produced by power. But. and to
anticipate the critique I shall attempt shortly, when Foucault affirms that power
'produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production' (p.194), much
rides on the value of the word and concept 'production'. At a theoretical
level, Foucault will understand production as both process and ensemble
produced. In terms of his analysis, however, he will intimate that the latter, .
with its sense of completion, carries the day.
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5. Finally - and he is patently not the first - Foucault links this
process of disciplinary individualization to the technical emergence of the
human sciences, for the two share the same instruments, techniques of
measurement, and general knowledge of populations." For a long time, he
writes, ordinary individuality remained below the threshold of description: it
was the privilege of kings and the doers of great deeds. The disciplinary
methods reversed this relation, lowering the threshold of describable
individuality. Whence the importance in Foucault's scheme of the examination
(the presence of which gestures also to the moment of the book's composition,
to the on-going student militancy in the aftermath of May '68), whose great
apparatus of writing allowed it to open up two 'correlative possibilities', recto
and verso of a dialectical model of constitution:
firstly, the constitution of the individual as a describable, analysable object
[...] under the gaze of a pennanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly, the
constitution of a comparative system that made possible the measurement of
overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of
collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their
distribution in a given 'population'. (p.l90)
In other words, the examination echoes the legal system in making each
individual a 'case', an object of knowledge and a hold (prise) for power.
Without ever mentioning Nietzsche, Foucault's genealogy of the human
sciences' ignoble origins follows Nietzsche in challenging the fundamental
faith of metaphysicians, that is, the faith in antithetical values. Nietzsche,
mimicking the voice of a metaphysician:
28 Owen Chadwick recounts that the growth of historical determinism in the nineteenth
century was bound up with new collections of statistics in modem censuses and the origins of
the social sciences. The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; repro 1990), p.203.
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'the things of the highest value must have another origin of their own - they
cannot be derivable from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, mean little
world. In the womb of being, rather, in the intransitory, in the hidden god,
in the "thing in itself" - that is where their cause must lie and nowhere
etsel'"
Theoretically, Discipline and Punish foregrounds its refusal of one great
antithesis in the formula power-knowledge." Practically, it follows the
pairing precisely into that 'mean little world'.
The Panopticon and a Classical thematics of the eye
I turn now to explore more closely the problems thrown up by
Foucault's understanding of the relationship between the body and the new
technology of power. Broadly speaking, I shall argue two things: first, that a
network of themes surrounding panopticism (including the eye, ideality,
individuation) suggests an Apollonian conceptual framework; second, that in
order for Foucault to argue that the disciplined, subjected condition of
prisoners is but an exemplary instance of a general condition found in modem
society at large, he is forced to demonstrate that the example must necessarily
be the least exemplary instance of subjection, that within the economy of his
theory delinquents constitute an example for others only on condition that they
do not follow their own example. This second point will become clearer in
due course. I begin by returning to Foucault's first point concerning the
examination.
The examination links four themes: the body, visibility, power and
29 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp.33-34.
30 Max Weber traces a similar dialectic between capitalism and the techniques of modern
science. The Protestant Ethic, p.24.
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technology. The following paragraph merits full transcription:
1. The examination transformed the economy of visibility into the exercise
of power. Traditionally, power was what was seen, what was shown and
what was manifested and, paradoxically, found the principle of its force in
the movement by which it deployed that force. Those on whom it was
exercised could remain in the shade; they received light only from that
portion of power that was conceded to them, or from the reflection of it that
for a moment they carried. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is
exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom
it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline it is the subjects
who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold [I' emprise] of the
power that is exercised over them. [...] And the examination is the technique
by which power [...J holds them in a mechanism of objectification. (p.187)
We could take issue with this account of traditional power, the power of the
sovereign regime. Who or what bestowed such power upon the sovereign, if
not the representatives of a theocentric order and, through them, God himself!
And what was God if not the great seer never seen? Nietzsche writes of the
endeavour to find sense in suffering: 'In order to get the secret, undiscovered,
and unwitnessed suffering out of the world it was almost compulsory to invent
gods and a hierarchy of intermediate beings, in short, something which
wanders even among secret places, sees even in the dark, and makes a point
of never missing an interesting and painful spectacle' (p.77). And has not
Foucault's own depiction of the supp/ice already acknowledged the role of God
as all-seeing witness? If Foucault overlooks eyes here, he will overstate the
importance of the eye for disciplinary power, and with good reason.
It is no coincidence that the chapter on 'Panopticism' follows close on
the heels of his discussion of the examination, for Bentham's famous
architectural figure embodies this new power. We recall the Panopticon's
design. A series of cells round the periphery of a ring-shaped building which
give on to a central tower. Each cell houses a window on the outside wall and
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another that faces the tower. The tower is itself pierced with windows that
open onto the cells. From this central point it is possible to gaze into any cell
at any time and for that gaze to fall on a neatly isolated individual. The
apparatus's ingeniousness (and it is really so simple) is that the visibility is
one-way. The inmate 'is seen but he does not see; he is the object of
information, never a subject in communication' (p.200). This theme of the
gaze of others, a non-reciprocal gaze linked to the themes of Surveillance and
Judgement (Foucault's capitals), is already present in Histoire de la folie
(p.506). Likewise in The Birth of the Clinic, where doctors' gazes come to
form, around the time of the French Revolution, a network of 'constant,
mobile, differentiated supervision' (p.31). Here, it clearly reworks the
psychoanalytic primal scene of the formation of the super-ego." Though
Foucault's insistence that at stake is the very constitution of the subject(ed)
confuses matters, since the scene would then seem to offer itself as an
amalgam of Lacan' s Imaginary and Symbolic. Nonetheless, working on the
assumption that the scene is really to do with the super-ego (questions of
judgement, morality, the work ethic, reflection and remorse weigh heavily in
the book), there is at its heart a vital, eerie dissymmetry, because the gaze of
the other, like God, is hidden from view. The exchange of gazes is
interrupted. It is not quite, then, a matter of a 'universal visibility'.
Elsewhere, Foucault describes Bentham as 'the complement to Rousseau':
31 Cf. Norman O. Brown, Love's Body (New York: Random House, 1966), p.l22: 'The
super-ego is based on "incorporation through the eye" or "ocular introjection"; it is the sight
of a parental figure that becomes a permanent part of us; and that now supervises, watches us.
In other words, the super-ego is derived from the primal scene.' Foucault refers fleetingly to
the influence of Lacan in Foucault, Remarks on Marx, p.73.
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What in fact was the Rousseauist dream that motivated many of the
revolutionaries? Itwas the dream of a transparent society, visible and legible
in each of its parts, the dream of there no longer existing any zones of
darkness, [...], zones of disorder. It was the dream that each individual,
whatever position he occupied, might be able to see the whole of society,
that men's hearts should communicate, their vision be unobstructed by
obstacles, and that opinion of all reign over each. [...] Bentham is both that
and the opposite. [...] He effects the project of a universal visibility which
exists to serve a rigorous, meticulous power."
The Panopticon institutes a dissymmetrical, controlled visibility and
communication both between guard and prisoner and between prisoners. No
lateral communication, no crowd, therefore no disruption: 'The crowd, a
compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together,
a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated
individualities.' There is an entire Apollonian metaphorics here which predates
the Enlightenment - Apollo the Greek god and source of light, the god of
plastic powers, the god of knowledge who is also associated with the principle
of individuation, the god called 'most powerful eye' in Sophocles's
Trachiniae." A.D. Nuttall argues that Nietzsche eschews this characterization
of Apollo because he believes the principle of individuation to be an illusion.
Which is why Foucault adopts it. His endeavour in Discipline and Punish is
to show how, technically, it was hoped to realize this Apollonian order in a
modem context.34 I stress the role of aspiration here. It is important to bear
in mind that the Panopticon was never actually built. Foucault's argument is
32 Michel Foucault, 'The Eye of Power', in Power/Knowledge, pp.146-165 (p.l52).
33 A.D. Nuttall, 'The Game of Death', London Review of Books, 14:11, II June 1992, 14-
16 (p.14).
34 For a brief discussion of the Apollonian complex of justice, truth and politics see his
summary of a course given at the College de France in 1970-71. Michel Foucault, 'History
of Systems of Thought', in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp.199-204
(p.204).
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that it was the ideal form of an otherwise very real power.
Now a number of themes coalesce in this description of the Panopticon.
Ideality (the Panopticon is 'the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to
its ideal form '); purity ('its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle,
resistance or friction, can be represented as a pure architectural and optical
system'); adequation between power and knowledge (it constitutes 'a mixed
mechanism in which relations of power (and of knowledge) may be precisely
adjusted, in the smallest detail, to the processes that are to be supervised');
finally (though I am sure there are more), the eye as the instantaneous
instrument of omniscience ('An inspector arriving unexpectedly at the centre
of the Panopticon will be able to judge at a glance [d' un seul coup d' oei!], [ ...]
how the entire establishment is functioning'), Again, though, it is worth
remembering that despite an overwhelming sensation of 'fit', the scheme is
crucially dissymmetrical, especially at the level of the eye: 'The Panopticon is
a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad' (pp.201-202). And it is
this dissymmetrical position of the inmate that assures his subjection
(assujettissement),
At this juncture, my analysis is carried forward by two related points
about this scheme of the Panopticon. The first concerns the preeminence
accorded the eye. The second bears on a certain Cartesianism.
Two observations concerning the eye impose themselves. Firstly, there
seems no good reason either to reduce the workings of the Panopticon
exclusively to a question of sight or to consider panoptisme as the disciplinary
form of power above all others. We could perhaps say of panoptisme what
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Noonan Bryson says of the Natural Attitude in art and criticism. In both cases
it is a question of dualism:
From the material and muscular body, continuous with physical reality and
capable of performance within physical reality, a reduced and simplified
body is abstracted. In its classical and Albertian formulation, this body of
perception is monocular, a single eye removed from the rest of the body and
suspended in diagrammatic space."
In fact, and in a sense against his own theory, Foucault's depiction of
disciplinary technology suggests that its unremitting power-effects are achieved
precisely because it is exercised on and through all the senses." The drills,
timetables and constant training implicate the body's sense of touch;
alimentary regimes play with taste and smell a la, albeit avant, Pavlov; finally,
his master's voice must be heard. Kant states that touch is the only sense in
which external perception is immediate." As such, it would seem
particularly well suited to characterize Foucault's disciplinary power, which,
we recall, is persistently evoked by variants of the verb prendre as a prehensile
power. The difference between Kant and Foucault lies in a certain
deanthropologization. Compare Kant:
Man is easiJy distinguished from all other natural beings by his technical
predisposition for manipulating things (a mechanical predisposition joined
with consciousness), by his pragmatic predisposition (for using other men
skilfully for his purposes), and by the moral predisposition in his being (to
treat himself and others according to the principle of freedom under laws).
(Anthropology, p.l83)
As to the first of these, Kant says that 'the characterization of man as a
35 Vision and Painting: the Logic of the Gaze (London: Macmillan, 1983), p.lO.
36 Foucault says elsewhere that the procedures of power in modem societies are 'much
more numerous, diverse and rich' than the Panopticon would suggest. 'The Eye of Power',
p.148.
37 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. by Mary J.
Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
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rational animal is already present in the fonn and organization of the human
hand' (p.184).38 For Foucault, on the other hand, Kant's three aspects
migrate into the machine. It is not man or the sovereign or even the
bourgeoisie who stretches out the hand of power. It is not the figure of the
doctor, 'the priest of the body', as it had been in The Birth of the Clinic. Not
even God (' As one reads him one wonders who he is putting in the tower. Is
it the eye of God? [...] In the last analysis one is forced to conclude that
Bentham himself has no clear idea to whom power is to be entrusted' ['The
Eye of Power', p.l57]). Power itself effects its own grip, holds an individual
in its own clutches, 'se donne prise sur lui' (p.127). The metaphorics of
taking, grasping, seizing, helps connote the unmediated nature of this
corporeal, material technology of power which would not need to pass by way
of consciousness and representation.
The second observation, which is closely allied to the privilege
accorded the eye, concerns a certain Classical, Cartesian imprint. It should be
remembered that the passion for light and the fascination with optical
instruments were inseparable from Classical thought (Clark describes Spinoza
as the finest lensmaker in Europe). It is thus not insignificant that disciplinary
technology emerges in the Classical age, that the latter discovered the body as
object and target of power:
The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two
registers: the anatomico-metapbysical register, of which Descartes wrote the
38 Jacques Derrida explores this thematic of the hand in relation to Heidegger in
'Geschlectu II: Heidegger's Hand'. trans. by John P. Leavey, Jr.• in Deconstruction and
Philosophy: The TeXIsof Jacques Derrida, ed. by John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987), pp.161-196; and Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. by Geoffrey
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991), pp.l l ff.
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first pages and which the physicians and philosophers continued, and the
technico-political register, which was constituted by a whole set of
regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the anny, the
school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the
body. (p.136).
And we find a lexical and conceptual scheme which is eminently Cartesian.
On the subject of the handling of plague, for example, in which Foucault sees
an anticipation of the disciplinary scheme, he speaks of its techniques of
analysis, partage, and order guaranteed by 'the functioning of an extensive
power that bears in a distinct [distincte] way on all individual bodies' (p.198).
On the Panopticon itself, Foucault speculates as to whether Bentham was
influenced by Le Vaux's menagerie at Versailles. The two projects manifest
a similar preoccupation with individualizing observation, with characterization
and classification, with the analytical arrangement of space. We recall the
lengthy overview in The Order of Things of the Classical episteme, with its
concern for the enumeration, tabulation and classificatory ordering of the
universe according to a comparative analysis of differences and identities. And
it is this same process which Foucault sees at work in the new, disciplinary
institutions." Again, though, it is less a question of ideology than of a
technological Cartesianism. We have already seen the decomposition of the
crowd into a 'collection of separated individualities' (p.201). The important
point about the Panopticon is that it individualizes at one end as it
disindividualizes the workings of power. He writes:
There is a machinery that assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, difference.
Consequently, it does not matter who exercises power. Any individual,
39 Foucault highlights the importance of the Classical age for his archaeologies in The
Archae%gy of Know/edge, p.176.
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taken almost at random, can operate the machine:" [...J The more
numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, the greater the risk
for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his anxious awareness of
being observed. The Panopticon is a marvellous machine which, whatever
use one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power. A
real SUbjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation. (p.202)
One senses that the apparatus rather gets the better of Foucault and that
the countless missed opportunities to acknowledge resistance to disciplinary
power can be attributed to a certain grip exercised on his thought by the
mutually reinforcing principles of sight and dissymmetry. If it is possible to
prevent the inmate's visual communication with his companions, it is more
difficult to control both his ears and also what goes into them, as Bentham
recognized. One of Foucault's footnotes reads:
In his first version of the Panopticon, Bentham had also imagined an
acoustic surveillance, operated by means of pipes leading from cells to the
central tower. In the Postscript he abandoned the idea, perhaps because he
could not introduce into it the principle of dissymmetry and prevent the
prisoners from hearing the inspector as well as the inspector hearing them.
(p.317, n.3)
Above and beyond the visual, dissymmetry is one of the key principles
deployed by the system to prevent feedback or interference. If one takes his
discussion of the isolation of inmates, for instance, where he looks at the
debate in the U.S. between a regime of absolute solitude (Philadelphia) and a
regime of nocturnal solitude (Auburn), we note that beyond the obvious
differences of the two institutions they share 'this primary objective of carceral
action: coercive individualization, by rupturing any relation that is not
supervised by authority' (p.239). As I began by saying in relation to the essay
'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', an objective and the realization of an
40 A variation this on the tradition of the insane qua public spectacle, mons/res montres.
Cf. Histoire de la folie, p.162.
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objective are not homologous. It is difficult to believe that the disciplines are
so complete as to assure a 'tete-a-tete' of the convict and power in which the
latter effects on the former a tabula rasa to match his shaven head," Would
not some of the calculation and reflection involved in understanding the idea
of surveillance be channelled into self-reflection, into a technology of the self,
amounting to sentiments of revolt as well as remorse? Nietzsche maintains
that punishment seldom produces remorse in its victims; rather, it 'hardens and
numbs, [...], it sharpens the consciousness of alienation, it strengthens the
power of resistance.' It also, he says, sharpens the criminal's sense of
prudence. lengthens his memory. and hones a peculiar form of self-
criticism.? In fact, a footnote to the American debate. which Foucault
appears not to want to feed back into his main argument, reveals that at least
one whisper of rebellion was transmitted. that the system was short-circuited
at least once (p.318. n.6).
Constructing machines (both marvellous and beautiful)
But let us return to that passage cited above, with its 'real subjection
born mechanically from a fictitious relation'. Who speaks thus? Bentham or
Foucault? This passage throws up the question of enunciation. It is a standard
technique of Foucault's to anchor his basic account in sources contemporary
41 This echoes his description of the mad as 'passive instruments' of internment (Histoire
de la folie, p.419).
42 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values,
trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici, 2 vols (London: T.N. Foulis, 1913), I, 233, p.191: 'The
criminals with whom Dostoiewsky associated in prison, were all, without exception, unbroken
natures, - are they not a hundred times more valuable than a "broken-spirited" Christian?'
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to the debate in question. Indeed, much of this passage is taken straight from
Bentham - though one can never be sure just how much, since a solitary page
reference does not compensate for the absence of those indicators 'Bentham
adds', 'he then postulates', etc.. What is more, Foucault almost always avoids
the use of the first-person singular and of those deictic markers indicating the
author's intention ('it seems to me', 'from which I conclude)." Of course,
much of the passage is entirely in line with the question of the Panopticon's
ideal quality. Whether or not the inmate is under surveillance is immaterial;
the important thing is that he believe he may be. Doubly ideal in a sense, in
that the Panopticon Bentham writes about, though based on an actual design
of his brother's, was, as we have observed, really a project 'for a society to
come' (p.209), as Foucault puts it. However, the fmal sentence is interesting.
What begins as a 'fictitious relation' ends 'mechanically' in a 'real subjection'.
What is the status of this 'real'? I should like to hold this question over just
long enough to look at the workings of the marvellous machine and of the
machinic metaphor. At stake in their functioning is once more (as in Chapter
one) a question of a victory played out in advance:
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power, he makes them play
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his
own subjection. By this very fact, the external power may throw off its
physical weight; it tends to the non-corpora1; and, the more it approaches this
limit, the more constant, profound, permanent and incessantly relayed are its
effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids any confrontation and which is
always decided Uoute] in advance. (pp.202-203; trans. mod.)
When Foucault writes in Histoire de la folie that the combat between reason
43 The exception is the (arch-conventional) third chapter from The Use of Pleasures.
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and unreason is 'always already decided Uouee]', that the defeat of unreason
is 'inscribed in advance' (pp.508-509), we must understand that the voice
which speaks of 'defeat' might almost be that of Samuel Tuke, the founding
father of the York Retreat for the insane; Foucault does not believe the victory
was complete. In the later text, however, that reserve seems to disappear.
The marvellous machine's production of a fictitious subjectedness of the
subject or, what amounts to the same thing, power's 'perpetual victory', is
predicated on two related things: 1. The existence of a proper species of power
with specific power-effects; 2. A model of the subject as fully constituted by
that power. Discipline and Punish maintains the first of these positions in turn
by positing one of two things. Firstly, by suggesting that panopticism is but
one instance of a larger disciplinary power that is always already in place in
society at large, and not just in the Panopticon, prior to the individual's entry
onto the scene. In fact, he says, it owes its origins to the gradual formation
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of a disciplinary society.
The prison, in other words, which is the realization of the Panopticon, is but
one form of 'the carceral":"
Prison continues, on those who are entrusted to it, a work begun elsewhere,
which the whole of society pursues on each individual through innumerable
mechanisms of discipline. By means of a carceral continuum, the authority
that sentences infiltrates all those other authorities that supervise, transform,
correct, improve. [...] The power to punish is not essentially different from
that of curing or educating. (pp.302-303)
(This image of an increasingly policed society needs to be questioned, without
conjuring up in its stead the image of a universally-felt gain in freedom. Jean-
44 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.374: 'There is no metaphor here: the factories
are prisons, they do not resemble prisons, they are prisons.'
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Rene Treanton provides evidence, in a discussion in which Foucault
participated, that the seventeenth century in France was arguably a much more
policed society than our own.)" On the other hand, if Foucault can suggest
the existence of more than one modality of power, the totalization is held in
place by intimating that disciplinary power has colonized the others, 'has
infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an
intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above
all making it posssible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and
distant elements' (p.216). In other words, by subsuming the fictitious
Panopticon under a more real generalizable carceral power which nonetheless
reproduces all the effects of Bentham's machine, Foucault can harness the
beauty and perfection of all those flawless written projects (architectural plans,
handbooks of rules and regulations, etc.) out of which he constructs the book
- as opposed to actual accounts of practices and experiences - to infer that
from a fictitious 'fictitious relation' is born 'mechanically' a real 'real
subjection' .46
Elsewhere, Foucault is anxious to refute the charge that there is in his
work a sort of 'ideal type'." He replies that the rational schemas of the
4!1 He recounts how the 1670 census conducted in Litle asked inhabitants if they were born
in the town, the motive for such a question being the fact that those not born in the town could
be expelled by the authorities at will. 'Table ronde', Numero S¢Cial: Pourquoi Ie travail
social? Esprit, 40 (1972), 678-703 (p.682).
46 See Michael Walzer, 'The Politics of Michel Foucault' in Foucault: A Critical Reader.
ed. by David CouzensHoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp.51-68.
41 Foucault, 'Questions of Method', Ideology and Consciousness, 8 (Spring 1981), 3-14
(flI'St publ. as 'Debat avec Michel Foucault: table ronde du 20 mai 1978'. in L'lmpossible
prison: Recherches sur le syslime plnilentiaire auM sucte, ed. by Michelle Perrot (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1980). pp.29-S6).
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prison, the hospital or the asylum are not general principles but explicit
programmes. He argues convincingly that to view such programmes and
schemas as somehow less real than, say, institutions is an impoverished notion
of the real. 'These programmes,' he says, 'induce a whole series of effects in
the real (which isn't of course the same as saying that they take the place of
the real): they crystallise into institutions, they inform individual behaviour,
they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things.' But the
following sentence rather confirms what Foucault is trying to deny.
It is absolutely true that criminals stubbornly resisted the new disciplinary
mechanism in the prison; it is absolutely correct that the actual functioning
of the prisons, in the inherited buildings where they were established and
with the governors and guards who administered them, was a witches' brew
compared to the beautiful Benthamite machine. ('Questions of Method',
p.ll)
One's impression is confirmed that what prevails in Discipline and Punish,
since it is the beautiful Benthamite machine in contradistinction to the 'actual
functioning' of the prisons, is something approaching, not an ideal in the sense
of imagined but never implemented programmes, but the ideal functioning of
undoubtedly real strategies. In another interview, Foucault maintains that
Bentham 'describes, in the utopian form of a general system, particular
mechanisms which really exist' ('The Eye', p.l64). Though that is not before
acknowledging that the effective resistance of inmates to the penitentiary
system 'is another of the factors which shift Bentham into the domain of the
unreal' (p.l62).
The question of enunciation, or the voice which tells the story, weighs
heavily in all this. Foucault remarks that all the sentences in the book saying
things like 'the disciplinary apparatus produces power', 'it matters little who
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exercises power', etc. are not his personal conception of power. Rather, they
describe projects - mostly Bentham's." Yet there is a revealing passage
which complicates matters. In it Foucault virtually summarizes Bentham's
'Letter XXI. Schools', which treats of the pedagogical experiments dreamt of
by enthusiasts of the Panopticon." Foucault's text reads:
one could bring up different children according to different systems of
thought, making certain children believe that two and two do not make four
or that the moon is made of green cheese, then put them together when they
are twenty or twenty-five years old; one would then have discussions that
would be worth a great deal more than the sermons or lectures on which so
much money is spent. (p.204; trans. mod.)
However, Foucault omits to put on record a certain spirited playfulness in the
original Panopticon which makes us think that there is indeed more Foucault
invested in the enunciation of panoptisme than we might otherwise have
believed. The final paragraph of the 'Preface' to Bentham's Panopticon reads
as follows:
The concluding Letter on Schools is a sort of jeu d' esprit, which would
hardly have presented itself in so light a form, at any other period than at the
moment of conception, and under the flow of spirits which the charms of
novelty are apt enough to inspire. As such, it may possibly help to alleviate
the tedium of a dry discussion, and on that score obtain the pardon, should
it fail of receiving the approbation, of the graver class of readers. (Bentham,
Panopticon, p.40)
In short, Bentham's posture is highly tongue-in-cheek at this juncture. He
speaks of the Panopticon's ability to ensure the purity of damsels ('with what
eagerness gentlemen who are curious in such matters would crowd to such a
school to choose themselves wives, is too obvious to insist on' [p.62]); to stir
even the most slothful {'nor would the pride of Toboso have been so long a-
48 Foucault, 'La Poussiere et Ie nuage', in l/impossible prison, pp.29-39 (p.37).
49 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. by John Bowring, 11 vols (New
York: Russell and Russell, 1962), IV.
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disenchanting, could her Knight have put his coward Squire into an inspection-
house' [p.63]). Again, on the dangers of 'constructing a set of machines under
the similitude of men' his only comment is: as long as they are happy
machines, who cares? And most tellingly: 'If the idea of some of these
applications should have brought a smile upon your countenance, it won't hurt
you, my dear ****; nor should it hurt the principle.' This great instrument of
government should not be condemned 'because some of the purposes to which
it is possible to apply it may appear useless, or trifling, or mischievous, or
ridiculous' (p.66). In the two parts of the Postscript to the Panopticon, the
pages of which together far outnumber the original piece, Bentham never
applies the principle to schools and one might call Foucault's misrepresentation
of Bentham systemic, as though Foucault's serious-mindedness on the question
of Diana and the eleven thousand virgins were programmed by a machinery
interested in the production of virginity. In our society of surveillance, he
says, 'it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated,
repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully
fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies. We are
much less Greek than we believe' (p.217). Not just colonization, therefore, but
fabrication. In a high-fidelity apparatus."
I must stress at this juncture that despite his obvious concern for the
functioning of the machine, the question of its formation does not go
50 Foucault insists on the machine metaphor after visiting Attica: 'at first sight you have
the impression you are visiting [...] a machine. the inside of a machine'. 'Michel Foucault on
Attica: An Interview'. Telos 19 (1974). 154-161 (p.l55).
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unaddressed." He takes up the problematic outlined by Deleuze and Guattari
in Anti-Oedipus - 'a machine [...] does not set itself into place any more than
it forms or reproduces itself' (p.283). His argument is that disciplinary
techniques are a response to the eighteenth century's great demographic
expansion and concomitant growth in the apparatus of production. Such a
concern with origins challenges the misunderstanding that in Foucault there is
only one kind of power. On the contrary, there is the prolix disciplinary
power and there is the power of the bourgeoisie to implement the former.f
Nonetheless, and caveat apart, the structuralist dimension is strong here, though
the concern with the sites and spaces of disciplinary power, with its
constructions and architecture, would not be structuralist per se. What marks
out this concern as structuralist is, paradoxically for a book on power, a
reluctance to think the force within form, glimpsed in the insistent theme of
simultaneity (we recall that 'an inspector arriving unexpectedly at the centre
of the Panopticon will be able to judge at a glance [d'un seul coup d' oei!], [...]
how the entire establishment is functioning'). Derrida writes: 'Simultaneity is
the myth of a total reading or description, promoted to the status of a
regulatory ideal. The search for the simultaneous explains the capacity to be
fascinated by the spatial image'. 53 In actual fact, the depiction of panopticism
corresponds closely to Foucault's own account of the Classical view of disease
51 Which is why, if we substitute 'disciplinary power' for 'discourse' in the following,
Discipline and Punish would be, by his own defmition, both structuralist and genealogical:
'Seek in the discourse not its laws of construction, as do the structural methods, but its
conditions of existence' (Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse', p.15).
52 Cf. The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction, p.93.
53 Jacques Derrida, 'Force and Signification', in Writing and Difference, pp.3-30 (p.24).
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presented elsewhere." He writes in The Birth of the Clinic:
Disease is perceived fundamentally in a space of projection without depth,
of coincidence without development. There is only one plane and one
moment. The fonn in which truth is originally shown is the surface in
which relief is both manifested and abolished - the portrait. (p.6)
And again: 'The ideal configuration of the disease becomes a concrete, free
form, totalized at last in a motionless, simultaneous picture, lacking both
density and secrecy, where recognition opens of itself onto the order of
essences' (p.9). Derrida calls the structural consciousness 'a reflection of the
accomplished, the constituted, the constructed. Historical, eschatological, and
crepuscular by its very situation' ('Force', p.5), and this evokes well the
sensation of a perfect, geometrical minting of machine-individuals which
Foucault would have disciplinary power effect, rather as though Foucault's
disciplinary individual becomes part of Heidegger's 'standing-reserve'."
(Again, it is not just the workings of an ideal Panoptic on but the carceral
texture of society itself which 'assures both the real capture of the body and
its perpetual observation' [p.304].)
Fabrication and production. While they neither originate in nor belong
to the modem industrial world, these words are immersed in the semantic
hinterland of the modem machine age. That is to say, production in the post-
Classical sense of a technological production rather than in the older meaning
54 Not the gaze of the post-Classical era. in which the 'nonnative observer is the totality
of observers' (Foucault, The Birth, p.102).
ss Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology'. in Basic Writings, pp.287-
317. Heidegger posits that modern technology is a Conn of revealing, a 'challenging' which
puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply efijlfgy which can be extracted and stored
as such. Everything is therein ordered to be immediately on hand, to be the standing-reserve,
except man, precisely because he at least takes part in this ordering as revealing, even if he
does not control it.
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of production as revelation or uncovering of the already existent.56 And if
disciplinary individuals are 'fabricated' or 'produced', by the same token they
would be 'constructions' (itself less ambiguous than 'constructs') rather than
'constitutions', insofar as in question is their production precisely by
architectural, spatial, physical techne. Discipline and Punish literalizes the
metaphor of social 'constructionism'. It assembles, builds, literally constructs
architectonically. And in this respect it wants to leave behind the figurative
meanings of the word, both the act. the elaboration or composition of
something abstract (e.g. a thesis), and that which is elaborated (Le Petit
Robert: 'C' est une simple construction de l' esprit. Une construction theorique,
intellectuellei. Construct. the name given to a concept
to which it is thought that there is nothing corresponding in reality, so that
it is merely a useful fiction. It may be useful for summarizing masses of
detailed facts, or formulating explanatory theories. [..•J Usually the alleged
construct is contrasted with something else which 'really' exists, as opposed
to being a useful fiction. 57
In Foucault, it is the construction that really exists. We know that for the
medieval mind geometry was a divine activity, and God the great geometer.
And perhaps Godliness is what is at stake in Foucault's turn to architecture,
in the would-be construction of the subject ab origine. (We should say that
the complete prise of inmates marks an important difference both from
Histoire de la folie, where knowledge does not manage to capture madness
completely (p.4S1), and from Lacan, for whom the speaking subject can never
56 See Jacques Derrida, 'Psyche, Inventionde l'autre', in Psychi. Inventions de l'ature
(Paris: GaliMe, 1987), pp.ll-61 (p.42).
57 The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, 2nd edn, ed. by Alan Bullock. Oliver
Stallybrass and Stephen Trombley (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p.169.
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totally possess meaning, just as the desiring subject can never possess the
object) Foucault's modem woodcut would not, though, be called Melancholia.
Nowhere is it a question of brooding or futility." Counterbalancing the sense
of entrapment, it cannot help but inspire admiration in the constructive powers
of man's ingenuity. While by rights it wants to be deterministic, the text in
fact sings a powerful and intoxicating hymn to voluntarism,"
Origins and ends: an exemplary malfunction
The stress on dissymmetry, appropriating the ideal quality of Bentham's
system, promotes a theoretical high-fidelity over a practice doubtless ridden
with distortion. It reproduces, among others, a technique of the monastic
model, but none of its effects ("'disciplines" of a monastic type [ ...], though
they entail obedience to others, had as their principal aim an increase of the
mastery of each individual over his own body' [p.137; trans. mod.]).60 Which
takes me to the question of whether the logic of this position on power is at
all faithful to one of Nietzsche's most important tenets, found in the Second
Essay? There, Nietzsche proclaims that 'there is no more pregnant principle
for any kind of history than the following' (p.89):
SI Kenneth Clark writes of DUrer's engraving Melancholia I: 'This figure [of humanity]
[ ... J sits in the attitude of Rodin's Penseur, and still holds in her hands the compasses, symbols
of measurement by which science will conquer the world. Around her are all the emblems of
constructive action: a saw, a plane, pincers, scales, a hammer, a melting pot, and two elements
in solid geometry, a polyhedron and sphere. Yet all these aids to construction are discarded
and she sits there brooding on the futility of human effort' (Civilisation, p.115).
59 In response to accusations that the text was debilitatingly pessimistic, Foucault argues
that certain prisoners who read it certainly did not think so.
60 I.G. Merquior is incorrect in saying that Foucault does not stress enough the religious
origin and motivation of many of the disciplinary techniques. Foucault (London: Fontana,
1985).
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The origin of the existence of a thing and its final utility, its practical
application and incorporation in a system of ends, are toto calo opposed to
each other [...J. All ends and all utilities are only signs that a Will to Power
has mastered a less powerful force, has impressed thereon out of its self the
meaning of a function, and the whole history of a 'Thing,' an organ, a
custom, can on the same principle be regarded as a continuous 'sign-chain'
of perpetually new interpretations and adjustments, [...J. Similarly, the
evolution of a 'thing,' of a custom, is anything but its progressus to an end,
still less a logical and direct progressus attained with the minimum
expenditure of energy and cost: it is rather the succession of processes of
subjugation [...] which operate on the thing itself; it is, further, the resistance
which in each case invariably displayed this subjugation, the Protean
wriggles by way of defence and reaction, and, further, the results of
successful counter-efforts. The form is fluid, but the meaning is even more
so - even inside every individual organism the case is the same: with every
genuine growth of the whole, the 'function' of the individual organs becomes
shifted, - in certain cases a partial perishing of these organs [...J can be a
symptom of growing strength and perfection. What I mean is this: even
partial loss of utility, decay, and degeneration, loss of function and purpose,
in a word, death, appertain to the conditions of the genuine progressus;
which always appears in the shape of a will and way to greater power, and
is always realised at the expense of innumerable smaller powers. (pp.89-
91)61
This passage can be read on two 'scales' (bearing in mind what
Foucault says about the 'scale' of disciplines) and depending on the scale
Foucault can be viewed as either slipping into the logic of or perpetrating a
violence on the Nietzschean system. On the macro-scale, Discipline and
Punish appears quite faithful to Nietzsche's logic. The procedure, Nietzsche
says, is anterior to its utilization in punishment ('The prison form,' Foucault
says, 'antedates its systematic use in the penal system' [p.231]). The meaning
of punishment in Europe, Foucault concurs with Nietzsche, has been
historically variable.
On the second, micro-scale, one takes not punishment as a whole but
the relation between a particular punitive procedure, the Panopticon, and a
given end, namely the subjection of the inmate's body. Now, suddenly, there
61 For a brief discussion of the gap between objectives and effects see Foucault, 'What
Calls for Punishment?', in Foucault Live, pp.279-292 (p.283); original interview with Foulek
Ringuelheim, December 1983.
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appears to be perfect transmission, an ideal progressus from the punitive
technique through to its end - a suitably docile, though useful, subjected body.
And the contingency which marks the relationship between the procedure and
the end at the macro-scale, hardens at the micro-scale into a necessity. One
witnesses this hardening in the following. Programmes of discipline, Foucault
writes,
don't take effect in the institutions in an integral manner; they are simplified,
or some are chosen and not others; and things never work out as planned
[...]. In fact there are different strategies which are mutually opposed,
composed and superposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects.
('Questions of Method', p.IO).62
Changing strategies, solid effects. This play of scales is what permits
Discipline and Punish to claim, at one and the same time, and on the same
page, that it is a question of tactics and strategies, and also that disciplinary
power is essentially productive of subjected bodies (p.308).
Yet, and to return to the theme of the example which we left in
abeyance, it so happens that there is a peculiar malfunction at the very heart
of the machine Foucault describes, all the more unsettling because this same
flaw is structurally necessary to the functioning of the machine as a whole.
We recall that the book argues for the existence of a crucial transmission from
the Panopticon to society at large (since it is but a generalizable model within
a larger, disciplinary complex). En route, the theme of the Panopticon finds
in the prison its 'privileged locus of realization' (p.249) (in fact he even
describes the carriage which replaced the chain-gang as the 'mobile equivalent
62 Quoted by Dana P. Polan, 'Fables of Transgression: the Reading of Politics and the
Politics of Reading in Foucauldian Discourse', Boundary 2, 10:3 (Spring 1982), 361-381
(p.368).
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of the Panopticon' [p.263]). The prison is thus a 'prison-machine' (p.249)
making 'machine-men' (p.242). But at one vital point the machine
malfunctions _ systematically. Foucault speaks of the prison as a 'carefully
articulated disciplinary mechanism', before adding the caveat '_ at least in
principle' (p.264). He then proceeds to show how, from the very beginning,
the functioning of the prison was accompanied by the (in our own time)
familiar criticism that it was failing in its central mission of rehabilitating
criminals, that, if anything, it fostered recidivism and a nefarious prison
culture. He argues that in reality the prison's failure, its production of a
veritable species, the delinquent, forms an integral cog in the larger, 'carceral'
system. In short, the prison is not intended to eliminate offences but to
distribute them, to use them, to assimilate the transgression of the law into a
'general tactics of subjection' (p.272). The carceral system invests and
organizes delinquency; it 'produces' delinquency, produces the delinquent as
a pathologized subject. And this production in turn legitimizes the State's
intervention in and surveillance of the social field:
Delinquency, with the secret agents that it procures, but also with the
generalized policing that it authorizes, constitutes a means of perpetual
surveillance of the population: an apparatus that makes it possible to
supervise, through the delinquents themselves, the whole social field.
Delinquency functions as a political observatory. In their tum, the
statisticians and the sociologists have made use of it, long after the police.
(p.28 I)
One can thus speak, he says, of an ensemble the three terms of which (police-
prison-delinquency) support one another and 'form a circuit that is never
interrupted' (p.282). A 'carceral archipelago' that spreads its 'net', widens its
circles, transports the penitentiary technique into the 'entire social body'. And
the carceral network 'has no outside' rn' a pas de dehors)', it 'economizes
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everything' (p.301; trans. mod.), it is 'unwilling to waste even what it has
decided to disqualify' (p.301). The machine is even more marvellous than was
first imagined: it is a green machine. It runs on its own effluent, its own
productive residue. But the systemic malfunctioning means that the only ones
in effect not subjected, who cannot, in general, be subjected, are prisoners, the
delinquents. And this is strictly correlated with our own subjection, for only
on the basis of the non-subjection of prisoners do mechanisms for our own
subjection operate, and with our blessing. And this is what I meant by the
unexemplariness of the example of prisoners. If the ostensible contention of
Discipline and Punish is that disciplinary power, in contradistinction to earlier
punitive regimes, consists of an unremitting work on individuals carried out
behind closed doors, with a view to making that individual an example for
himself, that argument is necessarily undercut by a much older, a pre-modem,
sense that punishment is primarily concerned with setting an example for
others. In arguing that the subjected condition of prisoners is an exemplary
instance of a general 'carceral' condition, Foucault demonstrates that this
example must necessarily be the least exemplary instance of subjection, and
that within the economy of his theory the best example to follow is the (least
exemplary) one set by delinquents."
63 In the light of what we have said about the constitutive failure of the machinery vis-a-vis
prisoners, another way of approaching the question of the success or otherwise of power's grip
is to take up the 'arms race' scenario, which Richard Dawkins discusses in his book The Blind
Watchmaker (London: Penguin Books, 1988; repro 1991). The exemplarity of this example
supposes real dangers (principally of a vulgar social biologism) but one could offer it
nonetheless in the spirit of a counter-example to suggest at least the theoretical possibility that
progress in equipment (the disciplines) need not necessarily result in an increased success rate
(of subjection). The principle of zero change in the success rate, despite possible leaps and
bounds in equipment progress, is known as the 'Red Queen effect'. This theory strikes at what
one commentaror has called the 'meta-anthroJx>logical or meta-historical process of
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Nietzsche and the bad conscience
In the final part of the chapter I assess the extent to which Discipline
and Punish is a Nietzschean enterprise. This entails a brief look at Nietzsche's
logic concerning the bad conscience, which clearly provides an important
starting point for Foucault's model, before moving to speculate in more general
terms on some of the similarities and, more especially, differences between the
two. At that point we shall ask the question which has so far been taken for
granted: why should one even want to be Nietzschean? What is at stake in
being, or better, in becoming Nietzschean? First, though, Nietzsche on the bad
conscience.
Nietzsche's hypothesis is that the bad conscience emerges when men
are suddenly catapulted out of a primitive environment and imprisoned within
a broadly peaceful social unit Their regulative instincts are therein switched
off and they are reduced to 'thinking, inferring, calculating', reduced to their
consciousness. But the old instincts do not immediately cease their demands:
All instincts which do not find a vent without, turn inwards - this is what
I mean by the growing 'internalisation' of man: consequently we have the
first growth in man, of what subsequently was called his soul. The whole
inner world, originally as thin as if it had been stretched between two layers
of skin, burst apart and expanded proportionately, and obtained depth,
breadth. and height, when man's external outlet became obstructed. (p.l00)
All the old instincts of wild, free man - cruelty, the delight in persecution, in
surprises, change, destruction - turn inwards against man himself, who begins
rationalisation' (Foucault, 'Questions of Method', p.8) found in Foucault's work, which is, I
think, conveyed as much by a certain tone in Foucault's prose (elegy on the past,
pathos/cynicism on the present) as by any content. The arms race analogy might suggest that
a modem power that becomes more subtle, more molecular does so as individuals themselves
get better at resisting power. As Dawkins says, 'it is precisely because there has been
approximately equal progress on both sides that there has been so much progress in the level
of sophistication of design' (Dawkins, p.186). If one side pulled too far ahead in the race, the
other design would simply cease to be used.
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to lacerate himself.
However, this herding of the population could be accomplished only
through violence, only through a 'grinding ruthless piece of machinery',
operated by 'blond beasts of prey, a race of conquerors and masters' (p.103),
which relentlessly moulds the raw material of the semi-animal populace. This
instinct of freedom forced into being latent and fmally 'only able to find vent
and relief in itself' is the beginning of bad conscience. But, says Nietzsche,
and this marks a huge difference from Foucault, the material on which this
instinct of freedom is let loose is 'man himself, his whole old animal self -
and not [...] the other man, other men' (p.l04-105). He speaks of
This secret self-tyranny, this cruelty of the artist, this delight in giving a
fonn to one's self as a piece of difficult. refractory, and suffering material,
in burning in a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a negation; this
sinister and ghastly labour of love on the part of a soul, whose will is cloven
in two within itself, which makes itself suffer from delight in the infliction
of suffering; this wholly active bad conscience. (p.105)
Glimpses here of the Freudian unconscious, Freud changing Nietzsche's
temporality by pushing back the emergence of the unconscious into a repeated
scene involving the most primary processes of socialization. But the difference
between Nietzsche and Foucault is even greater. For Nietzsche, there is man's
work on others and man's work on himself. The bad conscience is the product
of the two labours, and its perfection owes much to the later intervention of
a Christian priest, who manages to alter the direction of ressentiment'"
Instead of looking for a cause for his suffering in others, reactive man is
encouraged by the priest to find it in himself, in his guilt. With the
impossibility of paying the debt to the deity is conceived the idea of the
64 The last word of Riviere's memoir is ressentimens (sic). Moi, Pierre Riviire, p.l48.
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impossibility of paying the penalty. its inexpiability - the idea of eternal
punishment 6S In sum. we find in Nietzsche the existence of the conscience.
the bad conscience and the like; of a soul 'whose will is cloven in two within
itself'; souls plural. In Foucault. on the other hand. there is primarily the far
from sensational work of man and machines, of disciplinary power. on others.
Foucault does not altogether exclude the work of the individual on
himself. Instead. he gives Merleau-Ponty's theory of the lived world a
negative tweak. Merleau-Ponty's challenge to the strict subject-object division
of Cartesianism lies in his return not to some fallacious objective world but to
the lived world as experienced through the body," Ultimately. this capacity
to contribute to constituting the world (never ex nihilo, since our consciousness
needs things in a sense to be already there in order to define itself). is what
distinguishes a being-for-itself (~tre-pour-sOl) from the rather empty status of
the mere being-in-itself (~tre-en-soz). Now when Foucault says that an inmate
of the Panopticon makes the constraints of power play spontaneously upon
himself. thus becoming the principle of his own subjection, he makes him
collaborate in the process which effectively confirms his being-for-itself as it
prepares happily to appropriate that subjected condition. Terry Eagleton is
thus strictly speaking awry in viewing the body in Foucault as an object, even
if there is much truth in his conviction that Foucault's opposition to the
6$ Deleuze and Guattari (Anti-Oedipus. p.217) rewrite this internalization and
spiritualization of the infmite debt as the fonnation of the Oedipus. In their scheme, it is
desire that is turned back against itself.
Ci6 PhblOminologie de la perception. p.23 I. He goes on to say that Descartes himself was
aware of the distinction between the body of the lived world and the body conceived of by a
purely intellectual understanding, but privileges the latter because of theological prejudice.
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Marxist concept of alienation leads him all but to evacuate the notion of
human interiority:
The shift from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault is one from the body as relation
to the body as object For Merleau-Ponty, the body is 'where there is
something to be done'; for the new somatics, the body is where something
- gazing, imprinting, regimenting - is being done to you. It used to be
called alienation, but that implies the existence of an interiority to be
alienated - a proposition of which somatic criticism is deeply sceptical,"
Sartre rather confirms this with his third ontological dimension of the
body from L' Etre et le n~ant.68 In one sense - when the inmate cannot see
the surveillant - Foucault's scheme introduces an important rupture into
Sartre's model of subjectivity, which holds that '''Being-seen-by-the-Other'' is
the truth of "seeing-the-Other" (p.257). But Sartre goes beyond sight
narrowly envisaged to say: to the extent that I am conscious of existing for the
Other I apprehend my own facticity. And we recall that the inmate of the
Panopticon need only be aware of being seen. Sartre then reaches a telling
conclusion about this Being-there-for-others and the body:
Thus my body is not given merely as that which is purely and simply lived;
rather this 'lived experience' becomes - in and through the contingent,
absolute fact of the Other's existence - extended outside in a dimension of
flight which escapes me. My body's depth of being is for me this perpetual
'outside' of my most intimate 'inside'. (p.352)
Of course, Foucault will precisely push at the possibility that such a
perpetual outside must always erase the intimacy of the inside, that the 'soul'
is not the most private of private properties but the correlative of a technology
67 The beginning of the paragraph is even less applicable to Foucault 'For the new
somatics, not any old body will do. If the libidinal body is in, the labouring body is out.
There are mutilated bodies galore, but few malnourished ones, belonging as they do to bits of
the globe beyond the purview of Yale.' Terry Eagleton, 'It is Not Quite True that IHave a
Body, and Not Quite True that Iam One Either' (review of Peter Brooks, Body Work), London
Review of Books, 15, 10, 27 May 1993, 7-8 (p.7).
68 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology,
trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 19(6).
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of power. Yet there is a sense in which the microphysics of power that
characterizes disciplinary technology stops short of flowing into the body itself.
When Foucault speaks of the human body entering a machinery of power that
breaks it down (desarticule) and recomposes it, he thereby articulates a
difference between bodies - their separation, individualization, classification,
hierarchization - not the disarticulation and difference of one body from itself.
In other words, Discipline and Punish is selectively molecular, not molecular
enough. That Foucault's 'body' is, in Peter Dews' opinion, devoid of a
Nietzschean strength, joy and terribleness strikes me as wayward reasoning,
since there is not just one body for Nietzsche (indeed, one of Nietzsche's
central points about the slave morality is that it carries round a shuffling,
unjoyous and unterrible body). However, that the Foucault of Discipline and
Punish lacks a general theory of drives or an interest in the internal complexity
of the psyche - conditioned, Dews says, by his hostility to psychoanalysis -
is undeniable," When Foucault rules out desire, he rules out the positive
force of the schizoid revolutionary pole of social libidinal investment which
Deleuze and Guattari oppose to the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole
(which looks very much like the disciplines):
The two poles are defmed, the one by the enslavement of production and the
desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large
scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; the other by the
inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these molar
structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize
those that they retain in codes or axiomatics; the other by the molecular
multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates
69 Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of
Critical Theory (London: Verso, 1987). p.163ff. See also Axel Honneth, 'Foucault et Adorno:
deux formes d'une critique de la modemite', trans. by Christian Bouchindhomme. Critique,
471-472 (August-September 1986),800-815 (p.8tS).
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as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines
of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them. [...]
the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized
flows. inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new
flows. always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that
separates them from desiring-production. [...] The one is defmed by
subjugated groups, the other by subject-groups. (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus, pp.366-367)
Contra Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari do not assign an entirely negative value
to the notion of subject. The distinctions they make certainly run up against
problems. 'In what sense does the schizoid investment constitute, to the same
extent as the other one, a real investment of the sociohistorical field, and not
a simple utopia? In what sense are the lines of escape collective, positive, and
creative?' (Anti-Oedipus, p.367). But their point is that capitalism does not
always get its own way. Foucault, however, ignoring Nietzsche's belief that
the formation of the bad conscience is retarded by prison, infers that
disciplinary power fabricates just one, essential bad conscience, one little soul
(he writes of the 'little soul of the criminal, which the very apparatus of
punishment fabricated as a point of application of the power to punish'
[p.255]). And to that extent, the story of the bad conscience or little soul
contributes to the myth of its constitution.
Becoming Nietzschean
For all the overstatement that we detect in the theory, Foucault's
portrayal of disciplinary power remains a powerful evocation. Despite his
desire to render the account contemporary, Foucault's model of subjection is
best understood as applying to the early and mid-nineteenth century proletariat.
He is certainly not talking about the formation of bourgeois consciousness.
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There is no doubt that Foucault believed he was sketching a form of modern
subjectivity (he speaks of 'our society of surveillance' [p.217] and of the
prison revolts of 'these last weeks'), but aside from three or four pages, the
focus never really gets beyond the middle of the nineteenth century. The
historical sketches, prison cameos, architectural plans, reform bills, factory
descriptions, factory regulations, hospital rules, workhouse timetables, virtually
all the 'detail' relates to the period from the end of the eighteenth to the
middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the signs are that Foucault's
personal (or would it be national?) frame of reference is heavily marked by
that century. He responds thus to his visit to Attica in 1972: 'When you go
through those long corridors which are - let me repeat - clean, a Frenchman
has the impression of being in a somewhat austere private or parochial school;
after all, nineteenth century lycees and colleges were not that much more
pleasant' (,On Attica', p.156).70 Thus the grinding detail, the marshalling of
an illiterate populace and its moral coercion by a still overweeningly religious
social machinery merits a due wariness of the adjective 'progressive' applied
to capitalism and of a positive, voluntaristic account of subjectivity."
But, caveat apart, and to address our main concern, does one detect
what Nietzsche would call a 'socialist sympathy' running through Foucault's
discourse? There is a kind of individual, Nietzsche writes, who 'will not be
70 'It's often said in France that we're still living in the 19th century. When I looked at
[the exhibition] "Paris-Berlin" and read the Gennan authors of the years 1910-1930, I became
conscious that the 20th century actually does exist with its own ideas, problems, specific
cultural forms.' Michel Foucault, 'Spiegel Interview with Michel Foucault on "Paris-Berlin'",
New German Critique, 16 (1979), 155-156 (p.156); originally in Spiegel, 44, 30 October 1978.
71 See Raymond Wiiliams, The Country and the City (St, Albans: Paladin, 1973), p.50.
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responsible for anything, to blame for anything, and out of an inner self-
contempt wants to be able to shift offhis responsibility for himself somewhere
else':
This latter, when he writes books, tends today to espouse the cause of the
criminal; his most pleasing disguise is a kind of socialist sympathy. And the
fatalism of the weak-willed is indeed beautified to an astonishing degree
when it can present itself as 'la religion de la souffrance humaine',
(Nietzsche, Beyond, p.52)
Such an espousal marks out those who Nietzsche calls the 'levellers', men
whose two 'most oft-recited doctrines and ditties are "equality of rights" and
"sympathy for all that suffers'" (Nietzsche, Beyond, p.72). A doctrine shared
by Christianity. 72
But if we return to Foucault's argument we see that matters are not so
clear-cut. Foucault maintains (and this has been an important strand of his
case) that the development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms
represent the dark side of another process: the establishment of a juridical
framework and a parliamentary regime by which the bourgeoisie became the
politically dominant class in eighteenth-century Europe (the argument here is
about the constitution of Constitution)":
The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were
egalitarian in principle was underpinned by these tiny, everyday, physical
mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical that constitute the disciplines. And if, in a
72 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, I, 246, p.202: 'All "souls" became equal before God: but
this is the most pernicious of all valuations! [...] If the degenerate and sick man (lithe
Christian") is to be of the same value as the healthy man (lithe pagan"), or if he is even to be
valued higher than the latter, as Pascal's view of health and sickness would have us value him,
the natural course of evolution is thwarted and the unnatural becomes law.'
73 Likewise Bentham. A prime mover of disciplinary power but also and inseparably an
indefatigable constitutionalist, eager to draw up a Code for the new republics of Spanish
America. See Miriam Williford, Jeremy Bentham on Spanish America: An Account of His
Letters and Proposals to the New World (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1980).
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formal way, the representative regime makes it possible [...] for the will of
all to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines provide,
at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. The
'Enlightenment' , which discovered liberties, also invented disciplines. (p.222:
trans. mod.)
Although the expressions 'in principle' and 'in a formal way' suggest a
scepticism vis-a-vis the actual functioning of the juridical form, Foucault
nonetheless acknowledges that this representative regime can make it possible
for a system of rights to be exercised. Not least by Foucault himself." But
also by North African immigrants in France, Tunisian students, Parisian
students, Vietnamese boat people, all of whom Foucault threw his weight
behind at one time or another." It is fair to say that there is much truth in
Terry Eagleton's claim that Foucault's near pathological aversion to the subject
leads to a 'drastically undialectical attitude to Enlightenment' which 'eradicates
at a stroke almost all of its vital civilizing achievements' .76 I think at this
point, though, one has to consider the historical and institutional moment of
Foucault's work, notably the post-colonial situation and the consequent jarring
on the ear produced by universalizing discourses; consider the possibility, too,
74 Even in death. James Bernauer makes this point (somewhat despite himself) with
reference to the unpublished fourth volume on sexuality. 'Respecting Foucault's own wishes,
this unfinished volume will never appear'. Michel Foucault's Force of Flight, pp.l59-160.
See Eribon (pp.346-347) for an example of how even these rights must pass through a
machinery of interests, how Foucault's stated wish that there be pas de publication posthume
is now being debated by friends, family and publishing houses alike.
75 Briban (p.296.) quotes a text delivered by Foucault in Geneva in 1981 on behalf of the
boat people: 'There is an international citizenship which has its rights, which has its duties and
which commits itself to rising up against all abuses of power, whoever the author, whoever the
victims. After all, we are all governed, and as such united.'
76 The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.389. Michael Walzer
observes that Foucault cannot explain how or why our own society stops short of the Gulag
because that would require some positive evaluation of the liberal state. 'The Polities of
Michel Foucault'. My guess is that the Foucault of the mid-1970s would have said: because
technically, economically, militarily, socially it had no need. Which need not be pure
cynicism, but whieh is certainly sceptical about pure we-have-crossed-the-Rubicon liberalism.
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that his overstated opposition is really aimed at a puffed-up post-Enlightenment
version of the Enlightenment." Foucault makes it clear that the disciplinary
techniques were the underbelly of the juridical form and that this latter does
not stand in a relation of antithesis to them. Discipline and Punish, like
Histoire de la folie, is a condemnatory critique of those who do not see how
closely bound to inequality is the social process they regard as fundamentally
progressive, how closely bound to power are the workings of rationality."
This is why I do not see it as particularly 'ironic' that Foucault, as Eagleton
says, began to discover late in his life that 'the Enlightenment was not so
unreservedly monstrnous after all' (Eagleton, The Ideology, p.389). Foucault
would probably see their efforts as much more authentic than those of a later
age which justifies its endeavours positivistically according to criteria
established at the cost of much blood and toil by a former age.
The character of Foucault's work as primarily critical of the insouciant
collusion involved in the production of inequality, rather than as affirmative
of equality, thus makes it difficult to classify him as a 'leveller' or 'Tarantula',
one of those 'preachers of equality [...] and dealers in hidden revengefulness'
77 In other contexts he was quite happy to make Enlightenment claims for the necessity of
truth, justice, the role of the intellectual, etc. See Eribon (p.24S) for Foucault's participation
in the comue Wrlt~·Juslice against police action in crushing the prison revolts of late 1971.
According to A.D. Nuttall, Nietzsche himself, in his account of ethics in the Genealogy,
propounds a myth of decline into Christianity which is actually an Enlightenment myth and
as such his practice is as much an outgrowth from Enlightenment historiography as it is a
subversion of it. 'The Game of Death', p.14.
78 In this, Foucault echoes Nietzsche and Freud. while not exempting Freud from the same
charge. Cf. Nietzsche. Human. I. 299. p.268: on advisers of the sick: cf. Freud on the doctor's
feelings of unease in the face of hysterics (since they transgress the laws of his science).
Sigmund Freud, 'First Lecture', Two Short Accounts of Psychoanalysis, trans. by James
Strachey (London: Penguin Books. 1962; repro 1991), p.34; Cf. Htstoire de lafolie (p.S29) for
Foucault's criticism of Freud.
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in whom the urge to punish is strong (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke, pp.123-124).
Such an urge strikes me as particularly unFoucaultian. The Foucault of
Discipline and Punish is not one of those who 'raise outcry against everything
that has power' (p.123); his work raises outcry against knowledge and
institutions that deny their power-effects. Thus, when Zarathustra affirms
men's inequality as a precondition of life itself:
Life wants to raise itself on high with pillars and steps: it wants to gaze into
the far distance and out upon joyful splendour - that is why it needs height!
And because it needs height, it needs steps and conflict between
steps and those who climb them! Life wants to climb and in climbing
overcome itself ...
That there is baule and inequality and war for power and
predominance even in beauty: he teaches us that here in the clearest parable.
(Nietzsche, Thus Spoke, p.l25)
I would hold back from suggesting that Foucault shared this affirmative vision
of life but would maintain nevertheless that he posits power, certainly with less
joy than Nietzsche, as a fundamental force simultaneously productive of yet
premised on inequality.
Nietzsche, though, is much less sceptical and ambivalent than Foucault
on the question of law, because for him it is not the triumph of an insincere
equality-speak; it represents the fruit of power and will. (Nietzsche avoids
valorizing the will in a simple fashion. It is not a question of opposing the
bad unfree will term by term to a wholly positive will.)" Before Foucault,
79 'In all willing there is [...J a plurality of sensations [...J. A man who wtlls - commands
something in himself which obeys or which he believes obeys. But [...J inasmuch as in the
given circumstances we at the same time command and obey, and as the side which obeys
know the sensations of constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance, motion which usually begin
immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are in the habit of
disregarding and deceiving ourselves over this duality by means of the synthetic concept "1";
so a whole chain of erroneous conclusions and consequently of false evaluations of the will
itself has become attached to the will as such - so that he who wills believes wholeheartedly
that willing suffices for action. Because in the great majority of cases willing takes place only
where the effect of the command, that is to say obedience, that is to say the action, was to be
expected, the appearance has translated itself into the sensation, as if there were here a
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Nietzsche had already argued that throughout the longest period of history
punishment was based on a primitive economics according to which every
injury has its equivalent price or quantity of pain, an idea which originates in
the contractual relationship between creditor and ower. In the development of
penal law, the social organization itself comes to stand to its members in the
relationship of creditor to owers. Because it decides what is just and what is
unjust, and because it treats violations of the law as a revolt against itself, it
gradually trains people - though not without first waging war against the
reactive feelings - to an increasingly impersonal valuation of the deed, so that
they declare not only 'I have been injured' but 'That is unjust. It is against the
law'.
I suspect that even these sentiments on a subject, the law, not especially
close to Foucault's heart would not meet with his disapprobation. Nietzsche
speculates on the foundation of law; Foucault's b;te noire is the post-
Enlightenment faith in the rationality of the workings of law. The following
words from Nietzsche take us perhaps even closer to Foucault:
conditions of legality can be only exceptional conditions, in that they are
partial restrictions of the real life-will, which makes for power, and in that
they are subordinated to the life-win's general end as particular means, that
is, as means to create larger units of strength. ("'Guilt"', p.88)
Naturally, Foucault does not celebrate the life-will, which makes for power,
necessity of effect. Enough: he who wills believes with a tolerable degree of certainty that will
and action are somehow one - he attributes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the
will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of that sensation of power which aU success brings
with it. [...] He who wills adds in this way the sensation of pleasure of the successful
executive agents, the serviceable "under-wills" <X' under-souls - for our body is only a social
structure composed of many souls - to his sensations of pleasure as commander. L' e/fel, c' est
mol: what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth:
the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is
absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as I have said already, of a
social structure composed of many "souls", Nietzsche, Beyond, 19, pp.48-49.
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but he nonetheless appears to see it spreading relentlessly throughout the social
fabric in a Weberian vision of the unstoppable rationalization of society."
If Foucault charts the rise of that life-will, which he calls the carceral, it is
with a sense of mourning: power for Foucault is productive, yes, but
productive of a deleterious, near-inescapable subjection," Foucault does not
want Nietzsche to be right, but fears he is, when the latter declares:
A legal organisation, conceived of [...] not as a weapon in a fight of
complexes of power, but as a weapon against fighting [...J would be a
principle hostile to life, a destroyer and dissolver of man, an outrage on the
future of man, a symptom of fatigue, a secret cut to Nothingness. (p.88)
Thus, Foucault's relationship to Nietzsche is highly ambivalent. And,
to address a Nietzschean question, the morality aimed at by the Foucault of
Discipline and Punish is similarly difficult to decipher. Not a slave morality,
but not one celebrating the will to power either; a critical morality perhaps, but
one which cannot see its way to an overcoming. Foucault has been labelled
a nihilist by some critics, though taken in a Nietzschean sense that need not
be a criticism. Deleuze finds two meanings of nihilism in Nietzsche. First,
there is the nihilism which depreciates life, assigning it a value of nil and
opposing it to the idea of another, supra-sensible world bearing superior
values. Second, there is the nihilism in which that supra-sensible world and
its higher values are themselves reacted against and denied. After all, as
Nietzsche says:
have ye sufficiently asked yourselves how dear a payment has the setting up
of every ideal in the world exacted? To achieve that consummation how
much truth must always be traduced and misunderstood, how many lies must
80 See also Deleuze and Guattari, Ami-Oedipus, p.372.
II Cf. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic (p.181) on the 'iron cage' image.
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be sanctified. how much conscience has got to be disturbed, how many
pounds of 'God' have got to be sacrificed every time? ('"Guilt''', pp.l15-
116)
One could thus view Discipline and Punish as nihilism of the second kind. An
atopic project which concentrates its attack on existing values and institutions
rather than speculating on the creation of new ones." In a similar vein, John
Rajchman argues for the importance in Foucault of de-anthropologization, or
the thesis that 'we are free not in having a nature (place in tradition, etc.) but
in being able to reject and transform what is presented to us as our nature.'."
Arguably, though, the major difference between the two thinkers - and
an important respect in which Foucault is tellingly, fatally, unNietzschean -
lies in their respective relationship to Apollo. Nietzsche celebrates Dionysus
but acknowledges the importance of Apollo and, as far as possible, straddles
the two. Foucault advocates Dionysus, condemns Apollo but is an Apollonian
child. Doubtless this has to do with personal ethos: Nietzsche's aristocratic
frankness; Foucault's bourgeois concern to epater le bourgeois sitting
alongside his wish to be loved by the majority. But it also has to do with their
respective times and the eighty years which separate them. Years which have
witnessed the growth of libertarianism and individualism, the challenge to
European hegemony and the emergence of a European bad conscience. Years
82 'Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who teU you: "Don't criticise.
since you're not capable of carrying out a reform." That's ministerial cabinet talk. Critique
doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be
done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its
use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to
lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to
what is.' Foucault, 'Questions of Method', p.13.
83Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1985), p.74, 0.9.
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which have made the words 'discipline' and 'morality' both too easy and too
hard to say. Thus, when Nietzsche writes that 'every morality is, as opposed
to latsser alter, a piece of tyranny against "nature'" (Beyond, p.lIO), the
proximity of Nietzsche and Foucault is striking. However, a difference begins
to make itself felt when Nietzsche qualifies the phrase: 'but that can be no
objection to it unless one is in possession of some other morality which
decrees that any kind of tyranny and unreason is impermissible'. The
ambivalence of Foucault's position is here anticipated by Nietzsche. What
drives much of Foucault's work is precisely the belief that 'any kind of
tyranny and unreason is impermissible' . Yet he would still not object to the
first statement. And this not because he remains sceptical about the possibility
of being in possession of some other morality. But, rather, because he is
sceptical about the desire to want to possess any morality at all, where the
latter, to be learnable and transferable, would harden into decrees, dictates and
directives." The gap widens when Nietzsche writes, turning towards Apollo,
that 'the essential and invaluable element in every morality is that it is a
protracted constraint':
the strange fact is that all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety,
boldness, dance and masterly certainty, whether in thinking itself, or in
ruling, or in speaking and persuasion, in the arts as in morals, has evolved
only by virtue of the 'tyranny of such arbitrary laws'; and, in all seriousness,
there is no small probability that precisely this is 'nature' and 'natural' - and
not that laisser aller! [...J Protracted unfreedom of spirit, mistrustful
constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline thinkers imposed
84 Terry Eagleton opines that for Foucault what is objectionable is regime as such. Therein
a sophisticated relativism absolving one from the need to make explicit the values in the name
of which one's critique is deployed. The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p.385ff. Peter Dews makes
the same point: if norms are bad, one cannot claim any greater truth or normative superiority
for one's own position. 'Foucault and the Frankfurt School' in Ideas from France: The Legacy
of French Theory: ICA Documents, ed. by Lisa Appignanesi (London: Free Association Books,
1989), pp.71-78 (p.75). The History of Sexuality goes some way to answering these charges.
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on themselves to think within an ecclesiastical or courtly rule or under
Aristotelian presuppositions, the protracted spiritual will to interpret all
events according to a Christian scheme and to rediscover and justify the
Christian God in every chance occurrence - all these violent, arbitrary,
severe, gruesome and antirational things have shown themselves to be the
means by which the European spirit was disciplined in its strength, ruthless
curiosity and subtle flexibility: though admittedly an irreplaceable quantity
of force and spirit had at the same time to be suppressed, stifled and spoiled
(for here as everywhere 'nature' shows itself as it is, in aU its prodigal and
indifferent magnificence, which is noble though it outrage our feelings). [...J
Regard any morality from this point of view: it is 'nature' in it which
teaches hatred of laisser alter, of too great freedom, and which implants the
need for limited horizons and immediate tasks - which teaches the
narrowing of perspective, and thus in a certain sense stupidity, as a condition
of life and growth. (Nietzsche, Beyond, pp.HO-1l2)
The character and value of discipline in Nietzsche is entirely
overlooked by Foucault. Of course, it is fair to say that this passage certainly
does not take criminals as its paradigm case, in fact its exempla refer to
thinkers, artists, theologians. Furthermore, even when Nietzsche addresses
more directly the question of the body and a certain labour on it, one would
have to concede that this body is hardly that of a wretched inmate. He asks
how men attain to great power and to great tasks, and answers:
All the virtues and proficiencies of the body and the soul are little by little
laboriously acquired, through great industry, self-control. and keeping oneself
within narrow bounds, through a frequent, energetic, and genuine repetition
of the same work and of the same hardships. (Nietzsche, The Will, ii, 995,
p.385; the Fourth Book is called 'Discipline and Breeding')"
This is a logic which, above and beyond the question of the precise nature of
the individual produced, seems called for by Foucault's position - his
insistence that there is no outside the disciplinary, yet recognition of an
executive class able to profit from the increased power of the submissive
bodies of others; recognition, in other words, that discipline has brought
., See Histoire de la folie for the eighteenth-century belief that madness could result from
the absence of constraint (p.38S) and Tuke's conviction that religion was the fonn of constraint
best able to counterbalance insanity (p.502).
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mastery to some. Marcel Mauss sees training as fine-tuning the body's own
'craft' and technical 'cleverness' for its own benefit, but does not shy away
from stating that one of the reasons why what he calls 'physic-psycho-
sociological assemblages of series of actions' may more easily be assembled
where the individual is concerned 'is precisely because they are assembled by
and for social authority'. However, whereas Foucault's vision is of a
malevolent, all-embracing technology akin to the deterministic hand of God,
Mauss does not rail against that authority; on the contrary, he points to the
need for a 'determinate efficiency' as one of the 'fundamental moments of
history itself"." For his part, Foucault fights shy of this logic and when this
great systematizer does admit it - in the later texts - its implications are offset
by a massive shift of emphasis away from disciplining others to a less
authoritarian-sounding fashioning of the self, for so long banished from the
philosophical armoury.
In our own day the word 'discipline' raises hackles, largely by virtue
of the negative semantic weight which attaches to it. It is perhaps this same
weight that truly disarms us in advance with respect to Nietzsche. Foucault
asks the Durkheimian question: 'How can society hold individuals together?'
but sees in it only cynicism (,On Attica', p.156). This means his inquiries
court the libertarian in us at the expense of posing the more complex (and
doubtless unattractive) question of whether there could be any society without
86 Marcel Mauss, 'Body Techniques', in Sociology and Psychology. Essays, trans. by Ben
Brewster (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
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constraint 87 Not to ask this question is to risk the naivety of an expression,
which he takes from Les Miserab/es, such as crime is a 'coup d' ~tat from
below' ('On Attica', p.161). On occasion the necessity of this question is not
only intuited but experienced."
Derrida comes closer than Foucault to this problematic of Nietzschean
discipline in his analysis of Nietzsche's 'On the Future of Our Educational
Institutions' (1872).89 There, Nietzsche stresses the need for Germany's
youth to eschew a democratic and equalizing education and reject a
journalistic, vulgar German, in favour of constraint and linguistic discipline
under the direction of a guide, a leader or Fuhrer. Only on this condition can
the German spirit be saved from its enemies. The Hitlerian resonances are
obvious, Derrida says, but when Nietzsche's lecture recommends linguistic
discipline as a counter to 'academic freedom', it is not in order to set
constraint over against freedom. 'Behind "academic freedom" one can discern
the silhouette of a constraint which is all the more ferocious and implacable
because it conceals and disguises itself in the form of laisser-faire' (Derrida,
The Ear, p.33). Through 'academic freedom' it is the State that controls
everything. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Derrida adds, Nietzsche speaks of the
State as a hypocritical hound. Derrida continues:
87 The Marquis de Sade was in no doubt about the alternative to society: 'Nature averse
to crime, I tell you that nature lives and breathes by it, hungers at all her pores for bloodshed,
yearns with all her heart for the furtherance of cruelty' (cited in Clark, p.l92).
IS See Eribon (p.221) on Foucault's disaffectation with the Vincennes students' permanent
disruption of classes (his included).
89 'Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name', trans.
by Avital Ronell in Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation,
ed. by Christie V. McDonald (New York: Schocken Books, 1985).
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The hypocritical hound whispers in your ear through his educational systems,
which are actually acoustic or acroamatic devices. Your ears grow larger
and you turn into long-eared asses when, instead of listening with small,
finely tuned ears and obeying the best master and the best of leaders, you
think you are free and autonomous with respect to the State. You open wide
the portals [pavilions] of your ears to admit the State, not knowing that it has
already come under the control of reactive and degenerate forces. Having
become all ears for this phonograph dog, you transform yourself into a high-
fidelity receiver, and the ear - your ear which is also the ear of the other-
begins to occupy in your body the disproportionate place of the 'inverted
cripple.' (Derrida, The Ear, pp.34-3.5)
We should be wary of the Apollonian clinicalness with which Foucault's work
launders, folds and neatly parcels up ethics and moralities. The 'roughness'
and 'mountain peasantness' he praises in Nietzsche do not characterize his own
thinking.'?
The laundering manoeuvre by which Discipline and Punish is less
rigorous than Nietzschean logic consists in a neat distribution of human entities
according to the respective systems: the juridical systems define juridical
subjects, the disciplines disciplinary individuals. What could be read as a
process of doubling, the fabrication of a two-in-one figure, emerges in the
penal justice system as a neat separation: 'What is now imposed on penal
justice as its point of application, its "useful" object, will no longer be [ .• .] the
juridical subject of an ideal contract; it will be the disciplinary individual'
(p.221). One wonders if such a separation is not ultimately the result, on
Foucault's part, of an immense act of freewill traditionally defined. Nietzsche
writes:
Our ordinary inaccurate observation takes a group of phenomena as one and
calls them a fact. Between this fact and another we imagine a vacuum, we
90 Michel Foucault, '00 Literature', in Foucault Live, pp.l13-119 (p.118); originally in Le
Mondt sans visa, 6 September 1986. Camille Paglia, to whom I shall return in Chapters five
and six, is scornful of the comparison between Foucault and Nietzsche (Sex, Art, and American
Cullure: Essays, p.187).
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isolate each fact. In reality, however, the sum of our actions and cognitions
is no series of facts and intervening vacua, but a continuous stream. Now
the belief in free will is incompatible with the idea of a continuous, uniform,
undivided, indivisible flow. This belief presupposes that every single action
is isolated and indivisible; it is an atomic theory as regards volition and
cognition [...J. We are still constantly led astray by words and actions, and
are induced to think of things as simpler than they are, as separate,
indivisible, existing in the absolute. Language contains a hidden
philosophical mythology, which, however careful we may be, breaks out
afresh at every moment. (Nietzsche, The Wanderer, II, pp.191-192)
Is there a powerful modem Apollonian-Cartesianism in Discipline and
Punish with its mastery of flux? Modem, because Foucault does not believe
he is simply giving on to 'facts'; but, rather, on to a particular formation of
power-knowledge. Apollonian-Cartesianism because, despite the complexity
of the processes which have given birth to the disciplinary regime, its result
can be apprehended clearly and distinctly: docility + utility = subjection.
Powerful, because the analysis and ordering of the material, the systematicity
of its organization, is awesome. In the play between system and nuance, the
grand sweep and the detail, Foucault would be both Greek and modern."
Megill warns against thinking that Foucault's texts constitute a system or
method, a notion he considers anathema to Foucault (Megill, Prophets, p.255).
But Polan is closer to the spirit of Discipline and Punish when she remarks
that Foucaultian discourse can readily tum tensions in the system into 'a new
systematicity, a coalesced overdetermination' (Polan, p.368).
Nietzsche also speaks of philosophers' lack of historical sense, their
91 'A sense for, and a delight in, nuances (which is characteristic of modernity), in that
which is not general, runs counter to the instinct which finds its joy and its strength in grasping
what is typical: like Greek taste in its best period. In this [...J the general rule, the law, is
honoured and made prominent: conversely, the exception is laid aside, and shades are
suppressed. All that which is firm, mighty, solid, life resting on a broad and powerful basis,
concealing its strength - this "pleases"; i.e. it corresponds with what we think of ourselves.'
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, II, 819, p.262.
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hatred of the idea of becoming, their 'Egyptianism':
They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricize it. sub
specie aeterni - when they make a mummy of it. All that philosophers have
handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has
escaped from their hands alive. (Nietzsche. Twilight. p.45)
Because they cannot get hold of what is, they hit upon the idea that it must be
their senses that are deceiving them. Thus they declare: '''And away, above
all, with the body, that pitiable idee fixe of the senses! infected with every
error of logic there is, refuted, impossible even, notwithstanding it is impudent
enough to behave as if it actually existed!' (Nietzsche, Twilight, p.45). It
would appear that in its teaching of becoming (what else is genealogy if not
the study of becoming?), which Nietzsche says is a hundred times more
difficult than the teaching of Being, Discipline and Punish risks presenting us
with a new idee rue: the body as a thoroughly constituted, logical volume
subject to perfect control (power) and analysis (knowledge)." In Chapter
four I shall show how the pressing task for Foucault becomes precisely that of
thinking becoming.
But to conclude this assessment of Foucault's genealogical practice, we
might say that if Discipline and Punish represents a remarkable literalization
of the guiding metaphor of modern social constructionism, it is nevertheless
marked by a pronounced classicism, which means that in certain important
respects Foucault's genealogy falls short of the complexity of Nietzsche's
transvaluation of all values. Nietzsche showed that concepts like 'good' and
92 'The teaching of Being, of things l...]is a hundred times more easy than the teaching
of Becoming and of evolution [...J. Logic was intended to be a method of/acililaling thought
a means 0/ expression [...J. Later on it got to aCllike truth', Nietzsche, The WiIIlo Power,
II, 538, p.50.
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'truth' are not pure, unsullied, Olympian ideals constitutively cut off from the
base and the lowly; but that their historical emergence and the positive values
which attach to them are caught up in and contaminated by a mean little world
of intrigue, self-interest and power. Foucault appropriates this insight to tell
a story of great verve and panache concerning the emergence of the European
human sciences. But when he takes the idea and the practice of discipline,
showing its relentless and unerring dressage of the body, both discipline and
the body are evaluated in a revealingly unambivalent manner. Contemporary
events patently weigh heavily here - the struggle for the reform of an outdated,
repressive prison regime still operative in 1970sFrance, the continuing political
and social fall-out from the events of May '68 - and a more extensive
consideration of the historical moment of the book's composition than has been
possible here would doubtless lead to a less critical conclusion. My limited
purpose, by contrast, has been to examine with due wariness the call to
Nietzsche, to suggest the non-simplicity of an expression like 'I am simply
Nietzschean'," and to urge the necessity of thinking the truth and propriety of
a title such as 'Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze want to return to Nietzsche
his true face'. 94
93 'The Return of Morality', in Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, p.2Sl.
94 'Michel Foucault et Gilles Deleuze veulent rendre a Nietzsche son vrai visage', in Dits
et ecrits, I, pp.549-SS2 (first publ. in Le Figaro litteraire, 15 September 1966, p.7). I shall
develop these criticisms further in Chapter five.
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CHAPTER3
DERANGED VERSES: SUBJECT ·POSITIONS AND THE THEORY
OF THE ENONCE
IDtroduction
This chapter deals with Foucault's theory of discourse as act or event
and with his attempts to theorize the constitution of the subject in discourse.
Both of these aspects are themselves underpinned by Foucault's theory of the
lnonci, the exploration of which will be of capital importance here, firstly in
what concerns the question of subject-positions, secondly in what relates to the
detennination of them by the enoncl and the 'field'. The outline of Foucault's
theory of discourse is followed principally in The Archaeology of Know/edge,
though I draw on all his writings of the same period. The burden of my
argument may be summarized thus: that his largely Benvenistean
understanding of the relationship between the subject and discourse is wrought
with tensions: in short, the difficulty of maintaining a formalist theory of
subject-positions alongside a broadly contextualist desire to speak about real
individuals in real institutions. I claim that in the tension between the two
there would be, there wants to be, less a slippage, or dlca/age, than a ca/age,
a 'wedging, chocking, keying, locking', and that this ca/age is a vital
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manoeuvre for the emergence of an intellectual practice which construes the
analysis of subject-positions as a site of important political work (the value of
which, I argue, is limited).
The skeleton of the chapter, upon which the above issues are fleshed
out, is provided by the critical exchange between Foucault and Jacques Derrida
arising from Foucault's remarks on Descartes in Histoire de la folie a I'dge
classtque. The exchange straddles Foucault's so-called archaeological and
genealogical periods, and by itself refutes those who would see a clear break:
between the two. It also displays, with its rapier-sharp feints and passes, some
of the moves and strategies, assumptions and aporia involved in constructing
subject and propositional positions in discourse. There are two further reasons
for choosing this exchange. Firstly, because I think it demonstrates a certain
trade-off in Foucault between a post-Saussurean view of language which is
anathema to him and a post-Saussurean view of the subject which he would
like to make his own but which he is forced to repudiate in practice.
, Secondly, because it raises questions concerning the relationship between the
sign and reality, between forms of knowledge and the social world, questions
which will increasingly concern me throughout the remainder of the thesis.
Foucault and Derrida on Descartes and madness
Without further ado, let us follow the dispute over Descartes. In the
course of his reply to Derrida, which we shall examine shortly, Foucault
affirms: 'Any discourse, whatever it be, is constituted by a set of utterances
[Inoncls] which are produced each in its place and time, as so many discursive
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events': According to Foucault in Histoire de la folie d l'dge classique,
Descartes' theory of the Cogito is bound all too apparently to a particular set
of utterances in that it, too, perpetrates an exclusion of madness typical of the
time. How is this so? Foucault argues that during the European Middle Ages
and Renaissance, the insane were allowed to circulate with relatively few
constraints. They were viewed as harbouring hidden truths about the human
condition and consequently not regarded as being outside or beyond
humankind. During the Classical age, however, the insane corne to be
considered manifestations of a great Unreason categorically divided from a
properly human Reason. As such, they must be exiled from the social order
or leastwise exiled by a process of internment within. The Internment
institutions which sprang up across Europe around the middle of the
seventeenth century were thus not simply medical institutions but juridical ones
too, tied to the bourgeois and monarchic power of the day. In a Europe
experiencing economic crisis, the mad, as the embodiment of poverty,
indigence and potential mayhem, are apprehended as the representatives
incarnate of the great disorder which threatens to engulf man from the outside
if ever his vigilance should slip. As we saw briefly in Chapter one, Foucault's
contention is that the gesture of segregation itself constitutes alienation, itself
produces the figure of the asocial. An unreason which had hitherto wandered
through the social and imaginary landscape of the Middle Ages and
I 'My Body, This Paper, This rU'C', trans. by Geoff Bennington, The Oxford Uterary
Review, 4:1 (Autumn 1979), 9-28; 'Moo corps. cc papier. cc feu'. an appendix to Foucault.
Histoire de lafolie (first publ. in Paideia (September 1971». The piece does not appear until
1971, many years after Derrida's critique and in the midst of the so-called genealogical phase.
The same issue of the above journal contains a very helpful cxp0s6 of the FoucaultlJ)errida
debate by Bennington: 'Cogito Incognito: Foucault's "My Body. This Paper, This Fire ..• •S-8.
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Renaissance, always experienced in a sense in advance of the actual presence
of the madman, against a backdrop of bestiaries and representations of the
Apocalypse, is now isolated from that landscape and consequently localized,
shorn of ambiguity, in its concrete presence. Unreason becomes a simply
human fact, isolatable in certain human figures, a discrete object of perception,
an improper quasi-objectivity in a real social world. For Foucault, Descartes
himself, in his Mlditations, excludes madness as a founding move of the
Cogito. If man can always be mad, the logic goes, thought itself, as the
exercise of the sovereignty of a subject, can, on the contrary, never be insane.
In order to make sense of Derrida's rejoinder, we first need to follow
the continuation of Foucault's thesis and particularly his remarks on the
modem objectification of madness.
Internment, Foucault argues, was primarily a complex juridical rather
than medical affair. The juridical apparatus construes the mad in two ways:
it maintains a juridical theory of madness based on the person as a subject of
law and practises a social internment of the mad by positing them simply as
social beings. As a subject of law, the madman is exempted from his
responsibilities, insofar as he is alienated from his senses; as a social being,
madness implicates him in a field of culpability.2 Foucault's point is that one
also sees the emergence of two fonns of medicine at this time: one dealing
with the capacities of the subject of law (which later mutates into psychology);
the other with the behaviour of social man (and thus paving the way for a
:I PietTe Rivi='s banister defends him precisely on the grounds of the former. Mol.
Pietr« Rivilre. p.17S.
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dualist pathology, in terms of normal/abnormal, etc.). The thrust of his
argument is to claim that nineteenth-century positivist medicine inherits the
Enlightenment's belief that these two aspects fonn an essential unity of man,
taking it as read that the alienation of the subject of law can and should
coincide with the madness of the social man. Nineteenth-century
psychopathology's homo natura is thus, for Foucault, a creation which should
be situated in a social (juridical, medical) rather than natural space.
This second creation stems from a second partage, which supervenes
in the middle of the eighteenth century when Europe sees the foundation of a
series of houses reserved for the insane, the purpose of which (and it is largely
economic) is to avoid contaminating those non-mad internees with the madness
of those most incapable of being harnessed to productive life.3 But the final
step in the birth of the asylum is only taken once the negative gesture of
exclusion becomes at the same time an opening onto the positive world of
cure. By a trick of the (En)light(enment), what was social reform of
internment becomes fidelity to the deepest truths of madness; 'and the manner
in which one alienates the madman is forgotten only to reappear as the nature
of alienation' (p.4S8).· In other words, the insane are presented to knowledge
only in the neutralized fonn of an 'offered objectivity' (objectivit~ offerte), in
which each madman appears only insofar as he has been passed through the
abstraction of madness. An objectified madness is thereby stripped of its
J The creation of the asylum also neatly satisfies the Christian duty to offer public
assistance to the wretched at the same time as it queUs the fears aroused by the presence of
the insane •
..All translations of Htstoire de la folie are my own.
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deepest powers and mastered more effectively than its anterior enslavement to
unreason.
Yet madness also penetrates daily life in ways uncontrolled by the
asylum, and in this public domain it constitutes a scandal. Foucault maintains
that a body of knowledge like psychology is born when a sort of public
consciousness, in effect that of the bourgeois individual, is invoked as
universal instance of reason and morality in order to judge men. He thus
describes the new psychiatry as a double movement of liberation and
enslavement Yes, psychiatric positivism is linked to a promotion of
knowledge, but more originarily it is concerned to defme a mode of being
outside madness (Itre hors folie), a practice Foucault regards as a
'thingification' (chosijication) owing far more to sorcery and to psychiatry's
status as an arm of bourgeois power than to any scientific prowess.
So much for the argument of Histoire de lafolie (or Folie et deraison
as it was called when Denida locked horns with Foucault). Let us follow
Denida's reply, before turning to Foucault's rejoinder. Derrida's case can be
artificially separated into two points.' First, he argues that if Foucault holds
that the language of psychiatry could be established only on the basis of a
silence brought about by the stifling of madness, would not Foucault's
'archaeology' of that silence, by defmition itself a logic, 'an organized
language, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a "work'" (p.35), thus be
'Denida. 'Cogito and the History of Madness', in Writing and Difference, pp.31-63. The
original lecture was given in Foucault's presence. Derrida has a much later lectwe on the
same book, '"Etre juste avec Freud". L'histoire de la folie l rage de la psychanalyse', in
Penser la folie. Essais sur Michel Foucault, Collection D6bats, directed by Michel De10nne
(Paris: Editions GaJil6e, 1992), pp.139-19S, which I shall allude to in Chapter five.
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the subtlest repetition of the act perpetrated against madness? The psychiatrist,
Denida says, is but one delegate among the immense delegation that is
Western reason and by fustigating psychiatry one does not end all complicity
with that order. Moreover, the Oassical division between the Cogito and
unreason cannot have been the first such decision, since all thought is premised
on a less than comforting dissension (Denida' s preferred word) within reason.
Denida remarks that Foucault was himself aware of this difficulty of speaking
against reason, and that there is another discourse in Foucault's book in which
the silence of madness is not said, but is metaphorically made present by its
pathos. But even here, Foucault cannot exculpate his effort, as Demda's play
on 410ge and logos confirms: 'A new and radical praise of folly whose
intentions cannot be admitted because the praise [41oge] of silence always
takes place within logos, the language of objectification' (p.37).6
Yet, and this brings us to the second point, did Descartes at all simply
seek to exclude madness? In fact, Denida argues, contrary to Foucault's
contention that Descartes' process of reasoning can tolerate dreams and
sensory error but not (the totally unreasonable) madness, Descartes posits
madness as but one case of sensory illusion before making the radical break
with all the senses by moving up to another, higher order of reasoning - the
intelligible. As we shall see shortly, it is this moment in Derrida's rereading
15 Colin Gordon deflects this criticism by refening back to the suppressed preface inwhich
Foucault acbtowledges that the perception seeking to seize the sufferings of the insane
"necessarily belongs to a world whicb has already captured them', 'Histotr« de la/olle: An
Unbtown Book by Michel Foucault' • History of the Human Sciences, 3: 1 (February 1990), 3-
26 (p.19), But Delrida's point is that this and other such remarks are what makes Foucault's
book contradictory. divided within itself, since it continues to pursue madness itself despite
glimpsing the problems of doing so,
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of Descartes that Foucault will lock on to in 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire'.
In any event, Derrida argues that Descartes' apparent dismissal of the insane
is actually a feigned objection on the part of a non-philosopher who proclaims
that to doubt the senses in this manner would be to make us all mad.
Descartes, Derrida says, echoes this objection, only then to unsettle his
interlocutor more radically with the example of sleep and dream. This
hyperbolical example is more common than madness and also more total (since
the mad are not always wrong in everything), and will ruin all foundations of
sensory knowledge. In any case, Descartes is not concerned with determining
the truth of madness, he does not speak of 'madness itself'; his interest lies in
using the popular notion of insanity
in order to ask questions of principle regarding only the trUlh of ideas)-J
What must be grasped here is that/rom this point of view the sleeper. or the
dreamer. is madder than the madman. Or. at least, the dreamer [• .•J is
further from true perception than the madman. (p.St)
At this juncture let us turn to Foucault's reply. It bears greatly on the
word 'truth' and the phrase 'from this point of view'. The germ of his
. argument is that Derrida has misconstrued the discursive differences in
Descartes' text which ensure that it metes out varying treatments to dream and
to madness. Madness tends to be confronted as the completely other,
something external which cannot be experienced. merely stated. Dream, on the
contrary, is framed as a quotidian activity which Can be experienced without
much difficulty. Foucault then points to a telling lexical shift in Descartes'
passage on the mad. When it is a matter of characterizing the mad according
to their wayward imagination, Descartes uses insani, a word of quotidian as
much as medical usage. However, when he states that he should not follow
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the insane's example (,But just a moment: these are madmen [sed amentes
sun! iShl, and I should be no less extravagant [clemens] if I were to follow
their examples'), Descartes employs tenns (amentes and clemens) which,
Foucault says, are primarily juridical ones designating those incapable of
certain religious, civil and judicial acts. In brief, insanus is a characterizing
tenn; amens and clemens, disqualifying ones. Thus, for Foucault, the passage
does not, as Derrida maintains, concern the truth of ideas but, rather, the way
in which the subject is qualified.
Foucault's second main point is that Derrida has misread the
fundamental discursive differences which marks out Descartes' work as a
demonstrative meditation, one comprising an ensemble of discursive events
which modify the subject as they unfold (freeing it from its convictions,
inducing new doubts, etc.), only for these modifications of the subject in tum
to permit new ensembles of utterances," Thus the example of madness must
be excluded for Descartes, since it allows the constitution of a doubting subject
but disqualifies him from being a reasoning subject 8 Dream, on the contrary,
allows the proper constitution of the subject as at once doubting and as
continuing a valid meditation. Derrida's play of voices is therefore, for
Foucault, a means of continuing the exclusion of madness while attributing it
to an outside, non-philosophical objector and thus preserving the reputation of
philosophy.
7 The same idea is applied to the confession in The History of SexuaUty, p.62.
• There remains an insoluble difficulty of ttanslation here regarding the verb constituer.
The common fonns it takes, se constitue or s' est constitul, are at once passive and reflexive,
'is constituted' and 'constitutes itself'.
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Now, Derrida had already conceded that the f11'8tstage of Descartes'
reasoning, in which madness is subsumed within the category of sensory error,
might well have neutralized the originality of madness. However, Derrida
says, there is a further, properly critical phase of doubt in Descartes. This
entails the hypothesis of the evil genius (Malin Glnie) which will conjure up
the possibility of a total madness afflicting not only the body-object but the res
cogitans itself. Derrida cites Descartes:
'I shall consider that the heavens. the earth. colours. figures. sound, and all
other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this
genius bas availed himself in mIer to Jay traps for my credulity; 1 shall
consider myself as having no hands, no eyes. no flesh, no blood, nor any
senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things'. (p.S3)
Thus, Derrida surmises, neither sensory nor intellectual knowledge will be
sheltered from this new phase of doubt, and everything previously set aside as
insanity is now welcomed into the inner sanctum of thought
It would appear that Foucault delivers the coup de grdce precisely here.
He argues that Derrida's demonstration works by two series of semantic
derivations, in order that the evil genius and the Cogito may become better
instances of madness than madness itself. Thus the evil genius is described by
Derrida as 'total madness', 'total derangement', 'disorder of the body',
'extravagance'. And the Cogito, as 'mad audacity', 'mad project', 'disorder
and inordinate nature of hyperbole'. All of which represents Derrida striving
to erase from Descartes' text everything that shows that the episode of the evil
genius is a volontary exercise controlled in the last instance by the meditating
subject. The hypothesis of the evil genius may well carry the suspicion of
error beyond those sensory illusions exemplified in madmen, but the one who
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forms this fiction of the evil genius escapes ipso facto the risk of believing
such illusions. Descartes' quote speaks for itself: 'I shall consider myself as
having no hands... yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things.'
Hence, the meditating subject is a match for the evil genius and remains in the
position of master in relation to his fiction. We are thus far from Derrida's
line: 'total madness, total derangement which J am unable to master, since it
is inflicted by hypothesis and J am no longer responsible for it'. The stakes
are clear: first, philosophy is impure, traversed (as Derrida seems to
acknowledge only to disallow), by juridical and medical freightage; second,
philosophy excludes madness for the subject's benefit. In arguing this,
Foucault frames the debate between Derrida and himself as the confrontation
of a discursive analysis versus an immanent, narrowly textual reading.
Foucault is not the only one to alight gleefully on Derrida's words concerning
the need flISt of all for an 'internal and autonomous analysis of the
philosophical content of philosophical discourse', and on the sentence that
follows: 'Only when the totality of this content will have become manifest in
its meaning for me (but this is impossible) will 1 rigorously be able to situate
it in its total historical form' (p.44). In fact, 1 think this is a severe misreading
by Foucault, by Edward Said and by John Frow, all of whom see it as proof
of Derrida's neat drawing of boundaries around philosophy and the
philosophical text. Said. to take just one commentator, speaks of the contrast
between 'a criticism claiming that il n', a pas d' hors texte and one discussing
textuality as having to do with a plurality of texts. and with history. power,
knowledge. and society'; Derrida missing the fact that a text is a series of
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discursive events ruled by 'a set of constraints imposed on the author by the
kind of text he is writing, by historical conditions, and so forth'," All three
critics of Denida are over hasty, because they misunderstand his warning about
claiming to situate the totality of content in its total historical form. They
contribute the valuable insight regarding the impurity of knowledge, which
remains important even if it has today become a commonplace. But they are
all pushed from a general recognition that discourse makes available certain
subject-positions to a fonn of madness which tries to 'determine' that
discursive positioning. Foucault's theory of the ~nonc~, which subtends his
position in respect of the Denida debate, is an exemplary and admirable
instance of this madness.
Foucault's theory of the ~no"c;
At this juncture, I should like to elucidate the logic which subtends
Foucault's position. As we shall see, it fonns part of a much larger project
which straddles Foucaultian archaeology and genealogy. When Foucault says
in his reply to Derrida: 'Any discourse, whatever it be, is constituted by a set
of utterances which are produced each in its place and time, as so many
discursive events', he restates a theme which is central to The Archaeology of
Knowledge. In that text, Foucault elaborates a theory of the ;nonc~ which
binds its production to a notion of the event 10 The Archaeology of
9 'The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions', erldca/lnquiry, 4 (Summer
1978),673-714 (pp.673, 703).
10 The translation renders b.oncl as 'statement'. Emile Benveniste, in his ProbUmes dt
lingutsdque ginlralt (Paris: Editions Gallimard. 19(6). uses Inonciatioll 10 designate the act
of fcxmulating speech and lnonci 10 designate what is uttered in the lnonciadon. The English
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Knowledge does not yield up an easy understanding of the lnoncl but with the
aid of some of Foucault's examples we might be able to attempt a preliminary
defmition. He considers a typewriter keyboard. As it stands it is not an
lnoncl. However, the same series of letters A, Z, E, R, T, listed in a typing
manual is the lnoncl of the alphabetical order adopted by French machines.
By the same token, a classificatory table of species, a genealogical tree, and
an accounts book, all of which must be distinguished from a proposition, a
speech act and a sentence, are all, for Foucault, instances of enonces. The
enonce, then, which essentially has to do with rules, with allowing and with
disqualifying, is 'indispensable if we want to say whether or not there is a
sentence, proposition, or speech act' (The Archaeology, p.86). A specific
ground rule, then, with a built-in principle of evaluation. We are reminded of
Heidegger on the mode of an object's objectivity ('We are now not only not
directed to the object of the assertion, but also not to the form of the assertion
as such, but rather to how the object is the object of the assertion' [What Is a
Thing?, p.l78]). The precise goal of Foucault's archaeology is to ask how it
is that one lnoncl rather than another should appear at a particular time and
place. It is therefore imperative for archaeology that an enonce always betray
the specific place from which it is articulated and the status it carries. As
James Bernauer observes, Foucault is interested in the medical statement not
as a vehicle for the communication of medical understanding, but rather qua
'signal as to the existing system of relationships (of knowledge, of institution,
translation of Benveniste renders both terms as 'utterance'. I shall retain the French terms to
avoid the ambiguity implied by both 'statement' and ·utterance'.
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of society) in which such a statement is made'."
It is not coincidental that in the most eloquent, most synthetic
expression of his theory of discourse, The Order of Discourse, which
nonetheless contains important differences. as we shall see later. Foucault uses
the metaphor of policing. He states that in every society the production of
discourse is controlled by procedures designed to ward off its powers. He
indicates three principles of exclusion - the prohibition, the division between
madness and reason, the will to truth - and claims that the last of these is
gradually assimilating the other two. Bluntly put: 'One is "in the true" only
by obeying the rules of a discursive "policing" which one has to reactivate in
each of one' s discourses' .12 As a result, the speaking subject must satisfy
certain requirements in order to enter the discourse. There is fU'Stthe ritual
dimension (the qualifications, gestures and behaviour which the subject must
display); second, the membership of a society of discourse which protects the
discourse in a closed field; third, the doctrinal dimension involving the
subjection of speaking subjects to discourses and of discourses to a group of
speaking individuals. Such procedures of discourse, Foucault says. are usually
linked to one another, from the education system to Icriture, from the judicial
system to the medical institution. And. not to be forgotten, a certain number
of themes in philosophy also correspond to such activities of limitation and
1I Michel Foucault's Force of FUghl. p.l06. Bernauer offers a good summary of The
Archaeology in a book which is similarly punctilious throughout. There are many points with
I would take serious issue (not least the word 'ethics') but the book stands as a generous and
thorough commentary on Foucault's Ihought.
12Michel Foucault. 'The Order of Discourse: Inaugural Lecture at the Con~ge de France.
Given 2 December 1970', trans. by Ian McLeod. in Untying the Text: A Post-Structurallst
Reader, cd. by Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul), pp.51-77 (p.61).
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exclusion. We can allow the following to resonate in full:
They correspond to them first of aU by proposing an ideal ttuth as the law
of discourse and an immanent rationality as the principle of their unfolding.
and they re-introduce an ethic of knowledge. which promises to give the
truth only to the desire for ttuth itself and only to the power of thinking it
Then they reinforce the limitations and exclusions by a denial of the specifIC
reality of discourse in general. (p.6S)
In short, and to restate the themes of the response to Derrida (which are
already restated in this last quote), discourse must be conceived of as an event,
something that takes place, an event over which the subject does not have
control since in order to activate such a Inoncl it has had to accept a position
prescribed for it by the rules of formation.
These concerns bearing on the fundamental difference in the way in
which the subject of discourse is described inform Foucault's reply to Derrida,
One of the most important differences to note is that Derrida speaks of the text
in traditional terms: 'Descartes says', 'Descartes successively judges
inadmissible', 'Descartes imagines that he can always dream'. Descartes
remains the speaking subject but at a certain moment 'throws' his voice in
imitation of a narve objector. Foucault, on the other hand. speaks of a
'meditating subject', a 'doubting subject'. an 'enunciating subject', a
'philosophizing subject'. This vocabulary is strictly faithful to the semiotic
vernacular according to which the subject of the enunciation, or the
lnonciateur, is to be distinguished from the real author. The subject of the
enunciation is a textual strategy constructed by the text, functioning rather after
the fashion of an imagined paper person who 'speaks' and 'experiences' in
ways perhaps similar to but never identical with the thoughts and experiences
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of the author." For Foucault, there is a ceaselessly modified enunciating
subject which (who?) develops and changes as the meditation progresses.
Now, The Archaeology of Knowledge addresses the question of the
subject and discourse in some detail. (I note in passing that the argumentation
of The Archaeology lends credence to the view that 'My Body, This Paper,
This Fire' is as much Foucault putting the subject into playas it is Foucault
demonstrating how Descartes accomplishes this task.) Emile Benveniste's
work is crucial here and one can read The Archaeology as a necessarily
awkward attempt at the same time to assimilate those appropriations of
Benveniste that go beyond him and yet to claw back some of Benveniste's
original formulations.
We should first register the fact that The Archaeology is in many ways
a latecomer to the debate. Barthes writes in 'Introduction to the Structural
Analysis of Narratives' (1966) that 'who speaks (in the narrative) is not who
writes (in real life) and who writes is not who is' .14 Foucault himself writes
in 'The Thought From Outside':
the sovereignty of 'I speak' can only reside in the absence of any other
language; the discourse about which Ispeak does not pre-exist the nakedness
articulated the moment Isay, 'Ispeak'; it disappears the instant Ifall silent.
Any possibility of language dries up in the transitivity of its execution. The
desert surrounds it. [...] If the only site for language is indeed the solitary
13 For a different view see Foucault, 'Sexual Choice, Sexual Act', in Foucault Live,
pp.211-231 (first publ. in Salmagundi, 58-59 (Fall 1982IWinter 1983), 10-24). Discussing the
homosexual act and the fondness for recollection as the best moment, the questioner makes the
link with Swann's relations with Odette in the first volume of Proust's novel. Foucault agrees
but adds that 'though we are speaking there of a relationship between a man and a woman, we
should have to take into account in describing it the nature of the imagination that conceived
it' .
14 In Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), p.1l2. A
footnote after the quote reads: 'J. Lacan: "Is the subject I speak of when I speak the same as
the subject who speaks?"
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sovereignty of 'I speak' then in principle nothing can limit it - not the one
to whom it is addressed, not the truth of what it says, not the values or
systems of representation it utilizes. In short, it is no longer discourse and
the communication of meaning, but a spreading fcrtb of language in its raw
state, an unfolding of pure exteriority. And the subject that speaks is less the
responsible agent of a discourse (what holds it, what uses it to assert and
judge, what sometimes represents itself in it by means of a grammatical form
designed to have that effect) than a non-existence in whose emptiness the
unending outpouring of language uninterruptedly continues.IS
We shall return later to the phrase 'the discourse about which I speak does not
pre-exist the nakedness articulated the moment I say, "I speak'", Suffice it to
say here that this position is closely bound to the question of literature and to
an interrogation of the 'deepest interiority' of the subject, concerns which
Foucault articulates with consummate economy:
The reason it is now so necessary to think through fiction - while in the past
it was a matter of thinking the truth - is that 'I speak' runs counter to 'I
think.' 'I think' led to the indubitable certainty of the 'I' and its existence;
'I speak.' on the other hand. distances, disperses. effaces that existence and
lets only its empty emplacement appear. ('The Thought', p.13)
We note two things at this juncture: first, the relationship between the subject
and the phrase 'empty emplacement' (to which Ishall return); second, that this
phenomenon is a historical experience, in Foucault's (rather than Derrida's)
understanding of that term: namely, that it is peculiar to a specific era - in this
case our own."
Now, in a section of The Archaeology entitled 'The Enunciative
Function', Foucault stresses that the dlcalage between the author and the
15 'Maurice Blanchot: The Thought From Outside', trans. by Brian Massumi
FoucaultlBlanchot (New Y<I'k: Zone Books, 1987), pp.1O-11. Originally published as 'La
Pen. du dehors', Critique, 229 (1966), 523-546.
16 'The breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded [...] is an experience
now being heralded at diverse points in culture: in the simple gesture of writing as in attempts
to formalize language; in the study of myths as in psychoanalysis; in the search for a Logos
that would be like the birthplace of all of Western reason. We are standing on the edge of an
abyss that had long been invisible: the being of language only appears for itself with the
disappearance of the subject' ('The Thought', p.1S.).
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subject of the enonce is a general phenomenon not confinable to literature. It
is important to register the shift in tenninology here: he writes of the subject
of the 4nonce rather than the subject of the enonciation. The word decalag«,
'gap, interval, time-lag' but also 'jutting out' and 'standing back', suggests it
is not the case that formalism is being neady imported into non-literary realms:
the author is not vaporized; in this dJcaJage he simultaneously 'juts out' and
'stands back'. Using the example of a maths treatise, Foucault provides three
instances of different statements likely to appear in that type of discourse. Let
me hold back the fllSt and most problematical instance. The second and third
examples illustrate Foucault's point well. In the proposition 'Two quantities
equal to a third quantity are equal to each other', the subject of the enonce is,
Foucault explains, the absolutely neutral position - indifferent to time, space,
circumstances, and linguistic systems - that any individual can occupy to make
such a proposition. On the other hand, the sentence 'We have already shown
that. ..' implies a precise context: the position is located in a series of
enunciative events which must already have taken place and it is established
in a 'demonstrative time' the earlier steps of which need only to be invoked,
not rehearsed in full. These operations belong not to a real individual but to
the sujet enon,ant. (I think we are to read this expression as confiating the
subject of the enonciation with the subject of the enonce.) It is not difficult
to appreciate the pertinence of the following to the debate over Descartes'
Meditations:
The subject of such a statement [~noncl] will be defined by these requisites
and possibilities taken together; and he (I) will not be described as an
individual who has really canied out certain operations. who lives in an
unbroken. never forgotten time, who has interiorized, in the horizon of his
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consciousness,a whole group of true propositions,and who retains, in the
living present of his thought, their potential reappearance (this is merely, in
the case of individuals. the psychological, 'lived' aspect of their position as
enunciating subjects). (p.94)
If I am not mistaken, this passage simultaneously affirms and negates
Foucault's argument about Descartes. Affinns it inasmuch as it describes
convincingly the type of subject implied by such an enonce: that is, one that
presupposes prior discursive events in which the subject has been implicated.
Negates it insofar as it is just one subject-position. For as soon as we put
together the two instances of the two different positions of the subject of the
enonce, we have a discourse - the maths treatise - offering diverse subject-
positions and not simply a solitary enunciating subject that is mobile and
modifiable. as Foucault claims for the Descartes text.
John Frow suggests that Foucault's defence of his reading of Descartes
lends support, if anything, to Derrida's position since it is precisely in the
genre of the meditation that a play of voices takes place, a splitting of the
enunciating subject as the soul talks to itself, a 'sort of floating of discourse
rather than the direct derivation of a discourse from an axlomatic'." For
Frow, Foucault avoids the conclusions of his own position by tying the
movement of the discourse to its subject, which is then opposed to what
Foucault calls Derrida' s 'invention of voices behind texts', which allows
Denida 'to avoid having to analyse the modes of implication of the subject in
discourses'. Frow rightly observes that to speak of a subject 'implicated' in
discourses suggests an extradiscursive subject, as though it might be the real
Descartes that Foucault sees constituted as a subject in language, even if
17 Marxism and Ulerary History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986). p.212.
174
Foucault has been careful throughout not to take Descartes' name in vain.
(Nonetheless, without collapsing it into Descartes' consciousness, Foucault
anthropomorphizes this function: he speaks of the meditating subject's
'consciousness of actuality") Foucault's remark that the reader can become
the subject enunciating the truths of the meditation confirms Frow' s belief that
part of Foucault does seem to view the subject of the enunciation as 'a
discursive effect, a positionality, a function'. Frow writes:
The reader inscribes himself within a set of subject positions in order to be
constituted as subject of the enunciation: this taUCl' is the effect of the
occupation of these positions. But wbat guarantees the unity of these
positions? Not the preconstituted subjectivity of the author and the reader:
and not an effect of unity given by the text, because we are dealing precisely
with 'a mobile subject modifiable througb the effect of the discursive events
which take place'. Nothing. it seems to me. justifIes Foucault, under these
particular generic conditions, in assigning the 'ownership' of a plurality of
discursive positions to a single, unifted subject of enunciation - nothing apart
from a willful confusion of the discursive subject with 'real,' empirical
speaking subjects. (Frow. p.213)
Frow thus signals a possible confusion. Now what I want to argue is that
there could not not be a confusion and that the more telling confusion would
be Foucault's insistence on the fact that there is no confusion between the
. subject of the enonce and the author.
What really matters for Foucault, if he is to get any purchase on
questions of the time and place of an enonce, is the modality by which the
subject of an enoncl conjoins with an individual. Foucault speaks of the
subject of the Inonce as an empty place or function capable of being filled by
different individuals. Similarly, the same individual, in a series of enonces.
can occupy different positions and thereby 'assume the role of different
subjects' (I'he Archaeology, p.94). Thus he can say:
To describe a formulation qua statement [/nonci] does not consist in
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analysing the relations between the author and what he says (or wanted to
say, or said without wanting to); but in detennining what position can and
must be occupied by any individual if be is to be the subject of it. (pp.95-96)
On the one hand, he rehearses the emphatic difference between author and
subject of the ~nonc~; on the other hand; though, he affmns that the subject-
position can be occupied by a real individual who will then be the subject of
the ~nonc~. This conflation is already at work in the parenthesis in the quote
from p.94: individuals are fundamentally, in one aspect at least, sujets
~non,ants. It is also at the heart of the frrst example from the hypothetical
maths treatise which I left in abeyance and to which I now return. Foucault
says that in the proverbial sentence of the Preface where one explains the
work's aims and motivations, the position of the enunciative subject (sujet
~nonciatif)can only be occupied, for reasons of convention, by the author or
authors of the formulation: 'The conditions of individualization of the subject
are in fact very strict, ~verynumerous, and authorize in this case only one
possible subject' (p.94). In short, at one level the distinction
author/enunciative subject is preserved, while convention allows the real
individual to function as the subject of the ~nonc~.
This ambivalence subtends Foucault's piece on the parricide Pierre
Riviere. In his memoir, Foucault says, Riviere comes to 'fill' the 'lyrical
position of the murderous subject', a position 'defined from outside' by those
charged with draughting the loose sheets sold on the streets of nineteenth-
century Prance." He' fills this position 'by means of a real murder the
account of which he had projected in advance £projet~a I'avance]', Mente
II Michel Foucault, 'Le8\Meurtres qu'OIl raconte'. Moi, Pierre Rtvllre. p.273.
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concipere. Riviere lodged his deed and his word 'in a well-detennined place
in a certain type of discourse and in a certain field of knowledge [savoir]·.
All the historical recollections, to which he appeals in his text, are not at all
ornaments or justifications after the event. From Bible history. as one learns
it at school, right up to recent events that the sheets and rags [canards] tell
of or commemorate, it is an entire domain of knowledge which fmds itself
invested in his murder-account and in which this murder-account finds itself
involved. This historical field was less the mark or explanatory content than
the condition of possibility of this murder-memoir. (pp.273-274)
In other words, not only was the account written according to a prior script -
comprising. apart from Bible history. the complaintes composed by criminals
and published in the canards of the early nineteenth century; the murder itself
was pre-scribed,"
Again the transcendental subject would fall victim to an act of
parricide. would itself be the object of an epoche of sorts. As Gayatri Spivak
puts it, showing how Foucault's understanding of the 'statement' (which she
wrongly says translates lnonciation) may be of use for subalternist historians:
Foucault asks us to remember that what is reported or told is also reported
or told and thus entails a positioning of the subject. Purther, that anyone
dealing with a report or a tale (the marerial of historiography or literary
pedagogy) can and must occupy a certain 'I'-slot in these dealings. The
particularity of this "I'-slot is a sign. It may for instance signify a socio-
political, psycho-sexual, disciplinary-institutional or ethno-economic
provenance. Hence. Foucault uses the word "assigned': "the position of the
subject can be assigned.' There may be a hidden agenda in covering over
this rather obvious thing.20
It is time to pull together what we have been outlining. Broadly
speaking, we might say that Foucault is positioned somewhere between
19 Prom which one could argue that 'Piene Rivi~' merely occupies a certain subject-
position in a larger, determining text and that he is the real victim of the whole sordid affair.
I shall address this question of guilt and responsibility in Chapter five.
20 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'A literary Representation of the Subaltern: A Woman's
Text Prom the Third World', in In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (New York:
Routledge, 1988), pp.241-268. She quotes from Foucault'sThe Arclu:leology of Knowledge.
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'Benveniste' and 'Benveniste-through-Lacan-through-Barthes' . Benveniste
writes thus: 'In some way language puts forth "empty" fonns which each
speaker, in the exercise of discourse, appropriates to himself and which he
relates to his "person," at the same time defIning himself as I and a partner as
YOU'.21 That is slightly different from saying, as Foucault does, that a
speaker, an individual 'occupies' a subject position. In 'The Death of the
Author' , Barthes makes the same gesture as Foucault of refusing literature any
privilege in what concerns the relationship of a subject to discourse. But,
contrary to Foucault's line, for Barthes the process of the enunciation (and he
is speaking about writing) cannot be filled by an individual, for the good
reason that language knows a subject, not a person:
laving aside literature itself (such distinctions really become invalid),
linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a
valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an
empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to
be fdled with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is
never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the
instance saying I: language knows a 'subject'. not a 'person', and this
subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to
make language 'hold together', suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it22
And yet Barthes has given Benveniste's theory a slight, though important,
tweak. For Barthes, subjectivity in a sense disappears into written language.
For Benveniste (and he is concerned with spoken language), 'subjectivity' is
'the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as "subject". l...] "Ego" is he who
says "ego" ('Subjectivity', p.224). Subjectivity is thus an act of affmnation.
The pronoun I does not refer to any individual (Benveniste: 'How could the
21 'Subjectivity in Language'. inProblems In General Ungutstics, trans. by Mary Elizabeth
Meet (Florida: University of Miami Press). pp.223-230 (p.227).
221n.lmage. Music. Text, pp.142-148 (pp.144-14S).
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same tenn refer indifferently to any individual whatsoever and still at the same
time identify him in his individuality?'), but to 'something very peculiar which
is exclusively linguistic':
1 refers to the act of individual discourse in which it is pronounced. and by
this it designates the speaker. It is a tenn that cannot be identified except
in what we have called elsewhere an instance of discourse and that has only
a momentary reference. The reality to which it refers is the reality of the
discourse. It is in the instance of discourse in which 1designates the speaker
that the speaker proclaims himself as the 'subject.' And so it is literally true
that the basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language. If one really
thinks about it. one will see that there is no other objective testimony to the
identity of the subject except that which he himself thus gives about himself.
Language is so organized that it pennits each speaker to appropriate
to himself an entire language by designating himself as I. (p.226)
(Of course, it is difficult not to hear Lacan already in Benveniste's text I
define myself and assume a consciousness of self only through my relationship
to you; 'it is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person' (p.224).
As such. 'subjectivity' would in a sense always spill outside me, and would
be the effect of a process always begun again. never completed) Now it is
apparent that Foucault's project around the time of The Archaeology is
predicated fIrst and foremost on a theory of the constitution of subjectivity in
spoken language. Foucault's departure from Benveniste is to argue that such
a constitution would not be 'entirely linguistic' and, further. that the power to
'give' the 'objective testimony to the identity of the subject' would not rest
simply with the subject Subjectivity for Foucault is not simply about the act
of discourse, the enunciation, but also about what can be said. and what makes
this possible. about the enonce. In fact, in another essay Benveniste is in a
sense already Foucaultian. Benveniste remarks in 'Analytical Philosophy and
Language' that a perfonnative utterance 'is an event because it creates the
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event', an act 'identical with the utterance of the act' .23 But he modifies the
claims made in 'Subjectivity in Language' by remarking that a performative
utterance can be so only if it is an act imbued with the requisite authority.
Anybody can cry out at the shipyard: 'I name this ship... ', but such words will
constitute a performative utterance only if they come from the right V.LP. at
the right time and in the right place. Benveniste thus insists on the uniqueness
of the performative utterance and on its unrepeatability. One can anticipate
here Derrida's challenge to this uniqueness, his insistence on the necessary
iterability of the performative." But that is to get ahead of myself. Let us say
for now that Foucault's project is profoundly Benvenistean, more so than
Barthes'. Language, or better, discourse is so organized that it permits each
speaker to appropriate to herself not only an entire language but a truth, a
gravitas, an institutional support, a salary; and to do this not only by
designating herself as I, but also by saying 'Two quantities equal to a third
quantity are equal to each other' or 'We have already shown that...'.
Discourse permits her this, or pits her against these things, against authority.25
Maurice Blanchot would therefore be correct in saying that Foucault never
succeeded in getting rid of the subject. In words remarkably
23 In Problems, pp.231-238 (p.236).
24 'Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a "coded" or
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting,
launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it
were not then identifiable in some way as a "citation"?' Jacques Derrida, 'Signature Event
Context', in Glyph, Johns Hopkins Textual Studies, 1, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1977), pp.l72-197. I have preferred this translation to the one in Derrida, Margins of
Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982; repro 1986).
25 Again, The History of Sexuality on the confession: 'The confession is a ritual of
discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement [finonce];it is also
a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship' (p.61).
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similar to Prow's, Blanchot writes:
The subject does not disappear; ratber its excessively detennined unity is put
in question. What arouses interest and inquiry is its disappearance (that is,
the new manner of being which disappearance is), or rather its dispersal,
which does not annihilate it but offers us, out of it, no more than a plurality
of positions and a discontinuity of functions.26
We must credit Foucault with saying as much himself in The Archaeology:
Instead of refening back to the synthesis or the unifying function of a
subject, the various enunciative modalities manifest his dispersion. To the
various statuses, the various sites [emplacements], the various positions that
he can occupy or be given when making a discourse. To the discontinuity
of the planes IPlans] from which he speaks. (p.S4)
We note the presence of a spatial, geometric metaphorics. Our interest in the
second part of the chapter will shift towards questions of the planes. sites.
institutions and 'fields of regularity' that Foucault summons up to detennine
the positions of subjectivity, to circumscribe this dispersion. For now, I should
like to pursue this question of the subject and suggest that, in this respect, the
difference between Denida' s version of Descartes and Foucault's is really not
so pronounced.
Subject-positions and individuals
Since legal terminology has lain at the heart of the debate between
Foucault and Derrida, the phrase 'critical negligence' would seem appropriate
to characterize the astonishing elision of the remainder of Denida' s argument
by an entire phalanx of commentators (led by Foucault, it must be said). After
declaring that nothing would appear to escape the hypothesis of the evil
genius, Denida says that there is another, essential and principled truth that
26 'Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him', trans. by Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi
FoucaultlBlilnchol, pp.76-77.
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one must face: 'if discourse and philosophical communication (that is,
language itself) are to have an intelligible meaning, that is to say, if they are
to conform to their essence and vocation as discourse, they must
simultaneously in fact and in principle escape madness. They must carry
normality within themselves' (p.S3). And this is a point that Foucault never
grapples with in his response. Which is all the more curious given that
Denida had already pointed to the paradox that his own argument was 'strictly
Foucaldian' and that Foucault's phrase 'Madness is the absence of a work' in
fact saved Descartes from the accusations levelled at him. Irrespective of the
state of the one who speaks and of the paucity of the syntax, the work 'starts
with the most elementary discourse, with the flfSt articulation of a meaning'
(p.54), it is logos and reason. And if madness is, in general, the absence of
work, as Foucault says, then it is essentially silence. Not a historical silence
as Foucault understands it, but one linked essentially to an act of force, to a
prohibition which opens up history and speech, that is, historicity in general.
This is why Derrida says that any speaking subject who must evoke
madness from the interior of thought can do so only 'in the realm of the
possible and in the language of fiction or the fiction of language' (p.54).
Which is why Foucault's citation of Denida's allusion to the absolute madness
of the Cogito ('total madness, total derangement which I am unable to master,
since it is inflicted by hypothesis and I am no longer responsible lor it'), has
missed the essential parts of Denida's original phrase, the elision of one of
which - the word possibiliti - necessitates a slight doctoring of the original
French quote to make its syntax hold (the disappearance of a d' un before
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ajJolement, which does not show up in English). The original reads: 'Now, the
recourse to the hypothesis of the evil genius will evoke, conjure up, the
possibility of a total madness, a total derangement over which I could have no
control since it is inflicted upon me - hypothetically - and I am no longer
responsible for it' (pp.S2-S3; trans. mod.). For Derrida, and he believes
Foucault has glimpsed this truth, madness can by definition only be
hypothesized. At this hypothetical, hyperbolical phase of the Cogito, Descartes
does not exclude madness since he believes the certainty attained in it to be
valid even if he is mad
I wonder if the correlate of the logos is not some kind of speaking
subject? Benveniste himself observes that 'a language without the expression
of person cannot be imagined' ('Subjectivity', p.22S). And it seems to me that
in both Foucault and Denida, though in different ways, there is tacit agreement
over the functioning of some kind of provisional human subject speaking in
language. To take Derrida first, this can be illustrated with the aid of two
examples. First, a sentence of Heidegger's which Denida is not sure of
understanding. In 'Geschlecht U: Heidegger's Hand', Denida remarks of a
description by Heidegger of two hands that fold into one that he is 'not sure
of comprehending this sentence' (p.l75). But he nonetheless makes sense of
it by observing that this sentence in which Heidegger names man's hands in
the plural for the first and only time is one in which Heidegger seems to be
joining them in prayer. Denida struggles for meaning on the understanding
that Heidegger meant something by it. Which is neither to ignore the structure
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of the vouloir-dire nor to reinstate a simple intentionality. 27 Derrida is
insistent on the deconstruction of the subject, not its destruction. And it is
arguably that difference which makes him appear less revolutionary than
Foucault. Second, the example (which Derrida takes from Sarl)28 of
composing a shopping list for oneself. 'The sender of the shopping list,'
Derrida remarks, 'is not the same as the receiver, even if they bear the same
name and are endowed with the identity of a single ego' ('Limited" p.185).
The point that this instance (which is not an instance) exemplifies so well is
that the 'I' who receives the memorandum has moved on in space and time
from the 'I' who composed it. Indeed, as Derrida notes, were this not a
constitutive (and therefore self-dividing) condition of the act of inscription,
there would be no need for the list in the first place, since the self-identity of
'I' would ensure the proscription of forgetfulness and thereby vitiate the need
for an aide-m6moire. But a minimal remainder and a minimum of idealization
still hold. Derrida writes of iterability: 'Iterability supposes a minimal
. remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of
the selfsame be repeatable and identifiable in, through, and even in view o/its
alteration.' The last phrase takes back the suggestion of self-identity offered
by the first part. Again Derrida:
27 Cf. Jacques Denida, 'Limited Inc abc ... ', in Glyph, Johns Hopkins Textual Studies, 2
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1m), 162·2S4(p.249): 'What is limited by
iterability is not intentionality in general, but its character of being conscious or present to
itself (actualized, fulfilled. and adequate), the simplicity of its features, its undlvldedness.'
Elsewhere Denida writes that Rousseau's 'declared intention is not anuUed... but rather
Inscribed within a system which it no longer dominates' (Of Grammotology, p.243).
21 'Sarl' is Denida's designation for the collective body that authored'Searle's' reply
(since Searl mentions a number of individuals to whom he is indebted for their contributions).
It refers to the French SocUti et responsablliti llmitle. See 'Limited Inc', p.170.
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The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without
taking into account the fact that this identity can only determine or delimit
itself through differential relations to other elements and that it hence bears
the mark of this difference. ('Limited', p.190)
Our absent-minded shopper is neither reinstated as self-identical purchaser nor
is hislher relationship to a prior manifestation completely forgotten. The
invention of voices is limited, even if each voice knows no bounds. According
to Nick Heffernan, Deleuze and Guattari make the same move:
It seems that subjectivity must be worked through rather than exploded, for
'you have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn... and
you have to keep small rations of subjectivity to enable you to respond to the
dominant reality.' Such counsel is intended to inject a dimension of strategy
and negotiation into what, in Anti-Oedipus, seemed to be a politics of total
deracination; yet it also represents the difficulty of constructing a positive
modus operandi within the parameters of a system which is deemed
absolutely metaphysical or oppressive - a difficulty which besets post-
structuralist politics in general."
The place of ideality in Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry' is paramount here.
Husserl shows that in order to guarantee the identity of an idea and thus
preserve the possibility of communication from one individual to another, one
needs the 'persisting existence', the 'continuing-to-be' of both the ideal objects
and the subjects." Husserl will, of course, immediately invoke writing as that
function capable of preserving the mental objects. Derrida, seizing on the
spacing-timing of writing, will dance nimbly between the Same and the
Different, without destroying the provisional embodiment of the one who
thinks, sends and receives, Des-cartes.
29 'Oedipus Wrecks? Or, Whatever Happened to Deleuze and Guattari?', in Redirections
in Critical Theory, ed. by Bernard McGuirk (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.llO-16S (p.13S).
The quote is from Anti-Oedipus, pp.381-382. The greater difficulty, it seems to me, is that of
'constructing' any modus, positive, political or otherwise.
30 Edmund Husserl, 'The Origin of Geometry', published as Appendix IV in The Crisis,
pp.353-378 (p.360).
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Even more so from Foucault's point of view, one must hold on to the
individual in the white coat, the one who does the round of the wards and who
speaks with and from authority (The Archaeology, p.St). Which means that
he must draw back from the fonnalist pronouncement from 'The Thought from
Outside': 'the discourse about which I speak does not pre-exist the nakedness
articulated the moment I say, "I speak"'. After all, what is the relationship
between the three 'I's' here? Similarly, even as Barthes exposes the
conventions and ruses by which paper 'characters' assume human attributes,
he does not get rid of characters by redefining them as 'participants' rather
than 'beings', a fact of which he is well aware," 'James Bond' is not
constituted ex nihilo in and through narrative, since something called
'existence' - with its multiple Bonds and bindings - is already inside the text
The point, as Barthes intimates, is not to cease reading about characters and
their foibles, but to read with less naivety. SIZ, it should be recalled, posits
a subject which we know is not a person, but which has sexuality (perforce
ambivalent), sensitivity, a past and an uncertain future. We know that s/he
gains these trappings from larger, textual codes but without a minimum
anthropomorphism transgression would have no purchase, would cease to move
31 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis ofNarratives', p.l0S: 'The characters (whatever
one calls them - dramatis personae «actants) forma necessary plane of description, outside
of which the slightest reported "actions" cease to be intelligible; so that it can be said that there
is not a single narrative in the world without "characters",« at least without agents'. Denida
evokes something of this logic: 'It is dlus simultaneously true that dlings come into existence
by being named. Sacrifice of existence to the word. as Hegel said, but also die consecration
of existence by the wO'd.' 'Edmond Jata and the Question of the Book', in Writing and
Difference, p.70. Which I take to be less dismissive of the already-there than Bartbes' remark
about reading: 'to read is to name; to listen is not only to perceive a language, it is also to
construct it' ('Introduction', p.l02).
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US.32 Especially in view of the historiographical dimension of Foucault's
work. the minimal remainder and minimum of idealization are crucial. even if
they look rather like the return to an empirical human being. Vital to his
enterprise are the questions: Who speaks and what institutional position must
they occupy for their statement to be valid? What effect on the character of
the Inoncl does the institutional site of the speaker have?
By the same token. the nature of the discourse. the conventions of its
functioning. its intentionality-effect are all important considerations. And in
this respect the historical narrative is not to be collapsed into the literary. Let
us take the famous sentence from Balzac's story Sarrasine which Barthes
works at in the opening paragraph of 'The Death of the Author'. And let us
imagine that it is uttered by a male doctor to a group of student nurses in the
wake of a visit to a patient on the gynaecological wani: 'This was woman
herself, with her sudden fears, her irrational whims, her instinctive worries,
her impetuous boldness, her jussings, and her delicious sensibility: Barthes'
question was: Who is speaking thus?
Is it the hero of the sk»'y bent on remaining ignorant of the castrato hidden
beneath the woman? Is it Balzac the individual, furnished by his personal
experience with a philosophy of Woman? Is it Balzac the author professing
'literary' ideas on femininity? Is it universal wisdom? Romantic
psychology? We shall never know, for the good reason that writing is the
destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral,
composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where
all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing. (p.142)
32 Roland Barthes, SIZ (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970). Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan explains
the characters versus actants dichotomy thus: 'The two extreme positions can be thought of as
relating to different aspects of namtive fiction. In the text characters are nodes in the verbal
design; in the story they are - by defmition - non (or pre-) verbal abstractions, constructs.
Although these constructs are by no means human beings in the literal sense of the word, they
are partly modelled on the reader's conception of people and in this they are person-like'.
Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (London: Methuen, 1983; repro 1984), p33.
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I prefer Benveniste's words on the written enonciation, which, he says, moves
on two levels: 'the writer articulates himself by writing and, in his writing,
makes individuals articulate themselves' .33 At any rate, in the Balzac story the
hyperbole of the description heightens the surprise of the revelation that La
Zambinella is not a woman at all. In our new context, Foucault would not
have to reduce everything to the speaker: it is the enonce which speaks thus;
making possible the subject-position(s); opening up and sanctioning this
meditation on the female homo natura. And yet for this conclusion to be
drawn Foucault must assume a certain embodiment of the voice, the identity
and sincerity of the speaker, and of the status, time and place - the institution
- of the utterance. In itself it means nothing and even situated in a hospital
it does not give us the voice's origin, the wisdom's provenance. But a glance
at its functioning might see the voice endowed with a certain weight,
particularly if there is a historical sedimentation of the discourse - if there is
a historical archive testifying to such views and evidence of an accompanying
essentializing practice.
My assessment of Foucault, though, is this: that in his theory of subject-
positions one does not witness a decalage between an individual and the
subject of the enonce, but the collapse of one into the other. An individual
steps forward to 'occupy', or 'fill', a position. Broadly speaking, this would
allow Foucault to do two interrelated things: firstly, to construct a formalist
subject by cutting through the messiness and vagaries of human personality;
33 'L'appareil fonnel de l'enonciation', in Problemes de linguistique generaie II (paris:
Editions Gallimard, 1974), p.88.
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secondly, to determine the subject's place (to 'lock' or 'wedge' him into a
position to which he is 'assigned') with a similarly geometric precision.
The Foucaultian discourse of SUbject-positions,which has assumed an
exaggerated importance in contemporary critical production, has obvious
political ramifications. The flip side of Foucault's historical narrative
describing how individuals have been locked in to certain subject-positions is
the attempt to diagnose present positions and create new ones. Strictly
speaking, the archaeological theory of discourse elaborates a general theory of
how corpuses of knowledge come to be formed and how they assign a
particular position to the general historical subject of knowledge. But the
extrapolation from the general theory to a more local one is not difficult to
make. In such an extrapolation, the regulation of subject-positions would not
affect individuals in a unifonn fashion but instead function differentially,
according to the status, sex, class, race of the individual concerned. Pierre
Riviere does not rush forward at this juncture; he is already in the former,
general project. He is the subject matter for other knowing subjects, other
'specialists'. Even when he becomes a formal knowing subject, inserting
himself into a tradition of writing with its attendant conventions, Foucault is
not interested in showing how this particular individual - from a certain class,
of a particular sex, with a certain educational standard - comes to be assigned
a specific subject-position different from other writers. This latter work has
been canied out by others, such as Spivak with her suggestion that the
assignation of an 'I'-slot may signify a socio-political, psycho-sexual,
disciplinary-institutional or ethno-economic provenance. The endeavour is
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non-foundational. Judith Butler, who is heavily marked by Foucault's theory
of discourse, embraces the idea of subject-positions because it allows her to
think the contingency of positionality rather than the essentialism of
foundations. To that extent, though, and talk of 'post-' apart, her inclinations
are manifestly structuralist. She must argue for the determining quality of the
subject-positions made available to us (if they were not determining, there
would not be a problem), while holding out the possibility that, through
analysis, new positions may be created. The italicization of the past participle
is hers:
The 'I' who would select between [positions] is always already constituted
by them. The 'I' is the transfer point of the replay, but it is simply not a
strong enough claim to say that the 'I' is situated; the 'I,' this 'I,' is
constituted by these positions, and these 'positions' are not merely theoretical
products, but fully embedded organizing principles of material practices and
institutional arrangements, those matrices of power and discourse that
produce me as a viable 'subject.':"
'It is simply not a strong enough claim.' What is at stake is the strength of the
claim. This is why my criticism of Foucault's theory of the enonce differs
slightly from Spivak's judgement that Foucault often seems to conflate
'individual' and 'subject' .3S Spivak is referring to Foucault's genealogical
work around the time of Discipline and Punish which, as we saw in the last
chapter, does tend to introduce an undivided subject. My contention is not,
pace Spivak, that one ought to think the relationship more plurally; I maintain,
on the contrary, that one should question the very possibility of conjuring the
34 Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of
"Postmodernism''', in Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. by Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott
(New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.3-21 (p.9).
35 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture, ed. by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan,
1988), pp.271-313 (p.274).
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two notions in a manner which allows the pair of them to be plunged into the
same conceptual and semantic field. Although pluralism appears to be the
avowed stake, it seems to me a pluralism premissed on univocality and
univalence. I shall have more to say about this question of subject-positions,
and especially the part played by voluntarism, in Chapters five and six. For
now~I should simply like to point up the perils of such assumptions as they
are deployed in the field of literary theory.
The parallel endeavours of Colin McCabe and Terry Eagleton in the
field of British literary theory are instructive in this respect McCabe takes
Saussure to task for failing to see that at the level of meaning language is
always discourse." This was due to the two great lacunae in Saussure's
work, subjectivity and institutions, which allowed him to think langue the most
unmotivated social system. (In point of fac~ the Course in General Unguistics
is a little less conclusive than McCabe saggests.)" Nonetheless, McCabe's
programme of correction is strictly Foucaultian:
In order to deal with the effecas of meaning we must combine an analysis of
the institutional sites of language together with an analysis of subjectivity in
language to enable us to understand how specifIC practices of language both
produce SUbject positions for individuals and articulate various practices
within institutions. (p.441)
Eagleton's criticism levelled at Saussure in his Uterary Theory: An
Introduction touches similarly on Saussure's failure to think his way through
language to discourse:
36 'Language, Linguistics and the Study of Uterature', inModern Criticism and Theory:
A Reader, ed. by David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), pp.432444 (p.440).
37 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course In General Unguistics, tmns. by Roy HaITis (London:
Duckworth, 1990). On mtinary language see p.71; on literature p.21.
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We may also notice that Saussure's model of individual and society, like
many classical bourgeois models, has no intennediare terms, no mediations
between solitary individual speakers and the linguistic system as a whole.
The fact that someone may not only be a 'member of society' but also a
woman, shop-steward. Catholic, mother, immigmnt and disarmament
campaigner is simply slid over.
However, his following sentence gestures to the complexity this insight thereby
gives on to: 'The linguistic corollary of this - that we inhabit many different
"languages" simultaneously, some of them perhaps mutually conflicting - is
also ignored. ,38 McCabe, too, is aware of this complexity: 'Institutions
overlap and conflict, discourses are not tied in some obviously physical way
to their institutional sites. Indeed the very possibility of discursive
transformation rests on these contradictory relations' (p.443).
Yet it seems to me that this readiness to speak of subject-positions as
the site of political work has limited value. And I think one can discern as
much from Foucault's own words on ritual in The Order of Discourse:
Ritual defines the qualifICation which must be possessed by individuals who
speak (and who must occupy such-and-such a position and fonnulate such-
and-such a type of statement [inone/] [...J); it defines the gestures.
behaviour, circumstances, and the whole set of signs which must accompany
discourse. (p.62)
We note the lexicon of exteriority: 'gestures', 'behaviour', 'signs', that is, the
institution (in all senses) of the discursive process. The value of thinking in
terms of ritual is that it allows us to foreground techniques, tropes and
discursive positions: not essence, but artifice. However, the repeated 'must'
in this context (the language of prohibition still marks the Lecon) needs to be
tempered. to be read perhaps more strategically as the suggestion of a much
more provisional and itself strategic obligation, and one which would not serve
38 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p.llS.
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to exhaust the meaning of the event. One thereby holds open the possibility
of non-interiorization and of a discourse doing more than its loud, gestural
words might indicate. One also, I think, moves away from a strictly formalist
idea of subject-positions to a consideration of psychological content, of the
workings of the psyche which make certain positions the object of resistance
and others the object of desire. Ritual is nothing if it knows not pleasure,
incantation, the seduction of known formulae, the desire to belong to the
cabbala, the desire also to transgress and exceed the ritual. By the same token,
this psychic content would also impose limits on a process that would
otherwise involve a voluntaristic notion of the perpetual substitution of
positions, as one moved from that of a Catholic housewife to that of a
professor of anatomy to that of a unemployed Wigan miner to that of an
Iranian Ayatollah. This voluntaristic tendency, which is intimately bound to
the fortunes (in all its senses) of the modem humanities, to pedagogy and to
research, to their assessment and (e)valuation, is synthetically expressed by Ian
Hunter:
One of the leading features of the modem humanities is their incorporation
of specific &!Celie disciplines. In the 'critical' (Romantic) teaching of
literature and hist<xy, for example, texts are not the objects of a methodised
knowledge. They are devices attached to practices of mlding and writing
whose object is the probIematisation and stylisation of the reader's 'divided'
or otherwise 'incomplete' self. If this begins to indicate the way in which
such }X'8Cticesdiffer from philological or 'object-oriented' fonns of literary
and histmcal scholarship it is also a sianificant index of the tasks of moral
formation now perfonned by the humanities."
The question, it seems to me, is not to deny the task of moral formation now
perfonned by the humanities. It is simply to recall that, in accordance with the
" 'PeJsonality as a Vocation: The Political Rationality of the Humanities', in Foucault's
New Domains, pp.1S3-192 (p.181).
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very logic of subject-positions, the reader in the academy is also and
simultaneously a Catholic housewife, a trade unionist, a consumer, a voter ...
and consequently that this 'stylisation' and 'moral formation' can not be laid
at the door of the academy quite so easily. We are therefore back with
weighing and measuring, with a certain sense of the mathematical. I shall
have more to say about 'problematization' in the final Chapter, and about
measurement in Chapter four.
When Foucault says that the demonstrative meditation modifies the
subject in the course of its unfolding (freeing it from its convictions, inducing
new doubts), it becomes clear that UN peace-keeping forces ought to be firing
demonstrative meditations in all the world's trouble spots. But what is the
quality of 'occupation' when we speak of 'occupying' a subject-position?
Would the subject-position be occupied territory? And if so, are we happy
to believe (and belief is at stake) that we occupy that territory in a manner
identical to the manner in which it is occupied by its 'normal' occupiers. This
is not tantamount to saying: here discursive subjects, there real people. But
one will probably not be released from quite all one's convictions by means
of the meditation, for the simple reason that the text in which one finds oneself
is much greater than that of a demonstrative meditation and includes others
(competitors, enemies, friends, sons and lovers) together with one's own
(presumably) complex psychological make-up. Gillian Rose, who does not
refer to Foucault's earlier work on madness, argues that in Discipline and
Punish Foucault abandons not the fiction of the juridical subject but 'the
complex reality of legal personality, especially the relation between personality
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as a legal and as a social and psychological category' (Rose, Dialectic,
p.178). I would argue that one of the reasons Histoire de la folie remains a
more adroit text than Discipline and Punish on the question of the constitution
of subjects is that the former simply does not believe that a madman
constituted as, say, a subject of law does justice to the psychic reality of that
individual.
The enonce, the field and iterability
Which brings me to the question of the field, to that which necessarily
locks the subject into (a) position. For there is only so much discontinuity in
Foucault and what there is can be determined. In this part of the chapter I
should like to look at the powers that accrue to an enunciative field or a
discursive domain which organizes and distributes the subject. For if analysing
a discursive formation is about the law of economy, it is also once more about
taking its measure ('To analyse a discursive formation is to seek the law of
that poverty [of enonces], it is to take its measure [en prendre la mesure], and
to determine its specific form' [p.120]).40
If discourse is no longer a phenomenon of expression, we should view
40 Although the convergence will not be explored here, there are reasons for thinking that
Foucault's theory of the enonce owes much to mathematical set theory. Foucault mentions the
contribution of Cavailles to the French conceptual tradition (,Introduction' to Canguilhem's
On the Normal and the Pathological, p.x) and a sentence like 'The field of discursive events
[...] is a grouping [ensemble] that is always finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic
sequences that have been formulated; they may be innumerable, they may, in sheer size, exceed
the capacities of recording, memory, or reading: nevertheless they form a finite grouping' (The
Archaeology, p.27) brings to mind the paradox of the infinite treated by Bernard Bolzano,
Paradoxes of the Infinite, trans. by Donald A. Steele (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1950), in which even something so apparently straightforward as the task of conceiving of the
complete set of whole numbers proves paradoxical given that the series of whole numbers is
potentially infinite and the set therefore never quite closed. Bolzano, too, was an ardent
ratiocinator.
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it as 'a field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity' (p.55):
Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolded manifestation of
a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality in
which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may
be determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct
sites is deployed. (p.55; trans. mod.)"
The above carries two opposing prefixal forces in French, simultaneously
exploding (,dis-', 'dis-', 'ex-', 'de-', 'dis-') and imploding ('en-', 'em-').
Dispersion, yes, but a determinate dispersion. What would a determinate
dispersion look like? How would a dispersion be structured and ruled? One
obviously has to bear in mind the critique of philosophies of the subject which
underwrites Foucault's discursive theory. Foucault: 'It is neither by recourse
to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that
the regulation of its [i.e, the discursive formation's] enunciations should be
defined' (p.55). One must certainly extend credit to this attempt at thinking
through some of the abusive inflations of the subject but nevertheless maintain
one's vigilance towards a destructive metaphorics that would substitute for the
subject an even greater power of regulation.
I alluded earlier to Derrida's critique of speech act theory in 'Signature
Event Context', reelaborated in 'Limited Inc abc...', and it is that critique
which poses perhaps the greatest challenge to Foucault's theory of discourse
as event. It should be said that Foucault is most punctilious in The
41 'Le discours, ainsi concu, n'est pas la manifestation, majestueusement deroulee, d'un
sujet qui pense, qui connatt, et qui dit: c'est au contraire un ensemble OU peuvent se determiner
la dispersion du sujet et sa discontinuite avec Iui-meme. II est un espace d'exteriorite OU se
deploie un reseau d'emplacements distincts' (L 'Archeologie, p.74). In an interview around the
same time he comments that the Death of Man cry in The Order of Things was just the
announcement of the death of the 'Subject with a capital letter' (Suje/ majuscule). He repeats
that the subject is 'not one, but split, not sovereign, but dependent, not absolute origin, but
ceaselessly modifiable function.' Michel Foucault, 'Entretien: La naissance d'un monde', Le
Monde, 3 May 1969, p.8.
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Archaeology to distinguish his ~nonc~ from a speech act. For Foucault, the
~nonc~ is what makes speech acts possible. Nonetheless, Foucault's account
of the functioning of ~nonc~s suggests a close affinity between the workings
of the two, as his appropriation of Benveniste already leads us to suspect.
Derrida himself observes that Foucault's archaeology shares certain of the
premises found in speech act theory.42
For Denida, and he is not dealing with the ~nonc~, any linguistic sign
has a constitutive force of breaking with its context. For it to be a sign at all,
it must have the capacity to function beyond the real context of the moment
of its production and in the absence of the conscious intention of the one who
first breathed life into it Elsewhere, Denida writes that the signifying
function of the 'I' does not depend on the life of the speaking subject. My
death, he says, is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the '1'.43 This
structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or the signified makes
every mark a 'grapheme in general', that is, 'the non-present remainder
[restance] of a differential mark cut off from its putative "production" or
origin' ('Signature" p.183).
Now Foucault is aware of this capacity of signs to function in new
contexts. Pondering over how to define an ~nonc~, he cites the instance of
letters of the alphabet traced randomly across a piece of paper as an example
of what is not an ~nonc~. And yet, he says, could not one view them as
42 See Denida, 'Urnited Inc abc• • :,p.173.
43 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena ond Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs. trans.
by David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p.96.
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precisely the enonce of an alphabetical series having no other law but chance?
However, his conclusion a few lines later contradicts this insight: 'but neither
is it enough to have just any material effectuation of linguistic elements, any
emergence of signs in time and space, for a statement to appear and to begin
to exist' (The Archaeology, p.86; trans. mod). But in spite of this rider, would
it not be the case that, as his example shows, any utterance can be made to
signify an example of agrammaticality or an instance of a non-enonce'f'4
Foucault describes the enoncl as
a function of existence that properly belongs to sisos and on the basis of
which one may then decide. through analysis Cl' intuition, whether or not
they 'make sense', according to what rule they follow one another Cl' are
juxtaposed. of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by
their formulation (oral or written). (pp. 86-87)
Surely signs can always make sense, and this is due not to any historically
detenninate enoncl, but to the essence of meaning in general. I cite Derrida,
not because the enonce is to be recuperated as just another linguistic sign, but
because the enoncl is nothing, has no reach and no power, if it is not
repeatable in different contexts:
Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken (J' written (in the cenent
sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can be cited, put between
quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context,
engenderin, an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely
illimitable.4S This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a
context, but on the conttary that there are only contexts without any center
(J' absolute anchoring [aneTag,). This citationality, this duplication (J'
duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neither an accident DCI' an anomaly,
44 Cf. Derrida on the phrase 'le vert est ou' (an example used by Husscri in Logical
Investigations) bearing within it the possibility of sisoifying an example of agrammaticality.
'Signature', p.185 and 'Limited Inc', p.22I.
4SDerrida takes the opportunity to tighten things up in 'Umited Inc': 'It would have been
better and more precise to have said "cngenderinl and inscribing itself,· or being inscribed In.
new contexts. F(J' a context never CRates itself ex nlhilo; no mark can create or engender a
context on its own. much less dominate iL This limit, this fmitude is the condition under
which contextual transf«mation remains an always open possibility' (p.220).
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it is that (normaI/abnormal) without whieb a mark could not even have a
function called 'normal.' What would a mark be that could not be cited?
Or one whose origins would not let lost aJonl the way? ('Signature"
pp.18S-186)
This is a powerful challenge to the comforting notion of context, though the
notion is not thereby dispensed with ('This does not imply that the mark is
valid outside of a context').
One glimpses something of this recognition in The Archaeology of
Knowledge, where the theory of the enoncl is nothing if not an attempt to
show that there is no sign in itself. But in the process of demonstrating this
fact, the book is obliged to acknowledge that there can be no lnoncl in itself
either. We may put it thus: H Foucault was criticized for failing to account
for the passage from one episteme to another in The Order of Things (Sartre
speaks in a telling metaphor of Foucault preferring the magic lantern to the
cinema),46 The Archaeology busies itself, on the contrary. precisely with
explaining the conditions of possibility of the conditions of possibility.
Because the fonnation of objects only takes place in discourse broadly defined.
Foucault will not only say that defining these objects is a matter of relating
them to the 'body [ensemble] of rules that enable them to fonn as objects of
a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance'
(p.48). He will speak in the same sentence of the objects' 'dispersion', that
is to say. of deploying the nexus of resularities which govern those objects'
dispersion. Thus, if objects are constituted by a disparate discursive fonnation
(rather than a monolithic episteme). then their own condition is at best
dispersed. at worst phantasmatic. Battle is joined in The Archaeology: how to
46 'Jean-Paul Sar1re ~'. L'Arc. 30 (1966). 87-96 (p.87).
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respect the differential quality of the Inoncl while preserving its
methodological purchase?
Foucault is alert to the dangers of making the Inoncl appear the 'atom
of discourse' (p.gO), the absolutely irreducible element of definition. To this
end, he asserts that an Inoncl always has margins which are populated by
other Inonces. These margins are distinguished from the notion of context
inasmuch as they make the latter possible. Foucault rightly affmns that the
contextual relationship of a sentence to surrounding sentences differs
depending on whether one is dealing with a novel, a treatise on physics or a
conversation. However, the following sentence seems caught between two
positions. He says: 'It is against the background of a more general relation
between the formulations, against the background of a whole verbal network.
that the context-effect may be determined' (p.9g; trans. mod.). On the one
hand he declares that only a wider understanding of the generic and
conventional rules will produce an understanding of the enonce. But on the
other hand. that since it is a question of a 'context-effect', the understanding
depends primarily on reading the formulations themselves, rather than on any
fond.'-7 One can see the strong henneneutical position here: Foucault does
not stumble across lnonces neatly preserved in the basements of libraries and
in the cellars of asylums. He reads them in (to) or out of texts. In any case,
47 Cf. two attemptS to queer the pilch of traditional retlettion mcmphm applied to a text's
relationship to reality. Bar1hes' expression 'I'effet de reel' ('The Reality SHeet', in French
Uterary Theory Today: A Reader, ed. by Tzvetan Todomv, trans. by R. Carter [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 19821, p.1(0) and Derrida's pI:nse 'racinating function': 'If a text
always gives itself a certain representation of its own roots, those roots live only by that
reJRSentation. by never touching the soil, so to speak. Which undoubtedly desIroys their
radical essence, but not the necessity of their racbwtlng/lUtCtlon' (O/Grammatology, p.101).
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Foucault makes it plain that an lnoncl unfolds in an associated field, where
it finds its place and status by modifying or opposing the other formulations.
and where possible relations with the past and potential links with the future
are respectively laid out and opened up:
Bvery statement is specified in this way: thele is no statement in general. no
free. neutral. independent statement; but a statement always belongs to a
series or a whole. always plays a role among other statements. deriving
support from them and distinguishing itself from them: it is always integrated
into an enunciative play. in which it has a role. however minimal it may be.
(p.99; ttans. mod.)
Denida remarks that the concept of gram needs to be surrounded by a 'certain
interpretive context', for like any other conceptual element it does not signify
by itself.'"
Despite the word jeu in that last quote from Foucault and despite also
his insistence on fields and relations - all of which would be enough to set to
work the movement of the trace, enough, that is, to destabilize self-identity-
Foucault is adamant that it is possible to determine the identity of an enonce.
On the subject of the enonce's materiality, which he says is constitutive of it,
Foucault writes: 'a statement must have a substance. a support, a place. and a
date. And when these requisites change, it too changes identity' (p.lOl). At
this point, Foucault draws a clear distinction between an enonclation and an
,nonce. The enunciation is an event belonging to a specific time and place
and is not repeatable. Two people may say the same thing, yet there would
be two enunciations. The enonce, on the other hand. is repeatable. The same
sentence uttered by two people in different circumstances could well be the
same enonce. Foucault then cites the example of successive editions of
.. Posilions. Irans. by Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1981). p.27.
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Baudelaire's Fleurs du Mal. The paper, the print, the layout may all have
changed but such differences are neutralized, Foucault remarks, by the general
element of 'the book'. The book, he says, is an instance of repetition without
change of identity. In this case, the materiality of the enonc« is not defined
by the space occupied or the date of its formulation; but by a status of thing
or object. And yet, for Foucault, when a novelist utters something in everyday
life which he then inserts unaltered into his current manuscript, now spoken by
one of the characters or even by the anonymous voice of the author, there is
no question of it being considered the same enonce. He thus concludes: 'The
regime of materiality that statements necessarily obey is therefore of the order
of the institution rather than of the spatio-temporal localization; it defines
possibilities of reinscriptton and transcription (but also thresholds and limits),
rather than limited and perishable individualities' (p.l 03; Foucault's emphasis).
The binding of the word institution - as both act and structural site - to the
expression 'possibilities of reinscription and transcription', I think indicates
something of the irreducible complexity and alterity of a word too often
summarily invoked to lend a solidity, edge and kudos to a discourse.
The institution of diseourse: the case of modernisttl literary history
In this section I should like to offer an extended illustration from a
literary historical field of the complexity of the word and concept institution
(in all its senses)." The example of institutionality discussed here is itself
49 Something of this complexity is suggested by Carlos Altamirano's excellent article 'La
fundaci6n de la literatura argentina', in Ensayos argentinos: De Sarmiento a la vanguardia.
ed. by Carlos Altamirano and Beatriz Sarlo (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina,
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perforce articulated from a position within the institutional discipline, Hispanic
and Latin American Studies, within which I teach. It concerns the production
and institution of a literary historical discourse on modernismo, and the
perennial, if a little tired, debate on the nature, historical moment and geo-
political provenance of the phenomenon, a debate too often characterized by
an implacable will to compartmentalize verging on chauvinism (most
notoriously when it is a matter of determining who belongs to modemismo and
who to the Generation of '98, as though it were a question of separate planets
each with an absolutely distinct lexical and conceptual system)." I shall trace
the outlines of this enunciative production with a view to highlighting the
positivism (a positivism precisely not devoid of a certain chauvinism) which
subtends too rigid a theory of the enonce.
It is widely accepted that Latin America's first literary movement of
any note, modernismo, represented a profound spiritual and philosophical
transformation. In this respect, Ivan Schulman highlights the consensus that
took hold around this idea in a famous 1907 inquiry published in El Nuevo
1983), pp.l07-115 (and the word fundaciOn should resonate in at least three ways, as
'founding', 'foundation', and 'Foundation'). Altamirano shows how, in Argentina just after
the turn of the century, Jose Hernandez's epic poem, Martin Fierro (1872-1879), becomes
institutionalized as the Argentine epic poem (their Chanson de Roland, their Poema de Mia
Cid), the rock upon which an Argentine literary tradition was to be built, the embodiment of
national spirit and identity. In the context of a huge influx of European immigrants, the
celebration of the gauchos and the obsession with founding a sense of national identity assume
a more than literary dimension. The analysis (and for reasons of space I cannot do justice to
the supporting evidence) demonstrates convincingly how discourse can be reinscribed in a new
context, and have new meanings grafted onto it, in a supplementary process which adds to and
makes up for a lack in the 'original'.
so Modernismo is a much more effete and ornate literary style than European
'modernism', closer to French Parnassianism than to the poetry of Eliot and Pound. Though
its existence is much disputed, the Generation of '98 purports to designate a group of Spanish
writers anxious to reassess the being and meaning of Spain in the wake of the country's defeat
in the Spanish-American war of 1898 in which it lost its last overseas colonies.
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Mercurio.51 For his part, in the fIrst documented use which he makes of the
word modernismo, Ruben Darfo, the recognized fIgurehead of the modernist as.
binds it closely to a 'new spirit' - a relationship confinned by many.52 More
precisely, and as a plethora of critics have observed, this discourse legitimized
itself, at least in one direction, as a rejection and subversion of a past
dominated by a tradition of positivism. 53
Lest we reduce the debate exclusively to the positivist connection, it is
worth mentioning that the phenomenon is not so easily encapsulated. There
are many other interpretations of modernismo in the context of Latin America:
a response to the oppressive socio-economic transfonnations resulting from its
incorporation into the world economy; a properly aesthetic manifestation of
independence and resistance to the traditional artistic discourse, and especially
the peninsular one; the product of anew. intensifIed psyche, itself the outcome
of the sensory bombardment which is the modem metropolls." We could
certainly show without undue difficulty how the project of modernismo, with
51 tReflexiones en tOOlO a la definiciOO del modemismo·. in Lily Utvak. El Modernlsmo
(Madrid: Taurus, 1975), pp.65-95 (p.72).
52 For the famous defmition by Federico de Onfs. f« example. see Angel Rama. Rubin
Darto y el Modernismo (ClrcunsttlnciG socio-econ6mica de un Grte amerlcQlto) (Venezuela:
Univenidad Central de Venezuela. 1970), p.26.
" Guillermo Dfaz PIaja speaks of the modernlslQS' tantitainian philosophy', Modernlsmo
Frente a Noventa y Oeho: Una Introducci6n a IDUterDlNTa &pDifola del 51,10 XX. 2nd edn
(Madrid: Bspasa-Calpe, 1966), p.14O; Cf. Rieardo Gull6n El modernismo vim> pol' los
modernisttlS (Baree1ona: Ouadamuna. 1980). p.12, on the tpvtest qainst positivism and
materialism'; Luis Alberto S4nchez, cited in Ned J. Davison. 71te Concept of Modernism In
Hispanic Crlliclsm (Colc:ndo: University of New Mexico. 1966). p.n, n.23. on the reaction
against'realist and positivist prosaism'; and Litvak, p.12.
s. See respectively Utvak, p.12; Angel Ram&. p.S; and Georg Simmel, "Las grandes
ciudades Y la vida animica" (1903), cited inRafael Guti6rrez Girardot. Modernlsmo (Barcelona:
Montesinos, 1983), p.126.
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its spiritualism, aestheticism, and 'arielism', is facilitated and traversed by an
economic materialism in opposition to which the fonner had set out its stall. 5S
But I shall concern myself only with the relationship between modernismo and
positivism.
Positivism: 'A philosophical system elaborated by Auguste Comte,
recognizing only positive facts and observable phenomena and rejecting
metaphysics and theism' (New Shorter OED). The positivist system is based
on a belief in the process of scientific investigation and observation. Crucially,
in Comte' s law of the three states, man, the knowing subject, evolves through
the theological state and its successor, the metaphysical state, until he reaches
the positivist state. In the last, man renounces the effort to know the absolute
and most intimate causes of phenomena and turns exclusively to discovering
their 'effective laws, that is to say, their invariable relations of succession and
similitude. ,56 (For his part, Taine distances himself from Comte - for him
causes form part of sensory experience and are therefore knowable.)
In his essay 'Traducci6n y MelMora', Octavio Paz traces schematically
the historical and psychological relationship between positivism and
modernismo in the context of Latin America. Paz argues that the variant of
" Rub6D Dario illustrates this coexistence of the commeace of bankers and merchants with
the transactions of the modernlltas. Rub6n Dado ('m Retorno'. La Nacl6n. 4.800. Buenos
Aires. 21 August 1912. p.8), cited in Rama. p.30: 'Our mandolins sounded next to the banks.
and our nocturnal Bohemia mel1ificated the atmosphere alongside the German. Bqlisb. and
Italian merchants [...J. Those were the good timesl The lyrical sound of a few cicadas did
not prevent the course of IJ'anSaCtions;the Ateneo brought a touch of Greece to the Phoenician
or Cartaainese atmosphere and youth learnt that man does not live by paper money alone and
that intellectuals. like heroes and beautiful. honest ladies. are the jewels of the Republic.'
56 Auguste Comte. COW" de plNlolOpli, positive. I, (1864). pp.9.10. Cited in D.O.
Charlton. PositMsl Thought In France During tilt Second Empire 1852·1870 (Oxfm!:
Clarendon Press, 1959). p.6. AU references to Comte are taten from Charlton; translations
mine.
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Positivism embraced by the dominant classes in the nineteenth-century colonies
actually functioned as a 'cut' (or what he calls a 'divisor knife'), reinforcing
the separation between Latin America and the Spanish tradition. On top of
that, modemlsmo comes as an even sharper blade:
Modernismo was the response to posidvism. the critique bom of sensidvity
and the heart - also the nerves - against empiricism and positivist scientism
[...] Modermsmo was our true Romanticism [...J The connection between
positivism and modernismo is of a histaical and psychological order. One
runs the risk of not understanding what this relation involves if one forgets
that Latin American positivism, more than a scientific melhod. was an
ideology, a belief. Its influence on the development of science in our
countries was much slighter than its sway over the minds and sensitivities
of the intellectual groups [.• • ]The superficial judgements belong to those
critics who could not read in the lightness and cosmopolitanism of the
modernista poets the signs (the stigmata) of spiritual uprooting [desarraJgo].
(In Utvak. pp.104-106.)
Schematically, according to Paz, the advent of modernismo marks the sign not
just of a cutting of roots, but of an uprooting (deSQ"aigo), which would
complete the constitution, the cultivation of a properly Latin American cultural
heritage and psychology. As Paz suggests, the rejection of the positivist world
is not purely academic; it is the refusal of a cultural vision which managed to
impose itself in Latin America (the truths of which were often profoundly
disconcerting in their implications for those indigenous populations that did not
conform to a Western model of progress). Whence the symbolic importance
for the modernist as of a figure like Taine: the representative of that spiritual
and discursive order which had to be purged simultaneously from and by the
new cultural configuration.
As one might suppose, the will to cut is more nuanced and more
selective. In fact there abound testimonies which highlight the evidence that
while modemismo was engaged in an exercise of deracination where positivist
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philosophy was concerned, it actively prolonged certain prior artistic,
especially Romantic, conceptions." There is obviously a convenient
selectiveness here: modernismo sprang positively from prior art but negatively
from philosophical positivism, lifting up its conceptual skirts and fleeing the
domain of the philosophical patriarch. However, in this selective move beyond
positivism, how should one qualify the difference which must necessarily
demarcate the modernist a inquiries from positivism?
The answer to this question, as one might expect from the way in
which I have framed the modernist a position thus far, is that the 'new'
institution of discourse struggles to rid itself of a certain positivism and in fact
sbows, at least in some of its manifestations, a pronounced kinship with it.
Both in tenns of an attraction towards the idea of progress, which was a
fundamental article of faith for the positivists, and a vaunting of the historical
method, which Comte calls 'the principal scientific artifice of the new positive
philosophy' (Charlton. p.30). Comte's objective is to 'determine. safe from all
arbitrariness. [...] with rigorous precision' (Charlton, p.4S) the place of social
phenomena in the process of social development, the latter understood as
evolution in a specific direction that presupposes by the same token 'that wbat
comes later in the process is an unfolding of what was at least implicitly
present in its earlier stage'." An observable transformation in the arts. say,
is the symptom of some other more fundamental process of development 'in
S'7 See Eduardo Chavani. a contributor to the 1907 inquiry; and Pedro SaIinu. UterallUQ
espalfola.g/o.a (Mexico, 1941), pp.21-22. Cited in Davison. p.37.
SI Maurice Mandelbaum, History. Man. and Reason: A SlIMly In Nlneletnth-Cennuy
Tho"ght (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1971), p.43.
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the culture as a whole, or in the spirit of a people, or in Humanity, or Reality'
(Mandelbaw:n, p.46).
Let me offer just a handful of examples of modernista literary history
by way of comparison. In his study of Rubin Dorio (1899). Jose Enrique
Rod6 speaks of modernismo representing 'the evolution of thought in the
closing stages of this century', a reaction against literary naturalism and
philosophical positivism which leads them to be dissolved into 'higher
conceptions'. A peninsular figure, Ram6n del Valle-IncI4n, commenting on
images from Baudelaire and Gabriel D'Annunzio in Corte de amor (1902).
says that such images are just 'a logical consequence of the progressive
evolution o/the senses' which means that we perceive gradations of colour, for
example, doubtless missed by our ancestors of centuries gone by.59 Ruben
Dar:fouses an analogous concept of historical development in 'Dilucidaciones':
'Poetic fonn is not destined to disappear, but rather to spread out, to modify
itself, to carry on its development in the eternal rhythm of the centuries"
which he uses again in EspafaaContemporanea (1901), referring to the 'sickly
and false production, ignorance of the world's mental progress' in Spanish
intellectual circles." A historicist posture which is maintained in the
'Uminary Words' from Proses Pro/anas, this time with an American
59 R0d6 and Valle-InclM cited in Max Henrfquez Urefta, Brew Hisloria del Modernismo
(Mexico: Fondo de Culture Econ6mica. 1954). p.166 and p.168. All italics mine.
dOCited in AllenW. PbiWps. 'Ru'" Dado y sus juiciOl solie cl modemismo·. in Estudios
Cr(licol IObre eI Modernismo. cd. by Homero Castillo (Madrid: Editorial Gredos. 1968). p.l37.
nuance:"
In the deptbs of my spirit, despite my
cosmopolitan outlook. lies the
inextractable seam of race: my thought
and my senses carry on a historical and
traditional process. (Phillips, p.I2S)
208
at each moment one may consider the
character of a people as the r6sum6 of all
its preceding actions and sensations, that is
to say. as a quantity and as a weight
(Taine. p.40)
Finally, when Darfo takes the rostrum in Buenos Aires at the headquarters of
the magazine El Ateneo, his discursive strategy would role the body politic and
the cultural spirit into an organic process:"
While our beloved and unfortunate Mother
country. Spain, appears to suffer the
enmity of a hostile fate. enclosed within
the walls of tradition. isolated because of
her own character. unpeneCrated by the
wave if menial evolwlon In recent limes.
the neighbouring brotherly kingdom
demonsttafes a sudden energy. lhe
Portuguese soul finds abroad voices that
celebrate her and raise her up. lhe blood 0/
Lusttanlaflourlshes in harmonious flowers
of art and of life: we, Latins.
Hispanoamericans, must view with pride
the vital manifestations of this people and
feel as our own the triumphs that she
achieves in honour of our race.
A civilization forms one body. and its
parts hold together like the parts of an
organic body. (Taine. p.50)
what one calls race is the innate and
hereditary dispositions that man brings to
light with him, and which ordinarily are
joined to marked differences in
lempenunent and in the structure of the
body. (Taine, p.39)
These examples, which merely touch the surface of the matter, but which I
think manifest a certain exemplarity, suggest that a disdain for positivism does
not prevent the modernistas from perpetuating the tropes of the old organic
historicism. from slipping into a similar discourse on the evolution of a species
and the destiny of a people whose time has come.
It is not, it seems to me, a question of reprehending the modemistas for
61 The quotes from Hyppolite Taine are from his Introduction tt r histotre de la littlrature
angloise (L' Histotre, son prlsenl et son avenir), cd. by H.B. Charlton (Manchester: Manchester
University Press. 1936).
62 Rub6n Dado. 'Eugenio de Castro y la Iiteralura portuguesa' (19 September 1896), cited
by Rafael Alberto Anieta. 'El Modemismo 1893-1900', in Litvak, pp.27S-276.
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their incapacity to break.with the past. As Derrida indicates, in what remains
the best expression of the paradox inscribed in historicist methods bent on
describing the radical originality of a new structure, postulating the pertinence
to the new system of any sort of past - as positive cause, as negative influence
- means that originality is traced through by a constitutive non-originality."
Any positivity necessarily carries within itself the marks of the repression of
the moment of the milieu." In the case of the modernistas, those tropological
figures of trenchant cut, generational division and genealogical discontinuity
would invest modernismo with the hubris of originality at the expense of
suppressing that which was already within its own formation. From which we
conclude that a much more hybrid and complex discursive, enunciative
economy operates, in which modernista thought (and I insist on this) cannot
be qualified as simply positivist, for the good reason that positivism 'itself is
not simply positivist.
Foucault is not ignorant of this structurality of the event. Perhaps the
closest he comes to a Derridian position is in an essay on Kant and the
Enlightenment where he explores Kant's wish to know, in the second
dissertation of his The Conflict of Faculties (1798), if there exists anything
63 'The appearance of a new structure, of an original system, always comes about - and
this is the very condition of its structural specificity - by a rupture with its past, its origin, and
its cause. Therefore one can describe what is peculiar to the structural organization only by
not taking into account, in the very moment of this description, its past conditions: by omitting
to posit the problem of the transition from one structure to another, by putting history between
brackets' (,Structure, Sign, and Play', p.291).
64 One witnesses the marks or empreintes of repression in Taine's own discourse - the
irruption of Ie moment, the historicity of the interior: 'When national character and
environmental circumstances operate, they do not operate on a tabula rasa, but on a table
where traces [empreintes] are already marked. According to whether one takes the table at one
moment or at another, the trace is different; and that suffices for the total effect to be different'
(Introduction, p.43).
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like constant progress for mankind 65 According to Kant, one must show that
a cause of progress acts effectively in reality, which implies isolating a
historical event that might serve as the manifestation of a cause that has
always guided men towards progress. For Kant that event was the French
Revolution. However, he guards against the mistake of looking for the proof
of progress in the fall of empires, in great crimes and catastrophes. On the
contrary, the Revolutionary drama, as a project with as much potential for
triumph as for failure, cannot be considered in and of itself a manifestation of
progress. Foucault writes:
what is meaningful and what is to constitute the sign of progress is that,
around the Revolution. there is, says Kant, 'sympathy of aspiration bordering
on enthusiasm.' What is important in the Revolution is not the Revolution
itself, but what takes place in the heads of those who do not make it or, in
any case, who are not its pincipal actors; it is the relationship that they
themselves have with that Revolution of which they are not the active agents.
('The Art', p.92)
Foucault's archaeological theory of discourse is nothing if not sceptical
towards historiography as the narrative of great events but its fixation with the
moment and place of production means that it cannot easily handle the
question of reception. Here, though, the institution of the Revolution means
that the Revolution cannot break: with constitution, since something has already
taken place in the heads of those who do not make it, the people have
themselves anticipated what is revolutionary about the event, that is to say,
a structure of reception has already been inserted into the heart of the event
As Foucault himself says, for Kant the moral disposition of humanity manifests
itself in two ways:
65 Given the name of 'The Art of Telling the Truth', in Politics, Philosophy, Culture,
pp.86-9S (p.89) (fll'St publ. in Magazine lilt/raire, 207 (May 1984),35-39).
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firstly, in the right possessed by all peoples to give themselves the political
constitution that suits them and, secondly, in the principle, in accordance
with law and morality, of a political constitution so framed that it avoids, by
reason of its very principles, all offensive war. Now it is the disposition that
leads mankind to such a constitution that is signified by the Revolution.
(p.93)
For the modernistas to forget the structurality of the event would be to
constitute themselves impossibly as the signifier and signified of a revolution
without a constitution, as that event which would represent a new, Latin
American 'sign of the existence of a cause [...] which, throughout history itself,
has guided men on the way of progress' ('The Art', p.90). And it is this rather
positivistic understanding of constitution which bedevils Foucault's own theory
of the enonce and makes us inclined not to dismiss it simply as an over-zealous
theoretical formalization of an otherwise empirical historical field. When he
asks, concerning discursive formations, what is the nature of the unity thus
'discovered or constructed' [decouverte ou construite], the latter past participle
thrusts itself forward, neutralizing the equivocation. For the theory itself
manifests a powerful will-to-constitute the domains and objects of which it
speaks.
Archaeology, deconstruction, and historicity
In point of fact, I think Foucault would probably circumvent any
apparent difference between modernismo and positivism along lines thus:
(minor) differences apart, they both belong to the modern episteme, both are
predicated on man as simultaneously subject and object of knowledge, and
both deploy continuous history as the 'indispensable correlative of the
founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded
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him may be restored to him' (TheArchaeology, p.12). Even ifwe suspect that
the 'founding function' is now occupied by the ~nonc~,the above reminds us
of the sheer level of generality at which Foucault operates and it is important
to recognize this conventional difference from Derrida. To that extent, do we
not commit a fundamental category-mistake when we use the insights of
deconstruction against Foucault's fonn of history? Is not Derridean
deconstruction potentially debilitating for the historian? Do not the minimal
remainder and the minimum of idealization of which Derrida writes - what
\
Foucault calls 'regularity' - need to be more than minimal in order to begin
the work of historiography at all? Can historiography take on board Denida's
remark (and the quotation marks are not idle) that iterability is differential
within each 'element' as well as between the 'elements', and, at such an intra-
elemental level, ever get started? To return to The Archaeology, is not
Foucault right in stating, on the question of regularity, that archaeology is
interested in that which marks out ~nonc~sseparated from each other perhaps
by years as nevertheless the same? He refuses the opposition regularity-
originality on the grounds that every ~nonc~is in some measure the bearer of
a certain regularity in order for it to be at all considered as such. Therefore,
no ~nonc~may be considered a 'pure and simple creation, the marvellous
disorder of genius [g~nie]' (p.19l; trans. mod.). Is he not correct, from the
point of view which holds persuasively that a body of knowledge is constituted
only through the sedimentation to which it is subjected by a dense network of
institutions, that the identity of an ~nonc~ is subordinated to conditions and
limits imposed on it by surrounding ~nonc~s,by the particular function it has
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in a specific field? Indeed, Foucault is alive to the trap of ideality and insists
that the lnoncl can neither be treated simply as an event nor simply as an
ideal fonn.66 One thus gets a fonnulation which takes Foucault close indeed
to Derrlda, with the difference that Foucault is more conscious of the need to
ask the question concerning a discourse's weight or heaviness:
Too repeatable to be entirely identifiable [soltdaire] with the spatio-temporal
coordinates of its birth (it [the inonctj is more than the date and place of its
appearance), too bound up with what surrounds it and supports it to be as
free as a pure foon (it is more than a law of construction governing a group
of elements), it is endowed with a certain modif18ble heaviness [Iourdeur),
a weight relative to the field in which it is placed. a constancy that allows
of various uses, a tempooll permanence that does not have the inertia of a
simple nace <r mart, and which does not sleep on its own past. Whereas
an enunciation may be begun again or re-evoked. and a (linguistic <r logical)
fonn may be reactualized. the statement has the peculiar property [a en
pro pre] that it may be repealed - but always in strict conditions. (pp.104-
lOS; trans. mod.)
The word lourdeur is pressing here and we should therefore understand the
imbalance in the qualification of the two aspects - the dismissive reference to
the word trace, and the final phrase - as Foucault's preference for difference
over differance.67
However, the answer to the billboard question: 'What can
Deconstruction do for your history?' remains to be decided. This because
deconstruction is not to be thought of as an already-formed body of
methodological procedures which, independent of a particular application,
would always reach pre-defmed ends. Which is not to say that deconstruction
is reborn every second and knows nothing of its previous incarnations.
66 He addresses the question of ideality on p.62 of TheArchaeology. Although he refutes
the suggestion that ideality is at work in his theory, thejunctioning of what he calls the 'group
of rules'within the 'preconceptuallevel' does appear idealist.
61 The chapter entitled 'The Description of Statements' can also be read as an anti-
deconstructionist manifesto.
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Denida has always insisted that it is a question of practising deconstruction
(and also knowing when to keep it in reserve). Such a practice entails holding
on to all those traditional words and concepts which populate Denida' s
discourse alongside the explosive lexicon. It involves retaining the 'con-' of
deconstruction/" Denida's practice constitutes a tremendous challenge to
pedagogy (and we shall see that Foucault's objection was to Denida's
pedagogy), a challenge to the word challenge, to the words institution,
authority, reason, and truth, but also, and inseparably, to their opposites; a
challenge, then, to our modern understanding of the word research. Finally,
and this is where we ask what history can dolhas done for deconstruction,
Denida has always said that the impossibility of the as such (madness as such,
the aporia as such, history or deconstruction as such), does not, could not, rule
out the need to work with these terms and concepts. It is a matter of play and
of intervention in that play. Thinking the play between the finite and the
infinite is, pedagogically speaking, perhaps the most difficult and troubling
aspect of deconstruction. But Denida has shown himself to be at every turn
(when he says, for example, 'Descartes says', 'Western metaphysics', 'Jacques
Denida ') a brutal suspender of play, a clinical interventionist, who will select
only certain (perforce strategic) 'elements' for deconstruction.
One such element might be Foucault's use of the term 'discourse',
which is hardly an innocent by-stander in The Archaeology 0/ Knowledge.
There, Foucault speaks of what he calls the scarcity (raret/) of discourse, that
"Unlike Christopher Norris. I would not apply the wml 'deconstruction' to Foucault's
genealogical practice. The Truth about Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.31.
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is, the fact that, considering the endless permutations of linguistic elements,
relatively few things get said in the world. Economically speaking, enonces
are always in deficit. Discourse, and Foucault continues the economic
metaphor, is therefore a commodity: 'an asset [bien] - finite, limited, desirable,
useful - that has its own rules of appearance, but also its own conditions of
appropriation and operation'. The final qualification 'but also...' reinscribes
(somewhat despite Foucault) the commodity in a structure of grafting and the
graft in the structure of the commodity; inscribes an infmite play within a
finite, limited, scarce commodity." A commodity which Foucault links to
the question of power: 'an asset that is, by nature, the object of a struggle, a
political struggle' (p.l20). The following from Derrida's 'Umited Inc', though
not ostensibly aimed at Foucault's archaeology, pushes hard at the acceptability
of Foucault's metaphor of a policing of discourse from The Order of Discourse
(cited earller):"
Once iterability has established the possibility of parasitism, of a certain
fictionality altering at once - Sec too [Quasi sec] - the system of (it- or
perlocutionary) intentions and the systems of ('vertical·) rules or of
('horizontal') conventions, inasmuch as they are included within the scope
of itembility; once this parasitism or fictionality can always add DlJother
pamsitic or fictional structure to whatever has preceded it - what I elsewhere
designate as a 'supplementary code' [suppllmenl de code] - everything
becomes possible against the language-police; for example 'litemtures' or
'revolutions' that as yet have no model. Bverything is possible except for
an exhaustive typology that would claim to limit the powers of graft or of
et 'If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infmiteness of a field
cannot be covered by a fmite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field
- that is. language and a finite language - excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of
play. that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is fmile, that is to say,
because instead of being an inexhaustible fteld. as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being
too large. there is something missing from it a center which arrests and grounds the play of
substitutions' (Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign, and Play', p.289).
10Manfred Frank makes this point in his 'On Foucault's Concept of Discourse', in Michel
FOUCQult Philosopher. pp.99·1l6 (p.1l3) where he quotes this passage from Derrida. albeit in
a much traduced and melded Conn.
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fiction by and within an analytical logic of distinction. opposition and
classifIcation in genus and species. (p.243)
Iterability, for Derrida, is not tied to convention and is not limited by it. 'If
the police is always waiting in the wings, it is because conventions are by
essence violable and precarious, in themselves and by the fictionality that
constitutes them, even before there has been any overt transgression'
('Limited', p.250).
It is not a matter of dispensing with Foucault's policing metaphor:
literary history, for one, functions as a kind of guard, patrolling a culture's
frontiers, warding off foreign elements which threaten to wound the proper
name and legitimizing a position in the same movement (although because in
principle no-one escapes this condition, it would therefore not be enough in
itself to condemn anyone). In my chosen example of the literary history of
modernismo, one can see the police at work in the heavily Tainian discourses
on modernismo of critics like Max Henriquez Urena and Dfaz Plaja. First,
they concern themselves with the adequation of a spiritual orientation to a
specific race - arguing that modemismo did not fit the Spanish temperament,
the Spanish 'literary spirit' (Henriquez Urena, p.SI9); second, with that hoary
dichotomy between the Generation of 1898 and modernismo which posits the
latter squarely as a non-rational, non-formal system of discourse, the
'contemporary projection of Mediterranianism' (D{azPlaja, p.223); and finally,
with another classical opposition: 'This abandonment of the active-rational for
sensitive-passivity may it be qualified with the feminine sign?"·
71 Dfaz Plaja. p.213 (for the answer).
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But the policing metaphor has its limitations. We recall Foucault's
words that no ~nonc~ may be considered a 'pure et simple creation, ou
merveilleux desordre du genie'. In his L' Archlologie du frivole Derrida
discusses in a chapter entitled 'L' Apres-Coup de Genie' Condillac's belief that
knowledge consists in combining things. This involves two types of ability:
talent and le g~nie. The first combines things to produce expected effects.
The second adds to this the idea of a creative spirit, a retracing of familiar
ground to produce new angles. Of course, the 'coup de genie' needs certain
historical conditions, but by the same token imagining new twists to the rules
of analogy not only conforms to the genius of language but lends language
some of men's own genius (L'ArcMologie dufrivole, p.49). In other words,
and this is classically Derridean logic, genius does not simply respond to
history, it opens it up. (It is this 'ecart de genie' which Derrida calls the
'archeologie du frivole'.) Precisely the same logic is at work in 'Cogito and
the History of Madness', though passed over by Foucault without comment
Derrida argues that even if the totality of my thought and of the world is
imbued with madness, I still formulate the project of grasping the totality. For
Derrida, everything in Descartes can be reduced to a determined historical
totality except the hyperbolical project, which cannot be objectified as an event
in a detennined history. However, Derrida argues, at the point of this
hyperbolical extremity Descartes manoeuvres God into the frame. And he
does so (and I think this is what Foucault has insufficiently acknowledged,
despite his observations on the meditation as an exercise unfolding in time) by
temporalizing the Cogito. The Cogito itself is valid (for the mad too) only
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during the instant of intuition. But one must not be mad if one is to reflect the
Cogito and communicate its meaning. And it is precisely here. Derrida
remarks. that internment takes place in Descartes' text, For God is suddenly
conjured up as the sole guarantor of the representations and cognitive
determinations. and hence the discourse against madness. In fact Derrida goes
on to say that Descartes does not even wait for God. since he pulls himself out
of madness by determining natural light through a series of dogmatically
determined axioms which are established reciprocally on the basis of the
existence and truthfulness of God. As such, for Derrida, they fall within the
province of the history of knowledge. Which is why a clear distinction should
be made between the hyperbolical moment of the act of the Cogito versus the
language or deductive system in which Descartes must inscribe it from the
moment that he proposes it for communication.
Derrida thus points up the similarity of his reading to Foucault's. since
it is indeed the system of Cartesian certainty that functions to master and limit
hyperbole.72 But. Derrida argues. this movement can be described within its
own time and place only if one has previously disengaged the extremity (la
pointe) of hyperbole. which is what Foucault has not done. Thus we have
hyperbole (which is 'the project of exceeding every finite and determined
totality'), and 'that in Descartes's philosophy [...] which belongs to a factual
historical structure'. One without the other would be strictly unthinkable since
72 Foucault discusses the regulation of the hyperbolic in the context of classical Greek
sexuality. Michel Foucault. The Use 0/ PleaslU't. Volume II: The History fl/ Sexuality. trans.
by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintasc Books. 1986). p.so. The aphrodisia were naturally
hyperbolic since they were associated with an energeia which itself tended to excess. The
question concerned how to regulate rather than repress it.
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at stake is the very possibility of thought: 'The historicity proper to philosophy
is located and constituted in the transition, the dialogue between hyperbole and
the finite structure, between that which exceeds the totality and the closed
totality, in the difference between history and historicity' (p.60).73
Finally, then, that question of voluntarism. Derrida asserts that
Foucault's book has made him better understand that the philosophical act can
no longer no longer be in memory of Cartesianism ('ne pouvait plus ne plus
etre en memoire de cart6sianisme'), if to be Cartesian is to attempt to be
Cartesian. He expresses the latter project as: to-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-
hyperbole ('vouloir-dire-l'hyperbole-demonique'). And this is the passage
which answers the question that Foucault never properly put to Derrida:
This attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole is not an attempt among others;
it is not an attempt which would occasionally and eventually be completed
by the saying of it, or by its object. the direct objet of a willful subjectivity.
This attempt to say, which is not. moreover, the antagonist of silence, but
rather the condition for it, is the mginal profundity of wiD in general.
Nothing, further. would be more incapable of regrasping this will than
voluntarism, for, as fmitude and as history, this attempt is also a first
passion. It keeps within itself the trace of a violence. It is more written
than said, it is economized. The economy of this writing is a regulated
relationship between that which exceeds and the exceeded totality: the
diff~rance of the absolute excess. (p.62)
It is thus not, as Said erroneously deduces. a matter of choosing between
voluntarism or involuntarism, but of thinking voluntarism differently."
73 I was interested to see how a common misunderstanding of Derrida's notion of excess
held the key to the resolution of a recent television drama. The main sleuth related a spate of
brutal attacks on women to a (flctional) lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University
of Nottingham by turning over in his mind the latter's lecture on Derrida and excess as a
modus operandi for transgressing the limits imposed by society. Resnick: Lonely Hearts, BBC
TV, 8 August 1993.
74 'Foucault's dissatisfaction with the subject as sufficient cause ofa text and his recourse
to the invisible anonymity of discursive and archival power are curiously matched by Derrida's
own brand of involuntarism' (Said, 'The Problem', p.678).
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The derangement of pedagogy
Let us return, finally, to the issue of discursive differences and subject-
positions. Despite dissenting from Foucault on the question of the subject,
Frow concurs with Said and Foucault to the effect that we face a simple
textuality (Derrida) versus a more complex one (Foucault). Derrida offers
readings of a set of texts 'taken as given' and thereby neglects "'the
implemented, effective power of textual statement'" (Frow citing Said, p.214).
As is well known, the final blows of Foucault's reply to Derrida touch
precisely on this. Disdainfully, Foucault calls Derrida's practice 'a historically
well-determined little pedagogy' .75
For Frow, Foucault's practice 'does not seek to defer an analysis of the
"historical form" of the text until the impossible achievement of a total
understanding of the text's philosophical content' (Frow, p.215). Even if
Derrida has successfully challenged Foucault's positivism, his gesture toward
the 'historical situation of logos' indicates, for Frow, 'the most banal, the most
philosophical equation of the state of the real with the developed state of
reason; and it robs Derrida's question of all its potentially political force'
75 'A pedagogy which teaches the pupil that there is nothing outside the text [...]. A
pedagogy which gives conversely to the master's voice the limitless sovereignty which allows
it to restate the text indefinitely' (p.27). This move is a variant of theological determinism:
your clever argument which rebuts the idea of determinism has been entirely determined.
Foucault rehearses this in 'Entretien', La Quinzaine litteraire, 16May 1966, 14-15 (p.l S). 'In
order to think the system [he is referring to The Order of Things], I was already constrained
by a system behind the system, which I do not know, and which will retreat as I discover it,
as it discovers itself...' Decouvrir, 'discover', 'reveal', 'uncover', 'see'. Following Derrida,
he is condemned to discovering the system indefinitely. He will discover it when it allows him
to discover it, a fact he will discover only when the system... All of which looks remarkably
like a Hegelian dialectic of the spirit, despite what Foucault says elsewhere about trying to get
out of it. 'Debar sur Ie roman', Tel Quel, 17 (1964),12-54 (p.14).
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(Frow, p.216). Said is even less circumspect,"
I question, though, the pertinence of the oppositions erected by Foucault
and company between his analysis and that of Denida: discursive
practice/textual traces, events/marks, need to go and look elsewhere/comforting
belief that there is nothing outside the text. When Descartes moves from
insani to demens there is thus more than philosophy at stake. And yet, the fact
that demens should be a disqualifying tenn does not invalidate, and in fact can
be accommodated within DeITida' s argument for the feigned objection: it is
precisely the scandalized voice which recognizes the legally minor position of
the insane and declares such a position intolerable. The wold's provenance
(which is not to be thought simply) is an important detail, but the wold's value
and significance cannot be understood independently of its function in
Descartes' text, its reinscription by his body in this paper in front of this fire.
What Foucault says about discourse as an event produced at a specific time
and place is alluring. But it implies that a discourse's meaning is determined
by those coordinates and not by the functioning of its various elements, nor by
the nature of the working of signs in general." Which leaves Foucault's
'event' looking much like a 'structure'. 78
76 See Said. 'The Problem', p.709.
77 For an exlreme fonn of this logic see Robert D'Amico, 'Text and Context: Denida and
Foucault on Descartes', in The StruclIITal Allegory: Reconstructive Encounters with the New
French Thought, ed, by John Fekete. Theory and History of Literature, vol.ii (Manchester:
Manchester University Press. 1984), pp.164-182 (p.179).
78 I rather think Lemert and Gillan's assessment of the event in Foucault refers to their
understanding of the event. not to Foucault's: 'If the IonS-term structures reduce the
unwarranted privilese of the buman in history, the event as rupture prevents structures from
emersing as unidirectional determinants of buman action.' Michel Foucault: Social Theory
and Transgression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p.13. Foucault. I think.
conceives of the event as an instance of the structure, the appearance of wbicb precisely allows
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Thus, one should be a little less hasty than Fou co. Ltd in reading
Denida's question: 'Have we fully understood the sign itself, in itself?'
('Cogito', p.32). Less hasty, too, with Denida's remark: that only when the
totality of the philosophical content of philosophical discourse will have
become manifest in its meaning for him (,but this is impossible ') will he
rigorously be able to situate it 'in its total historical fonn'. The key word is
total. Denida does not ward off attempts to situate Descartes' work
historically; he suggests that a confident, unproblematical and total situating
of Descartes' text would presuppose a prior, total exhaustion of the text's
meaning which would be precisely totalitarian. I doubt very much that Derrida
would dissent from Foucault's invocation to go and look elsewhere. Denida
never rules out history and never discounts causality.79 As Derek Attridge
concludes from Saussure's recourse to etymology (which the latter uses to
prevent misunderstandings about a synchronic state), synchrony is an
impossible fiction: 'Doesn't my knowledge of past fonns of the language
(whether accurate or not) necessarily affect my present use and understanding
us to grasp the structure.
79 If Derrida remarks (Of Granutftltology, p.lO) that history and knowledge, tstona and
eptst~mt, have always been detennined "as detours lor the purpose of the reappropriation of
presence', that is not to rule out a more self-queslioninS practice of history. Derrida says that
the question concerning whether an event such as the creation of a house of internment is a
sian among others, whelber a symptom or a cause, could appear exterior to a structuralist
method for which, 'everytbing within the structural totality is interdependent and circular in
such a way that the classical problems of causality themselves would appear to stem from a
misunderstanding'. Perhaps, he says. 'But I wonder' whether, when one is concerned with
history (and Foucault wants to write a bistcxy), a strict structuralism is possible, and,
especially, whelber, if only for the sake of order and within the order of its own descriptions,
such a study can avoid all etiological questions, all questions bearing, shall we say. on the
center of gravity of the SIructure. The legitimate renunciation of a certain style of causality
pedJaps does not give one the right to renounce all etiological demands' ('Co8ito', pp.43-44).
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of it?,80 Contrary to what Merquior believes, Derrida is not about 'ditching'
history."
What disturbs Derrida is Foucault's provocative act of locating his
discussion of Descartes at the very beginning of the crucial chapter on the
great internment, before ever confronting the socio-economic dimensions of the
process. Is Descartes' supposed act of force a symptom or a cause? And if
it has a structural affinity with the totality which is internment, what is the
status of this affinity?" What, to use Said's expression, might 'the identifiable
power of a text' look like and on what instrument could it be measured? In
other words, and the crudity is mine, three pages on Descartes is no kind of
discursive analysis at all. It simply produces a reading at once massively
determined and underdetermined. The passion for system." And in his
treatment of the Meditations Foucault fails to respect what he himself describes
elsewhere as the non-simplicity of the 'gesture that encloses' (Histoire de la
folie, p.64).
80 'Language as HistorylHistory as Language: Saussure and the Romance of Etymology',
in Poststructuralism and the Question 0/History, ed. by Derek Attridge, Geoffrey Bennington
and Robert Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.l83-211
(p.200).
81 J.G. Merquior, From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist
Thought (London: Verso, 1988), p.221.
82 In The Archaeology (p.l 0) Foucault appears to address this question of the relationship
between what he calls different 'series' (that is, the economic, the religious, the literary, etc.).
But he still thinks in terms of 'series of series' (which he says is another way of describing
the tableau), a notion which, despite his protestations, would not differentiate his project
significantly from traditional history.
83 Elsewhere, Derrida observes that one must not isolate notions as if they were their own
context, but also one 'must not submit contextual attentiveness and differences of signification
to a system 0/meaning permitting or promising an absolute formal mastery'. 'From Restricted
to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve'. in Writing and Difference, pp.251-277
(p.273).
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One of the stakes involved in this treatment is articulated clearly by
Foucault himself when, discussing the concentration of academics in the
movement for prison refonn in the rnid-1970s, he insists that it was not a
question of a meeting of 'historians' and 'philosophers', but a matter of a
common labour by people looking to 'se "di-disciplinariser"'.84 The turn
towards a discursive analysis and away from the internal and autonomous
analysis of texts has featured prominently in contemporary literary theorizing
in Britain. This confident belief in the capacity to grasp literature's
institutionality, its disciplinarity, seems to me closely bound to a loss of
confidence - only partly in the study of literature itself. Of course, Foucault
himself would not focus on internal structures, though notice in this proposal-
to-think-the-hyperbolical-project how he presupposes what he claims advenes
(that is, literature):
In order to know what is literature, I would not want to study the internal
structures. I would rather grasp the movement. the small process through
which a non-literary type of discourse, neglected. forgotten as soon as it is
spoken, enters the literary danain. What happens there? What is released?
How is this discourse modified in its efforts by the fact that it is recognized
as literary?"
I think one glimpses something of the difficulty, nay madness, of practising a
discursive analysis of literature in the conclusions reached by Terry Eagleton
and Colin McCabe.86 Eagleton's response to what he describes, in decidedly
M Foucault. 'La Poussrere et le nuagc', in L'/mpossiblt prison, pp.29-39 (p.39).
IS 'On Literature', in Foucault Live, p.1l7.
16For similar expressions of literary-critical insanity see During, pp.198, 237; and Barbara
. Riebling, 'Remodeling Truth, Power. and Society: Implications of Chaos Theory,
NonequiJibrium Dynamics, and Systems Science fCB' the Study of Politics and Literature', in
After Poststructuralism: /nterdisciplinarlly and Ulerary Theory. cd. by Nancy Easterlin and
Bamara Riebling (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp.1n-201 (p.191).
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Foucaultian terms, as the 'power of "policing" language' which the literary-
academic institution arrogates unto itself, is to call for a different critical
practice, which would study 'what Michel Foucault has called "discursive
practices"', that is. the 'whole field' of practices that come to decide what
counts as 'literature' (Literary Theory, p.20S). His would therefore be a return
to rhetoric, to a practice which
saw speaking and writing not merely as textual objects. to be aesthetically
contemplated or endlessly deconstructed. but as forms of activity inseparable
from the wider social relations between writers and readers. orators and
audiences. and as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and
conditions in which they are embedded. (p.206)
I shall end with a contemporary literary example which condenses
peculiarly well the difficulties, the madness, which this project brings in its
wake. The applicability of Foucault's theory of discourse as event to literary
production finds an unfortunate test case in the affair surrounding Salman
Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, as Rushdie himself acknowledges. In his 1990
lecture, entitled 'Is Nothing Sacred?', Rushdie quotes from Foucault's 'What
Is an Author?' to the effect that 'texts, books and discourses really began to
have authors... to the extent that authors became subject to punishment, that
is, to the extent that discourses could be transgressive'. r1 The Foucault piece
rehearses a familiar pincer movement: the subject of discourse is not the
author, yet real individuals can assume the position of the subject.88 But that
is by the bye. More germane to my argument is Rushdie speaking (via Pinter)
17 'Is Nothing Sacred?'. The Herbert Read Memmat Lecture. 6 February 1990 (Granta),
p.11. For reasons of safety. the 1ecture was delivered by Harold Pinter. Foucault's essay can
be found in The FOllCalllt ReodD', pp.lOl-I20.
• 'Where has it [discourse] been used. how can it circulate. and who can appropriate it
for himseJfl Wbat are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects? Who can
assume these various subject functions?' (The FOllCauil Reader, p.120.)
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with Foucault's words:
In our culture (and doubtless in many others), discourse was not originally
a product, a thing, a kind of goods; it was essentially an act - an act placed
in the bipolar field of the sacred and the profane, the licit and the illicit, the
religious and the blasphemous. Historically it was a gesture fraught with
risks. (p.II)
What Rushdie's case itself illustrates only too well is that discourse, in this
case literary, is still viewed as an event, an act which takes place at a definable
historical moment. An event marked by Rushdie' s position as a lapsed Muslim
within a new tradition of non-English writers of literature in English; an act
received in parts of the world mobilized against perceived blasphemies of the
Koran by a militant Islam bolstered by the fundamentalism of the Iranian
revolution. A summary glance at the fate of Flaubert, D.H. Lawrence, Oscar
Wilde, and Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz before them, serves to remind us that the
literary discursive event has indeed been a gesture fraught with risks. And yet,
although he does not say as much, Rushdie articulates some of the limitations
of Foucault's practice. Rushdie's act has been constructed as a simple,
punishable act only on the basis of a misunderstanding of literary discourse.
Only by virtue of a reduction of the novel's plural voices (and the novel is
about nothing if not voices) to a single, determinate position of the author,
Salman Rushdie, only by collapsing cacophony into monologue, can the fatwa
be issued. Only by determining the precise discursive formation of which The
Satanic Verses is a statement, and then by making the real Rushdie identical
with a discernable SUbject-positionwithin the novel (despite-the-play-of-fiction-
we-all-know-it's-Rushdie-speaking), can the novel be adequately described as
an event. In short, a Foucault-type analysis would condemn itself to repeating
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the move against discourse which Foucault denounces in others. The Order
of Discourse exposes the ways in which a society controls, organizes and
innoculates discourse, which, if given its rightful free reign, would show its
lawlessness, its proliferation to infinity, its 'strange'. 'frightening' and
'maleficent' qualities. We might question whether discourse could ever show
its lawlessness, if discourse must not, rather, in principle always submit to law
in general. But as to the omnipresence and -potence, the law, of a single
subject-position. I'm making no claims at present - that would be folly!9
To conclude. It remains important to allow for a difference in genre
and conventions between a practice like Foucault's and that of Derrida.
Foucault was interested in the perfectly reasonable question of why people in
institutions of knowledge come to articulate a certain body of learning. Faced
with evidence of certain general rules, it is perhaps not surprising that his
discourse should at times assume the visage of the lawlike. However, the
tremendous effort to account for regularity in theoretical terms perforce carries
within it the risk of a deterministic gesture of exclusion of becoming. I shall
argue in the next chapter that the first volume of the history of sexuality
responds to this danger.
19 The Stuantc Verses, p.10: 'I know the truth, obviously. 1 watched the whole thing. As
to omnipresence and -potence, I'm making no claims at present'
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CHAPTER4
BIG SCIENCE. LITTLE SCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
FOUCAULT'S 'POWER'
Introduction
In the preceding chapters, an oft-repeated criticism has been that
Foucault's conceptual apparatus is marked by a certain rigidity, attributable to
a largely spatial, structural understanding of thought, discourse, the subject and
society. In this chapter I shall argue that with La Volante de savoir a
significant reorientation takes place and that insufficient attention has been paid
to the differences which distinguish the elaboration of power in Discipline and
Punish from the notion of power as it comes to be re(de)fined in the volume
on sexuality.' In La Volonte de savoir, plurality, difference, instability and
disequilibrium are broached as never before. What we see there is the
deconstitution, not the abandonment, of the constitution metaphor, a process
driven by the thinking of time and becoming which had hitherto been the great
unthought (rather like HusserI's delay in incorporating genesis into his theory
of phenomenology). In addition, and despite Foucault's attack on the depiction
I The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. by Robert Hurley
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). Unless otherwise indicated, all page references refer to this
text, though I have preferred the French title owing to its Nietzschean overtones.
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of power as law, I shall argue that Foucault never abandons, could never
abandon, the regular and the lawlike, the Constitution.
With respect to the question concerning the ends of power and
knowledge which we began to explore in Chapter three, this chapter will
explore the nature and consequences of the opposition which Foucault sets up
between power on the one hand and meaning on the other. We shall ask here
what hope there can be for the possibility of measuring power once one
accepts its unstable, fractured, plural, microphysical character. In fact I shall
contend that we have in La Volonte both the sketch of a fundamentally
inorganic, dynamic world predicated on inequality, where the latter designates
the structural imbalance of forces without which there would be no power, and
the powerful desire to construct a theory that would allow Foucault precisely
to trace and 'see' that inequality. (To that extent, Foucault's insistence on the
microphysical, his effort to be microscopic, does not distance him from a
spatial, structural thought.) To that end, the chapter will explore some of the
theoretical touchstones of contemporary science, in an effort to suggest that
Foucault on power cannot adequately be understood from within a perspective
shaped exclusively by the humanities. Specifically, I shall draw on aspects of
the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, evolutionary theory and, lastly,
theories of deterministic chaos - all this to suggest that Foucault's 'power'
circulates, and largely holds its own, in a much larger theoretical field. As
with many of the scientific theories, so in Foucault the very small is
supplemented by considerations of much more conventional dimensions.
Despite the brouhaha surrounding micro-powers, one cannot overlook the
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importance in Foucault of the macro and the systemic (it is not without
significance that many of his analyses should concentrate on the macro
phenomenon of population), and we will be suitably vigilant when the
microphysical, the local and the recondite threaten to move to their own
rhythm. By the same token, I shall suggest that theoretical science can offer
a challenge to Foucault's theory: for instance nonrandom cumulative selection
as a corrective to Foucault's vaunting of chance. It, along with other theories,
suggests convincingly that thinking time, mobility, change and contingency
need not necessarily lead to thinking disorder.
The local, the specific and power
There is a famous formulation which is often hailed as Foucault's
clearest expression of the shift in his work away from what he himself calls
'the great model of language (langue) and signs' towards a Nietzschean model
of war and battle. It reads:
The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than
that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has
no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On
the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to
the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of
struggles, of strategies and tactics.'
In another place, he speaks of wanting his books to be Molotov cocktails.'
Accompanying this new thematics (which is not entirely new) are a number of
2 Foucault, 'Truth and Power', in Power/Know/edge, pp.109-133 (p.114) (first publ, as
'Intervista a Michel Foucault', trans. by Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino in Michel
Foucault, Microfisica de/ potere (Turin, 1977». In Moi, Pierre Riviere, Foucault insists
(problematically) that medical, juridical and other discourses form a battle rather than a text.
In Remarks on Marx, he shows signs of tiring of the war metaphor (p.180).
3 Foucault, 'Sur la sellette', Us Nouvelles litteraires, 17 March 1975, p.3.
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related themes the appearance of which implies a departure from and criticism
of the earlier archaeological texts, in which such themes were either too latent
or indeed absent altogether. I am thinking of the themes of specificity and
practice, which are to be opposed to the abstract theorization and generality
characteristic of the work on epistemes (though even in an archaeological text
like The Archaeology of Know/edge there is a pronounced thematics of
plurality and specificity, of discontinuous levels and autonomous domainspace
Althusser, and in fact that text anticipates (p.193) the analysis conducted in La
Volante), In the new work, Foucault postulates that such doughty theorizing
is part of the problem, a postulate he shares with thinkers like Deleuze and
Lyotard and which is broadly symptomatic of the shift from structuralism to
post-structuralism." By the mid-I 970s Foucault has contributed immensely to
making specificity a desirable and worthy objective, and in the process himself
come to epitomize the new breed of 'specific intellectuals' engaged in local
analyses 'at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work
situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university,
family and sexual relations), (,Truth and Power', p.126).
The stress on the local and the specific is not idle; it directs his thought
on power. In La Volante de savoir, where Foucault elaborates on the work
done (though not begun) in Discipline and Punish, he writes of wanting to
move towards an analytics rather than a theory of power (p.82). The preference
for the word ana/ytics bespeaks Foucault's conviction that the role for theory
4 Spivak cites Deleuze's (similarly problematic) action-man expression: "'A theory is like
a box of tools. Nothing to do with the signifier'''. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', p.275.
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today is 'not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything
in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power, to locate the
connections and extensions, to build little by little a strategic knowledge
(savoir)'.s This emphasis is confmned in interviews of the time, where
Foucault repeatedly upbraids the knowledge industry for its overblown
theorizing and lack of a sense of the specific, both of which he suspects have
come to exert an inhibiting effect on thought. Nevertheless, does the text of
the first volume on sexuality bear out these statements on specificity? In fact
- and I will argue shortly that this is no coincidence - the reflection he
develops bears, in its speculative and general quality (he speaks of' advanc[ing]
a certain number of propositions' about power [p.94]), many of the hallmarks
of more abstract, old-fashioned theory.
What, he asks in that volume, explains the tendency in Western
societies to recognize power only in the 'emaciated form of prohibition'? Why
persist with this juridical and negative representation? A power only to say no;
'in no condition to produce, capable only of positing limits, it is basically anti-
energy' (p.85). 'Power', he reasons (and we can almost hear the quotation
marks), can be 'positive', in the sense that it is capable of actively moulding
or 'producing' individuals. Power's condition of possibility 'must not be
sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of
sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate'. 'It
is,' he continues, 'the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of
5 'Power and Strategies', in Power/Knowledge, pp.134-145 (p.145) (first publ. as 'Pouvoirs
et strategies', Les Rewires logiqua, 4 (1977)).
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their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always
local and unstable' (p.93). I shall return to this passage and to the place of
that word inequality. Note, for now, and they saturate the text, the semantics
of dynamics and of production: power is not; power is becoming." If Foucault
can speak of the 'omnipresence' of power, it is because power 'is produced
from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from
one point to another' (p.93).7 His next words are worth citing in their entirety,
since they constitute one of Foucault's clearest statements on power, while at
the same time harbouring a by now infamous axiom:
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it
comesfrom everywhere. And 'Power,' insofar as it is permanent, repetitious,
inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from
all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks
in tum to arrest their movement. One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt:
power is not an institution, and not a structure; neitber is it a certain strength
we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a certain complex
strategical situation in a particular society. (p.93; my empbasis)
This invocation of the local has a political agenda, since it is not a
matter of the local for the local's sake. The return of the local represents, in
Foucault's eyes, an 'insurrection of subjugated know/edges'.8 By this he
means not only erudite historical knowledge which has been forgotten or
overlooked; he refers at the same time to knowledge which has been
disqualified on the grounds of naivety or insufficient elaboration (he cites
6 Hence Foucault's suspicion of identity politics. We must work, he says, 'at becoming
homosexuals'. 'Friendship as a Way of Life', in Foucault Live, pp.203-209 (p.204) (first publ.
in Le Gai pied (Apri11981».
7 It is as well to point out at this early stage the crucial influence of Deleuze. For
Deleuze's Nietzsche all reality is nothing but quantities of force in mutual 'relations of
tension'. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: The Athlone Press, 1983; repro
1992).
• Foucault, 'Two Lectures', inPower/Knowledge, pp.78-108 (p.81; his italics) (first publ.
in Microfuica del potere).
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variously the knowledge formulated by the psychiatric patient, the ill person,
the delinquent, women, conscripted soldiers, homosexuals). Yet how does this
insight square with that slogan 'Power is everywhere ... because it comes from
everywhere. ' Does this mean that power emerges equally from everywhere?
And from everything? The polemic spawned by such phrases arises from the
image of a power so mobile and decentred as to make us lose sight of those
blockages, knots and (non-)alignments which permit us to speak of inequality.
(It is interesting how, when pressed in a 1977 interview, Foucault inflects the
issue of mobility differently. A certain stability is invoked which allows him
to be more definite about the respective 'potentials' for power of certain
positions: 'In so far as power relations are an unequal and relatively stable
relation of forces, it's clear that this implies an above and a below, a difference
of potentials' .~
In fact, if we look back at that passage from Foucault, two powers are
in play here, a point clearly marked in the passage and systematically ignored
by commentators." First there is 'power' (Ie pouvoir) and then there is
"'Power'" (,Ie' pouvoiri," The second is evidently a more traditional, 'over-
all' name for the general 'complex strategical situation in a given society'.
Foucault is much less concerned with this power, but never entirely
9 'The Confession of the Flesh', in Power/Knowledge, pp.19....228 (pp.200-20t) (first publ.
as 'Le Jeu de Michel Foucault', Omiceri, 10 July 1977).
10 E.g. Edward Said, 'The Problem of Textuality', p.710.
11 The English resorts to the capital letter to highlight the stress on the article which is
lost in translation. Foucault himself says that he never uses the word power with a capital
P. 'Clarifications on the Question of Power', in Foucault Live, pp.179-192 (p.185) (first publ.
in Aut Aut, 167-168 (1978}).
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unconcerned with it, as we shall see later. By contrast, the first represents a
new inscription of the word's meaning, with the aim ofre-marking Foucault's
nominalistic contention that power is not a thing or a substance, which one
might possess or capture whole for one's own use. It is not embodied, self-
present and self-identical, in either a state, social system or individual. The
entire drift of the text is to counter a notion of power characteristic of a
historically specific social form: the juridical monarchy. The reason being, for
Foucault, that power no longer has that form in our society. Whence the
slogan: 'The representation of power has remained under the spell of
monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head
of the king' (pp.88-89). 'In political thought and analysis': it goes without
saying that Foucault's purview exceeds the specifically sexual, the latter being
precisely an impossibility.
La Volonte exceeds the sexual by binding sex closely to power. In one
of those reversals of which we spoke in the first chapter, 'sex' is produced by
a dispositif of sexuality, which is itself produced. (I preserve the French
dispositif; since it suggests not only 'apparatus' and the workings of a machine,
but also the (military) sense of a more strategic spatial arrangement of forces.)
This Nietzschean hypothesis entails thinking the process by which sex is
objectified and essentialized. Foucault must argue that the essentialist notion
of sex, by which it comes to function as a 'causal principle', a 'unique
signifier' and a 'universal signified' (p.154), is itself the reversal; viz. that sex
- aided by an appropriation of the biological sciences - is thus made to appear
an irreducible thing that power comes to subject from the outside, rather than
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appearing in its essential and positive relation to power. Thus, the idea of
'sex' obfuscates what makes power powerful, reducing everything to law and
taboo. By contrast, for Foucault, sex is 'the most speculative, most ideal, and
most internal element in a dispositif of sexuality' (p.l55; trans. mod.). One
already senses a significant volte face here. Power produces not real bodies,
as in Discipline and Punish, but ideal, fictive unity. Foucault is close at this
point to a classical theory of ideology, with a garnishing of techne. However,
if the quotation is allowed to continue, one witnesses Foucault's language,
betraying the cause somewhat, speaking of power as a being-able-to. The hand
of power is once again raised: '[a dispositif of sexuality] organized by power
in its grip [ses prises] on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies,
sensations, and pleasures' (p.155). Old metaphors exert a grip of their own.
Tbeoretical pbysics
It can be postulated that this first power, which Foucault believes is
proper to our own epoch (though ultimately this is difficult to maintain), has
its cognitive roots less in political thought than in certain other fields, of which
I name but three. Firstly, this century's natural sciences - particularly post-
Einstein physics and post-DNA biology; secondly, a Nietzscheanism heavily
filtered through Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy; and thirdly, a
certain Derridean logic. (On the question of influence it should be said that
La Volonte, with a power at once open and plural, is a sociological SIZ.)
Postponing the last two until a later moment, it is to the natural
sciences that we now turn, for it is first and foremost this nexus that will be
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explored in the present chapter. We recall that Foucault termed power in the
negative, juridical view 'anti-energy'. By contrast his is the discourse of
'capillarity', 'micro-relations of power', 'force', 'micro-physics'. This
scientific lexicon at times invests his work with a strained ring of scientificity
(Foucault himself speaks of nineteenth-century reproductive biology rewriting
economic, political and moral concerns 'in a scientific-sounding vocabulary'
[p.55]), but more importantly it also places him foursquare within the new
tradition of the specific intellectual. As he observes in another interview, it is
with Darwin and the post-Darwinian evolutionists that such a figure begins to
emerge, a line continued by the theorists of relativity at the turn of the century.
Biology and physics, then, 'were to a privileged degree the zones of formation
of this new personage' ('Truth and Power', p.129).
One obvious bridge into the natural sciences for Foucault is the work
conducted in the history of science by people like Canguilhem and Bachelard.
Foucault attributes to Canguilhem the distinction between the microscopic and
the macroscopic which will be of such value to him, and one thinks of
Bachelard's demand that concepts be thought relationally, his displacement of
the notion of object, his refusal to think knowledge without specification."
However, this chapter's concern is with more contemporary inflections of these
themes, and in any event one is obviously dealing with certain 'truisms' of
twentieth-century science, of which Bachelard's work, say, would be but one
instance. I should therefore like to begin examining this cluster of themes
12 See Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology, pp.39, 52, 54. Significantly, what counts for
Bachelard is thinking the process of objectification.
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(relationality, displacement of the object, specification) in a contemporary and
popularizing account which charts the state of the art of theoretical physics,
Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black
Holes.13 I shall first discuss the general theory of relativity (which deals with
the very big), before moving to an overview of quantum mechanics (which
treats of the infinitesimally small). My aim is to see the degree to which
certain concepts in those fields operate in Foucault's own discourse.
I begin with the challenge posed by Newton's work to the Aristotelian
belief in a preferred state of rest. Although Newton himself resisted the
conclusions of his own findings, his work suggested there simply was no such
absolute standard. Henceforward, it was impossible to determine whether two
events taking place at different times occurred in the same position in space.
Hawking cites the example of a Ping-Pong ball on a train bouncing up and
down on a table on the same spot at one-second intervals. To someone at the
side of the track, the two bounces would appear to take place forty metres
apart. Hence, the positions of events and the distances between them would
vary according to the position of the observer, and no observational position
would be intrinsically better than any other.
However, Newton did believe, along with Aristotle, in absolute time,
a position challenged in turn by the theory of relativity. James Clerk
Maxwell's theory that light should travel at a fixed speed ran into the problem,
in the wake of Newton's dismissal of the idea of absolute rest, of determining
what that fixed speed was to be measured relative to. Einstein (and Poincare
13 London: Bantam Press, 1988; repro 1992.
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in parallel work) argued that it was necessary precisely to abandon the notion
of absolute time. In the theory of relativity the speed of light is the same for
all observers irrespective of their own motion. But because the distance the
light has travelled differs for each observer (since space is not absolute, as the
example of the commuter Ping-Pong ball demonstrates), the time taken is also
disputed (since the time taken is equal to distance divided by speed). Absolute
time crumbles. Observers assign different times and positions to the 'same'
event. And yet although this is relativity, it is not chaos. In an important
sense - and this point will be emphasized in a different context later - the
system as a whole still holds, even in the face of sundry observers:
No particular observer's measurements are any more correct than any other
observer's, but all the measurements are related. Any observer can work out
precisely what time and position any other observer will assign to an event,
provided he knows the other observer's relative velocity. (Hawking, p.22)
Einstein's general theory of relativity holds also that gravity IS a
consequence of the fact that space-time is 'warped' by the distribution of mass
and energy in it. Similarly, it predicts that time should appear to run slower
. near a massive body like the earth which has a stronger gravitational field."
The example of the twins illustrates this point. If one twin lived on a
mountain and the other at sea level, the first would age faster. But if the first
twin were to relocate to a very dense planet, he would age more slowly than
14 'This is because there is a relation between the energy of light and its frequency (that
is, the number of waves of light per second): the greater the energy, the higher the
frequency. As light travels upward in the earth's gravitational field, it loses energy, and so
its frequency goes down. (This means that the length of time between one wave crest and
the next goes up.) To someone high up, it would appear that everything down below was
taking longer to happen' (Hawking, p.32).
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his brother. IS The paradox, Hawking remarks, is a paradox only if one thinks
in terms of absolute time. He sums up:
Before 1915, space and time were thought of as a fixed arena in which
events took place, but which was not affected by what happened in it. [...]
The situation, however, is quite different in the general theory of
relativity. Space and time are now dynamic quantities: when a body moves,
or a force acts, it affects the curvature of space and time - and in tum the
structure of space-time affects the way in which bodies move and forces act.
Space and time not only affect but also are affected by everything that
happens in the universe. Just as one cannot talk about events in the universe
without the notions of space and time, so in general relativity it became
meaningless to talk about space and time outside the limits of the universe.
(p.33)
Therein the rub. For Edwin Hubble discovered in 1929 that distant galaxies
are moving rapidly away from the earth: ergo, that the universe is expanding
and knows no limits. For the young Alvy Singer this was existentially
disturbing." For Foucault, the disturbance will indeed be existential - the
cosmos itself refuting the image of equilibrium imputed to it - though by
definition not necessarily negative.
Let us go from the very large to the very small, from relativity to
quantum mechanics, beginning precisely with the quantum. Max Planck's
quantum is defined as a packet of energy in which waves are emitted or
absorbed, a notion subsequently used by Werner Heisenberg in his attempts to
predict the future position and velocity of a particle. The idea may be
summarized thus: by shining light on the particle, the scattering of waves of
light which ensues will indicate the particle's position. The shorter the
wavelength of the light the more accurate the measurement. But, pace Planck,
15 Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, The A TrOW of Time: The Quest to Solve Science's
Greatest Mystery (London: Flamingo 1991), p.95.
16 Woodie Allen, Annie Hall, 1977.
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to achieve this measurement one has to use at least one quantum of energy. the
problem being that this quantum disturbs the particle and changes its velocity
in unforeseeable ways:
Moreover, the more accurately one measures the position, the shorter the
wavelength of the light that one needs and hence the higher the energy of a
single quantum. So the velocity of the particle will be disturbed by a larger
amount. In other words, the more accurately you try to measure the position
of the particle, the less accurately you can measure its speed, and vice versa.
(Hawking, pp.54-55)
In short, and to come rather too quickly to the point, quantum mechanics
emerges on the basis of this uncertainty principle. Particles do not have
separate, well-defined positions and velocities, but a quantum 'state' which is
a combination of position and velocity. Likewise, quantum mechanics cannot
offer up a single definite result for an observation, but deals in predicting a
number of different possible outcomes and estimating the likelihood of each.
'One could predict the approximate number of times that the result would be
A or B, but one could not predict the specific result of an individual
measurement. Quantum mechanics therefore introduces an unavoidable
element of unpredictability or randomness into science' (Hawking, p.56).
And yet not everything defies definition. Hawking explains that of the
universe's two groups of particles (those which make up matter and those
which give rise to forces between the matter particles), the matter particles
obey what is known as Pauli's exclusion principle (after Wolfgang Pauli). To
wit, it is impossible for two similar particles to exist in the same state, since,
in line with the uncertainty principle, they cannot have both the same position
and the same velocity. The exclusion principle helps account for the fact that
matter particles do not collapse to a state of high density under the force
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exerted by the second group of particles, that such matter particles form
separate, well-defined atoms instead of collapsing to form a 'roughly uniform,
dense "soup'" (Hawking, p.68).
But the outcome does not make for a static, if nicely structured,
universe, and this because the force-carrying particles do not obey Pauli's
exclusion principle. Instead, the force-carrying particles emitted from matter
particles induce change: first, in the velocity of the matter particle as it recoils;
then, in the velocity of a second matter particle which absorbs the force-
carrying particle that collides with it. And at some level in the theory (because
all this is speculative), in order for the earth and all the galaxies to exist it
would have to be the case that in the high-energy heat at the beginning of the
universe more antielectrons turned into quarks than electrons into antiquarks:
so that despite the fact that every particle has an anti-particle with which it can
annihilate, as quarks annihilated with antiquarks a small excess of quarks
remains. Hawking notes in a telling parenthesis: '(Had it been an excess of
antiquarks, however, we would simply have named antiquarks quarks, and
quarks antiquarks)' (Hawking, p.78).
The significance of this theory emerges in Hawking's discussion of the
challenge to the commonly-held view of black holes, appropriately entitled
'Black Holes Ain't So Black'. Theoretical speculation and calculation had
come to suggest that black holes should emit particles, a flat contradiction of
the very being of black holes since one of the latter's defining characteristics
was precisely that nothing could escape from its event horizon. Quantum
theory offers a plausible hypothesis, positing that the particles do not come
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from within the black hole, but from the 'empty' space just outside the black
hole's event horizon. The following passage may be read as an inspired piece
of reasoning (not simply by Hawking, but by an entire tradition, inherited and
understood by Foucault) according to which force is everywhere ... because it
comes from everywhere:
What we think of as 'empty' space cannot be completely· empty because that
would mean that all the fields, such as the gravitational and electromagnetic
fields, would have to be exactly zero. However, the value of a field and its
rate of change with time are like the position and velocity of a particle: the
uncertainty principle implies that the more accurately one knows one of these
quantities, the less accurately one can know the other. So in empty space the
field cannot be fixed at exactly zero, because then it would have both a
precise value (zero) and a precise rate of change (also zero). There must be
a certain minimum amount of uncertainty, or quantum fluctuations, in the
value of the field. (Hawking, pp.1 05-1 06)
'There must be...', theoretically speaking. But theory is supported by
calculation and measurement. As Hawking says, the fluctuations of which he
speaks may be thought of as pairs of force-carrying particles which remain
virtual (since they cannot be observed with a particle detector). One is thus
in the business of calibrating their effects: all very Foucaultian. However,
these effects, Hawking insists - and he cites the example of small changes in
the energy of electron orbits in atoms -, 'can be measured and agree with the
theoretical predictions to a remarkable degree of accuracy' (Hawking, p.l 06).
Relativity, if I understand it correctly, issues in and recognizes a certain play;
at the same time, however, standards and norms do not thereby disappear into
the nearest black hole: the theorist's armature still bristles with instruments,
gauges and formalized equations to register, measure and evaluate. It is
arguably here, in the measurement of effects and in the determination of cause,
that Foucault's model of power, and probably any model of social power,
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comes up against severe limitations. Einstein's own mistrust of the quantum
mechanics he had helped spawn is due largely to its apparent eschewal of
causality. On the bicentenary of Newton's death, Einstein wrote: 'May the
spirit of Newton's method give us the power to restore unison between
physical reality and the profoundest characteristic of Newton's teaching - strict
causality' (Coveney and Highfield, p.121).
Force(s)
One wonders if, for the first and 'new' power of which we spoke
earlier, Foucault would not have been better served by the word force,
reserving the word power for an executive use, as a difference of potentials,
of being-able-tos (pouvoirs). The OED defines power in one of its technical
meanings as 'Any form of energy or force available for application to work.
spec. a. Mechanical energy [...] as distinguished from hand-labour, often
viewed as a commodity saleable in definite quantities [...] b. Force applied to
produce motion or pressure.' Now there is something unduly instrumental,
quantifiable and substantial about all this, as though power could be gathered
and released at will, which is just what Foucault did not intend. On the other
hand, this is what the same source has to say about force, in its scientific
meaning:
11. Physics, etc. Used in various senses developed from the older popular
uses, and corresponding to mod. scientific uses ofL. vis. a. (= Newton's vis
impressa ...). An influence (measurable with regard to its intensity and
determinable with regard to its direction) operating on a body so as to
produce an alteration or tendency to alteration of its state of rest or of
uniform motion in a straight line; the intensity of such an influence as a
measurable quantity.
And this is followed by an interesting aside in smaller print: 'Recent physicists
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mostly retain the word merely as the name for a measure of change of motion, not as denoting
anything objectively existing as a cause.' Such a definition might just be more
workable, especially if one's critical project is an unrelenting attack on our
understanding of cause (particularly as embodied in the psychological
positivism of homo natura) and yet one is still in the business of nomination,
as Foucault says he is.
As a matter of fact, in the chapter on 'Method' from the first volume
on sexuality, the expression force relations is used repeatedly, and almost
tautologically, as a virtual synonym of power. The chapter's first attempt at
a definition reads: 'It seems to me that power must be understood in the first
instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which
they operate and which constitute their own organization [sont constitutifs de
leur organisation], (p.92). This 'multiplicity' of force relations is immediately
followed (it literally begins the next phrase) by 'play', Ie jeu: 'the play which,
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or
, reverses them' (p.92; trans. mod.)." Multiplicity and play suffice to de-
constitute any 'organisation'. La Volante questions the very possibility, and
certainly the sufficiency, of any constitution (both process and resultant) or,
more still, construction, without decommissioning any of those terms. Time
and movement take their place taking place away. Power, and with it the
constitutional model of power-knowledge, necessarily lose their grip, without
thereby becoming destitute." For Foucault, the whole shebang is multiplicities
17 The translation has 'process' for jeu.
11Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomen%gie, p.S17: 'The world is already constituted, but also
never completely constituted:
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of force relations, moving around, colliding, deflecting; webs and spirals of
them, shifting, mutating, regrouping. And if there are resistances, then these
are but the 'odd term' in relations of power, inscribed in the latter as an
'irreducible opposite' (p.96). For their sins they, too, are 'distributed in
irregular fashion [...J at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive
way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain
types of behavior' (p.96).
This characterization of power and resistance has met with a forceful
counter-lobby. For Jean Baudrillard in Oublier Foucault - and his is perhaps
the most compelling, the most eloquent of many similar voices - Foucault's
discourse is a mirror of the powers it describes." 'Too perfect', it describes
'an interstitial flowing of power that seeps through the whole porous network
of the social, the mental, and of bodies'; no backfiring, just a flawless writing
(pp.lO-ll). Yet Foucault's 'power' still remains a mystery for Baudrillard.
What is a force relation without a force resultant? And what sense could it
make to say that 'the same fragment of gesture, body, gaze, and discourse
encloses both the positive electricity of power and the negative electricity of
resistance' (p.37)? Power remains a structural, polar notion 'with a perfect
genealogy and an inexplicable presence':
Power no longer has a coup de force - there is simply nothing else either on
this side of it or beyond it (the passage from the 'molar' or the 'molecular'
is for Deleuze still a revolution of desire, but for Foucault it is an
anamorphosis of power). (p.39)
One form of power dominates and is diffracted into the prison, the military,
19 Paris: Editions Galilee, 1977. All references are to the English translation, Forget
Foucault (Columbia: Semiotext(e), 1987}.
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the asylum, etc.:
Power is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the
real (always more and more of the real), effecting a quadrature,
nomenclature, and dictature without appeal; nowhere does it cancel itself out,
become entangled in itself, or mingle with death. In this sense, even if it has
no finality and no last judgment, power returns to its own identity again as
e.final principle: it is the last term, the irreducible web, the last tale that can
be told; it is what structures the indeterminate equation of the world." (p.40)
It appears that Baudrillard in fact pours Discipline and Punish
indiscriminately into La Volonte de savoir" He takes from the former the
undoubted totalizing impulse and sense of spatial entrapment, and from the
latter the metaphorics of spirals, coils, movement and time. Foucault's 'power'
is then born as a species of malevolent and amorphous, energized slime that
spreads unstoppably throughout the social, seeping into pores and slowly
extending its empire over bodies and minds, like something out of a low-
budget 'B' movie. Baudrillard writes that because, in Foucault, power is an
20 The translation mistakenly reads 'word'. Might it not be the case that Baudrillard's
insistence on the catastrophic potential of reversibility is guided by a certain reading of
science? He argues that our culture gives meaning only to what is irreversible (accumulation,
growth, progress, production, power) and that the slightest dose of reversibility injected into
our economic, political or sexual machinery would suffice for everything to collapse at once.
Thus, power's mise-en-scene (since power itself does not exist) is the sign that 'the substance
of power, after a ceaseless expansion of several centuries, is brutally exploding and that the
sphere of power is in the process of contracting from a star of first magnitude to a red dwarf,
and then to a black hole absorbing all the substance of the real and all the surrounding
energies, now transmuted at once into a single pure sign - the sign of the social whose density
crushes us' (p.5I). But black holes ain't so black. Surrounding energies and all the substance
of the real would therefore never quite be absorbed.
21 He is not alone in failing to distinguish the two. The most bizarre example is Barbara
Riebling, 'Remodeling Truth, Power, and Society: Implications of Chaos Theory,
Nonequilibriurn Dynamics, and Systems Science for the Study of Politics and Literature', in
After Poststructuralism: Imerdiscipltnaruy and Literary Theory, ed. by Nancy Easterlin and
Barbara Riebling (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp.177-20 1 (p.178ft). She
deals precisely with everything she mentions in the title, yet forgets about La Volome. See
also During, pp.130-131; Duccio Trombadori, 'Introduction: Beyond the Revolution', in
Remarks on Marx, p.20; Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodemism: A Marxist Critique
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989; repro 1991), p.83; Marshall Bennan, All That Is Solid Melts
into Air: The Experience of Modernity (London: Verso, 1983), p,34; Dreyfus, 'On the Ordering
of Things', p.82;
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immanent, unlimited field of forces, 'we still do not understand what power
runs into and against what it stumbles since it is expansion, pure
magnetization'. Similar misgivings are voiced by Toril MoL She argues that
the price to be paid for giving in to Foucault's seductive and powerful
discourse is the depoliticization of feminism:
Ifwe capitulate to Foucault's analysis, we will find ourselves caught up in
a sado-masochistic spiral of power and resistance which, circling endlessly
in heterogeneous movement, creates a space in which it will be quite
impossible convincingly to argue that women under patriarchy constitute an
oppressed group, let alone develop a theory of their Iiberation."
Like Baudrillard, Moi insists that the crucial point bears on the question of
'what it is that resists power' (Moi, p.lOO). It cannot be sexuality, she says,
since Foucault claims that power produces sexuality. Nor can it be individuals,
since he reduces the subject to subjection. In fact, Moi reflects, Foucault is
unable to answer: 'His celebratory account of the pleasures of power
degenerates into a kind of pan-powerism where "power" has become a
nebulous, mystical entity beyond the reach of human reason' (Moi, p.l 0 I).
Now, I recognize the difficulty of conjuring up an adequate image of
power, when adequatio is just what is being put into question. But if there is
anything that Foucault's 'power' would not do, it would be to run into
something or stumble against something else. Foucault's 'power' in La
Volonte de savoir is much less substantive (and photogenic), far more abstract
(and destined for box-office failure). It is, as he repeatedly says, relational.
Power would thus not suddenly bump into something which, finally, would
22 'Power, Sex and Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault', Paragraph, 5 (March
1985),95·102 (p.95). With the expression 'sado-masochistic spirals' Moi is perhaps closer to
the mark than she realizes. For Foucault and sado-masochism see James Miller, The Passion
of Michel Foucault (London: HarperCollins, 1993), ch.8.
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resist it, since power is the name Foucault gives to that process of perpetual
collision, fusion, slippage and grating. I have already petitioned for the neutral
term 'force' to describe the powers in play (if I might be permitted the
tautology). As a matter of fact, Moi ends her piece with a quote from Peter
Dews - the author of an influential critique of Foucault's notion of power -
which makes the same point, therein, to my mind, reinforcing rather than
challenging Foucault's position:
'If the concept of power is to have any critical political import, there must
be some principle, force or entity which power 'crushes' or 'subdues', and
whose release from this repression is considered desirable. A purely positive
account of power would no longer be an account of power at all, but simply
of the constitutive operation of social systems.' (Moi, p.l 0 I)
Precisely. As was said earlier, one never escapes, or is released from, forces;
one changes their direction and balance. And this insight, this question of
change and changing, is what enables La Volante, and we with it, to escape
from the theoretical prison of the earlier book.
In addition to the scientific intertext, this insight owes much to a
Deleuzean Nietzsche. A dominating force would not be generically different
from a dominated force; it would be quantitatively greater. And qualitatively
too, since quality is the difference in quantity. Simplifying matters unduly we
might say that in Nietzsche the difference in the quality of forces usually
corresponds to the difference between 'active' and 'reactive' forces, and it
would be the former that in general dominated. However, it is possible to find
a situation in which the reactive forces have the upper hand. In such an event,
and crucially for Nietzsche, the reactive forces would not simply become
active. Nietzsche reserves the right to evaluate the respective forces on criteria
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all his own, which is why he can argue, against Darwin's evolutionism, that
natural selection tends, if anything, to lead to "'the defeat of the stronger, the
more privileged, the fortunate exceptions'" (Deleuze, Nietzsche, p.58). This
is why Deleuze says that the problem of measuring forces 'will be delicate
because it brings the art of qualitative interpretations into play' (p.42).
Foucault's endeavour, by contrast, is to rewrite the formal structure of
Deleuze's Nietzsche in terms of power and resistance: if a resisting force, by
definition an inferior force, became superior in quantitative terms, it would
cease to be resistance and become power. Baudrillard is thus correct in saying
that 'the one-sidedness of a force relation never exists' (p.44); but wrong in
thinking that Foucault believes otherwise. Nominalism is vital here (and that
word 'vital' should be understood in all its senses). As Hawking says: if there
had been more antiquarks than quarks left over from the Big Bang, we would
have called them quarks. The term 'power', as already indicated, would then
be reserved, in a very old-fashioned, nominalistic way, for the designation, the
massively difficult and fraught task of naming the beneficiaries of the
imbalance of forces. Something Foucault never shirks. (By contrast, and in
spite of the image of Nietzsche's thought as thunderously abstract and
mythical, and of Foucault's reputation for thinking through the dirty reality of
social institutions, Foucault is far more reticent about attaching positive values
to specific individuals, groups or social classes.) He never gets so caught up
in sado-masochistic spirals, so hooked on quicksilver micro-power as to deny
that women under patriarchy constitute an oppressed group. However, as in
Nietzsche, a newly powerful force need not necessarily be viewed positively.
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At this juncture, we recall Derrida' s logic regarding Reason in general.
We need go no futher than 'Cogito and the History of Madness'. There
Derrida writes:
The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that
which makes it not just another actual order or structure (a determined
historical structure, one structure among other possible ones), is that one
cannot speak out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only
from within it; and within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to
stratagems and strategies. (p.36)
Further, since the revolution against reason can operate only within reason, 'it
always has the limited scope of what is called, precisely in the language of a
department of internal affairs, a disturbance' (p.36). I disagree with Roy
Boyne's conviction that Foucault's formulation of power in Discipline and
Punish is Derridean." Boyne cites Foucault to the effect that 'there is no
outside', but what Foucault actually says, if I may supply the missing context,
is that 'the carceral network [...] has no outside' (Discipline and Punish,
p.30 1). He thereby restricts the concept of power to a determinate historical
structure (the carceral) and does not, as I argued in Chapter 2, think through
the possibility of resistance, which is to misunderstand Derrida's Reason in
general. It is Reason in general, or Foucault's power in general, that offers no
outside; but it does so only by sacrificing the cohesion of the inside, such that
the inside can always be displaced, disrupted, strategically disturbed. Should
it be said that one is always 'inside' power, Foucault asks. Or that, history
being the ruse of reason, 'power is the ruse of history, always emerging the
winner?' (p.95) No. Because resistances are always within the power
23 Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).
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network." Riviere's story would therefore not remain, as he previously
contended, 'below power' (Moi, p.270). Although in La Volonte Foucault still
refers to power as a specific configuration of our epoch, the propositions that
he advances concerning the nature of modem power take the form of
generalized abstractions about insides and outsides reminiscent of a Derridean
logic. And this is enough to deflect part (though not all) of the criticism
levelled at Foucault by Rainer Rochlitz, according to which a simplification by
Foucault vis-a-vis modem power allows him to stand as an exceptional
individual able to free his mind from this infiltration." Foucault is not outside
power; he has glimpsed the consequences irradiating from the (non-specifiable)
dislocation of power's centre."
A cautionary word, though, about resistance and the law. Towards the
end of La Volonte, Foucault writes of the great struggles which, since the
nineteenth century, have challenged the general system of power. (Note the
scale: like the power it challenges, this resistance is not micro.) He states,
strictly in accordance with his theory, that the forces that resist do so on the
back of the same 'things' which power invests - namely, life and man as a
living being. However, he is struck by the fact that this resistance is
24 See 'Powers and Strategies' (pp.141-142)for a clear restatement of this conviction.
lS 'The Aesthetics of Existence: Post-Conventional Morality and the Theory of Power
in Michel Foucault', in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, pp.248-259 (p.254).
26 There is perhaps no more pressing example of the need to think this 'economy' of
power than that of economics itself. Eduardo Galeano points tellingly, apropos of the birth
of the new Latin American republics at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to the
constitutive market forces of a purportedly 'free' freetrade regime. Open Veins of Latin
America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent, trans. by Cedric Belfrage (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1974), p.198.
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articulated in the language of law, viz. claims to the right to life, to health, to
happiness and, of course, to the body. Foucault mentions this detail as if to
highlight the gap between a modem, quicksilver form of power and its arch-
traditional rationalization. Again, in the 'Preface' to Anti-Oedipus he exhorts
us not to demand of politics that it restore the 'rights' of the individual; rather,
what is needed is 'de-individualization' (p.xiv). But he does not follow
through the possible ramifications of this gap for the critique he builds
concerning the obsolescence of the model of power as law. Rather, he
confuses the forms of force/resistance with the forms in which that force and
its resistance are put into discourse. Thus when he observes that modem
power emerges at the same time as a plethora of Constitutions and Codes
written in the wake of the French Revolution, he adds that this noisy legislative
activity should not fool us, since the forms it takes fail to do justice to the
ungraspable nature of power. But might it not be the case that the fate which
befalls the affirmation of resistance to bio-power of which Foucault speaks -
that is, its fall into an outmoded form of expression which literally (and
therefore dangerously) fails to come to terms with the nature of the beast - is
the fate which befalls every such affirmation?
The famous rallying cry towards the end of the book illustrates this
point well. Foucault postulates that in claiming the right to our sex, in making
sex the truth and index of who we are, in desiring its and our own liberation,
and in believing (for it is a question of belief) that in this process we say no
to power, we are bound just as closely to the apparatus of sexuality which
keeps us in debt to our sex. Therefore:
254
It is the authority of sex that we must break away from, if we aim - through
a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality - to counter the
grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their
multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the
counterattack against the dispositif of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire,
but bodies and pleasures. (p.lS7; trans. mod.)
But the law is never far away. Whoever affirms the need to think beyond sex-
desire, beyond an essence of sex, beyond the thought of the prohibition,
exclusion or repression of sex, and even beyond the law of desire, affirms the
right of affirmation. In other words, the Constitution which underwrites
constitution pejoratively envisaged must also underwrite the revolution. Which
does not suffice to bring sex back within the rule of law. This is the need for
a double strategy that Derrida insists on, the necessity of complementing theory
with a political lobby to alter legislation and rights which may have to preserve
work on metaphysical presuppositions until later,"
A further word about this passage and about the economy of power.
Foucault has been much criticized for this call to bodies and pleasures, to some
simply ingenuous, to others the logical conclusion for a radical libertarian
pessimist. For Baudrillard, Foucault's position, in spite of his refusal to accord
any kind of place in his theory to desire, remains remarkably Deleuzean.
Foucault's 'pleasures' constitute the use value of the body and thus even where
he appears to take his distance from 'sex-desire' he still ends up rediscovering
in bodies an unbound energy which would be opposed to the 'bound energy'
of productive bodies. And for Baudrillard, a capitalist imprint marks the
scenario to which the insistence on production leads: if one cannot control
27 Derrida, 'Choreographies' (Interview with Christie V. McDonald), DiAcritics, 12
(Summer 1982), 66-76.
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one's own means of production, one can at least control the product's
circulation:
sexual jurisdiction is the ideal means, in a fantastic extension of the
jurisdiction governing private property, for assigning to each individual the
management of a certain capital: psychic capital, libidinal capital, sexual
capital, unconscious capital. And each individual will be accountable to
himself for his capital, under the sign of his own liberation. (Baudrillard,
Forget, p.26)
In any event, one can already detect in Foucault's passage the germ of later,
more personal work on the possibility of individual self-control leading to the
creation of a certain radius of freedom around the individual: the work of
individuals as opposed to the work of systems.
And yet it is possible to view La Volonu as the first properly dynamic
response by Foucault to the opposition of system and individual. First, one is
to free oneself, Foucault says, from the authority, the instance of sex - a
specific juridical form of conceptualizing sexuality - not from sex tout court.
Second, the phrase 'if, through a tactical reversal [...J possibility of resistance'
does suggest, problematically, that bodies, pleasures and corpuses of knowledge
stand against power, as though to let one's pelvis girate lasciviously outside
Parliament would suffice, in itself and always, to subvert power. But Foucault
writes of valorizing these things 'in their multiplicity and their possibility of
resistance', and we have already seen that resistance, for him, is not outside
power: it is little power; and that in the same way that these things have
resistance possibilities, they have other, less disruptive ones. It is always
possible that the most brilliant local strategy may be no resistance at all.
Third, this is a 'counter-attack', to valorize and forge a legal space for specific
bodies, pleasures and corpuses of knowledge which fall outside a constraining
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- and often mythical - norm. But it is not the war to end all wars. The
specific, as Foucault realizes, does not allow us to put an end to power; neither
will a particular resistance always and forever, and we with it, be outside
power. There is no 'single locus of Refusal', no 'pure law of the
revolutionary' (pp.95-96); only resistances existing in 'the strategic field of
power relations' (p.96). He will therefore dream in the book's penultimate
paragraph of 'a different economy of bodies and pleasures' (p.l59), not of the
absence of economy. Consequently, thinking the 'moving substrate' would
thus mean thinking the former's complex and labile provisionality with rigour
and anxiety, and with an eye to the similar precariousness of the thought which
thinks. It is therefore difficult to suscribe to the theory of the break between
volumes one and two of the series on sexuality. The first volume clearly
foreshadows the return in the second volume to a markedly old-fashioned, not
to say universal philosophical pronouncement on the importance of the act of
thought:
The 'essay' - which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in
the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic
appropriation of others for the purpose of communication - is the living
substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what
it was in times past, i.e., an 'ascesis,' askisis, an exercise of oneself in the
activity of thought. (The Use of Pleasure, p.9.)
Notwithstanding what we have said about resistance, it remains that the
imagery of webs, subatomic powers, magnetic force fields and power radiating
from all points is undoubtedly not user-friendly, precisely Toril Moi's
objection. She reasons that a political theory such as feminism must
necessarily posit the existence of an agent of an action, even if this is seen to
be no more than an aspect of the decentred human psyche. Now, I am not
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sure that I can redeem or recuperate Foucault for Moi by pointing to a specific
page where Foucault whispers sweet nothings about human agents. The
nearest he gets to this ideal is the statement that 'power relations are both
intentional and nonsubjective' (p.94). But while fully conceding that La
Volante is not agent-friendly, I really do not see that Foucault's thoughts on
power rule out human agency, that people are vaporized into fluxes. Again,
it might be more instructive to conceive of the arrow, which in any situation
where power is at stake might seem to point to an agent, as an arrow-effect,
which is not to volatilize the subject.
Let us take an example. An example of a sexual agent which comes
from Foucault and 'is' 'Foucault'. Completed in draft form in 1958, Folie et
deraison is presented as part of a doctoral thesis in 1961. In chapter 3 of the
book, Foucault touches on Classical age internment, relating how miscellaneous
'experiences' viewed as socially deviant are suddenly lumped together under
the single banner of Unreason. The first instance he cites of a domain affected
by these experiences is sexuality and its relations with the organization of the
bourgeois family (Histoire, p.97). He then expatiates, examining firstly the
handling of those suffering from venereal diseases. Secondly, he turns to
sodomites and homosexuals," Foucault contends that by the end of the first
quarter of the eighteenth century in France a new leniency in the punishment
of sodomites - internment rather than the former punishment, ignis et
incendium - is paralleled by a moral condemnation which begins to punish
2. He will choose sodomy once more in LA Volonte (pp.133-134), this time to show how
discourses condemning it create space for discourses laying claim to it.
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homosexuality. The Renaissance's tolerance of homosexuality is replaced by
a new, moralizing intolerance. Two formerly separate experiences are thus
conflated and homosexuality passes into the realm of prohibition at the same
time as it is classified as an 'unreasonable love'.
Now, without glorifying Foucault's intervention in this academic force
field, we nonetheless witness here Foucault's self-inscription, his highly
personal (and risky) intervention qua human agent in the field of sexuality and
power. In the France of the 1950s this is a bold step. Although
homosexuality was not illegal, a Vichy decree of 6 August 1942 -
subsequently upheld by De Gaulle - had outlawed homosexual acts with an
individual under twenty-one years of age, thereby reversing the trend of
tolerance stretching back to the Constituent Assembly of 1791 which 'for the
first time in modem history contained no penalties for homosexual activity that
did not entail the use of force or the violation of public decency' .29 There is
an important sense, then, in which Foucault's work on sexuality does not wait
until the aftermath of the sexual revolution and certainly cannot be construed
as riding on its coat-tails. It already informs the earlier work on madness and
29 Encyclopedia of Homosexuality, ed. Wayne R. Dynes, 2 vols (Chicago: St. James Press,
1990), I, p.424; see also Antony Copley, Sexual Moralities in France 178()'1980: New Ideas on
the Family, Divorce and Homosexuality (London: Routledge, 1989). There is a poignant
comparison with Britain here, concerning the case of a British mathematician, Alan Turing,
whose pioneering work contributed immensely to the body of knowledge concerning self-
organization in chemistry which I shall touch on at the end of this chapter. Turing killed
himself in the wake of his trial in 1952 on a charge of Gross Indecency after confessing to
his homosexuality. Put on probation, he was sent for medical treatment - 'organo-therapy'
- where hormones were administered to curb his sexual urge {Coveney and Highfield,
p.189}. I cite this instance to support Foucault's case - if support were needed - concerning




And yet it is hardly proper to reduce Histoire de la folie to
autobiography - which is really what James Miller attempts to achieve in his
biography of Foucault, appropriately called The Passion of Michel Foucault,
and what the BBC television programme on Foucault (based largely on
Miller's book) tries somewhat pathetically to beat us with." Nor should one
reduce the gesture of resistance to a single individual. So, calibration of
resistance, and of degrees of power, becomes infinitely difficult. Which is just
what La Volante says, even if it offends our sense of justice and of the power
of human reason.
The Order of Things: histories already plural and successive
It is worth recalling that questions of inorganicism, of dynamism and
even of specificity were already central to The Order of Things, and it is
possible to read the later volume on sexuality as a sort of cranking up to an
advanced degree of the logic of specification and pluralization outlined in the
earlier work. In that early text, Foucault points up what he sees as the
dispersal of History into plural, autonomous temporalities specific to individual
things and beings. This is Foucault's modem episteme and challenge to the
historicist account of the nineteenth century as the century of a single history
30 See Histoire de la folie, p.103.
31 'Michel Foucault: Beyond Good and Evil', programme by Benjamin Woolley
broadcast on The Late Show, BBC, 7 June 1993.
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shared by all.32 Rather than belonging, as in the Classical age, to one great,
essentially visible order of things which could be enumerated and classified,
around the end of the eighteenth century things come to 'acquire' their own
depth, internal structure and temporality, along with their own hidden force.
European culture - and the parallel with Nietzsche is irresistible - turns to
origins, to causality and to history. Since we are concerned with science, let
us take the example of the shift from natural history to biology, from the
project of a general taxinomia to the laying bare of hidden internal functions.
Comparative anatomy is decisive here in opening up the depths to reveal
hitherto invisible resemblances and establish continuities (though also
differences) between species (for example, in the common functions of
breathing, digestion, reproduction, etc.). Rather than the traditional image of
the continuous scale (echelle) which had prevailed in the eighteenth century,
Foucault suggests the image of multiple rays spreading out from an ensemble
of centres. Nineteenth-century nature is thus discontinuous precisely insofar
as it is alive. This is what allows Foucault to say that from Cuvier onwards
'biological being becomes regional and autonomous' .33 It is the rupture of the
Classical space which reveals life's fundamental historicity. Even if Cuvier's
system cannot be described as evolutionism and even if his belief in the fixity
of species appears to represent a refusal of history, his system has already
inscribed time, growth, decay and death in the midst of life. For the Classical
32 On historicism, see Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason pA2; on single
history, pA9.
33 Foucault, The Orderof7bings, p.273. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this
section are to this work.
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age, chronological succession was but a property and manifestation of the order
of beings; from the nineteenth century on, it expresses the profoundly historical
way of being of each and every thing. Life becomes a fundamental force.
Opposed to being as movement is to immobility, time to space, life becomes
the common root of being and non-being.
The important point to bear in mind is that Foucault believes that since
the nineteenth century knowledge has itself become fragmentary and
heterogeneous. One example of this would be the differing conceptualizations
of the same theme of historicity that one finds in biology and economics. The
former holds that individuality is a precarious moment on the path to
annihilation, but that the obstinate recommencements of life in general prevent
us from imposing a limit to its duration. The latter, on the other hand, and by
virtue of a powerful concatenation of events, ushers in thoughts of the ultimate
immobility of History, which, Foucault says, can take two routes." The first
(Ricardo) involves rejoining a stable state which was in any case what history
had always been progressing towards; the second (Marx) means reaching a
point of return where history is stabilized only by suppressing what it had
hitherto been. Whence Foucault's scathing comment on Marxism's fish-in-
water existence in nineteenth-century thought: Marxism shares the dream that
the flux of becoming, with all its iniquities, will be caught up in an
anthropological finitude, and that with the end of time will come the truth of
34 The concatenation runs as follows: land rents rise due to the scarcity of productive
terrain - > entrepreneurs' profits fall- > no new workers taken on - > working population
stagnates - > no demand for new land - > land rents level out - > pressure eases on
industrial revenues which then stabilize.
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man: 'Finitude, with its truth, is given in time; and suddenly time is finite,
finished [fin;]' (p.263).
The final chapters of The Order of Things are a great attempt to surpass
this anthropological thought of finitude. For, like those organs that possess
their own rhythm and structure, man in turn loses his History only to gain
histories:
nature no longer speaks to him of the creation or the end of the world, of his
dependency or his approaching judgement; it no longer speaks of anything
but a natural time; its wealth no longer indicates to him the antiquity or the
imminent return of a Golden Age; it speaks only of conditions of production
being modified in the course of history; language no longer bears the marks
of a time before Babel or of the first cries that rang through the forest; it
carries the weapons of its own affiliation. The human being no longer has
any history: or rather, since he speaks, works, and lives, he finds himself
interwoven in his own being with histories that are neither subordinate to
him nor homogeneous with him. [...] The man who appears at the beginning
of the nineteenth century is 'dehistoricized'. (pp.368-369)
(One must temper Foucault's brilliance here. While it does not remain the
same, talk of creation, of a Golden Age and of Babel does not disappear.) For
Foucault, man's historicity is fundamentally ambiguous. On the one hand,
since he can only be known insofar as he speaks, labours and lives, his history
is an inextricable knot of different temporalities. On the other hand, since it
is man who speaks, labours and lives, it is man's positive historicity that makes
other histories possible.
A similar fate befalls the human sciences. History affords them a
cultural, temporal and geographical domain in which to work; but in so doing
it erects frontiers which limit that knowledge and with it the pretensions to
universality. History is thus engaged in an oscillation between the temporal
.limits which define the singular forms of labour, life and language, and the
historical positivity of the human subject. As a result, subject and object are
263
reciprocally submitted to a kind of erosion. Together, the unconscious and
History would therefore constitute the two faces of man's finitude which has
never finished. Foucault is here touching on the excess of man and of thought
in a manner reminiscent of Derrida's thrust in 'Cogito and the History of
Madness'. In this finitude which has never finished there would always be
something left for it to think in the very instant of thought, always be time left
to think anew what it has thought. Foucault erodes the limits both of
knowledge and of the human subject by pushing at the notion of finitude. This
is why, in the final pages of the book, he turns to psychoanalysis, to ethnology
and to linguistics (though it would be more accurate to say literature) as the
disciplines of modern thought most capable of questioning and contesting the
limits of man. The first two touch on the limits of man's consciousness and
of what in a culture is to be regarded as natural and normal. The third
announces that man is finite/finished, that in language man does not arrive at
his own essence, but at the edge of what limits him. Interestingly, and despite
. an apparently quasi-universal reach, Foucault states that because the first two
disciplines are directed towards what constitutes the external limits of man,
they never get near a general concept of man because the uncertainty of limits
prevents them from determining what is specific to man, what might be
uniformily valid for him.
Close here to a species of deconstruction, Foucault distances himself,
however, from deconstruction by suggesting that one abandon the subject
completely. Such a radical desire to see and imagine beyond the present
begins by first negating the contents and forms of the present, and ends by
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locating the new order in the heterotopia of language. This is an ingenious
way of thinking becoming without thinking the end or goal of that becoming,
without thinking a become, since language would be, or would always be
becoming the non-place. But removing man (as opposed to displacing him),
allocating him no place at all, makes for an end-game of mystical, not to say
apocalyptic, dimensions.
This is the substance of Derrida's essay 'The Ends of Man', the critique
of an antihumanist, antianthropologist vogue of thought in 1960s France which
Derrida believes has insufficiently assimilated the critiques of anthropology and
metaphysics carried out by Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, while believing it
has surpassedthem," For Derrida, in certain respects 'we are still on the same
shore', a revealing choice of metaphor which recalls Foucault's famous image
from the final lines of The Order of Things where he wagers on the effacement
of man, 'like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea' (p.387). Besides, the
essay's third epigraph is taken precisely from The Order of Things: 'As the
archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date.
And one perhaps nearing its end.' For Derrida, it is a question of thinking
with greater rigour what it might mean to think the end, or ends in all its
senses, of man. Hegel's Aufhebung of man, Derrida writes, doubtless marks
the end of man, that is, man past. But by the same token, and reading 'end'
differently, it also marks 'the achievement of man, the appropriation of his
essence'. Derrida continues:
lS In Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982;
repro 1986), pp.l11.136.
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11 is the end of finite man [C'est la fin de l'homme fini]. The end of the
finitude of man, the unity of the tinite and the intinite, the finite as the
surpassing of the self - these essential themes of Hegel's are to be
recognized at the end of the Anthropology when consciousness is tinally
designated as the 'intinite relationship to self.'
For Derrida, Hegel had already put into question any simple understanding of
man's self:
The releve or relevance of man is his telos or eskhaton. The unity of these
two ends of man, the unity of his death, his completion, his accomplishment,
is enveloped in the Greek thinking of telos, in the discourse on telos, which
is also a discourse on eidos, on ousia, and on aletheta. Such a discourse, in
Hegel as in the entirety of metaphysics, indissociably coordinates teleology
with an eschatology, a theology, and an ontology. The thinking of the end
of man, therefore, is always already prescribed in metaphysics, in the
thinking of the truth of man. What is difficult to think today [1968] is an
end of man which would not be organized by a dialectics of truth and
negativity, an end of man which would not be a teleology in the tirst person
plural. (p.121)
I mention Derrida's piece because of a striking achievement and a lingering
difficulty in Foucault's first volume on sexuality. On the one hand, the
Foucault of La Volante is no longer concerned with any simple end of man,
any beyond of man which would entail the removal to another, altogether
different shore. This corresponds to the first strategy of deconstruction, that
is, deconstruction without changing terrain, whereby one uses the concepts of
metaphysics to disturb the edifice of Western thought (which is to be opposed
- though not absolutely - to the second strategy, which entails changing terrain
'by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute break and
difference' [Derrida, 'The Ends', p.135]). On the other hand, despite the
lexicon of plurality, difference, kinesis, instability and strategic reversals,
despite all this effort at thinking the complexity of relationality, the thought of
power has not managed to distance a stubborn teleology and a finitude of more
conventional garb.
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The ends of power and knowledge
What, then, of the ends of power and knowledge? One of the principal
achievements of Foucault's work consists in submitting to scrutiny the
traditional view that knowledge is strictly delimited from power, that
knowledge begins where power ends; and in suggesting, by extension, that the
borders placed around a particular field of knowledge might themselves
constitute highly artificial divisions. These insights already inform Histoire de
la folie, even when the reciprocal nature of power-knowledge is not yet
recognized, even when knowledge is conceived, conspiratorially, as a simple
disguise of power." Similarly, TheArchaeology of Knowledge touches on the
dubious nature of the distinctions traditionally drawn between the major types
of discourse we happily call science, literature, philosophy, etc. Dubious
enough applied to our own world of discourse, but doubly so when applied to
another era: 'After all, "literature" and "politics" are recent categories, which
can be applied to medieval culture, or even classical culture, only by a
retrospective hypothesis' (The Archaeology, p.22). (Or, at least, only with
care: it would be the difficult dream of historicism - which Foucault
occasionally also dreams - to believe it possible to dispense with 'recent
categories") This argument forms the substance of 'What Is an Author?': the
author is a function, a principle of thrift in the economy of meaning, but the
latest in a series of such functions the powers of restriction of which have
served to limit the play of discourse. It also applies to the idea of the book.
36 See Histoire de la folie, p.S2S.
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Here Foucault joins Barthes, Kristeva, Derrida":
The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut [...J it is caught up in a system
of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within
a network.[ ...J The book is not simply the object that one holds in one's
hands; and it cannot remain within the little parallelepiped that contains it:
its unity is variable and relative. As soon as one questions that unity, it loses
its self-evidence; it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a
complex field of discourse. (The Archaeology, p.23)
This persuasive logic of intertextuality is mutually supported by the
notion of the non-extrinsic relations of power and knowledge, that is to say,
by a fundamental mistrust of the doctrine of knowledge for knowledge's sake.
Even literary discourse would not be devoid of power-effects. Literature, the
teaching and theorizing of literature, thus become, have always been - and this
in strict accordance with Foucault's metaphor of war - sites of struggle. It is
then the proper of knowledge to think the ruses of power-knowledge and to
engage in struggle.
Now this logic, which has become a truism of contemporary critical
theory, goes hand in hand with a general, 'post-modernist' trend away from
high theory towards local, less grand theories. However, with the aid of two
brief examples, the first from a conference, the second from a newspaper
article, I should like to question this praise of the particular and its
understanding of the ends of power and knowledge. Before doing so, it is
important to underscore that Foucault does not say, as far as I am aware, that
knowledge is power. Had he done so, he would no longer have anything to
37 One instance. Barthes, 'From Work to Text', in Image Music Text, p.156: 'Just as
Einsteinian science demands that the relativity of the frames of reference be included in the
object studied, so the combined action of Marxism, Freudianism and structuralism demands,
in literature, the relativization of the relations of writer, reader and observer (critic). Over
against the traditional notion of the work, for long - and still - conceived of in a, so to speak,
Newtonian way, there is now the requirement of a new object, obtained by the sliding or
overturning of former categories. That object is the Text.'
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say, 'since in identifying them I would have had no reason to try to show their
different relationships' .38
The first example comes from the 'Inequalityffheory' Conference held
under the aegis of the School of Critical Theory at the University of
Nottingham in July 1992. One of the Conference's main tendencies was its
concern with a sort of interventionist theory which could be brought to bear
on specific social as much as intellectual questions of inequality. However, in
the final Plenary session of the Conference, Geoffrey Bennington gave a paper
which we might characterize, broadly speaking, as an unashamed example of
high theory, and what interests me here is the reaction which it aroused.
Dwelling in an eminently Derridean fashion on the question of' Difference and
Inequality', and striving to engage with the bald terms of the Conference title,
Bennington passed by way of Hegel on the Enlightenment and the terrorism
of knowledge, through Kant, and on to Derrida's notion of differance. His
concluding remarks stressed that differance is precisely the name for the
absolute impossibility of difference, the impossibility of absolute difference,
which would, rather, be a Hegelian return to absolute identity. Thus, those
social groups brandishing 'The right to difference' as a political slogan run an
essentializing risk. Instead, they should be claiming the right to be different
differently. The argument is the classical Derrida-influenced one warning
against the seduction of a narrowly defined identity politics. The identity
fought for and subsequently lauded as proper to the group in question can itself
31 Foucault, 'The Concern for Truth', in Foucault Live, pp.293-308 (p.304) (first publ. in
Le Magazine litteraire (May 1984».
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become, the argument goes, terroristic and intolerant of differences which
threaten to disturb it. One might think here of the vexed question of the search
for identity which polarizes so many debates on Latin America. In some
hands, the question, loosely asked (and Rigoberta Menchu constitutes one
prominent contemporary instance), is about affirming marginalized peoples,
silenced values and lost social relations. In others, narrowly asked, it lends
itself at worst to an aggressive, if untenable, pan-Americanism and at best to
a well-meaning trade in continental-sized stereotypes. Garcia Marquez's
utterances on Latin America merit attention in this latter respect.
Now, Bennington's paper did not reach me without interference. Aside
from the fact that I am no hi-fidelity receiver, I was also distracted throughout
the presentation by noises and violent gestures coming from someone seated
immediately in front. This second form of interference ended during question
time when that person, manifestly upset at not understanding the paper and
saying as much, walked out. There would be little remarkable in this episode
.were it not for the fact that she was not alone in those sentiments. Another
conferencee asked Bennington with pointed irony what he thought about the
propensity of certain theorists to resort to elitist language. The question (the
answer to which I think prompted the walk-out) met with murmurs of
approval. I patently cannot rule out the possibility of subjective distortion, but
the reaction of some of the audience seemed to be that Bennington had dwelt
on inequality too theoretically. That he had been guilty of emphasizing theory
at the expense of inequality, and, indeed, that ultimately his variant of theory
had perpetuated a kind of inequality. His variant of theory. It is not, of
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course, a question of theory versus non-theory.
I mention the Bennington case because it provides one of the clearest
examples, in a sense by default, of a pronounced desire, manifest in many of
the Conference papers, to see theory at work in the service of the fight against
a demonstrable social inequality. To see theory, adopting a social imperative,
instrumentally active in the struggle of a particular social group experiencing
inequality. Not something I would take issue with. That critical theory should
exhibit a social imperative is a view which strikes me as impossible to refute,
and for reasons I have already touched on with Foucault. It is not that such
a view is simply correct; rather, it is not incorrect. After all, we are in the
historical tracks of Terry Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction ('literary
theory [...] is really no more than a branch of social ideologies, utterly without
any unity or identity which would adequately distinguish it from philosophy,
linguistics, psychology, cultural and sociological thought');" and Christopher
Norris's Deconstruction: Theory and Practice ('[The] mystique of origins and
presence can best be challenged by annulling the imaginary boundaries of
discourse, the various territorial imperatives which mark off "literature" from
"criticism", or "philosophy" from everything which stands outside its traditional
domain')." Once the propriety of object or method is sundered, and this
sundering of the proper becomes itself widely taught and learnt (for the
sundering has, theoretically at least, always already been there; what is new is
its institutionalization), the notion of 'correctness' assumes a value anywhere
39 Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p.204.
40 London: Methuen, 1982, p.23.
271
between the quaint and the quartermasterly. It is then always possible to
reproach knowledge for its impurity, its conceptual and discursive
entanglement in systems of values and in the social.
But what to make of a 'Critical Theory' Conference which engages at
every turn with inequalities while shying away from the analysis of the term
inequality and, still more, of the relationship between inequality/theory? It
need not be, and I insist on this, that the Conference was intolerant of
Bennington-type theory - but it was remarkably lacking in it. In any event,
to consider abstract speculation misplaced because it appears indifferent to
tangible inequality, because it fights no obvious cause, seems to me to be
questionably confident, in this post-Saussurean age, about the relationship
between the sign and 'history', between the sign and 'reality'.
In this respect, and I now move away from the Conference to my
journalistic example, it is interesting how the refusal of a certain traditional,
canonical form of critical correctness shades into a more modern form. (In
moving away I doubtless sacrifice a certain consistency here, a certain
specificity, though I do not believe I have moved altogether outside the text of
the Conference.) In an article published in The Guardian, Lisa Jardine,
Professor of English at QueenMary and Westfield College, argues, in the wake
of the appearance of The Selected Letters of Philip Larkin 1940-1985, that the
racism, misogynism and parochialism of the new documents confirm her
department's decision to displace Larkin to the margins of their course." One
of the beliefs that informs this view is that Literature, pace Eagleton (whom
41 'Saxon Violence', The Guardian, 8 December 1992, Arts 4.
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she quotes later in the piece), can no longer be considered a comfortably
delimited realm and therefore rather than treat it as such we should study the
'cultural frame'. After all, 'the work is the product of its times; its author's
preoccupations are those of a generation, a class and a nation'. This is
literature as improper object and Larkin's poetry as improperly representative
of those times.
Yet, on the other hand, Larkin is not representative: 'Actually, we don't
tend to teach Larkin much now in my Department of English. The Little
Englandism he celebrates sits uneasily within our revised curriculum, which
seeks to give all of our students, regardless of background, race or creed, a
voice within British culture.' Laudable but confused. A confusion crystallized
by Jardine later in the same piece with the help of another commentator:
The furore over Larkin (censored or uncensored) is a row about cherished
values. Tom Paulin thinks we are no longer allowed [Police Warning: A.S.]
Larkin (or Virginia Woolt), because their writings are structured by key
beliefs to which we can no longer subscribe. To acknowledge their beliefs
and still to promote the cultural centrality of their works is, in his view, at
best dishonest, at worst viciously corrupting.
The syllogism: Larkin belongs to another age, our age does not share those
beliefs, therefore Larkin is not important, is the stuff of Nineteen Eighty-Four
(' Ingsoc. The sacred principles of Ingsoc. Newspeak, doublethink, the
mutability of the past')." Whatever became of those Saussurean insights?
Sent packing on the 8.45 London-Paris boat train? Annulling the imaginary
boundaries between verse and beliefs, abolishing their absolute difference
becomes instead a collapse into an undifferentiated sameness. 'Above all,'
Jardine writes, 'we teach our students to read with care, and to take account
42 George Orwell, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, repro 1983), p.27.
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of the nuanced opinions that careful reading reveals. In 1992 that means
teaching our students to see through the even texture of Larkin's verse, to the
parochial beliefs which lie behind them.' Oh Philip, how could you?.. From
text back to work.
There are a number of questions which go unexplored by Jardine,
questions regarding the power-effects of a literary artifact and the capacity of
theory to determine them: (a) If one destroys - as opposed to deconstructs -
the propriety of literature, if Larkin's work is said to have multiple effects
beyond the literary (since the literary is itself always marked by the social),
what are these effects and where do they take place? (b) Derrida reminds us:
'That a declaration of opposition to some official policy is authorized, and
authorized by the authorities, also means, precisely to that extent, that the
declaration does not upset the given order, is not bothersome' (,The Ends',
p.1l4). (c) If power is to be thought plurally, as powers, is it the case that
Larkin's poetry exercises purely dastardly powers? Does it, in this weighing
up of its effects, resist nothing? Does it produce no other effects? Do we
know, and can we calibrate, the ways in which poetry affects? (d) What is the
speaker's benefit in power-accountancy? This essentially Foucaultian question
touches on the self-interest involved in telling the truth about power. Here
Foucault muses on the business of speaking about sex in terms of repression:
'As if the urge to talk about it, and the interest one expects from doing so, had
far exceeded the opportunities for being heard (possibilttes de l'ecoute), some
people have even rented out their ears (mis leurs oreilles en location)' (p.7).
I wonder if what one sees at work in the Conference and in Jardine is
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not something like a reinstated fmalism, wherein the production, functioning
and power-effects of signs would become specific and specifiable; and the
academic reassume the function of chartered accountant, power-broker, estate
agent. Despite protestations of difference, plurality and openness, the thought
of power always threatens to close in on its subject, to denounce it by means
of a knowledge knowing the ends of power, knowing how to calibrate power's
effects, knowing that it can resist the forces of power. Such is my objection
to Jardine: the hasty gathering up of the multiple strands of Larkin's work into
a single, and terribly impoverished, principle of ideological unacceptability.
Here nothing in Larkin would exceed the ear of power, least of all anything
specifically poetic, anything powerful in specifically poetic ways.
But in this question of representation, would it not be necessary to
dwell a little longer - to theorize - on the nature of the relationship between
power and signs? The linguistic and political dimensions of representation are
inseparable if we aspire, from our specific situation in the academy, to the
latter via the former. Besides, in Foucault's terms, there can be no 'pure law
of the revolutionary' (p.96), even where, perhaps especially where, one thinks
to have sundered both object and method. From which it follows that
theoretical discourse, after Foucault's fourth rule ('Rule of the tactical
polyvalence of discourses'), in which he enjoins us to 'conceive discourse as
a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform




Let us return to La Volante de savoir, where history has the form of
relations of power and where Foucault has redoubled his efforts to think the
plural, the unstable and the miniature. I attach particular importance to
Foucault's leaning on the expression force relations, for the latter, with its
connotations of an infinitely mobile network, with its gesture to relativism and
to a positionality without positive term(ination)s, condenses a contradiction
which goes to the core of Foucault's methodological vision." This may be
schematized by positing a certain relation between two terms:
InequalitylTheory. On the one hand, then, we have the sense in Foucault of
a fundamentally inorganic, dynamic world predicated on inequality, where the
latter is the name given to the structural imbalance of forces without which
there would be no power ('the moving substrate of force relations which, by
virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are
always local and unstable'). And on the other, the powerful desire nonetheless
.to construct a theory which would allow Foucault to trace and finally 'see' (we
are reminded of the etymological link between theory and seeing) that 'moving
substrate' .
This raises a crucial question, which should certainly be put to Jardine,
and which we might formulate thus: Once one accepts a decentred model of
power and accepts that power is relational and is 'exercised from innumerable
points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations' (p.94); accepts
43 We recall Saussure's 'in language there are only differences, without positive terms'.
There is an argument for seeing Foucault's use of the word inequality as a synonym of
differance.
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that relations of power are immanent in economic processes, knowledge
relationships, sexual relations and are 'the immediate effects of the divisions,
inequalities and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely [...]
the internal conditions of these differentiations' (p.94); accepts that power cuts
into and disciplines bodies, and that resistance to power produces 'cleavages
in a society that shift about [...] furrowing across individuals themselves,
cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them,
in their bodies and minds' (p.96); once one accepts this and accepts with it the
impossibility of knowing, seeing and revealing where inequality begins and
ends, how does one begin to measure and consider, in a non-Cartesian but not
altogether unclear, indistinct, anti-Cartesian way, the weight of inequality?"
How to see and then take into account, account for, all those forces, relations
of power, excesses and play (what Foucault calls 'de la' plebe)'ts And further,
how to do all this when it is texts not bodies that one is considering?
Foucault himself provides a dizzying example - and unlike Megill on
The Archaeology I see no sign of parody - of the lengths (breadths and depths)
one is forced to go to as a consequence of the micro-physical logic. The idea
of 'eventalization', Foucault says, is to construct around a singular event
44 It is interesting how the terms Foucault uses to describe the task of power in its control
over life echo what we surmise to be the goal of the analysis of power's effects: 'Such a power
has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize' (p.l44).
45 'The plebs is no doubt not a real sociological entity. But there is indeed always
something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some
sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more or less docile or
reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge.
There is certainly no such thing as ''the" plebs; rather there is, as it were, a certain plebeian
quality or aspect ("de la" plebe). There is plebs in bodies, in individuals, in the proletariat,
in the bourgeoisie, but everywhere in a diversity of forms and extensions, of energies and
irreducibilities' (,Powers and Strategies', pp.137-138).
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(which is constituted precisely by multiple processes) a "'polyhedron" of
intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not given in advance and can never
properly be taken as finite':
the further one decomposes the process under analysis, the more one is
enabled and indeed obliged to construct their external relations of
intelligibility. (In concrete terms: the more one analyses the process of
'carceralisation' of penal practice down to its smallest details, the more one
is led to relate them to such practices as schooling, military discipline, etc.).
[ ... J This operation thus leads to an increasing polymorphism as the analysis
progresses. ('Questions of Method', pp.6-7)
There then follows a great list of elements, relations and domains to be
described: from British empirical philosophy and techniques of firearms to the
growth of banditry and the 'attempted emplacement in a capitalist economy of
new techniques of power'. Let it not be said that Foucault had no interest in
truth as correspondence. In La Volonte, precisely when he is anxious to deny
the place of theory, he asserts that his heuristic model of power merely follows
from how things are in the world." (This was our argument in Chapter one:
he is not simply saving the phenomena.) Clearly, he remarks in 'Questions of
Method', from the standpoint of those forms of history which prefer to gather
everything under the rubric of a plainly intelligible structure, what he is
proposing entails too many relations, too little necessary unity. But for him
this is precisely what is at stake in historical analysis and political critique.
'We aren't, nor do we have to put ourselves under the sign of a unitary
necessity' (p.7). A powerful indictment this of traditional history - and a
programme to send every genealogist the way of Nietzsche in the dying days
<46 'The strategical model, rather than the model based on law. And this, not out of a
speculative choice or theoretical preference, but because in fact it is one of the essential traits
of Western societies that the force relations which for a long time had found expression in war,




Where on earth, then, does this explosive dissemination leave the
analysis and weighing of power? I shall argue later that Foucault supplements
this 'infra-rationality' with a rationality of much more familiarly conventional
dimensions. For now, it is difficult not to be sceptical of that call to arms in
which history is laid bare by an Apollonian intellect:
The history which bears and detennines us has the form of a war rather than
that ofa language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has
no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On
the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to
the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of
struggles, of strategies and tactics. ('Truth and Power'. p.1l4)
One wonders in what sense this claim for intelligibility and 'analysis down to
the smallest detail' differs in spirit from an older 'in the last instance' claim.
In fact, Foucault's preference for power over meaning, maintaining the
possibility of intelligibility down to the smallest detail, retains a certain
principle of visibility, in accordance with the etymological roots of 'theory'.
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (p.112) Foucault had already stressed the
principle of visibility and the transparency which theory permits, and despite
the critique of theory's pretensions to universality which informs the later work
on sexuality, visibility, even when taken negatively as a support of power, still
retains an important role. What is more, Foucault had shown in The Birth of
the Clinic how the principle of the visual - in this case the gaze - is closely
allied to the spatial. And it is with the insistence in Discipline and Punish on
the manipulation of space and visibility for the purposes of achieving a grip
on the body that the nexus of visibility-space-power, already latent in the
earlier text, becomes manifest. (It should be noted - and I shall return to this
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point - that the notion of space does not always and everywhere in Foucault
have a negative value.) In an interview from 1977 Foucault affirms that the
neglect of space as an issue worthy of study is due in part to philosophy:
At the moment when a considered politics of spaces was starting to develop,
at the end of the eighteenth century, the new achievements in theoretical and
experimental physics dislodged philosophy from its ancient right to speak of
the world, the cosmos, finite or infinite space. This double investment of
space by political technology and scientific practice reduced philosophy to
the field of a problematic of time. Since Kant, what is to be thought by the
philosopher is time. Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger, Along with this goes a
correlative devaluation of space, which stands on the side of the
understanding, the analytical, the conceptual, the dead, the fixed, the inert."
It should be borne in mind that this revaluation of space was published as a
preface to the French translation of Bentham's Panopticon. Speaker's benefit
apart, it is appropriate to dwell briefly on the 'negative' nexus of space-
visibility-power and the extent to which those force relations and their
correlative inequality are revealed to us, in the last and smallest instance, by
theory.
This question of space and the primacy of the visual is germane to
Baudrillard's critique of Foucault's 'power'. For Baudrillard, Foucault never
ceases to posit a certain givenness, a thereness of power. The concept of
'production' - which one might suppose to offset the idea of thereness -
Baudrillard views as part of the problem. The original understanding of
'production' was not bound up with notions of material fabrication, but with
making visible, causing to appear: pro-ducere:
let everything be produced, be read, become real, visible, and marked with
the sign of effectiveness; let everything be transcribed into force relations,
into conceptual systems or into calculable energy; let everything be said,
gathered, indexed and registered [...]. Ours is a culture of 'monstration' and
demonstration, of 'productive' monstruosity (the 'confession' so well
47 'The Eye of Power', in Power/Knowledge. pp.149-150.
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analyzed by Foucault is one of its forms). We never find any seduction
there - nor in pornography with its immediate production of sexual acts in
a frenzied activation of pleasure; we find no seduction in those bodies
penetrated by a gaze literally absorbed by the suction of the transparent void.
Not a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production,
ruled by the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of
visible and calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross
national product. (8audrillard, Forget, pp.22_23)48
Baudrillard reproaches Foucault his acceptance that power functions
according to a teleonomical order." 'Teleonomy is the end of all final
determination and of all dialectic: it is the kind of generative inscription of the
code that one expects - an immanent, ineluctable, and always positive
inscription that yields only to infinitesimal mutations' (p.34). Baudrillard is
suspicious, though, of the felicitous collusion of Foucault and Deleuze in their
appropriation of and 'wallowing' in recent scientific work on the molecular.
'It is a spiral of power, of desire, and of the molecule which is now bringing
us openly toward the final peripeteia of absolute control. Beware of the
molecular!' (pp.35-36)
Foucault's writing and theory, which see and expose the microscopic
ruses of power, the infinitesimal tremblings of inequality, which shine light
into the most obscure substrata, do not, pace Baudrillard, mirror a relentless
colonization by power of everything and of every space between everything;
but in order to measure and weigh power, they always threaten to hypostatize
force. As Baudrillard says above (pp.22-23), everything is transcribed into
48The dramatic weakness of a text like Federico Garcia Lorca's La casa de Bernardo Alba
lies precisely in its making everything visible and explicit, even though repression is supposed
to prevail.
49 The OED defines teleonomy thus: 'Biol. The property of living systems of being
organized towards the attainment of ends without true purposiveness.' I shall say more about
this property in the final sections of the chapter.
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'calculable energy'. The question remains, though, as to whether it is possible
to think force without hypostatizing it.
We are close here to Derrida's critique of structuralism's incapacity to
think force. From one perspective, Foucault's thinking in La Volonte de savoir
responds in large measure to Derrida's challenge to interrogate the notion of
structure, to turn away from the fascination with the geometrical figures of
space to a consideration of the play within those figures. so It is this effort of
thought that differentiates the 1976 text from the one of the previous year, a
distinction - and an intellectual labour - often uncredited. However, from
another angle - and perhaps unsurprisingly given a certain commitment to
specificity and to struggle - vestiges of the previous taste for spatial dispositio
still remain. Brandishing the historian's power to specify and delimit a
historical ruse in time and space, Foucault writes of a general dispositif of
sexuality being 'put in place' (p.IS9). If it becomes a question of reproaching
others their historical inaccuracies (his argument is that this disposuif predates
Freud), this questioning nonetheless falls short of interrogating the self-identity
of history and the spatio-temporal presence of a structural-looking dispositif.
From this other angle, then, we might say of La Volonte what Derrida says of
Jean Rousset' s Forme et Signification; namely, that time itself is often reduced
to a dimension. Time is but the element in which a form or a curve can be
displayed and measured. Let us say that for the Foucault of La Volonte the
effort to be microscopic does not mark the end of spatial, structural thought;
space merely contracts and thinking force adequately therefore entails thinking
soDerrida, 'Force and Signification', in Writing and Difference, p.l6.
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more profoundly what it is still possible to see and therefore gauge and
measure. Hence Derrida's remarks on structuralism still hold true even for this
the apparently most unstructuralist text of Foucault's. To think force at the
molecular level, to believe it intelligible 'down to the smallest detail', would
be an example of that which, according to Derrida, metaphysically menaces
every structuralism, namely, 'the possibility of concealing meaning through the
very act of uncovering it':
To comprehend the structure of a becoming, the form of a force, is to lose
meaning by finding it. The meaning of becoming and of force, by virtue of
their pure, intrinsic characteristics, is the repose of the beginning and the
end, the peacefulness of a spectacle, horizon or face. Within this peace and
repose the character of becoming and of force is disturbed by meaning itself.
The meaning of meaning is Apollonian by virtue of everything within it that
can be seen. ('Force', p.26)
It remains a moot point, then, as to whether Foucault succeeds in avoiding, at
one level of his discourse, the repetition of the ancient complicity between
light and power, between theoretical objectivity and techno-political possession
which Derrida writes of in 'Violence and Metaphysics' and which Foucault
exposes so vividly - ultimately overexposes - in Discipline and Punish.
Yet how would one ever escape light? And in what language would
this escape be articulated? It is difficult, as Derrida observes, to maintain a
philosophical discourse against light. For Derrida, it is a matter of choosing
the best light, in an economy of 'violence against violence, light against light'
('Violence and Metaphysics', p.117). Moreover, the dialectic of force and
weakness can only be articulated in the language of form, through images of
shadow and light. Force is not simply darkness opposed to the lightness of
form, 'nor can it be conceived, from within phenomenology, as the fact
opposed to meaning' (,Force', p.28). Derrida asserts that it is not a question
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of abandoning this language, but of resisting it, of criticism exceeding itself 'to
the point of embracing both force and the movement which displaces lines'.
Finally, the difference between Dionysus and Apollo, between ardour and
structure, is not to be found in history, for it is the opening of history,
historicity itself. This is why Derrida can write:
If we must say, along with Schelling, that 'all is but Dionysus,' we must
know - and this is to write - that, like pure force, Dionysus is worked by
difference. He sees and lets himself be seen. And tears out (his) eyes. For
all eternity, he has had a relationship to his exterior, to visible form, to
structure, as he does to his death. This is how he appears (to himselt).
('Force', pp.28-29)
And this is perhaps the difficulty common to force and meaning which is not
overcome by Foucault's opposing the one to the other, as if everything in force
had a more immediate, evident, real and tangible value. Force, like meaning
- and as I think Foucault realized only too well in La Volonte - is worked by
difJerance.
I mentioned earlier that space does not always and everywhere in
Foucault bear a negative value. In 'The Thought From Outside' Foucault
assimilates the positive (because disruptive) power of the language of fiction
to space. He writes:
The fictitious is never in things or in people, but in the impossible
verisimilitude of what lies between them: encounters, the proximity of what
is most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very midst. Therefore,
fiction consists not in showing the invisible, but in showing the extent to
which the invisibility of the invisible is invisible' (,The Thought', pp.23-24).
It is hard to shrug off the visual, as the semantic battle in this last sentence
testifies: fiction in no sense reveals the invisible; but it nonetheless 'shows' the
degree to which this property of invisibility cannot be seen. There is an entire
Saussurean problematic here. Saussure spoke of the temptation to assimilate
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linguistic signs to visual ones - as though they existed neatly in space; and of
how the very word form confirms us in this error. Of course, Saussure is
concerned with spoken language, but the push-pull of the following definition
of language - now you see it, now you don't - still suggests the need to think
play before the spatial opposition of presence and absence:
language has the character of a system based entirely on the contrasts
between its concrete units. One cannot dispense with identifying them, nor
move a step without having recourse to them. And yet delimiting them is
such a tricky problem that one is led to ask whether they are really there.
(Saussure, p.105)
But to return to the question of fiction and space, allow me to continue
Foucault's quote:
Thus, [fiction] bears a profound relation to space; understood in this way,
space is to fiction what the negative is to reflection (whereas dialectical
negation is tied to the fable of time). No doubt this is the role that houses,
hallways, doors, and rooms play in almost all of Blanchot's narratives:
placeless places, beckoning thresholds, closed, forbidden spaces that are
nevertheless exposed to the winds. ('The Thought', p.24)
One is struck by the intractability of the visual. Foucault posits fiction as the
great transgression of place and of the commonplace, of the thereness of the
visual; but the evocation of placeless places would be meaningless if it did not
first pass by way of 'houses, hallways, doors, and rooms', if it did not in some
provisional sense think these places."
One is put in mind of Borges. In the preface to The Order of Things,
Foucault, famously, repeats from Borges' piece 'The Analytical Language of
John Wilkins' the enumeration of creatures found in a certain Chinese
51 To judge by Blanchot's comments on Mallarme's Un coup de des jamais n 'abolira le
hasard, at issue was the spatialization of space rather than its destruction. See Malcolm
Bowie, MaJ/arme and the Art of Being Difficult (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), p.144. What was perhaps Foucault's misprision ofMallarme lay in his conviction that
the defiance of ordinary logic was somehow inherent in the transitive language used by
Mallarme, rather than a function of a certain practice of writing which called forth a new and
demanding practice of reading.
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dictionary. 52 For Foucault, this menstruous, yet startlingly matter-of-fact
classification precisely ruins the site of thought. Such a classification could
exist only in the non-place of language, but this language only ever opens up
an 'unthinkable space'. In fact, Borges goes further: 'We may go further; we
may suspect that there is no universe in the organic, unifying sense of that
ambitious word' (p.112). But Foucault's preface, a great hymn to the (dis-)
order of space, to its displacement, overlooks the importance in Borges of time
as the other great force which prises open the order of presence. Where
labyrinths are concerned, for instance, the idea of openness and of non-place
is intimately bound to time. (Though time in Borges does not always have the
same function or value: there is a sense in which Borges uses the past to
disrupt the arrogance and fallacious originality of the present, but in so doing
bestows upon time great powers of continuity. Despite the movement of
difference in Borges - of which 'Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote', where
it is thematized, is perhaps the finest example - one is struck by the presence
of heredity and inheritance - nature and culture - as leaden forces of repetition
of the same.) However, the mythical, metaphysical dimension of the labyrinth,
and of the creatures that inhabit it, does not remove us to a simple non-place.
Derrida has expressed convincingly this difficulty of escaping the thought and
language of space.53 In Borges, labyrinths take the shape of houses and houses
S2 From Jorge Luis Borges, Prosa completa, vol. 3 (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1985).
53 E.g. 'Violence and Metaphysics', p.112: 'that it is necessary to think true exteriority as
non-exteriority, that is, still by means of the Inside-Outside structure and by spatial metaphor;
and that it is necessary still to inhabit the metaphor in ruins, to dress oneself in tradition's
shreds and the devil's patches - all this means, perhaps, that there is no philosophical logos
which must not first let itselfbe expatriated into the structure Inside-Outside. This deportation
from its own site toward the Site, toward spatial locality is the metaphor congenital to the
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acquire the form oflabyrinths ('Death and the Compass'): one does not simply
pass from the domestic to the metaphysical or vice versa. This is not an idle
point. One of the effects produced by 'The House of Asteri6n' is a disquieting
pathos. 54 The Minotaur, in his own first-person (7) narration, speaks of his
solitude and his 'house'. The absence of furnishings lends the labyrinth a
timeless quality and makes the story the very opposite of a period piece,
preventing an easy reality-effect (no little door here). And yet, that the
Minotaur itself should comment on the absence of furniture is enough to inject
an unexpected domesticity. (In Cortazar, by contrast, the movement would
tend to introduce unexpected metaphysical dimensions into a domestic locus.)
In the assignation of speech and human emotions, one catches the pathos of the
creature's condition, a pathos one can see in Watt's painting, which Borges
says inspired the story. In that canvas, the Minotaur gazes out across what
looks to be a rampart, holding his body in a posture suggestive of an
anticipated long and perhaps fruitless wait. This is art from art, but it is not
therein to be opposed to the real world with its visual dimension. What is
scandalous in Borges is not the fact that he writes simply about Minotaurs as
a figure of man (or as a metaphor of Hitler, as Donald Shaw suggests)", but
that he also attributes rationality and emotions to Minotaurs: a (very old)
transgression, rather than abolition, of the proper.
philosophicallogos.[ ...] Space being the wound and finitude of birth (of the birth) without
which one could not even open language, one would not even have a true or false exteriority
to speak of.'
S4 Prosa comp/eta, vol. 2.
ssBorges' Narrative Strategy, Liverpool Monographs in Hispanic Studies, no. 11 (Leeds:
Francis Cairns, 1992), p.S.
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Macro and micro: the rule of double conditioning
There is a sense in which Foucault anticipates the criticism levelled at
the primacy he accords the visual and at the unacknowledged functioning in
his work of a traditional notion of aletheia revealing the smallest of powers.
Although its expression assumes a defensive posture, the idea of seeing power
and inequality is matched by scattered references to his texts as 'fictions'. The
use of that word, particularly from within a conventional perspective which
would oppose it categorically to truth, may seem to indicate a capitulation on
Foucault's part, as though he had abandoned the hope and possibility of truth.
However, he insists on the possibility that exists 'for a fictional discourse to
induce effects of truth'." A nominalistic blurring (but not obliteration) of
boundaries, I read that recourse to the word 'fictions' as Foucault's
acknowledging the extent to which his work involves the hazardous
reconstruction in narrative form of the most recondite power effects he can
only imagine to have taken place.
Such remarks on fictions may also be turned back on the empiricism
of Discipline and Punish, on the anchoring which takes place there in the
notion of the body. In fact, for all the corporeal semantics one does not really
sense in his histories the effects of power on a particular body; he is a historian
of techniques not of bodies. By the same token, and as important as it is, the
lexeme 'micro-' should not beguile us. Indeed, it has been objected that
Foucault's schema of obstreperous molecules is so reductionist that it plain
56 'The History of Sexuality', in Power/Knowledge, pp.183-193 (p.193) (first publ. as 'Les
Rapports de pouvoir passent Al'Interieur des corps'. Quinzaine lttteraire, 247, 1-15 January
1977).
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misses the true level at which power works, that is, the level of human beings
and social structures. By contrast, Richard Dawkins writes in another context
that he is happy to be labelled a 'hierarchical reductionist':
'reductionism' is one of those things, like sin, that is only mentioned by
people who are against it. To call oneself a reductionist will sound, in some
circles, a bit like admitting to eating babies. But, just as nobody actually
eats babies, so nobody is really a reductionist in any sense worth being
against. The nonexistent reductionist [...] tries to explain complicated things
directly in terms of the smallest parts, even, in some extreme versions of the
myth, as the sum of the parts! The hierarchical reductionist, on the other
hand, explains a complex entity at any particular level in the hierarchy of
organization, in terms of entities only one level down the hierarchy; entities
which, themselves, are likely to be complex enough to need further reducing
to their own component parts; and so on. It goes without saying - though
the mythical, baby-eating reductionist is reputed to deny this - that the kinds
of explanations which are suitable at high levels in the hierarchy are quite
different from the kinds of explanations which are suitable at lower levels.
This was the point of explaining cars in tenns of carburettors rather than
quarks. But the hierarchical reductionist believes that carburettors are
explained in terms of smaller units..., which are explained in terms of
smaller units..., which are ultimately explained in terms of the smallest of
fundamental particles. Reductionism, in this sense, is just another name for
an honest desire to understand how things work. (The Blind Watchmaker,
p.13)
There is a compelling case for hierarchical reductionism in Dawkin's field of
biology, which takes in the general functioning of the eye from the lens to the
retina, and down to the 125 million rods or photocells found in each retina.
However, I would suggest that the term 'hierarchical reductionism' is also
apposite for Foucault's approach, if we are to do justice to his attempt to think
the complexity of power. At the same time - and I now return to a point
made in passing some while back - the term is also suggestive of Foucault's
interest, perhaps more than in the micro, in the systemic. While Foucaultian
semantics may suggest the micro, the scope of his analyses suggests an
overviewer is also at work. A micro-physics which one might expect to have
more than a little in common with textual psychoanalysis in fact becomes a
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genealogy dedicated to macro-scale reconstruction. S7 Which is why Eagleton
is both correct and wide of the mark when he writes thus in connection with
Foucault's micro-analytics:
It is always possible [...] to stumble across a more fervent nominalist than
oneself. For all those who feel that the human body is no more than a
disarticulated ensemble of this or that organ, there is always someone else
who feels just the same way about the concept of organ. It is as though
almost any thought can be made to appear an illicit homogenization from the
standpoint of some other, and so on in a potentially infinite regress. 58
As Eagleton is well aware, to go micro to the nthdegree would mean foregoing
any such homogenizations as 'the prison'. But Eagleton would be incorrect in
thinking that Foucault had not realized the need for a complementary large-
scale analysis. Hasty, too, in labelling that tendency, which in Foucault
supplements the micro-level, a 'totalizing impulse'. The opposition need not
be micro- versus totalizing thought.
Borges expresses this problematic elegantly in 'Funes the Memorious' ,
where Funes is left, in the wake of a fall from a horse, with infallible
perception and memory, with a startling grasp of the specific in its smallest
57 In a discussion of Foucault's work on the history of sexuality, Jacques-Alain Miller, no
stranger to psychoanalysis, is less polite: 'Don't you ever have the feeling that you're putting
together an argument, which - amusing as it is - is destined to let slip the essentials? That
your net is so coarse-meshed that it will let all the fish through? Why, instead of using your
microscope, are you now taking a telescope, and looking through the wrong end at that?' ('The
Confession of the Flesh', p.2IS). The whole interview (which dates from 1977) is important
reading for those interested in Foucault's first volume on sexuality, since he is under
considerable pressure to maintain many of the points advanced there. However, unaware of
the macroscopic dimension of the book he is not. He puts to himself in that text the concerns
of a feigned objector: in your thoughts on sexuality don't you try to 'reveal what might be
called the organization of "erotic zones" in the social body; it may well be the case that you
have done nothing more than transpose to the level of diffuse processes mechanisms which
psychoanalysis has identified with precision at the level of the individual' (p.15 I). His retort
bears on the question of sex versus sexuality; but he never denies the question of scale, nor the
preference for 'social body' over 'individual'.




He knew by heart the forms of the dawn southern clouds of 30 April 1882,
and could compare them in his memory with the mottled streaks on a book
in Spanish binding he had only seen once and with the lines of foam raised
by an oar in the Rio Negro on the eve the Quebracho uprising. These
memories were not simple; each visual image was linked to muscular
sensations, thermal sensations, etc.59
Where the emperor of Lilliput, according to Swift, discerned the movement of
the minute hand,
Funes would discern the tranquil course of corruption, of decay, of fatigue.
He would note the progress of death and dampness. He was the solitary and
lucid spectator of a multiform, instantaneous and almost unbearably precise
world. (p.94; trans. mod.)
But the unceasing welter of detail which besieges Funes' mind and which he
registers precisely, in Nietzschean terms, without forgetting, nevertheless does
not prevent the narrator from suspecting that, when all is said and done, Funes
was not very capable of thinking: 'To think is to forget differences, to
generalize, to abstract. In the plethoric world of Funes, there were only
details, almost immediate details' (p.94; trans. mod.).
For his part, Foucault consciously reflects on the general and the
systemic, and despite the stress placed on specificity it could be no other way.
Derrida maintains that no discourse could be meaningful if it did not draw
upon a layer of general concepts which guided thought in some provisional
way. By virtue of this possibility of intelligibility, however, Derrida can say
that 'all thought and all language are tied to theoretism, de facto and de jure';
that the meaning of the non-theoretical can be known only with a theoretical
knowledge (in general) ('Violence', p.122). This Derridean understanding of
59 Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths, ed. by Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970; repro 1985), p.92 (trans. mod.).
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the necessity of theorizing in order for thought to happen at all is supplemented
in Foucault by a strategic generality. In the chapter on method from La
Volante, Foucault speaks of overall strategies and does not discount, contrary
to what Eagleton states, expressions like 'ruling order'. In his 'Rule of Double
Conditioning' the local and the general presuppose each other, though they are
not simply the other in miniature or en gros. It is also not without significance
that one of the concerns of La Volante - and an aspect of the book which
Foucault says has received scant attention - should be eminently general,
namely, population. Which brings us to the second of the two sciences
mentioned some time ago: biology. Or, more accurately, to evolutionary
theory as the theoretical history of bios.
Evolutionary theory and genealogy
Foucault's work has always been marked by biology (or previous
incarnations of biology such as Natural History). But it would appear that
around the time of La Volante contemporary biological sciences held a
particular interest for him. In the same issue of Le Monde Foucault published
reviews of Jean Bernard's Les Paliers de l'evolution and Jacques Ruffle's De
la biologie a la culture.60 On the surface of things evolutionary theory, the
theory of the development of life in all its forms over time, could not be
further from Foucault's genealogy. Where the former dwells on continuity and
gradual development, the latter seeks out rupture and discontinuity. However,
60 'Les Palters de l'evoluuon by Jean Bernard', Le Monde, 17·18 October 1976, pp.l, S;
'Bio-histoire et bio-politique', Le Monde, 17·18 October 1976, p.S.
292
I want to suggest that a certain double schema in Foucault - in which sex lies
at the heart both of individual bodies and of the species - has instructive
affinities with evolutionary theory. I will also suggest that the idea of
nonrandom cumulative selection, a commonplace of evolutionary theory, offers
a cogent corrective to Foucault's vaunting of the positive, because contingent,
force of chance; and that the same idea takes us close to an understanding of
why it is that the notion of construction or constitution cannot be thought to
describe a process and a product which would both be without necessity, would
be the mere outcome of random accident.
The image of evolutionary theory as the great search for continuity is,
as Gillian Beer argues, a popular misconception. Evolutionary theory does not
in fact privilege the present, but sees it instead as 'a moving instant in an
endless process of change'." In point of fact, there are features of
evolutionary theory which are common to Foucault's genealogy. In the first
instance, evolutionary theory, though to all intents and purposes a science, is
in one sense a form of imaginative history, one which 'cannot be
experimentally demonstrated sufficiently in any present moment' (Beer, p.8).
Secondly, Darwin's theory is suspicious of language. Although borrowing
from Lyell the metaphor of etymology as a representation of descent and
change, Darwin shied away from language because of its anthropocentric
tendency to place man at the centre of signification and because of the notion
of agency implied therein.
61 Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century
Fiction (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1983; repro 1985), p.13.
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Now, strictly speaking, in La Volonte Foucault is not interested in
biology. The question of what we are, he says, has gradually come to be put
not so much to sex-nature, to biology, as to sex-history, or sex-signification.
to sex-discourse. Even genetics - which sees the reproductive mechanism not
as one capacity among others but as the very thing which introduces the
biological dimension - in a sense continues this work of positing sex as the
key to an individual's very being, not just his biology.
At the same time, modem power is exercised not in the name of the
sovereign's ancient right to dispense death but primarily as a power over life
exercised in the name of the population itself. Power (le pouvoir) - and we
note the absence of compunction with which Foucault uses the singular form
for the most massively generalized statement - 'is situated and exercised at the
level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of
population' (p.137). At this level of generality it is difficult to avoid the return
of old metaphors and of old separations, as though life and power were
precisely different things, with the latter needing to get a grip on the former:
'Now it is on life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its grip
[prises]' (p.138; trans. mod.).
This power over life takes two forms: the first, following Discipline
and Punish, is that of the disciplines, centred on the body qua machine (here
Foucault calls it an anaiomo-politics of the human body); the second is centred
on the species-body which hosts the biological processes such as propagation,
birth and mortality, life expectancy and longevity. These are supervised and
regulated by what Foucault terms a bio-politics of the population. Although
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he refers to the second technology as specifiante and to the first as
indtvidualisante, the latter designation does not prevent his account from
assuming the most general countenance: the individualizing power is treated
not in relation to individuals, but rather schematized according to what are
generally assumed to be its overall effects on unspecified bodies."
The administration of bodies and the calculated management of life and
populations. Once again, we note the scale of the analysis. Anatomo- and
bio-politics, Foucault states,
operated at the level of economic processes, of their development, and of the
forces working to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation
and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces
of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects
of hegemony. (p.141; trans. mod.)
Such formulations would easily pass for classical Marxism. The Foucaultian
twist comes in his contention that what happened in the eighteenth century in
certain Western countries was nothing less than the entry of life into history,
that is to say, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the species into
the order of knowledge and power; viz. that with the development of
knowledge about life, about its mechanisms and about how to maximize and
regulate it, the fact of living is no longer what he calls an inaccessible
substratum (soubassement) in an economy fundamentally ordered by death and
fatality; instead, it becomes something of which power-knowledge can take
62 The individual focus is supplied by Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered
Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite, trans. by Richard McDougall
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). The idea of 'governmentality', to which I shall return in
the final chapter, is an attempt to bridge the gap between the macro- and the micro-.
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charge."
The foregoing postulate paves the way for the entry of sex, the
importance of which - and this is what I would like to stress - consists in the
fact that it lies at the pivot of the two axes: of the disciplines and of the
regulation of populations. The concern with sex thus gives rise to infinitesimal
surveillances and meticulous orderings of space: to micro-power; and to
'massive' measures, to statistics and interventions aimed at the social body as
a whole: to macro-power. Foucault is close at this juncture to blurring the
meaning of the term 'evolution' in an eminently Darwinian fashion. The
eighteenth century used the word to designate an account of a single life span,
as in the term ontogeny. By the 1830s the term was used to describe the
development of the species, that is, phylogeny. However, in the wake of
Darwin the two meanings are condensed in, and their distinction blurred by,
the 'same' term 'evolution' (Beer).
This double schema - whereby sex is 'a means of access both to the
life of the body and to the life of the species' (p.146) - is what allows
Foucault, contra Eagleton, to yoke together the local and the general, powers
and Power. He can thus write that the four great lines of attack in nineteenth-
century sexual politics were all to some degree premised on the putting
together of disciplinary techniques with regulative methods: the sexualization
of children (as a campaign for the health of the race), hysterization of women
(in the name of their responsibility to the family and the well-being of society),
63 I shall question Foucault's establishment of a 'threshold of biological modernity' in
Chapter five.
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birth control and the psychiatrization of perversions. Now, it is this double
schema of Foucault's which has instructive affinities with evolutionary theory.
Both are premised on the central pairing individual/collective species which is
never far from appearing as an antagonistic opposition individual/system in
which the former's role may always be characterized, mournfully, in terms of
insignificance and ephemerality. Almost by definition, the species, or the
system, will always prevail. We have seen the triumph of the carceral in
Discipline and Punish. Similarly, the theorist of evolution, Richard Dawkins,
can gaily remark that individuals are but 'temporary vehicles' for the DNA
whose messages live on long after memory of the host has slipped into
oblivion.
The source of a more optimistic strain in Foucault's thought, and one
of his important insights into history writing, is the stress placed by his
genealogy on chance. The play of accident, error and chance is powerfully,
even triumphantly, expressed across 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'. 64 If one
can show the degree to which the formation of a system is marked by chance,
rather than by necessity, it becomes possible to envisage a way out of those
present systems which confine us. This scheme is classical. Despite the great
denunciation of knowledge's interestedness, the Enlightenment theme prevails:
it is knowledge, more especially 'effective' history, that will liberate us from
the old historians' prejudices.
64 It is not pure chance that Foucault should speak thus. Deleuze had already argued that
because a body is constituted by any two unequal forces, it is always the fruit of chance
(Deleuze, Nietzsche, p.40). Thomas M. Kavanagh uses a Foucaultian scheme to argue that
chance was one of the Enlightenment's betes noirs, against which much of its thinking was
directed. 'Chance and Probability in the Enlightenment', French Forum. 15:1 (1990),5-24.
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The theme of chance is again taken up by Foucault in his review of
Francois Jacob's book La Logique du vivant.6s In it, Foucault states that more
important than any humiliation of man that Darwin may have achieved by
making him the descendent of monkeys was Darwin's stripping the individual
of his privileges by studying the aleatory variations of a population in time.
Mendel added to this debunking by showing that we do not blend inheritance
from our parents, but receive it in discrete particles according to calculable
chances which only sudden mutations could modify. And then there is
molecular biology, which has discovered in the nucleus of the cell
a liaison, as arbitrary as a code, between nucleic acids and proteins; better
still: it has spotted, in the transcription of this code, errors, lapses, inversions,
like the slips or involuntary strokes of inspiration of a momentarily distracted
scribe. Throughout life, chance plays with discontinuity. (p.l3)66
Discontinuity not only delimits us; it traverses us, teaching us that 'the dice
rule us'. We recall, by contrast, that Einstein was disturbed by the randomness
implied by quantum mechanics: "'God does not play dice with the world'"
(Coveney and Highfield, Time's Arrow, p.121). For Mallarme, in the words
of Malcolm Bowie, the question becomes in Un coup de des jamais n 'abolira
le hasard: 'Is structure ('le nombre', 'une constellation') attainable, whether
by grace or by effort, by calculation or by intuition, over and against the
teeming chaos of things?' (Mallarme, p.l26) In any event, how does one write
of chance in a chancy way? How to construct around an event that
'polyhedron of intelligibility', without suggesting that event's inevitability?
65 'Croitre et multiplier', Le Monde, 15-16 November 1970, p.13.
66 This idea is repeated in his 'Introduction' to Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and
the Pathological, where he affirms that 'life is what is capable of error' (p.xix).
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And how, then, to construct one's narrative of chance in a way that would
avoid determining the coordinates which produced a random event, and so
derandomize chance? A near impossible demand to make of a historian or
perhaps of any writer. And yet the preliminary task should be to question the
assumptions Foucault makes regarding chance. To which end, I borrow from
evolutionary theory the notion of evolution as nonrandom cumulative selection.
Scientists concur in the belief that the selection of genes that get passed
down the generations is a chancy affair, even though the likelihood of their
being passed on may be affected by the success of the body they helped to
create (Dawkin, p.56). It goes without saying that the offspring in anyone
generation will, as the chancy combination of genes dictates, be different from
their parents in random ways. But - and this is where one must rein in the
paean to chance - the respective progeny selected to go forward into the next
generation is not a random affair. Although natural selection does not choose
genes directly, it does select 'the effects that genes have on bodies' (Dawkins,
p.60). The point here is that in nature the selecting agent is death and that, in
one respect, death is nonrandom. This might seem to contradict all we know
about the arbitrariness of the grim reaper, who arrives at the most unexpected
moments and via the most unforeseen routes. Household flies know all (and
nothing) about this. And yet, statistically speaking, the more a creature is
suited to its environment, is able to counter its predators and to stave off
illness and find food, the greater its chances of survival and, consequently, the
greater likelihood of it reproducing and passing on its genes. In an important
sense, then, death may be viewed as nonrandom. Flies who avoid houses
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increase their chances over their stay-at-home brethren. On a far more serious
note, Foucault's own death is a stark example of this logic ofnonrandomness,
which should not be collapsed into determinism: his position as a gay man
frequenting the bath houses of 1980s San Francisco introduced a strongly
nonrandom dimension into his death.
Now, DNA can be compared to the Read Only Memory (ROM) of a
computer. In the same way that ROM is read millions of times but written
only once, DNA can be replicated but is burnt in once. However, there is a
sense in which the notional collective data bank of an entire species can be
written to: 'The nonrandom survival and reproductive success of individuals
within the species effectively "writes" improved instructions for survival into
the collective genetic memory of the species as the generations go by'
(Dawkins, p.119). On this scale, living organisms exist for the benefit of
DNA, not vice versa. The messages that the DNA molecules contain are as
good as eternal in comparison with the time scale of an individual life. Each
individual organism, Dawkins remarks, should be seen as a 'temporary
vehicle'.
The essential element to underscore is that a social system may evolve
with the help of chance; it evolves to a greater degree, though, by virtue of
nonrandomness. In seeking to account for the development of the most
complex pieces of biological machinery, Dawkins states the puzzle thus: 'There
are billions of possible ways of putting together the bits of an airliner, and only
one, or very few, of them would actually be an airliner' (Dawkins, p.7). Do
these things come about through pure chance? He replies in the negative.
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Such a chance scenario is statistically inconceivable:
however many ways there may be of being alive. it is certain that there are
vastly more ways of being dead, or rather not alive. You may throw cells
together at random, over and over again for a billion years, and not once will
you get a conglomeration that flies or swims or burrows or runs, or does
anything, even badly, that could remotely be construed as working to keep
itself alive. (Dawkins, p.9)
Not surprisingly, given the fantastic complexity of design and the efficiency
with which a cell or an organ or a wing can carry out its functions, the
temptation to invoke a creator is strong. And yet, however improbable they
may appear to us, these 'machines' should be understood on the basis of
cumulative nonrandom transformations over vast periods of time. In the last
section of the chapter, I should like to calion a final strain of thought from the
field of theoretical science in order to elucidate this tension between chance
and nonrandomness, before turning to some final reflections on La Volonie.
I hope that my bricoleur's approach to contemporary science will then be seen
as having a certain pertinence to the Foucaultian concern with systems, with
the history of systems of thought.67
Deterministic chaos theory: between chance and necessity
To what extent might scientific theories of deterministic chaos, as
opposed to 'pure' chaos theory, offer valuable insights for humanities-based
models of the interaction between social systems and power? I shall suggest
that theories of deterministic chaos, theories which, like La Volonte, live and
breathe disequilibrium, offer an instructive reminder to the effect that thinking
67 We recall that Foucault changed the name of the Chair he came to occupy at the College
de France to 'Chair of the History of Systems of Thought'.
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time, mobility, instability and change does not necessarily mean succumbing
to a massive non-principle of disorder. I should say before looking at such
theories that I dissent from Barbara Riebling's suggestion that Foucault's
notions of social systems dynamics, which she wrongly says are 'equilibrial,
unchanging, and symmetrical', could not be further from current scientific
thinking. Nor do they, as she would have it, violate the second law of
thermodynamics (Riebling, p.l80). I shall argue, on the contrary, that La
Volante goes some way towards respecting that important law.
In physics mobility and perpetual disequilibrium do not necessarily give
on to chaos, do not, that is, prevent a certain system from holding. To
illustrate this hypothesis, let me take Coveney and Highfield's discussion of
Thermodynamics, the Second Law of which states that all physical processes
are irreversible because some energy is always dissipated as heat. By turning
the crankshaft through a full 360°, an engine may be returned to a position
indistinguishable from its initial state. 'But the wasting of energy as heat will
have ensured subtle changes that cannot be wiped out' (Coveney and Highfield,
pp.ISO-lSt). The concept of entropy introduces an important distinction and,
in the process, furnishes an explicit arrow of time. From the Greek en (in) and
trope (turning), it is defined as 'a quantity that relentlessly grows with
dissipation and attains its maximum value when all the potential for further
work is spent' (p.1SI).68 The distinction lies in the fact that zero entropy
68 Interestingly, Foucault uses the headings 'Increasing Entropy' and 'Decreasing Entropy'
to divide up his reply to two (as Foucault sees it) ill-informed reviewers (one of whom is
George Steiner) who respectively manage to increase or decrease the entropy of The Order of
Things. Foucault, 'Monstrosities in Criticism'.
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change results from a reversible process, while entropy always increases in an
irreversible one. Thus, 'increasing entropy coincides with time's forward
movement' (p.ISI). 69
In a piece on Jules Verne from 1966, Foucault maintains that Verne's
boffin figures are entrusted with the precise task of preventing the world from
coming to a halt through an equilibrium which would be fatal. Their function,
he says, is to find new sources of energy or organize the colonization of
another planet, to discover a/oyer ardent which will 'assure disequilibrium and
guarantee the world against death':
Above this monotonous munnur inwhich the end of the world is articulated,
[fictional discourses] fused the assymetrieal ardour of chance, of improbable
fate, of impatient unreason. Jules Verne's novels are the 'negentropy'
[nE?genlropie] of knowledge. Not science become recreative; but re-creation
based on the uniform discourse of science."
At one time it was believed that the universe itself, rather after the
fashion of a Thermos flask, could be considered an isolated system. As
Coveney and Highfield remark (and we shall shortly relate this observation to
Foucault's system), 'what else is there outside it'? The First Law of
thermodynamics would then state that the total energy of the universe is
constant and the Second, that the total entropy of the universe is inexorably
increasing towards its maximum value. But this leads to a cosmic degeneration
69 As far back as the 1930s Borges argued that the Second law of thermodynamics was
enough to refute Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return. Jorge Luis Borges, 'La doctrina de los
cielos', in Prosa camp/eta, vol.2, pp.SS-63.
70 Foucault, 'L' Arriere-Fable', L '.Arc, 29 (1966),5·13 (pp.10, 11). This is ofa piece with
a paper from 1967, 'Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias', Diacritics, 16:1 (Spring
1986), 22-27 (first publ. as 'Des espaees autres', Architecture Mouvemenl Cominuue, 5
(October 1984), 46-49), in which Foucault affirms that the nineteenth century found the
quintessence of its mythological resources in the second law of thermodynamics but that our
own era is that of space. This article is perhaps the most explicit statement of Foucault's one-
time structuralist orientation.
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scenario whereby the universe finally grinds to a halt at thermodynamic
equilibrium when all change ceases, 'where entropy and randomness are at
their greatest, in which all life has died out' (p.lS3). Now, as I tried to show
in Chapter 2, the system of power which Foucault formulates in Discipline and
Punish is on a par with these isolated systems. Useful energy is extracted from
individuals by the system in proportion to the formers' increased docility and
the latter's equilibrium. But in Foucault, on the contrary, equilibrium
supervenes not at the end of a temporal process, but belongs to the system as
a spatial property: the carceral network, he says, 'has no outside'.
However, the discovery that the universe is expanding contradicts this
equilibrium theory and suggests the universe cannot be anywhere near a state
of thermodynamic equilibrium:
in a very real sense, equilibrium is also a dead end. Since it is concerned
with the end-state of thermodynamic evolution and thus of time, it cannot
describe the very processes by means of which time becomes manifest. [...]
Life consists of many processes, from cell division and heart beat to
digestion and thinking, all of which can only occur because they are out of
equilibrium. (p.158)
The question then arises - and this is what interests me where Foucault's
model of social systems is concerned - if one is to think non-equilibrium, can
there be anything like a system, or are we confmed to thinking only disorder?
What happens if a system tending towards eventual equilibrium is stopped in
medias res? Coveney and Highfield cite the example of thermodiffusion which
contradicts the belief that entropy equals disorder. One heats a vessel
containing a mixture of hydrogen and hydrogen sulphide gas. By maintaining
a small temperature difference at opposite extremes of the vessel - and thereby
preventing it from reaching equilibrium - a gradual separation of the gases
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emerges along the vessel, rather than the chaotic mixing that one would expect.
One therefore has the unexpected combination of increased entropy plus a less
random arrangement of molecules:
In spite of the popular interpretation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics
as linking entropy in a facile way with 'disorder'. thermodiffusion shows
how structural organisation can spontaneously emerge from randomness. [...]
To be sure, there is randomness in the frantic motions of the gas molecules,
yet overall this is clearly less than at equilibrium. Thermodiffusion provides
the first indication that irreversible, non-equilibrium processes can give rise
to organisation. Thus there is a link between the arrow of time and the
possible emergence of structure. (p.160)
Ilya Prigogine showed that where systems are not pushed too far from
thermodynamic equilibrium, the rate of change of the system's entropy declines
and the system as a whole evolves to a steady state in which the dissipation is
at a minimum. And so long as there is some minimal outside influence to
keep a system out of equilibrium then it will persist in a steady-state rather
than collapse into total randomness.
However, does this phenomenon hold for cases where systems are
maintained far from equilibrium? Glandsdorff and Prigogine argued that it
does. Despite the fact that a steady-state when pushed far from equilibrium
may reach a crisis point, at which the system evolves into some other state, it
is still possible to find beyond this point - and despite massively increased
global entropy production - highly organized behaviour in time and space.
Indeed, it is important to appreciate that a system can only be held away
from equilibrium if it is open to its environment: this enables the entropy
produced by the system to be exported to the surroundings, thereby
permitting the maintenance of organisation while allowing an overall increase
in the entropy of the system and the environment. (p.l64)
As an example of the phenomenon of order emerging at a point far
.beyond equilibrium one may take the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions. Boris
Pavlovitch Belousov mixed together assorted chemicals in order to simulate the
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process by which living cells break down organic foodstuffs. Instead of the
mixture settling into one uniform colour, as one would expect when enough
stirring has gone on, the solution changed with clockwork regularity from a
colourless appearance to a shade of yellow and back again, and so on and so
forth. One witnesses therein the creation of order from disorder through the
phenomenon of self-organization. But not everything is order. If one changes
the concentrations of the chemicals and pushes the process too far beyond
equilibrium the result is random colour change such that predicting the moment
of change becomes impossible.
Even in this instance, understanding and indeed harnessing such
randomness is not entirely denied us. The notion of a strange attractor proves
decisive here, one of the distinguishing features of which is that it is a fractal
object. This word, coined by Benoit Mandelbrot in 1975, describes the
peculiar geometry of irregular shapes, any region of which may be magnified
and will be found to contain the entire structure of the attractor:
This property of showing a motif within a motif within a motif ad infinitum
is known as self-similarity. The motif is mirrored at every scale of length:
the edges of a clover leaf will be bristling with smaller clover shapes which
will bristle with still smaller clover shapes. (p.204)
One is thus forced to rethink dimensions. Instead of a line being one-
dimensional, it must be thought of as one-and-a-bit dimensional, that is, fractal.
Mandelbrot's example of the difficulty of measuring the length of the British
coast illustrates the point well. An as-the-crow-flies measurement would be
extended by the walker who, replete with pedometer, has to follow the twists
and turns of every cove and promontory; which would in turn appear a short
measure in comparison to the ant's journey up and over every pebble, etc.
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'Indeed, if we could shrink. the scale to the infinitesimal. then the coastline
would have an infinite length. The apparently paradoxical result is that the
coast is in fact a "line" of infinite length contained quite happily within a finite
area (draw a circle round Britain)' (p.205).
If we return to our example of the chemical reaction, the fractal
property of a strange attractor means that a point in a chemical reaction can
explore an unending series of points. And this in turn leads us to its chaotic
property. In the words of Coveney and Highfield: 'the system samples
different configurations as time passes, never repeating itself. [...] Armed with
the notion of fractal forms, it becomes easier to see how a system, though
restricted to a finite region - the strange attractor - can nevertheless discover
unlimited opportunity' (p.206). The parallel with Derrida's notion of play is
inviting. One also returns to the problem of measurement. Unless the initial
conditions of the system are known to a literally infinite degree of precision
at the outset, subsequent developments will be entirely unpredictable. The
slightest uncertainty - 'which will always be the case in the real world' (p.207)
- denies the capacity for prediction.
There are, however, regularities within this deterministic chaos.
Because the chaos is internally generated by and is intrinsic to a system, it is
not wholly random. Therefore, as Coveney and Highfield put it, 'deterministic
chaos blurs the ideas of order and disorder' (p.207). Nor should one be
blinded by the buzzword 'chaos'. 'Order and deterministic chaos spring from
the same source - dissipative dynamical systems described by non-linear
differential equations' (p.207).
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Finally, then, to what extent, if any, might scientific theory on
deterministic chaos be useful in the humanities?
Societies can be regarded as open and highly non-linear dynamical systems,
in which feedback loops and competition abound. Scientists have begun to
draw parallels between the self-organisation and chaos which can be seen in,
for example, chemical reactions, and the phenomena which develop in human
and animal societies, typified by words like 'revolution', 'riot' and economic
'crash'. (p.294)
The parallel is seductive but the central difficulty of comprehending time
remains, merely glossed over. Throughout the hook, the authors insist on the
need for any scientific theory to be able to explain the common phenomenon
of the passing of time. They write:
It is the crucial role of indeterminism, of random fluctuations, controlling the
denouement at the crisis points, that makes time an innovative entity:
between one stable state and the next, the system's entire future lies in the
precarious hands of chance, unlike its past. One can see the asymmetry of
time revealed in a bifurcation diagram in the same way as we experience it:
a one-week-old baby may become a prince or a pauper, whereas the history
of a 50-year-old man is fixed. Likewise, imagine that there is a beetle
crawling up and down the bifurcation tree. It could have crawled from
anywhere in the foliage to end up on the trunk. But to get to a particular
twig from the trunk, it had to take a particular path through the branches.
Thus even a beetle sitting on a twig in the bifurcation tree has a specific
history. (p.212)
This deeply misleading passage is rather like the contents of the Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reactor: a murky amalgam out of which a logic of sorts emerges.
The logic, in this case, is a classical historicism: the present is a dicey thing,
Fortuna looks on, amused; but the past, despite those crisis points of
vacillation, uncontentiously has been. But to argue that a system's entire
future lies in the precarious hands of chance is to contradict all that the authors
have said ahout the dynamic between organization and chaos, between structure
and event. After all, a one-week-old baby seldom mutates into a globe
artichoke. Likewise, ascribing necessity to the past can be maintained only
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thanks to the most facile of examples (and it is not without interest that the
example is predominantly spatial: the path metaphor raised to a
historiographical principle). As soon as one asks why the beetle took that
route, why it was on the tree in the first place or what conditions allowed the
tree to thrive, specificity itself begins to bifurcate.
Where human and social machines are concerned - and it is apparent
that the timescale is massively telescoped by comparison with biological
organisms - one should not assume, as Foucault at one level seems to, that
chance rules. Chance opens up the horizons of possible alternatives; it cannot
account, though, for the work which is done to build and sustain a social
structure, institution or system of power. (This is the criticism levelled at
Saussure: rather than the arbitrariness of language, one should speak of its
conventionality.) In this respect During is correct to criticize Foucault for
intimating that the epistemic shifts in The Order of Things are based on chance
and reversibility (During, p.102). On the other hand, nor is it a matter of
attributing everything to intentionality.71 Perhaps we could slightly alter the
expression Dawkins uses to capture the not-quite-random, though not-fully-
determined nature of biological objects (I substitute 'probable' for
'improbable'): he speaks of the quality of being 'statistically-[ [probable-in-a-
direction-specified-without-hindsight' (Dawkins, p.IS). The reduced time scale
of the development of human institutions, the importance of short-term
objectives (even if never fully attained), the place of human intentionality, and
71 For Derrida the peculiar condition of the gift lies in the necessity that it be structured
simultaneously by the aleatory and the intentional. Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit
Money, pp.122-123.
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the aim of power over others, all suggest the need for that substitution. But
they in no sense amount to determinism, nor to teleology, a point made by
Raymond Williams in a discussion of Dickens." In fact I think Foucault says
something similar in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'. The world of effective
history (Nietzsche's wirkliche history, as opposed to traditional history)
knows only one kingdom, without providence or final cause, where there is
only 'the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance.,73 Chance
is not simply the drawing of lots, but raising the stakes in every attempt to
master chance through the will to power, and giving rise to the risk of an
even greater chance." ('Nietzsche', pp.88-89)
The difficulty facing the historian remains that of recapturing something
of the aleatoriness and contingency of the past as it presented itself, while
retaining something of the systemic without which chance would not even be
recognizable as such. The division between history and literature does not
pertain here, and it would be left to a certain kind of literature to allow the
enactment, in the reading process itself, of the experience of living between
necessity and chance, system and chaos."
It is, I think, this play between chance and necessity which leads to the
72 Williams speaks of Dickens' view of London in his novels as a seemingly paradoxical
one in which variation and the apparent randomness of the city coexist with a determining
system. The Country and the City, pp.190-191.
73 A footnote reads: 'Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 130.'
74 A footnote reads: 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, sec. 12.'
75 The most important problem facing Mallarme was that of 'realising a poetic structure
which will allow chance its weight and its omnipresence while allowing the fragile ordering
impulse of the human being its proper dialectical edge [...J creating for his "hero" the role of
a beleagured pattern-seeker. And a fine balance is kept as the contest unfolds. The worst that
can happen and the best that can happen are not equally possible and mutually exclusive
futures: they are twin versions of the present moment, twin ways of seeing and inhabiting the
world. Every moment is the complete wager.' Malcolm Bowie, Mallarme, p.143. For
Foucault on Roussel, by contrast, 'there is only random language, methodically treated' (Death
and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, trans. by Charles Ruas [London: The
Athlone Press, p.38]), as if, though, language were not in its essence order.
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growing realization in Foucault - articulated with pessimism in Discipline and
Punish, with increased optimism in La Volante - of just how untenable is the
notion of any massive principle of disorder equating to the slaying of order.
In 'Questions of Method' he speaks of not feeling himself capable of effecting
the 'subversion of all codes', preferring 'to give some assistance in wearing
away certain self-evidentnesses and commonplaces' (p.11). Chance may be
enough to disrupt teleology, but if power is itself non-teleological then
Foucault's stress on force, disequilibrium and kinesis need not suggest to us the
precariousness of a system on the verge of a nervous breakdown, about to slip
into chaos."
76 As far back as 'The Thought From Outside' one reads: 'Sovereignly, the law haunts
cities, institutions, conduct, and gestures; whatever one does, however great the disorder and
carelessness, it has already applied its might' (p,33).
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CHAPTERS
FOUCAULT AND A GUILT-EDGED EUROPE
Introduction
This chapter continues the theme of the play between chance and
necessity, disorder and order, here exploring such issues in the context of
Foucault's attitude towards the system and constitution of 'Europe'. Yet it also
marks a break. I have hitherto respected a chronology of sorts, tracing a
development in Foucault's thinking from the archaeological work through to
the first volume on sexuality. This chapter punctures the time and trajectory
of the thesis. It may be read as a (long) polemical aside which, ranging across
Foucault's entire oeuvre rather than concentrating on anyone text or period,
returns to and reworks selected strands first woven in previous chapters.
Notably the constitutionalist model of Discipline and Punish and its relation
to guilt; the issue of subject-positions and the individual's motility In
negotiating between positions; the question concerning the 'economy' of
power; the all-pervasive theme of the relationship between power and
knowledge.
The chapter focusses on Foucault's attitude towards Europe as a
geopolitical and cultural configuration, and responds to the many charges
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levelled at him according to which his work is fundamentally Eurocentric. I It
argues that despite his questioning of Western thought's pretensions to
universality, it remains the case that the disjunctive, iconoclastic character of
Foucault's ecrtture helps furnish an idiom for the accusations of
Eurocentredness subsequently directed against him. In this respect, Foucault's
relationship to the preceding intellectual generation (the latter at once very real
and eminently constructed) and his apparent shift away from Ie vecu to matters
of system assume important dimensions. One detects in Foucault's work and
ecriture two conflicting energies, the one a centrifugal, de-colonizing
movement, which would estrange him from the Western tradition, the other a
movement of re-colonization - precisely in the name of system. The chapter's
polemical strain begins to emerge when it addresses the general issue of what
might be at stake in the way one poses the question of the value of 'European'
or 'Western' thought. Appropriating Foucault's ideas on power, I question the
worth of two expressions employed by Robert Young in White Mythologies:
Writing History and the West (a book influenced by and sympathetic towards
Foucault) concerning the 'decolonization' of European thought and the
'dissolution' of the West. To what extent are such aims attainable and even
desirable, and to what extent do they betoken a misplaced iconoclasm, an
immodest inflation of the power of thought? - as though thought and language
could so easily withdraw from areas formerly colonized, as though, further,
they could leave such areas independent and self-determining. Precisely what
1 A shortened version of this chapter has appeared as 'Foucault and a Guilt-Edged
Europe', Renaissance and Modern Studies, 37 (1994), 104-120.
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economy of thought would be capable of such a repatriation of metaphors and
logos? I make no bones about the fact that such a discourse seems to me both
ill thought out and a gross simplification of political reality. At the most
elementary level, it is a matter of common knowledge that an aspirin which
dissolves does not cease to work. That is a question of realpolitik. The more
intractable question would be whether dissolution, understood in its stronger
sense as disintegration, 'injurious relaxation or softening; enfeeblement', 'the
action of bringing to an end; the state of being ended; destruction or ruin of
an organized system', 'termination of the existence of a constituted body or
association', is even something meritorious. What interests me particularly is
the possibility that the panoply of expressions of disjuncture that one finds in
Young harks back to a voluntaristic and undialectical strain in Foucault's
genealogies (without Foucault's ever constituting a simple origin here) which
returns to shape those denunciations of his own Eurocentrlsm. Finally, the
chapter will suggest that a central weakness of such axiological thought lies in
the model of constitution, or projection, it employs, a model clearly, in the
case of someone like Edward Said, adapted from Foucaultian thought. So long
as one attributes exaggerated constitutionalist powers to old Europe, one can
continue to think guilt, despite the possibility of an etymological relation to
guild, 'payment', 'reward' and 'sacrifice', in the most classically uneconomic
terms. How satisfactory is it to adapt the model of the bloated carceral order
of Discipline and Punish, which depicts a necessarily narrow canvas of
humankind, to the problematic of the 'colonial other'?
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The question of Foucault's Eurocentrism
I should like to attempt an initial approximation to the question of
Foucault's perceived Eurocentrism by asking why the charge relates to Europe
and European thought rather than simply to France and Gallic bias. It is fair
to say that Foucault has been much reproached for his narrowly European, not
to say French, centre of gravity. Merquior writes that he is parochial in his
intellectual reach; During, that he does not take national differences seriously
enough and ignores the relations of the West with the Third World; Said, that
compared to Fanon, who scrutinizes the Western system of knowledge and
discipline and seeks to treat colonial and metropolitan societies together, 'as
discrepant but related entities', Foucault never gets beyond the first project and
even then his later work seems to represent 'an irresistible colonizing
movement that paradoxically fortifies the prestige of both the lonely individual
scholar and the system that contains him'; Paglia, in the most vehement attack,
not only on Foucault but on the entire 'French school' of Saussure-influenced
thinkers who 'bankrupted a whole generation of American critics', that his
work suffers from an overintellection characteristic of the French tradition
which means that it is simply not relevant elsewhere.'
2 J.G. Merquior, From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist
Thought (London and New York: Verso, 1988), p.186; Simon During, Foucault and Literature,
pp.12, 128; Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993),
p.278; Camille Paglia, 'Junk Bonds and Corporate Raiders: Academe and the Hour of the
Wolf, inSex, Art, andAmerican Culture: Essays (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp.170-248
(p.191). The loose-cannon, deliberately scurrilous low-style of the Paglia piece invites a take-
it-or-leave-it response. One should try to avoid this alternative. Despite the slightly pathetic
narrative of degeneration-from-outside which it pedals, whereby US academics are cast as
'victims' of a 'rigid foreign ideology', of a 'foreign fascism', of a 'grotesque head trip'
'imposed on us', the piece does make many telling (and serious) points, some of which I shall
return to in the final chapter.
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Let us take stock, in the most provisional fashion, of the general
character of Foucault's thought. What does he deal with? Despite sporadic
allusions to non-Western countries (Ancient China, for example, in The Use of
Pleasures), Foucault's work, generally speaking, concerns itself with Western
Europe. Occasionally, it is true, the latter functions as little more than a cipher
for France - as in The Birth of the Clinic, where the concluding words about
'Western man' and 'European culture' must read like undue homogenizations,
for while the book does touch on other European countries, it deals for the
most part with the development of clinical medicine in France. Nonetheless,
while the principal social and institutional focus of his work may well be
France (he states in The Archaeology that all his archaeologies have thus far
been centred on the French Revolution [p.177]), his purview usually extends
to continental Western Europe, only infrequently going beyond (to America in
Discipline and Punish). Indeed, even when he deals with a specific individual
like the Belgian surrealist painter Rene Magritte, Foucault nevertheless has in
his sights some of the founding principles which 'ruled Western painting from
the fifteenth to the twentieth century' .3 Likewise with Roussel, whose strange
motifs represent but one moment of a larger history which is that of the
'tropological space' of the West itself. Roussel constructs and crisscrosses
the two great mythic spaces so often explored by Western imagination: space
that is rigid and forbidden, surrounding the quest, the return and the treasure
(that is the geography of the Argonauts and of the labyrinth); and the other
space - communicating, polymorphous, continuous, and irreversible - of the
metamorphosis, that is to say, of the visible transformation of instantly
crossed distances, of strange affinities, of symbolic replacements. (Foucault,
Death and the Labyrinth, p.80; cited in During, p.77)
3 Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, p.32.
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This 'other space' anticipates the sympathies of the Renaissance episteme with
their capacity to communicate across great expanses. Together the two spaces
(and the title) also echo Borges, of whom more later.
In fact, if one adds to the above the extensive use Foucault makes of
Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger, one would certainly need to stretch the
accusation, if it is to be made at all, to one of Euro- rather than Franco-
centrism. I do not thereby mean to apprehend what Michelet calls the 'pure
selfishness of the calculator without fatherland', to erase the importance and
particularity of national traditions, which may be national in the sense of
distinctive lines of appropriation rather than in the sense of origin." For her
part, Paglia insists on the significance of national context, contrasting the
United States with France. In the USA there is the Sixties Dionysian attempt
to return to nature:
We asked: why should I obey this law? and why shouldn't I act on every
sexual impulse? The result was a descent into barbarism. We painfully
discovered that a just society cannot, in fact, function if everyone does his
own thing. And out of the pagan promiscuity of the Sixties came AIDS.
Everyone of my generation who preached free love is responsible for AIDS.
The Sixties revolution in America collapsed because of its own excesses. It
followed and fulfilled its own inner historical pattern, a fall from
Romanticism into Decadence.
In France, by contrast, the student and worker revolt was quashed from
without, by the government, and hence Foucault's generation 'never saw the
errors of their ideas because those ideas, through lack of French moxie, were
never tested against reality by being put through their full organic cycle'
(Paglia, 'Junk', p.216). The analogy is deeply flawed. The American
4 Cited in Roland Barthes, Michelel, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang,
1987), p.198.
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movement ran its course because it was not first and foremost an attempt to
topple a political administration (though of course it contained very real
political elements, most obviously the opposition to the Vietnam war). The
French equivalent posed a much greater and more immediate threat to the
political order. However, despite the obvious importance of a notionally
'French' tradition of thought, which we here treat in the most etiolated socio-
political manner, the charge with which we are dealing concerns '-centrism'
and really the centre at stake is greater than France.
Simon During's criticism of Foucault is that he appropriates ideas from
elsewhere without taking national differences seriously enough. This he relates
to three things: first, to Foucault's early flirtations with the French Communist
Party; second, to the overvaluation of French nationalism by the right
especially from the period of the Dreyfus affair up until the Second World
War; third, to the grand style and universalizing sweep characteristic of a
confident and glamorous French intellectual elite. These speculations are
helpful in sending us to a moment and a milieu, but a predilection for the
arresting pronouncement is hardly exclusive to French intellectuals and can be
traced back at least as far as Scholasticism. Notwithstanding this caveat, as an
example of such a pronouncement we may cite Foucault's averment that in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries those who could not find work were
regarded as slothful, as moral reprobates, whereas today 'we know quite well
that whoever is not working cannot find work, is unemployed. Work has left
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the domain of morality and entered into that of politics'.! The journalist's
response ('It's clear that you are not Italian') speaks volumes, and indeed one
could happily substitute a community of adjectives for 'Italian'. Ultimately,
though, this line of reasoning is self-fulfilling. To attribute Foucault's remarks
simply to race or, in less discredited terms, national difference, is to counter
one failure to differentiate (we Europeans, or we French, think thus) with
another (it's because you're French). For in his case we come up as much as
anything against an amalgam of poor personal judgement and suspect logic.
A logic invested with and undermined by a bold style of pronouncement where
the grand claim is for division - the partage - rather than continuity, the
division working along an epochal rather than national axis in order to
emphasize (though often, as here, overstate) historical differences and the
contingency of present values. The irony of the word partage, a hallmark of
Foucault's work, is that, as Derrida notes in Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money,
it means both 'partition' and 'sharing'. But we shall come to that in due
course.
Ifwe are right in thinking that a concern for the national differences of
intellectual production did not greatly exercise him, it remains the case that
Foucault's treatment of France and Western Europe is certainly not marked by
indifference. Apparently severing the above thread which stretches between
experience and nationality, he develops an entire geopolitical thematics of
estrangement. This is perhaps not surprising, given his extensive travels and
'Foucault, 'An Historian of Culture', in Foucault Live, p.85. Though Foucault does not
say as much, he is restating an argument from Histoire de la folie (p,427), where it is more
nuanced: 'poverty was perhaps not only of the order of a moral failing'.
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nwnerous soujourns In other countries. One thus finds him employing,
specifically in the context of experiences of colonialism, the topos of the
estrangement from one's country which follows the experience of being
abroad." The topos returns in his reflections on the composition of Histoire de
la folie, written largely in Sweden and Poland, a text he describes as echoing
his experience of those two countries at a time when France was being
convulsed by the Algerian War and by the end of the period of colonization.
Detachment, he suggests, affords a privileged vantage point. He understood
the absurdity of the war and divined its necessary conclusion all the better for
experiencing events 'somewhat like a foreigner' (Remarks on Marx, p.74).
The simile is as problematic as it is commonplace. It casts Foucault's specific
difference from his compatriots, perhaps of necessity, in the form of a huge
generalization (precisely which foreigner's experience did he experience?) and
as if he already knew what that experience was.
Except for a fleeting visit to Paris, Foucault was again absent from
another of modem France's decisive experiences, living in Tunisia at the time
of May '68. As with his remarks on the Algerian War, so too here necessity
is made something of a virtue. He speaks of taking back to Paris his
'foreigner's way of seeing things', with the result that what he had to say was
'not always easily received' (Remarks, p.132). Tunisia in fact experienced its
6 Estrangement patently does not guarantee sound judgement. On his first trip to the
United States, Foucault repeats the topos but achieves only disingenuousness, saying that New
York made him aware that poverty still existed in advanced countries. 'A Conversation with
Michel Foucault', Partisan Review, 38 (1971), p.l98. Derrida remarks in Specters of Marx:
The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and The New International, trans. by Peggy
Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp.70-71, that 'there is a French tradition, a kind of
"French speciality" of peremptory diagnoses upon returning from a quick trip to a faraway land
whose language one does not even speak and about which one knows next to nothing',
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own student turmoil while he was there, which biographer Eribon says touched
Foucault profoundly, galvanizing him into political activism. Much later,
Foucault himself states that it was the courage of the Tunisian students in the
face of a brutal police and no less ruthless penal system that triggered his
engagement: 'It wasn't May of '68 in France that changed me; it was March
of '68, in a third-world country' (Remarks, p.136). Following the Tunisian
students, Foucault speaks of channelling his energies in the years immediately
after 1968 into actions implying a 'personal, physical commitment' within a
determinate situation (Remarks, p.139). There is a potentially very real gap
here between the subject of the enonctatton and the subject of the enonce,
between the mature Foucault in dialogue with Duccio Trombadori (the Marxist
interlocutor is doubtless an important detail) and the much younger protagonist
of thought and action. It is for example true to say that, unlike a Simone de
Beauvoir, Foucault's major books up till the end of the 1960s provide no real
commentary on contemporary events and make no reference to important
contemporary reflections on the injustices of the time.' One does not find in
Histotre de la folie, written at the time of the Algerian war, either allusions to
the fate of the colonized or to the work of someone like Fanon (whose Black
Skin, White Masks from 1952 already dealt with questions of the exclusion of
the marginalized by a dominant order), from which one could adduce that
colonialism was really not a burning issue for him. Furthermore, Foucault
(like Fanon) makes no reference to de Beauvoir and seems little interested in
7 The point about de Beauvoir is made by Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of
an Intellectual Woman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), p.186.
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the situation of women's oppression, an issue which Tori! Moi believes was
even more marginal in France than questions of colonialism and racism (Moi,
Simone de Beauvoir, p.190). Nor does he allude to Barthes' mythologies (1954
onwards), in which a model of the social construction of otherness is clearly
employed. However, generic considerations impose themselves. Foucault's
are histories, mainly of the French Classical age. Their field of concerns is
simply not contemporary events, even if they are occasioned by them, and
therefore the demands of the genre simply do not invite personal observations
and political commentary. That said, in the articles and journalism of the same
decade, which lend themselves to commentary on contemporary political and
social concerns, no such commentary appears, and it does seem that Foucault's
politicization coincides with the era of student revolt. In any event, and if his
memory serves him, Foucault's radicalization, his shift towards the work on
Western European disciplinary societies and on power, is propelled at least in
some small way (let us not overstate this) by a responsiveness to 'the
intolerable nature of certain conditions produced by capitalism, colonialism,
and neo-colonialism' (Remarks, pp.136-137). Even if we detect vainglorious
mythologizing in Foucault's feelings of strangeness visas-vis events in France
- and this is particularly the case with the Algerian war, which does not appear
to have exercised his conscience unduly - there is a case to be made for the
importance of working from within." To a nation conscious, like France, of
dwindling influence abroad, the sight of its intellectual elite turning on its own
I Cf. The Birth of the Clinic, where Foucault is himself sceptical about the topos of 'the
foreign spectator in an unknown country' (p.65), which he describes as one of the great
mythical experiences on which eighteenth-century philosophy had wished to base itself.
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institutions, on the very foundations of its self-image, 'is not a small matter for
a country whose culture has always been bound up in national glorification'
(Remarks, p.IIO). Whence Foucault's work on the prisons and public health,
and his concern - voiced through his participation in the comite Djel/ali - over
the living conditions of Arabs in France (specifically, those in the Goutte d'Or,
the Arab quarter of Paris)." Again, though, the award, and acceptance, of a
Chair at the College de France clouds the picture of glorious subversion.
Nevertheless, to the experiential estrangement one must therefore add
the intellectual project of a defamiliarization of certain key concepts of the
European tradition. There is an entire thematics in Foucault - up to and
including the 'Introduction' to The Use 0/ Pleasures - surrounding the notion
of estrangement. Histoire de la folie names the madman of Tuke's Retreat
l'Etranger (p.507). In The Order of Things, Foucault writes of language once
more lying both at the limits of Western culture and at its heart, for 'it is what
has been most foreign to that culture since the sixteenth century; but it has
also, since this same century, been at the very centre of what Western culture
has overlain' (p.44). Likewise, in his thoughts on Pierre Riviere's memoir he
writes in the opening sentence of a text of great strangeness (etrangete) ('Les
9 Spivak, commenting on an exchange between Foucault and Deleuze, finds it
unremarkable that the two should touch on third-world issues, given the topicality of France's
relations with her erstwhile colonies, but unacceptable that they should do so and yet still
ignore in their books 'both the epistemic violence of imperialism and the international division
of labor' (,Can the Subaltern Speak', [p.289]). Now, I will try and show that Foucault did not
exclude these concerns altogether from his books. I would add that this interview
('Intellectuals and Power', in Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, pp.20S-217) is ill-
equipped to do justice to either thinker. For the most part it pedals a version of power which
is still 'naked', 'brutal', 'global', that is, pre-Discipline and Punish. Further, it is marked by
a naive populism (which I think accounts for the uncritical remarks, on which Spivak bases
much of her argument, concerning the masses and prisoners as privileged subjects of
knowledge). Considerations of genre (the interview), of place and time (Paris, 1972), of the
specificity of their own positions, would not go amiss.
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Meurtres', p.26S). In this respect once more, Foucault's relationship to
Nietzsche is pivotal, describing Nietzsche's work as hearing 'an outsideness,
a kind of mountain peasantness' that might enable one 'to exit from
philosophy', and viewing Nietzsche as 'the outside edge' of philosophical
discourse." And again, here on a different influence, he speaks of Pierre
Boulez allowing him to feel (a) strange(r), foreign(er) in the world of thought
in which he had heen formed.
I only know that having divined - and through the mediation of another,
most of the time - what Boulez was doing allowed me to feel a stranger (me
sentir etranger) in the world of thought in which I had been formed, to
which I still belonged and which, for me as for many others, was still
prominent. II
This in a sense answers the doubt regarding the earlier simile 'like a foreigner'.
Here the place of others is crucial: to the extent that this sense of feeling
oneself a stranger is achieved most of the time through the mediation of others,
it must remain a foreign, improper estrangement.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is thus possible to take a
more sympathetic view of Foucault's work on European thought, seeing it,
following Robert Young, as a contribution, rather than to the direct analysis of
colonialism, to the 'decolonization' (a problematic word to which I shall
return) of Western thought from within. Young cites one of Foucault's
inquisitorial moments where he writes of
the movement which, at the close of the colonial era, led it to be asked of
the West what entitles its culture, its science, its social organization, and
finally its rationality itself, to be able to claim universal validity: was this
10 Foucault, '00 Literature', Foucault Live, pp.IIS·119.
II Foucault, 'Pierre Boulez ou l'ecran traverse', Le Nouvel Observateur, 2 October 1982,
p.St.
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not a mirage associated with economic domination and political hegemony?"
As the Foucault piece on Canguilhem (from which the above is taken) makes
abundantly clear, the spirit of Husserl remains vital here. Not only because
Husserl introduced phenomenology into France, a tradition out of which
Canguilhem's work emerges, but because Husser! makes the connection, which
Foucault is precisely anxious to deny, between the spirit of geometry and a
universal (though of course profoundly Western) reason." Nonetheless, and
leaving aside the problem of Foucault's own position in that quote (what
purchase could possibly be achieved by a critique of Western reason which did
not itself have recourse to that reason?), his work is well served by Young's
description of it as 'a relentless anatomization of the collusive forms of
European knowledge' (Young, White Mythologies, p.9).14
Arguably the most relentless aspect of Foucault's work is its effort to
fracture the metaphor of history as continuity and, with it, puncture a certain
self-image of the West's. Nineteenth-century Western historicism had looked
.backward upon the past as if it constituted a single lineage, the outcome of
which was modem Western man, 'and what could not be regarded as having
had a role in his development was not regarded as having been part of the
historically significant past'. IS By contrast, and producing a different version
12 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London and New
York: Routledge, 1990; repro 1992), p.9; he is quoting from Foucault, 'Introduction' to
Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, trans. by Carolyn R. Fawcett
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1978), pp.ix-xx.
13 See Husserl, 'The Origin of Geometry', Appendix VI to The Crisis, p.378.
14 Cf. The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.2IO.
IS Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason, p.131.
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of the nineteenth century, The Order of Things breaks the line, as we have seen
in Chapter four. 'History' is dispersed into plural, autonomous temporalities
specific to individual phenomena. Thus, as Foucault says, the eighteenth-
century image of the continuous ladder of living beings (Lamarck's scala
viventium) is supplanted by that of multiple rays spreading out from an
ensemble of centres. Naturally, this conclusion owes much to anthropology
and to nineteenth-century philology's work on non-Western languages. To
learn about this pluralization, one does not go to Foucault. Paglia makes the
same point but infers from it that Foucault should therefore be ignored as
derivative. A hasty judgement this, since one goes to The Order of Things to
see how this mutation is worked out in the slenderest detail of three disciplines
of thought, not for the mere statement of the shift. Similarly, when Foucault
says that man loses his History in favour of histories, it is not a matter of
heralding as innovatory his displacement of Western man from the centre.
Foucault's particular concern (which is certainly a wider, 'generational' affair)
is to disrupt the very concept of the human subject, its 'sovereignty' as he is
fond of saying (and the geopolitical terminology is not without interest).
For the same reason, that is to say, for questions of genre and
convention, one should not expect that text to become a treatise on colonialism,
and in this respect I dissent from Robert Young. Young expresses the view
that when Foucault turns to ethnology at the end of The Order of Things, one
would expect him to discuss colonialism, an opportunity not taken, he says,
even if one does get something like an analysis of the predicates which made
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Eurocentric thought possible." This opinion echoes Said's claim that Foucault
seems unaware of the extent to which ideas of discourse and discipline are
'assertively European' and of how discipline was also used to 'administer,
study, reconstruct - and then subsequently to occupy, rule, and exploit -
almost the whole of the non-European world'. 'This dimension,' he continues,
'is wholly absent from Foucault's work even though his work helps one to
understand it' (Said, 'The Problem of Textuality', p.711). This is strictly
speaking inaccurate, as Ihope to show in this chapter. Even in The Order of
Things Foucault writes that there is a certain position of the Western ratio
which provides a foundation for the relation that the ratio can have with other
societies. 'Obviously,' he observes, 'this is 'not to say that the colonizing
situation is indispensable to ethnology', but the latter can assume its proper
dimensions 'only within the historical sovereignty - always restrained but
always present - of European thought' (p.377; trans. mod.). Iremain uneasy
with the expectations of Young and Said for another reason. To expect The
Order of Things to mushroom into an exploration of colonialism is not an
expectation produced by the book itself. By the time one reaches the question
of ethnology, the archaeological character of the book, together with the
systematic absence of social and political history, invite anything but such an
expectation. The section on ethnology has to be read as part of the text's
climactic acceleration towards the conclusion regarding the disappearance of
man. The detailed analytical work has been done and Foucault is now
16 Paper delivered at the University ofLondon Union as part of the Foucault AMiversary
Conference, 2S June 1994.
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unfurling a manifesto in support of three new disciplines. The barest outline
of their project, not their historical formation. And that project will come to
bear, he envisages, precisely on a culture's 'norms', 'rules', 'systems', and
'limits', rather than on the positive contents of consciousness or on the
representations a civilization gives of itself. Here one has a formal statement
of the formal possibilities of ethnology; no analysis of colonialism but hardly
a denial of its importance. The expectation, I think, derives from later
concerns, and those who harbour them must ask themselves whether their
objections to certain omissions from a text like The Order of Things do not,
rather, constitute a rejection of philosophical epistemology itself." Naturally,
one could object that responding to colonialism by attacking the classical
subject of philosophy represents a curious form of struggle. One should
certainly be heedful of a position like that of Fanon, whose retention of the
bond between subjectivity and the body perhaps corresponds to a greater
emotional and political need, but one should avoid asking Foucault to be
Fanon.
If we are to circumvent a hasty criticism of The Order of Things, if we
are to avoid repeating what Foucault does to Descartes' Meditations, we need
to respect questions of convention, of levels of analysis, and of intentionality.
It is not a matter of denying politicization tout court; the text demands a
specific form of politicization, a formalist politics which questions the
epistemological link between words and things, and in the process the efforts
17 Hardly a new phenomenon. Niet1Sche criticizes the increasing disparagement of
philosophy in Beyond Good and Evil, 204.
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of a preceding generation to underwrite the position and privilege of the human
subject. However, it is interesting that in both the structuralist wager on
linguistics in The Order of Things and the later wager on power, the homicide,
which is also a parricide, bears the same apocalyptic semantics (which,
incidentally, pre-date May '68). And this is worthy of consideration. In the
following section, therefore, I should simply like to recall, in the most
traditional manner, though without abandoning myself to formalism, that
Foucault's work on institutions, corpuses of knowledge, and power is also a
practice of writing. A practice which has a significant bearing on its subject
matter.
Foucault's eeriture
At this juncture, on the verge of considering aspects of Foucault's
writing, I borrow the notion of ecriture from Barthes' Le Degre zero de
l'ecrtture. Although he applies the term to literature, not to history, it remains
apposite for a discussion of Foucault.
Barthes observes that Hebert never began an issue of Pere Duchene
without slipping in the odd 'fuck' or 'bugger', vulgarities which of themselves
meant little but which achieved the overall desired effect of signalling
'Revolution'. Such, for Barthes, is ecrirure, 'a set of signs unrelated to the
ideas, the language or the style, and setting out to give definition, within the
body of every possible mode of expression, to the utter separateness of a ritual
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language' .18 Compare this to Foucault's expose of ritual in The Order of
Discourse:
Ritual defines the qualification which must be possessed by individuals who
speak (and who must occupy such-and-such a position and formulate such-
and-such a type of statement [finonces], in the play of a dialogue, of
interrogation or recitation); it defines the gestures, behaviour, circumstances,
and the whole set of signs which must accompany discourse; finally, it fixes
the supposed or imposed efficacity of the words, their effect on those to
whom they are addressed, and the limits of their constraining value. (p.62)
In Barthes, ecriture is the set or ensemble of signs which defines ritual; in
Foucault it is the other way round. What separates the two thinkers (for the
police haunts both alike) is the question of choice: excluded as an irrelevance
by Foucault, for Barthes ecrtture implies choice (though not unlimited) and as
such is to be rigorously distinguished from language (langue) and style.
Language is a 'horizon', at once a limit and a perspective; property of all, 'it
remains outside the ritual of Letters; it is a social object by definition, not by
option' (p.lS). Style, by contrast, comprises the images, delivery (debit) and
lexicon born of the writer's body and past, and which become the automatisms
of his art. Style wells up from the writer's personal, secret mythology; never
the product of choice, it is properly speaking a 'germinative phenomenon', the
'transmutation of a Humour' (p.l7). Ecriture, on the other hand, entails
choosing a tone, an 'ethos'; it is an act of historical solidarity, the choice of
a social area at the heart of which the writer decides to situate the Nature of
his language (which does not by any stretch of the imagination mean this is
achieved). Naturally, this freedom is not unlimited since both history and
tradition delimit the range of possibilities.
II Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p.8.
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The question of Foucault's style (narrowly conceived) has prompted
varying responses. The dismissive: Lawrence Stone's malicious citation of
'what an unkind critic has called "his obscure, arrogant, sensationalist, and
opaque form of discourse'" .19 The admiring-though-it does-not-save-him:
Merquior considers him a 'superb writer' but ultimately thoroughly wrong-
headed (Merquior, From Prague, p.211). However, when Dominick LaCapra
writes that the critical dialogic exchange within Histoire de /a folie destabilizes
a positivistic rendition of the past, I submit that he is describing Foucault's
ecriture. In the weave of chiaroscuro lyrical interludes, positivistic
structuralism and more problematic, self-questioning liminal overtures, this
third, hybridized voice represents a challenge to traditional historiography. 20
This is the choice of a tone and an ethos, an act of historical solidarity which
establishes its own ritual language by virtue of a Bloomian swerve away from
prior rituals.
According to Francois Chatelet, the turning away from traditional
Marxism in French intellectual circles occurred in the years following the
Algerian War, the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the seizure of power by De
Gaulle in 1958.21 He describes the will to leave behind an 'overfull and
stereotyped historicity', a resolve which gained in cachet from the forced
dissolution of the structuralist group of the Sorbonne philosophy students' cell.
19,An Exchange with Michel Foucault', TheNew YorkBook Review, 31 March 1982, p.42.
He is quoting H.C. Erik Midelfort.
20 'Foucault, History, and Madness', History of the Human Sciences, 3.1 (1990) 31-38
(p.37).
21 'Recit', in Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, ed. by Meaghan Monis and Paul
Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), pp.13-28 (p.1S).
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The difference between the responses of an Althusser and a Foucault lies for
Chatelet in the fact that the former remained obsessed, like Sartre, by a unitary
conception of Being and Truth, which led to the reinforcement of intellectual
authority and the communist party.22 In a voluminous series of interviews
(mostly from the 1960s), Foucault elaborates what amounts to a parricidal
discourse, the targets of which are invariably the preceding generation of
phenomenologists, existentialists and Marxists. Merleau-Ponty is frequently
invoked but the Father, condensing all the aforementioned traditions, is Sartre.
One of the most instructive statements of the swerve is found in a 1966
interview, which drew a response from Sartre himself." The piece has its own
precedent since it is profoundly redolent of Nietzsche's challenge to the 'grey-
beards' in The Use and Abuse of History. Like Nietzsche's essay, it alludes
repeatedly to age and generation, urging the reign of youth and a distancing
from the generation of Les Temps Modemes which had been their 'law for
thinking' and their 'model for existing' (p.l3). It also follows Nietzsche's call
to break up the past and bring it to the bar of judgment. The butt of
Nietzsche's invective is the Darwin-influenced historian of continuity who
thinks he sees in the 'too proud European of the nineteenth century' the
completion of Nature (Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse, pp.55-56). Life, for
Nietzsche, suffers from the malady of history, the antidotes to which are the
'unhistorical' and the 'superhistorical'. The latter, embodied by art and
22 In his White Mythologies, ch.3, Robert Young makes the same point about Sartre.
23 'Entretien' (with Madeleine ChapsaJ), in La Quinzaine lltteraire, 16 May 1966, pp.13-
14. See Chapter three for Sartre's response.
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religion, is turned towards the eternal, while the former is 'the power, the art,
of forgetting and of drawing a limited horizon round oneself (p.69). In
Foucault, this limited horizon corresponds to his generation's predilection for
'system'. He argues that Sartre's understanding of 'meaning' led him to a
prescriptive thought where the assumption is made that meaning must already
be in the world. For Foucault, this ignores the anterior systems which make
meaning a surface-effect. Although the interview is marred by an inflated and
deterministic vaunting of system (in remarks on genetic codes for instance), it
ends on an interesting note when Foucault, responding to accusations of
abstractness, argues that the charge should, rather, be made against humanism,
since the latter has successfully managed to cut off things like the 'human
being' or 'existence' from the real, scientific and technical world. In the later
'Introduction' to Georges Canguilhem's On the Normal and the Pathological,
Foucault repeats the idea that the true dividing line of the time ran between the
two modalities according to which phenomenology was taken up in France,
namely a philosophy of experience/sense/subject versus a philosophy of
savoir/rationality/concept, that is, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty versus Cavailles,
Bachelard and Canguilbem (p.ix-x).
It is important to remember that the Nietzsche essay does not claim that
the unhistorical should always take precedence over the historical; it represents
a polemic against a particularly overbearing and dominant form of historicism.
Likewise, Nietzsche suggests that youth will suffer both from the historical
malady and its antidotes, even if he then proceeds to posit youth as true
destroyers owing nothing to the past:
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[their mission] can use no idea, no party cry from the present-day mint of
words and ideas to symbolize its own existence; but only claims conviction
from the power in it that acts and fights, breaks up and destroys; and from
an ever heightened feeling of life when the hour strikes. (p. 71)
It seems to me that it is this destructive movement that Foucault annexes.
Absence of 'fuck' and 'bugger', Foucault's is the ecriture of the prefixes 'de-'
and 'dis-', closer to Nietzschean demolition than to Derridian deconstruction."
A modem Praise of Folly, a 'dam-burst' which would wash away everything:
'popes, kings, monks (of course), scholars, war, theology - the whole lot' .25
In the Chapsal interview, Foucault speaks of getting rid (debarrasser) of
humanism. In his rejoinder to the response Sartre had made to the Chapsal
piece, man is 'volatilized', 'disappears'." This Is Not a Pipe speaks of
'demolish[ing] the fortress where similitude was held prisoner to the assertion
of resemblance' (p,49), and of the power of similitude to 'destroy' identities
(p.50).27 In 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History': 'The body is the inscribed
surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a
dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in
perpetual disintegration' (p.83). In The Birth of the Clinic, he writes: 'At this
level, all structures are dissolved, or, rather, those that constituted the essence
of the clinical gaze are gradually, and in apparent disorder, replaced by those
24 See Derrida, 'Lettre a un ami japonais', in Psyche, pp.387-393, on his choice of
'deconstruction' .
25 Kenneth Clark on Erasmus (Civilisation, p.112).
26 Michel Foucault, 'Foucault repond a Sartre', La Quinzaine Itueratre, 15 March 1968,
pp.20-21.
27 'All knowledge at the moment of its construction is a polemical knowledge; it must first
destroy to clear a space for its constructions.' Bachelard cited in Dominique Lecourt, Marxism
and Epistemology, p.88.
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that are to constitute the glance' (p.121). The Archaeology of Knowledge is
a paean to disjuncture: to the traditional repugnance shown towards conceiving
of difference, separations and dispersions, it opposes general history as the
'space of dispersion' (p.lO), operates a 'decentring', vaunts 'discontinuity'.
The Order of Things, to cite but three instances which will acquire significance
for us later, tells of a man doomed to 'absolute dispersion', to 'dissolution', of
a man whose 'disappearance' is announced. But perhaps one finds the
quintessential Foucault in his review of Deleuze's Difference et repetition,
'Ariane s' est pendue', more precisely in the 'fable' that he 'invents' apropos
of the Deleuze text. Tired of waiting for Theseus to emerge from the
labyrinth, Ariadne has hanged herself, while Theseus, the thread broken, leaps
and dances through the tunnels and passageways:
In the skilful geometry of the artfully centred labyrinth? No, rather all along
the dissymmetrical, the tortuous, the irregular, the mountainous and the sheer
[I'd-pic]. At least towards the end of his trial, towards the victory which
promises return? No: he goes joyfully towards the monster without identity,
towards the disparate without species [...]. And he moves towards it, not to
wipe this unbearable form from the face of the earth but to lose himself with
that very form in its extreme distortion. And it is there, perhaps (not at
Naxos), that the Baechle god keeps watch: Dionysus masked, Dionysus
disguised, indefinitely repeated. The famous thread has been broken, the one
that was thought so solid; Ariadne has been abandoned for rather longer than
had been thought: and the entire history of Western thought is to be
rewritten."
And yet the figurative and mythological resources of the fable themselves
suffice to suggest the inadequacy of the metaphorical alternative which opposes
the single continuous thread (as if there could be but one) to the image of
severance.
As with his relationship to Heidegger, Foucault wants to radicalize
28 'Ariane s'est pendu', Le Nouvel Observateur, 31 March 1969, pp.36-37 (p.36).
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Nietzsche. As R.J. Hollingdale observes, Nietzsche's philosophy emerges from
a Lutheran Pietism and contains many parallels with the teachings of
Christianity." His 'will to power' is a variant of divine grace, his concept of
'self-overcoming' corresponding to a Christian conception of unregenerate
nature redeemed by the force of God's grace. Foucault adopts the scheme but
tries to remove the last vestiges of Christianity by refusing the very notion of
the individual. If one looks again at Foucault's statement of the
'dehistoricization' of man from The Order of Things, one sees that it is written
in terms of secularization. For this man who finds himself 'dispossessed',
'nature no longer speaks to him of the creation or the end of the world, of his
dependency or his approaching judgement; [...] language no longer bears the
marks of a time before Babel or of the first cries that rang through the forest'
(The Order, p.368). Similarly, if in This Is Not a Pipe the embrace of
similitude (over resemblance), which 'develops in series that have neither
beginning nor end, [...] that obey no hierarchy' (p.44), reads like the return to
a Renaissance episteme, it is a return devoid of the micro- and macro-cosm,
that is, a return to a space from which God is absent. What Foucault
denounces (following Nietzsche) is the divinization of man, the man who, as
subject of his own consciousness and freedom, is a correlative image of God.
Nineteenth-century man is God made flesh, the theologization of man.
However,
when Nietzsche announces the coming of the overman, what he announces
is [...] the coming ofa man who will no longer have any relation to this God
29 'Introduction' to Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
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whose image he continues to bear. (,Foucault repond a Sartre', pp.20-21)30
In the face of a certain nineteenth-century divinization of man, one gets in
Foucault an apocalyptic, homicidal discourse, a 'dynamite of the spirit' as
Nietzsche puts it, in which negative and disjunctive prefixes strive to formalize
estrangement into divorce."
And yet belief (how could it?) does not disappear. The apocalyptic
tone suggests that Foucault still moves in a largely eschatological universe,
where the new order will be that of 'system'." When Chapsal asks: 'When did
you stop believing in "meaning"?', Foucault's reply makes it apparent that it
was when he started believing in 'system', when he discovered another
'passion': 'the passion of the concept and of that which I would call "system'"
('Entretien', p.13). If God and man are displaced, the place of belief they
have vacated is left intact: 'In a certain way we come back to the point of view
of the seventeenth century, with this difference: not to put man in the place of
God, but an anonymous thought, of knowledge without subject, of the
. theoretical without identity' (p.14). '_ It is a curious thing, do you know,
Cranly said dispassionately, how your mind is supersaturated with the religion
30See the christological parallel in Foucault et ai, Moi, Pierre Riviere, p.130, where
Riviere compares himself to Christ. He too is prepared to die for others (in this case his
father, on behalf of whom he has slain his family).
31Derrida says that eschatological themes were, for those schooled philosophically in 1950s
Europe, their daily bread, the 'bread of apocalypse'. Specters of Marx, p.14.
32Elsewhere, defending the syllabus put together by colleagues and himself, Foucault
speaks of the teaching of philosophy in France as itself 'the Lutheranism of a Catholic and
anticlerical country'. Foucault, 'Le Piege de Vincennes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 9 February
1970, pp.33-35 (p.34).
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in which you say you disbelieve. ,33
Notwithstanding this caveat, one can begin to imagine the significance
of this destructive discourse for the question of Europe, for the cultural, social,
political and economic position of Europeans, a question which exceeds the
philosophical, as Nietzsche recognizes in The Use and Abuse of History,
criticizing the dangerous influence of Hegelian philosophy when it attempts to
raise man to the status of godhead, 'the true meaning and object of all past
creation' (p.S1). However, these words from Nietzsche immediately remind
us of the presence and continuity of a destructive tradition. In the movement
by which Foucault's discourse punctures European thought, deflating the
sovereignty both of the subject and of a certain practice of historiography, it
simultaneously confirms another European tradition, that of Destruktion.
Heidegger points up the place of anthropology in all this:
the more extensively and the more effectually the world stands at man's
disposal as conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the
more subjectively, i.e., the more importunately, does the subiectum rise up,
and all the more impetuously, too, do observation of and teaching about the
world change into a doctrine of man, into anthropology."
By the same token, Foucault's puncturing discourse does not amount to
positioning France as the pointe, the tip, the headland, the advanced point."
33 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (London: Paladin Books, 1988),
p.244. It is also licit to see a profound continuity between Foucault's discourse and that of
traditional Marxism. In Barthes' terms, Foucault's writing would tread a fine line between the
litotic and the emphatic (Barthes, Writing Degree, p.29). I shall return to this observation at
a later stage.
3. 'The Age of the World Picture', in The Question Concerning Technology, p.l33.
Dreyfus maintains that if at one time Heidegger believed that man was dominating everything,
he later came to hold that man was not in control, that technology rendered him a mere effect
of forces, a trajectory Foucault follows in the later work on prisons (Dreyfus, 'On the
Ordering', pp.86-87).
35 In the aforementioned 'Entretien' with Chapsal, Foucault suggests the interest in systems
is far from simply French: 'It takes all the monoglot narcissism of the French to imagine - as
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The rhetorical distance from someone like Francois Mauriac is apparent,
Foucault rejecting the tradition of French national mythography descending
from Michelet based on the personification of France."
The absence of a discourse on the patria does not necessarily mean,
though, that patriotism is foresworn. The recourse to Borges in the preface of
The Order 0/ Things is revealing in this respect. The appeal which Borges
holds for Foucault relates to the former's exploration of the labyrinth and the
metamorphosis, the 'mythical spaces of the Western imagination', to borrow
Foucault's judgement of Roussel. In Borges, the labyrinth is transformed from
the image of a forbidden enclosed space into a metaphor of the imprisonment
which results, paradoxically, from infinity. Most obviously in 'The House of
Asteri6n' . Similarly, metamorphosis disrupts the identity, and mutually
defining properties, of thought and individual." In the preface to The Order
of Things, Foucault uses Borges' famous piece from 'The Analytical Language
of John Wilkins' concerning that classification of animals found in 'a certain
Chinese encyclopaedia' which breaks up all the 'ordered surfaces and all the
planes (plans) with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of
existing things' (p.xv; trans. mod.). (At stake is the disruption of a projection.)
That category of animals 'included in the present classification' ruins the site
they do - that it is they who have just discovered this whole area of problems. This movement
developed in America, in England, in France, on the basis of work which had been done
immediately after the First World War in the Slav- and German-speaking countries.[ ...] We
have a hexagonal awareness of culture which means that paradoxically de Gaulle can pass for
an intellectual' (p.l5).
36 Malcolm Scott, 'Francois Mauriac and the Politics of the Sermon on the Mount',
Renaissance and Modern Studies, 36 (1993), 54-69.
37 See 'The Immortal'.
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of taxonomy, the classificatory tableau, effecting instead a 'distortion of
classification'. As Foucault notes, it is interesting that Borges gave as the
mythical homeland of this distorted tableau a precise region (China), 'whose
name alone constitutes for the West a vast reservoir of Utopias' (p.xix)." In
a move which is remarkably Borgesian, Foucault allows this vast reservoir to
well up in his own prose:
In our dreamworld, is not China precisely this privileged place of space? In
our imaginary, Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most
hierarchically ordered, the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached
to the pure unfolding of extension (I'etendue); we dream of it as a
civilization of dikes and dams beneath the eternal face of the sky; we see it,
spread out and frozen, over the entire surface of a continent surrounded by
walls. Its very writing does not reproduce the fugitive flight of the voice in
horizontal lines; it erects in vertical columns the motionless and still-
recognizable image of things themselves. So much so that the Chinese
encyclopaedia quoted by Borges, and the taxonomy it proposes, lead to a
thought without space, to words and categories that lack all life and place,
but which ultimately dwell in a ceremonial space, overburdened with
complex figures, with tangled paths, strange places, secret passages, and
unexpected communications. There would thus be, at the other end of the
earth we inhabit, a culture entirely devoted to the ordering of extension but
one which would not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any
of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think.
(p.xix; trans. mod.)
As with Borges on the kabbalah and on Arab thought, though in much less
detail, Foucault is content to allow the mythical otherness of China to resonate
in all its, for our thought, disturbing aspects. Amid the metaphors of the
disruption and transgression of space, China is momentarily annexed to aid in
the centrifugal movement of thought. In the final sentence of the preface, this
movement presages both a groundswell and an earth tremor: 'In attempting to
bring to light this profound "dislevelling" (denivellation) of Western culture,
we are restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its
38 In the related 'Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias' from 1967, Foucault locates
the oldest example of a heterotopia again beyond the West, this time in the traditional garden
of Persia.
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instability, its faults; and it is this same ground which is once more stirring
under our feet' (p.xxiv; trans. mod.). Maintaining the central metaphor of
archaeology, Foucault assimilates the disruption of the ground of our thought
to that of our geopolitics (the word sol extends from 'ground' to 'soil', in the
sense of 'on French soil'). The awkward word denivellatton suggests not only
a difference in levels within Western culture but a 'making uneven', a
'lowering' of that same culture. I shall question later in what sense the
metaphorics of disjuncture may be termed disruptive and similarly the degree
of 'levelling' that Foucault operates here between thought and geopolitics, that
is, the extent to which tremors in the first may truly be said to resonate in the
second.
Be that as it may, there is obvious irony in allowing a text by Borges
to stand as an ebranlement, a 'shaking', 'weakening'. 'disturbance'.
'unhinging'. of Western culture. Borges is not nearly so formalist as the
Foucault of The Order of Things. If there is transgression of space in Borges,
there is also a strong sense of continuity: firstly, in the notion that history is
but the repetition of a few metaphors (as in 'Pascal's Sphere'). that the
'system' thus stretches far back into the past and cannot be conceived of in
terms of discrete epistemes; secondly, in the idea that ancestry and blood are
binding ties to tradition. In 'The Dead Man'. Benjamin Otalora responds to
the call of ancestry: 'That life is new to him, and at times cruel, but it is
already in his blood. because just as men of other nations venerate and make
offerings to the sea, so we (including the man who weaves these symbols) long
for the inexhaustible plain that reverberates beneath the hooves' (Borges, Prosa
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completa, 2, pp.256-257).39 Ariadne did not hang herself. Mythical or not,
there is a forceful centripetal tendency in Borges which betokens a different
attitude and ethos towards the notion of tradition, a key theme in the question
of Europe." Borges uses the following words from Francis Bacon (Essays
LVIII) as an epigraph to 'The Immortal': 'Solomon saith: There is no new
thing upon the earth. So that as Plato had an imagination, that all knowledge
was but remembrance; so Solomon giveth his sentence, that all novelty is but
oblivion' (p.239).
Euro-centrism and the idea of economy
But let us return to our main argument, to the question of Foucault's
putative Eurocentrism. I shall argue in this section that the charge contains a
fundamental misreading and a troubling aggression. For even if one senses
vast generalizations about European thought in the sweep of The Order of
Things ('Taking a relatively short chronology and a restricted geographical cut
[decoupage] - European culture since the sixteenth century' [p.386]), Foucault
eschews universalization and acknowledges, here as elsewhere, the Western
limits of his scope at the same time as he questions the possibility of any
proper limits. Thus, Said's judgement on Foucault ('his Eurocentrism was
almost total, as if history itself took place only among a group of French and
39 'Story of the Warrior and of the Captive' would contradict this pull of ancestral ties.
The barbarian Lombard warrior, Droctulft, changes sides and ends up defending the civilized
city (Ravena) whose destruction he had sought. The English woman turns her back on
European civilization and remains with the Indians in the desert.
40 For Foucault on tradition as the embodiment of a constructed continuity, see The
Archaeology, pp.21-25.
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German thinkers') is a gross simplification." First, neither Pierre Riviere,
Herculine Barbin nor many of the inmates of La Salpetriere were schooled in
Konigsberg or Paris. Second, and without claiming for Foucault's work an
unimpeachable intellectual reach, not to explore other histories is not ipsofacto
to deny them - and Foucault never proscribed the question of colonialism.
Third, to write exclusively about French or German thinkers may be to exhibit
a broadly European perspective; it is not necessarily to be Eurocentric.
Eurocentrism involves holding up European thought or values as the self-
identical centre around which all else orbits and against which everything else
is defined.
In this respect, the art historian Kenneth Clark, whom one might
condemn on the above grounds, is an interesting case. The preface to the book
of the television series Civilisation unfurls the classic humanist discourse
(history as continuity; the progress of the 'human mind', of 'mankind' , and of
the 'European mind', all in the singular; the national stereotypes: Spain is
omitted because 'she has simply remained Spain') and by 'civilization' means
'Western Europe'. Yet, as Clark himself remarks, it would be obtuse indeed
to believe he thought it the only civilization. The' ancient civilisations' of
Egypt, Syria, Greece, Rome, China, Persia, India and the world of Islam,
would simply have necessitated many more programmes, and in any case he
fears assessing cultures whose language he does not know.
However, I confess that the title has worried me. It would have been easy
in the eighteenth century: Speculations on the Nature 0/ Civilisation as
illustrated by the Changing Phases of Ctvtlised Life in Western Europefrom
41 Edward W. Said, 'Michel Foucault, 1926-1984', in After Foucault, pp.9.10.
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the Dark Ages to the Present Day. Unfortunately, this is no longer
practicable. (Clark, Civilisation, p.xvii)
Compare this to Foucault's Preface to Anti-Oedipus. The opening words:
'During the years 1945-1965 (I am referring to Europe), there was a certain
way of thinking correctly' (p.xi). That's a long time and a big place. In fact,
statements of specificity can always look like the most unsatisfactory of
generalizations. Spivak's averred positionality (,feminist, Marxist
deconstructivist') certainly begs more questions than it contains epithets.
An unfair concession seems already to have been made, though, if we
allow that Foucault's interest lies exclusively in Western knowledge and power
as commodities produced solely through the labours of the West. In fact, there
are references in his work to beyond Europe and the West, points of fugue
which demand quotation marks (even though they form part of the West's
system of script) around 'Western'. In Discipline and Punish, the colonial
question is not altogether neglected. Foucault alludes to an increase in the
theft at the port of London of products arriving from America and the West
Indies (pp.85-86), and to the birth of an empiricism 'that covered the things
of the world' at a time when the Western world 'was beginning the economic
and political conquest of this same world' (p.226). And just for the record, in
the 1967 piece 'Of Other Spaces' (therefore long before Discipline and
Punish), Foucault cites both the seventeenth-century Puritan colonies founded
by the English in America and the Jesuit colonies established in South America
as examples of heterotopias, describing the 'totally regulated' existence of the
latter. In Histoire de la folie, and as far as knowledge is concerned, Foucault
evokes the possibility (his expression is timid: 'It is not impossible that. ..') that
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the Orient together with Arab thought had played a determining part in
influencing the formation in Europe since the Middle Ages of a 'medical
humanism' which had reached out to the insane (p.133). Possibly as early as
the seventh century a hospital reserved for the mad had been founded at Fez,
an Arab connection which explains for Foucault why the first such European
institutions should have appeared in Spain."
Where political and economic power are concerned, on the other hand,
he argues that the internment of the insane and other 'unreasonable' elements
at the end of the seventeenth century in Europe was a response to economic
crisis probably due to a collapse in the Spanish economy brought on by a
cessation of mining in the Latin American colonies (Histoire de la folie, p.77).
Further, he cites the intention of the English to use the newly discovered lands
of the East and West Indies as escape valves for their own steadily growing
mendicant population (p.78), and also mentions French exploitation of the
North American colonies in the early years of the eighteenth century, achieved
by means of those among the interned population considered '''bons pour les
lIes''', who were then embarked at La Rochelle and put to work for the French
economy in the New World (p.422).43 I would venture at this juncture that the
values attached to these examples are not fortuitous: what comes freely from
beyond Europe (medicine) is good, what Europe does to its colonies (extract
42 Foucault restates the indebtedness of European development in the Middle Ages to the
Arab world in a Spanish interview, 'Le Pouvoir, une bete magnifique', in Dits et ecrits, III,
pp.368-382 (first publ. as 'El poder, una bestia magnifica', Cuadernos para el did/ogo, 238,
19-25 November 1977).
43 The first and fourth examples are excised completely from the English translation while
the explanation for Spain's crisis is omitted from the second.
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wealth) is bad. When Foucault notes that another product of the Latin
American slave colonies were the 'technologies of power', we note in tum that
they are not, of course, an indigenous invention (Remarks, p.170). If anything,
Foucault's discussions of Europe and its others valorize the latter, even if to
accomplish this he occasionally resorts to positive stereotypes, as happens with
the over-spiritualized judgement of the Iranian revolution, of which more later.
In any event, although it assumes only a minor role in Foucault's writings,
there is a recognition on his part that European knowledge and power do not
spring Minerva-like out of themselves, that any genealogy of European
capitalism must necessarily pass by way of the colonial projects.
That said, and despite its theoretically borderless economy which we
praised in the previous chapter, the theory of power that Foucault elaborates
in La Volonte de savoir is not exempt from problems, theoretical and
geopolitical, which risk reinstituting false boundaries and illicit homogeneities.
Against its better instincts, the book seems to want to restore a form of epochal
and geopolitical unity to the modern West. Since power in 'our society' can
no longer wholly be embodied in a unique central point or source of
sovereignty, Foucault writes that our representations of power should likewise
cut off the king's head. It is noticeable, though, how absolutism marks this
announcement of the end of sovereignty. The partage, or guillotine, mentality
still lingers: here and now, disciplinary power; there and at that time, a
sovereign force. Elsewhere, Foucault remarks that disciplinary power 'is in
every aspect the antithesis' of the sovereign model.44 This discourse of the
44 Foucault, 'Two Lectures', Power/Know/edge, pp.78-108 (p.l04).
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guillotine would constitute a sort of surrogate form of revolution. a
revolutionary language without the revolution. Barthes says of the writing of
the French Revolution that its exercise was tied to 'the Blood which had been
shed' (p.27):
The Revolution was in the highest degree one of those great occasions when
truth, through the bloodshed that it costs, becomes so weighty that its
expression demands the very forms of theatrical amplification.
Revolutionary writing was the one and only emphatic gesture commensurate
with the daily presence of the guillotine. What today appears turgid was
then no more than life-size. This writing, which bears all the signs of
inflation, was an exact writing: never was language more incredible, yet
never was it less spurious. (Writing Degree, pp.27-28; trans. mod.)
Despite moving us away from the supplice in Discipline and Punish, the
discourse of the scaffold persists in Foucault, bearing the signs of a modern
form of inflation. Let us say that we are not in an absolutely different, and
modem, era of power, a point betokened by an awkward shuffling in La
Volonte, where power is at once specifically modern and yet irrascibly general.
Even when it would seem that power was held in the fist of a single great
sovereign, there must still have been class, sexual, religious and economic
power, the shifting sands of which might coalesce just enough to depose him
(Charles I of England, for instance). Equally, not all modem power is subtle,
faceless disciplinary coercion, as evidenced by 'the exceptional forms of
capitalist State (fascism, military dictatorship, etc.) which infest to-day's
world'."
Furthermore, the division between power regimes in La Volonte is
predicated on a precarious geopolitical faultline, emerging on the heels of a
<4S Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. by Patrick Camiller (London: Verso,
1980), p.80.
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certain relationship between life and history. Foucault argues that although life
has always impinged on history (in the shape of epidemic and famine), only
in recent times, and only in the West, has a certain 'threshold of biological
modernity' been reached, whereby techniques for the control and management
of life mean that the species enters a society's political strategies as one of the
conscious stakes." Again positivism lurks, as if power regimes (like epistemes
or discourses) existed in a state of uncontaminated purity at a specific time and
in a specific place." Foucault seems, therefore, at one level of his discourse,
to erect and conform to all three types of border limits that Derrida refers to
in Aporias: namely, the geopolitical and cultural separations, those between
domains of discourse, and finally the forms of the border that separate concepts
or terms." Spivak, who rightly contests the geopolitical division, relates
Foucault's separatist instinct to the theoretical lack in his work of a thought of
inscription, which means that he 'buys' a self-contained version of the West,
symptomatically ignoring its production by the imperialist project. It is not
strictly the case, however, that he omits to think inscription. In The Birth of
the Clinic, and it is a theme taken up by The Order of Things, Foucault is at
pains to show the formation of the 'technical and conceptual trinity' of life,
disease, and death. Before Beckett, Bichat:
46 The English translation contrives to omit 'biological'. The History of Sexuality, p.143.
47 Foucault invokes an untenable division even between the contemporary dictatorship of
Poland and those of Latin America. Foucault et al, "'En abandonnant les Polonais, nous
renoncons a une part de nons-memes", Le Nouvel Observateur, 9 October 1982, p.36.
48 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1993), p.23.
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Bichat relativized the concept of death, bringing it down from that absolute
in which it appeared as an indivisible, decisive, irrecoverable event: he
volatilized it, distributed it throughout life in the form of separate, partial,
progressive deaths, deaths that are so slow in occurring that they extend even
beyond death itself. (The Birth, p.l44)
Be that as it may, Spivak maintains that Foucault forgets that the new
mechanism of power invented in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
which he says is 'absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty',
is secured precisely by means of territorial imperialism elsewhere, in places,
moreover, where the representation of sovereignty is still pertinent:
Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault's analysis of the
centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of that
heterogeneous phenomenon: management of space - but by doctors,
development of administrations - but in asylums, considerations of the
periphery - but in terms of the insane, prisoners, and children. The clinic,
the asylum, the prison, the university, seem screen-allegories that foreclose
a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism. (Spivak, In Other Worlds,
p.210.)
It is true that the section of Discipline and Punish which deals with the
distribution of individuals in space elects not to explore the question of
imperialism or colonialism, though it does not thereby preclude consideration
of it." Indeed, despite a metaphorical use of the term colonization (he writes
of the 'colonization' of delinquency by the dominant illegalisms [p.285]),
Foucault touches briefly and unmetaphorically on the plans (soon abandoned)
of the July monarchy to use deportees in the colonization of Algeria
(Discipline and Punish, p.279).sO Likewise, he is not oblivious to the 'racism
of expansion' of the second half of the nineteenth century (The History of
49 'I shall choose examples from military, medical, educational and industrial institutions.
Other examples might have been taken from colonization, slavery and child rearing' (Discipline
and Punish, p.314, n.l).
so He mentions Algeria fleetingly in Foucault, 'Michel Foucault on Attica', p.IS7.
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Sexuality, p.125).51
One wonders, on the other hand, if Spivak herself goes far enough in
her criticism, or if she is not reluctant to relinquish the hubristic idea of a
categorical geopolitical difference between First and Third World. To think
that the reinscription of sovereignty comes only from 'elsewhere', as though
Europe did not bear the traces of sovereign power from before the imperialist
project, would be to restitute a certain partage. As though, too, the Third
World did not already carry within it disciplinary possibilities. In Garcia
Marquez's novel The Autumn of the Patriarch, the portrayal of a monstruously
archetypal Latin American dictator, the supp/ice sits side by side with the
surveillance technology of a modern, late twentieth-century state, the symbols
of a sovereign and a disciplinary regime respectively. 52 And again, Foucault's
earlier remark regarding the technologies of slave colonies further suggests a
more complex order of power. 53
The strictly theoretical dimension of Foucault's formulation of power
in the first volume on sexuality is more successful than the historical aspect in
evoking this complex economy of power. His theory, which emerges precisely
in contradistinction to an 'economism' - a Marxist economism but also the
liberal, juridical variant, where power is taken to be a right, which one
possesses like a commodity, or understood as something one exchanges -,
SI See also Foucault, 'Eugene Sue quej'aime', Les Nouvelles Liueraires, 12 January 1978,
p.3.
52 Gabriel Garda Marquez, El otoPlodel patriarca (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1975),
pp.226-231.
53 Compare Foucault, 'Two Lectures' (p.93) where he intimates that the division of power
regimes might be a matter of degree.
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posits that power is literally everywhere, produced from one moment to the
next 'in every relation from one point to another' (The History of Sexuality,
p.93). There is no outside of power, merely an economy of forces (always
understood that oiko-nomia, as 'the law-of-the-house and the law of the
proper', precisely exceeds the economic narrowly defined"), an economy in
which relations of power are 'not in a position of exteriority with respect to
other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships,
sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter' (The History of Sexuality,
p.94). An economy of power in which logos matters profoundly: 'Has not the
practice of revolutionary discourse and scientific discourse in Europe over the
past two hundred years freed you from this idea that words are wind, an
external whisper, a beating of wings that one has difficulty in hearing in the
serious matter of history' (The Archaeology, p.209)?
Post-colonial theories of discourse: economics and critique
Foucault's work on the power-effects of knowledge relationships has
proved an important resource for post-colonial theories of discourse. Even if
his work provides no direct analysis of colonialism, it does offer a theoretical
and historical model of the complicity between forms and institutions of
knowledge and forms of power, though its limitations are clearly exposed on
the question of resistance. Said, Bhabha and Spivak have all variously mined
Foucault's writings for insights. Said: 'The parallel between Foucault's
carceral system and Orientalism is striking. For as a discourse Orientalism,
54 See Jacques Derrida, 'Le Retrait de la metaphore', in Psyche, pp.63-93 (p.7S).
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like all discourses, is "composed of signs; but what they [discourses] do is
more than use these signs to designate things. It is this 'more' that renders
them irreducible to the (sic) language and to speech'" (Said, 'The Problem of
Textuality', pp.711-712; quoting from The Archaeology of Knowledge). This
'more' lies in the power of discipline to differentiate, classify, exclude, and
ultimately constitute an entire domain called 'the Orient'.
The notion of Europe's or the West's constituting or constructing other
peoples and places can readily be disengaged from Foucault's texts. His
analyses are centrally concerned with the processes of objectification by means
of which a body of knowledge, a savoir, comes to be institutionalized and a
subject (knowing or known) constituted therein. It is not my intention to
examine the manner in which Foucault's work is taken up by the
aforementioned thinkers. Rather, my concern touches upon an overstatement
of the link between knowledge and power, whereby European historicism is
condemned for its collusion in European geopolitical hegemony but European
postmodern thought, by a neat turn of the wheel, invested with the power to
put an end to this dominance. I shall suggest in the remainder of this chapter
that Foucault's work must take its share of responsibility for this inflation,
firstly because of the genealogies' Manichaeism in respect of the nexus
Europe-thought-power, and secondly because of the voluntarism which marks
the disjunctive discourse explored earlier.
I should like to address these issues by turning to Robert Young's
White Mythologies, a text which assumes the link between knowledge
relationships and power but proposes to make positive use of it. I choose
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Young because he draws explicitly on Foucault but also, and perhaps more
importantly, because he draws on what I would call the spirit of Foucault, even
if his project would advertise itself as primarily Derridian rather than
Foucaultian in nature. Young harnesses Foucault's genealogies to a wider
project of deconstruction involving the 'decentralization' and 'decolonization'
of European thought - insofar as the philosophical tradition of the latter makes
"'common cause with oppression and with the totalitarianism of the same'"
(Young, White Mythologies, p.18; quoting Derrida). For Young, the result of
this project of our 'Postmodern' era is nothing less than the 'dissolution' of
'the West'. At this point, it seems licit to ask what might be put in the place
of 'Europe'. What other economy, of knowledge and power, could avoid the
sins of old Europe? Might a postmodern economy accomplish these
objectives? Let us suspend these questions for the time being. For now, we
note that there is a causal chain in Young borne, curiously, by disjuncture, by
a surfeit of disjunctive prefixes the like of which we have observed in
Foucault. Through an activity of thought (deconstruction), we can effect a
process - more than simply a thought process - which leads to the
decentralization, decolonization and eventual dissolution of the concept 'the
West'. The inverted commas are important: Young is not saying that with the
aid of deconstruction a piece of Brittany will slip into the sea. In the final
paragraph of his book, by contrast, there is a strategic removal of quotation
marks. Young writes that the analysis of colonialism shows the enactment of
the links between Western history and Western historicism 'in the colonial past
and the neocolonial present' (Young, p.175). Leaving aside the question of
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mischaracterization - Young's text barely analyzes colonialism and the 'links'
between history and historicism remain heavily overdetermined - Young
rightly contests the credo that thought, rather like quotation marks in relation
to a word, is suspended in an ideal realm above reality: 'The effect of this
[analysis] has been to produce a shift away from the problem of history as an
idea towards an examination of Western history's and historicism's
contemporary political ramifications' (Young, p.17S). Western historicism, like
Western history, has contemporary political ramifications, without quotation
marks. This is Said territory: 'The simple fact is that between 1815, when
European powers were in occupation of approximately 35 percent of the
earth's surface, and 1918, when that occupation had extended to 85 percent,
discursive power increased accordingly' (Said, 'The Problem of Textuality,,
p.711). The point, for Young, is to embrace the political character of thought,
only this time to de- rather than re-colonize.
There are certain questions that I should like to pose: Is the
decolonization of European thought possible through thought alone? What of
economy as economics in the narrow sense? And finally, what in all this is the
value of 'Europe'? Let us be guided by Young's praise of Spivak's analysis
of Jane Eyre: 'It is impossible to forget that the moment when Jane achieves
her independence by inheriting a fortune - from the West Indies - is also the
moment in which she becomes complicit with the history of slavery' (Young,
p.166). For we can see here a cameo of the Western academic's position. The
bid for academic independence from the paradigms of a constraining institution
takes place at the same time as we invest our salaries inWestern banking and
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commercial interests, many of whose activities consist in cementing economic
imbalances between 'the West' and the former colonies, and much of whose
effort goes to removing the inverted commas. Take the example, from Latin
America, of the foreign debt.
Significant changes in the world economy took place in the 19708,
including a process of deregulation of the fmancial world, the disintegration of
controls on the movement of private capital, the emergence of private banks
as principal lenders to the Third World." The OPEC crisis of 1974 fuelled
recession in the West and led to a falloff in the demand by Western
governments for new loans. Certain Third World countries, on the other hand,
were anxious for loans, $60 billion worth of which was forthcoming from
private and commercial Western banks to Latin America between 1975 and
1982. In point of fact this was vastly more money than the banks had left in
their vaults - a flagrant transgression of one of the cardinal rules of banking.
Furthermore, there was seant analysis of the risks, no monitoring of the debtor
. countries' ability to pay, little consideration of to whom the money was being
lent.
In Latin America in the mid-1970s, the money was being lent to a
series of unelected regimes, be they military dictatorships or bureaucratic-
authoritarian machines. This was the case in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia
and Argentina, the latter receiving a $290m loan from the International
Monetary Fund in the wake of the military seizure of power in 1976. A
ss What follows relies heavily on Jackie Roddick, The Dance of the Millions: Latin
America and the Debt Crisis (London: Latin America Bureau, 1988); and Susan George, A
Fate Worse than Debt (London: Penguin Books, 1989),
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sizable proportion of the money went on purchasing military hardware but the
flight of capital was perhaps the most acute problem: the World Bank estimates
that between 1979 and 1982 $19.2bn left Argentina. Now, and this is the crux
of the matter for my limited purposes, on the return to democratic governments
the debts still had, and have, to be honoured, and at vastly higher interest rates
than those in place at the time at which the bulk of the debt was contracted.
In other words, it is perfectly possible for a deconstructed, decentralized,
decolonized and dissolved conglomeration of bodies to break down national
boundaries, transgress the rules of their own institution, lose, and still win.
Therefore, and as Foucault's first volume on sexuality is keenly aware,
the question of contesting an already fragmented dominant order (as Young
urges us to) is a complex one. Firstly, if resistances, like power, are plural,
mobile and transitory, 'fracturing unities and effecting regroupings' (The
History of Sexuality, p.96), then it is difficult to say what is resistance and
certainly to guarantee that it will continue being so. For this reason, we ought
to question the contemporary signs of inflation which have got into the
discursive system and which manifest themselves in the widespread tendency
(which does not belong exclusively to modernity and even less to Foucault)
towards a metaphorics of disjuncture and destruction. Stephen Kern, for
example, compares the disruption wrought by Cubism with a certain levelling
(a word he insists on) of spatial and even social hierarchies on the battlefields
of World War I: 'If an artist, aviator, or anyone should actually see the earth
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as no one has ever seen it before, then the old world must go smash. ,56 Again,
this time on the levelling brought about the communications 'revolution':
'Telephones break down barriers of distance - horizontally across the face of
the land and vertically across social strata. They make all places equidistant
from the seat of power and hence of equal value' (Kern, p.316). Yet if all
places were of equal value, there would be no 'seat' of power.57 Indeed,
perhaps disjuncture is and has been for some time (strictly speaking, Derrida
would say it has always been) a modus operandi, a modus vivendi. As Richard
Terdiman says apropos of nineteenth-century newspapers, they instruct us in
the irreducible fragmentation of daily experience and prepare us to live in it.
Furthermore, 'there is a real sense in which the principle of organization of
these structures - of the market, of the daily paper - is a systematic emptying
of any logic of connection. They rationalize disjunction; they are organized
as disorgantzation'P" For this reason, the prefixal weighting of a book like
William Rowe and Vivien Schelling's Memory and Modernity: Popular
Culture in Latin America, which aligns 'pluri-', 'multi-', 'hetero-' with the
culturally desirable and progressive, should be closely examined, even if one
56 The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1983), p.312.
57 Kern says as much: 'The distance between the fighting and the decision-making created
an experiential and emotional gap between the generals and the men at the front [who
presumably could not telephone their fellow foot soldiers: AS] that enabled commanders to
continue to spin table-top plans for offensives and be shielded from direct contact with the
disastrous consequences' (p.309).
58 Discaurse/Counier-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in
Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p.127. The same point
about newspapers as a kind of metonym of capitalism is made by Gerald Graff, Literature
Against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modem Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979),
p.92. Terry Eagleton argues similarly that capitalism is the great dismantler of the sacred and
the fixed (The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p,37S).
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is broadly in sympathy with its attempt to valorize that continent's popular
cultures. 59 Historically speaking, and as Kenneth Clark argues, it is the self-
same emphasis on unshackled, freely-circulating processes - fluid capital, free
economy, dislike of state interference - which gives rise both to the great
artistic, intellectual and architectural achievements of the seventeenth-century
Netherlands for instance and to the soon to be squallor of industrial society
(Clark, p.154). Such decentralizing forces thus need not necessarily cut across
the grain of large power conglomerates and in fact may even be gilt-edged."
Foucault speaks precisely of the 're-colonisation' of subjugated knowledges by
unitary discourses ('Two Lectures', p.86). Conversely, even the state - stick-
in-the-mud centralizer to the last - need not always and everywhere represent
the forces of oppression and may even, as Derrida observes, help us to fight
against private and transnational empires."
Secondly, it would indeed be a lacuna in the economy of power for
economics to figure as metaphor but not as economics in the narrow sense.
While Foucault is no economist, he nevertheless does not reject economics: 'It
effectively remains the case that the relations of power do indeed remain
profoundly enmeshed in and with economic relations and participate with them
59 London: Verso, 1991.
60 Gilt-edged, '(of a security, esp. British government stock) having a high degree of
reliability as an investment' (NSOED). As Sheldon S. Wolin puts it: 'The hoariest cliche is
that we live in a changing world. The second hoariest cliche associates change with progress
toward freedom, democracy, and the alleviation of mass suffering. The significance of
Reaganism and Thatcherism is that change has become a conservative category. We live in
a constantly changing world because change is institutionalized and manufactured.' 'On the
Theory and Practice of Power', in After Foucault, pp.179-201 (pp.183-184).
61 Jacques Derrida, 'The Other Heading: Memories, Responses, and Responsibilities', in
The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and
Michael B. Naas (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p.37.
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in a common circuit' (Foucault, 'Two Lectures', p.89). (One assumes that at
least part of that common circuit is occupied by daily world-wide foreign
exchange flows of around one trillion dollars/") It is worth recalling that
Discipline and Punish postulates that the disciplines emerge precisely as a
response both to the great demographic increase and the growth in the
apparatus of production in the eighteenth century, and that disciplinary power
is marked emphatically by the economic in the narrow sense since it serves
simultaneously to increase the subjected forces and improve the force and
efficacy of that which subjects them. Foucault's portrait of the insane in
Htstoire de la folie is about madness as a medical, moral but also economic
affair. There is a vital economic principle running throughout the book,
whereby madness is perenially linked to the question of non-productivity and
indigence, and indeed a good measure of the text's tremendous power derives
from the poignancy and pathos which attach to Foucault's immersing the mad
into the same mire of poverty and squallor as all the other children of St
Francis. It would be a lacuna, then, for Foucault's rhetorical question, cited
by Young, regarding the West's claim to universal validity ('was this not a
mirage associated with economic domination and political hegemony?') to be
dissolved by contemporary efforts at enlightenment. For his part, Young uses
the metaphor of a 'conflictual economy' to which colonial power is subject
(Young, p.142), yet virtually elides the role of economics in Spivak's work
62 Paul Kennedy, Preparing/or the Twenty-First Century (London: Harper Collins, 1993),
p.St.
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(alluding to her neolithic-sounding 'residual classical Marxism'j." It makes
interesting reading to compare this elision of economics with his inflation of
'critique', the latter able to inflect both theory and detailed historical material
towards 'an inversion of the dominant structures of knowledge and power'."
A case of making a revolution easy for all.65
And yet the 'decolonization' of European thought could not be
accomplished strictly by thought, unless bank deposits count as thought-less (an
aim, it must be said, which automation renders plausible), nor by the restitution
of a strict causality between thought and politics, for thought is never self-
identical, can never be purged of undesirable traces. In this project of
deterritorialization, it is pointless, if well-meaning, to try and cede the
uncedable. Young is well aware of this fact ('it is not an issue of removing
colonial thinking from European thought, of purging it, like today's dream of
"stamping out" racism' [Young, p.1l9]). And again, when he construes the
relationship between thought on the one hand and colonialist politics and
commercial exploitation on the other as mutually reinforcing, though not
isomorphic (since thought has lagged behind the other areas in 'decolonizing'
63 Spivak herself writes: 'A "culturalism" that disavows the economic in its global
operations cannot get a grip on the concomitant production of barbarism' (Spivak, In Other
Worlds, p.l68).
64 Young, p.173. In fact an economic concern creeps in at the death. Young paraphrases
Salman Rushdie to the effect that Europe no longer colonizes to exploit labour power, since
the latter comes to Europe. He adds: 'If the imperial situation has thus been reversed, the
power-structure remains exactly the same' (Young, p.175). Ironically, Young's economism
is suddenly far greater than the economism I accused him of ignoring. However, that the
power-structure remains 'exactly the same' was certainly not what I wanted to suggest. For
a similar inflation of critique and critical strategy in relation to Foucault's work, see David
Carroll, Paraesthetics, p.77.
6S Cf. The Archaeology, p.208.
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itself), he touches on the intractably residual quality of thought. Rather than
a project for a new, pristine order, Young's objective, following Fanon whom
he cites unquestioningly, appears to be disorder." The effect of the negative
prefixes is to situate Young as one who feels neither anxiety nor nostalgia at
the 'loss' of Europe, as one who escapes the condition of a Western culture
'which constantly fantasizes itself as constituting some kind of integral totality,
at the same time as endlessly deploring its own impending dissolution' (Young,
p.139). However, if we are witnessing the 'dissolution of "the West''', then
'we' should know that something - here a concept or a notional geographical
entity - cannot dissolve into nothing; it simply changes form or state. I
suggest that this is why Derrida would be circumspect about any such
dissolution. Using a cognate word, Derrida writes of the danger that European
cultural identity might find itself 'dispersed' into 'a multiplicity of self-
enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each one jealous and
untranslatable' (Derrida, The Other Heading, p.39). The fate of Yugoslavia
. and the Soviet Union are two obvious cases where ethnic rivalry and regional
separatism have resurfaced in the wake of national disintegration. At a world,
as opposed to European, level, Paul Kennedy observes that by the early 1990s
there were almost three times as many states compared with sixty years before
(Kennedy, p.330). The concomitant danger that Derrida points to takes us
close to Foucault. It concerns a new centralization which, by reconstituting
'places of an easy consensus' through 'mobile, omnipresent, and extremely
66 "'Deco Ionization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously a
programme of complete disorder'" (Young, p.l20).
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rapid' media networks that immediately cross every border, breeds a
normalization which would establish a cultural capital 'at any place and at all
times [...] remote control as one says in English for the TV, a ubiquitous tele-
command, quasi-immediate and absolute' (Derrida, The Other Heading, pp.39-
40). Although the stress falls in Foucault's economy of power on its unstable,
mobile and micro-physical character, nonetheless, and as I argued in the last
chapter, he never discounts the 'more general powers or economic interests'
('Two Lectures', p.99), the large-scale 'major dominations' which, he says,
'are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations' (The
History of Sexuality, p.94), that second '"power''' ('le' pouvoir), which is the
'over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities [...] and seeks in turn to
arrest their movement' (The History of Sexuality, p.93). Again, Kennedy
makes the point that, at one level, 'far from national borders being dismantled,
they are simply being folded into a bigger entity - the EC, a North American
free-trade zone, a yen-dominated area - with the world economy increasingly
dominated by three enormous regional trading blocs' (Kennedy, p.285).
The gamut of expressions used by Young which tell of the West losing
power, seeing its control and authority subverted, appear to overlook those
forces through which the West is, in the same movement, gaining control,
albeit in an uneven fashion. Even if the shareholders of multinational
corporations have become the new sovereigns, as Kennedy submits, the
presence of a certain critical mass - institutional, infrastructural, financial -
ensures that control remains largely in Western hands. In fact, in economic
terms, and despite the flow of development aid from North to South, there
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remains a huge net transfer of capital from the Third to the First World - an
estimated $43 billion every year (Kennedy, p.224). At another level, and as
Derrida puts it, it is quite possible that Europe itself renounces the role as the
centre or capital of the planet 'only at the moment when the fable of a
planetarization of the European model still seems quite plausible' (Derrida, The
Other Heading, p.36). So then, there is a certain irony in Young's
voluntaristic, decidedly uneconomic inflation of thought. First, because he has
precisely not wanted to divorce cultural, symbolic power from the general
power of the colonial situation, insisting that the deconstruction of European
thought is part of the process of European decolonization, as before it the
humanist project was bound up with the original acquisition of colonies.
Second, because he himself takes Homi Bhabha to task for a similar
voluntarism: for suggesting that thinking the 'hybridization' of colonial power
allows us to read between the lines of the colonizer's discourse to see another,
subversive colonized voice at work, and even "'to change the often coercive
reality that [those lines] so lucidly contain'''. Is this a real historical resistance,
Young asks, or does it have to wait for the astute critic many years later?
'And precisely what reality can such a reading between the lines hope to
change?' 'What political status can be accorded the subversive strategies that
Bhabha articulates', and what is their relation to 'the general text of
colonialism' (Young, pp.148-151)? I read these remarks as objections to the
literary theorist's failure to think through the relationship between subject-
positions and the individual which we explored in Chapter three. Again, if it
is a question of economy broadly understood, then thinking oiko-nomia as 'the
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law-of-the-house and the law of the proper' need not amount to finding a
single site, intellectual discipline or force (say economics narrowly defined) as
the seat of power. However, economy would require consideration of degree,
proportion, distribution.
Maria Daraki has some interesting musings apropos of the relationship
between economics and intellectual production in Foucault. She argues that
Foucault's work offers a plausible description of the very real psychological
overdetermination of modem man by consumer society and its massive
capacity to overdetermine desires. However, his work gives no cure, merely
attacking 'anthropolitical finitude'. While the situationists denounce economic
power as the fundamental power, he denies the existence of any fundamental
power, proclaiming only powers plural and fragmented, and no promise of
liberation. And yet by the same token, by replacing the economic
overdetermination of desire with an anthropological determinism, Foucauldism,
she insists, perpetuates the basic ideology of economic power, namely,
determinism itself, merely rendering it more acceptable to our delicate ears.
Today, economics is, without a doubt, determining in relations of power. On
this level the proof is in the action. Where power is exercised, one is on the
strong side. On the weak side, one makes theory. Theory is in local
economic power. One enters a complicated field. There is the weight of
traditions, the realities of cultural Europe. It is not easy to tell people on the
go: you are submitting to the economic power which others exercise. You
cannot brutally give them economic determinism. You have to dilute it.
These are refined people; even under occupation, they have pretensions. they
believed themselves 'the cradle of civilization.' You have to dilute it.
Economic determinism must be served in a sauce of philosophical
determinism, where it will be essentially a question of man. (Daraki,
'Foucault's Journey', p.109)
I have some sympathy for her argument, though it would be wrong to rule out
the possibility that the surpassing of anthropological finitude might represent
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precisely a form, or better, a force ofliberation (however limited). In addition,
Daraki passes over the phenomenon according to which the relative autonomy
that Foucauldism (and she is right to say that this trend exceeds Foucault)
cedes to non-economic powers paves the way precisely for an explosion of
subversive work on power which largely brackets out the economic to produce
an undeterministic-sounding socius. It is this subversion-speak which leaves
its imprint on Young and one would have to ask (precisely because it is not
necessary) to what extent the success of this largely literary-based iconoclasm
is programmed by a certain historical receptivity of academe, by the demands
for productivity, output and enterprise, where 'research' is allied more than
ever to the post-Classical sense of technical production, of making something
appear which was not formerly there (and generating profit as a result).
It is worth recalling, though, and in order to complicate what has just
been claimed, that Foucault's discourse on 'specific intellectuals' is rather
sanguine about the subversive possibilities of the humanities." He instances
Oppenheimer, post-Darwinian evolutionists, and physicists as specific
intellectuals, distancing himself pointedly from the literary or philosophical
figure. For Foucault, the specific intellectual has importance - and a certain
power - commensurate with his or her capacity to reach beyond the local and
the specific to touch the life of a population in a dramatic way. This would
not disqualify the humanities from political work; it would merely counsel a
67 Foucault, 'Truth and Power', in Power/Knowledge, pp.109-133.
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of proportion."
Constitution beyond good and evil
Finally, let us return to complicity and guilt. In this last section of the
chapter I shall suggest that a Foucaultian model of constitution has potentially
debilitating implications both for the study of other cultures and for our sense
of truth.
There is a persistent economic metaphorics at work throughout
Foucault's writings which introduces into notionally uneconomic areas the
theme of profit and loss, of winners and losers, of the obvious 'interest' or
'benefit' a discourse may have (this is thematized explicitly in La Volonu as
the 'speaker's benefit'). One of the best examples of this metaphorics (and it
is an instance closely bound to the fortunes of constitution) is provided by
Foucault in an interview from 1983:
This is my question: at what price [...] can subjects speak the truth about
themselves as mad persons? At the price of constituting the mad person as
absolutely other, paying not only the theoretical price but also an institutional
and even an economic price, as determined by the organization of psychiatry.
[...] How can the truth of the sick subject ever be told? That is the
substance of my first two books. The Order of Things asked the price of
problematizing and analyzing the speaking subject, the working subject, the
living subject. [...] I went on to pose the same kind of question in the case
of the criminal and systems of punishment: how to state the truth of oneself,
insofar as one might be a criminal SUbject. I will be doing the same thing
with sexuality, only going back much further: how does the subject speak
truthfully about itself, inasmuch as it is the subject of sexual pleasure? And
at what price?"
The metaphor of paying a price understood as sacrifice is a well-worn figure
68 Foucault, Remarks on Marx, pp.l80-181: 'Don't certain intellectuals hope to lend
themselves greater political weight with their "ideological struggle" than they really have? A
book is consumed very quickly, you know. An article, wen ...'
69 In Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp.17-46 (p.30) (first publ. as 'Structuralism
and Poststructuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault', Telos, SS (Spring 1983), 195-211).
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of common language and it would be impossible to locate a precise
predecessor, such is the number of users through whose hands (and mouths)
it has passed. But there are nevertheless interesting Nietzschean overtones
here. In Foucault's metaphorics (and it is inferred rather than stated
explicitly), 'cost' is linked to responsibility and guilt, in a moral economy
different from, though not unrelated to, that posited by Nietzsche in the Second
Essay from the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche's hypothesis concerning the
origin of guilt and bad conscience posits a crossing of the moral and the
economic, in which the moral concept of Schuld, 'guilt' and 'ought', descends
from the economic concept of Schuld en, 'debts'. To become conscious of
owing something to someone was to become aware of an obligation, a sense
of duty. Guilt is thus inseparable from the idea of repayment. Nietzsche
argues that the ghastly highpoint of this complex, Christian guilt and self-
abnegation, is the result of an original tribal association in which the living
generation always acknowledges an indebtedness (Schuld), a legal obligation
. towards the earlier generation, and particularly to the founding fathers. The
ancestors of the most powerful tribes, Nietzsche speculates, grow to an
immense stature before finally assuming the proportions and aura of a god.
Christianity continues this tradition, raising guilt to new heights of self-
flagellation.
In Foucault, the one who pays the price, offers the tribute, the guild,
is the one who, and this strictly in keeping with Nietzsche, experiences the
guilt; but in contradistinction to Nietzsche, the guilt ought by rights to belong,
together with the guild, to the creditor. Foucault is involved in an overt
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turning away from Nietzsche insofar as the inculcation of guilt into the weak
and oppressed by the strong is precisely what is injurious and shameful.
However, this turning away is itself anticipated in Nietzsche's scheme, at the
point where Nietzsche postulates that the ultimate ruse of Christianity is to
have none other than God sacrificing himself for man's guilt, none other than
God paying himself back. The point being that man thus becomes even more
indebted to God, especially since the guilt cannot be paid off once and for all,
being inexpiable and the punishment eternal. In Foucault, it is psychiatry, the
human sciences, the Western disciplinary order that must assume the guilt.
Problems arise, though, when the guilty party is an entire system, be it
Europe or the West. When Spivak postulates that the complicity between
cultural and economic value-systems is 'acted out in almost every decision we
make' (Spivak, In Other Worlds, p.166), we are at once condemned and
absolved: responsibility is ours and yet is a function of the system. Thus the
question of value, which, she says, must be asked 'as the capuccino-drinking
worker and the word-processing critic actively forget the actual price-in-
exploitation of the machine producing coffee and words', is more complex than
the innocent 'actual' would suggest - insofar as coffee machines give you
capuccinos, not actual price-in-exploitation. Interestingly, this analysis of value
'is certainly not required of every literary critic' (Spivak, In Other Worlds,
p.167), a sentiment echoed by Young (p.90) and which I take as a salutary
reminder of the importance, for the sake of the value of thought, of thinking
other things besides power (which would not amount to thinking outside
power). For there is a real danger (especially since no machine can ever
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calculate its reality) of the simultaneous hyper- and a-trophy of thought on
power, which promotes the argument that because force is everywhere, so too
should the condemnatory thought of power be - a spectacular misunderstanding
of Nietzsche, for which Foucault was in part responsible (and from which he
extracted his own gain).
Foucault's contribution to the misunderstanding derives from the same
root as his major methodological insight, namely, that objects of knowledge are
'constituted'. In The Order of Things, which, as we have seen, foregrounds
the activity of pro-jection, the way in which knowledge goes ahead in advance
of the thing to be known, the decisive moment in the passage from
Renaissance to modern learning is the 'mathematical' project, in which things
are in a sense evaluated beforehand and determined according to universal laws
in axiomatic fashion. Foucault's achievement is to carry these philosophical
insights into social history, charting the manner in which Western knowledge
and its institutions variously constitute the insane, les chases, delinquents, sex.
In Histoire de la folie, he traces the attempts to comprehend the truth of
madness which, for him, succeed only in controlling it. Derrida observes, we
recall, that Foucault's own position remains deeply disquieting since his
archaeology is by definition itself a logic, a project, an order. The connection
between the projects of knowing the mad and knowing the colonial other is
apparent here, for both operate from within the treacherous problematic
according to which the attempt to comprehend the other always threatens to
collapse the alterity of the latter into sameness. For Spivak, Europe has
constructed itself as sovereign subject while constituting the colonized, '''for
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purposes of administration and the expansion of markets, into programmed
near-images of that very sovereign self" (cited by Young, White Mythologies,
p.l7). And even the most well-meaning attempts to restore self-determination
and a proper name to 'madness itself or to 'the subaltern as such' do not
escape the perils of objectification and control.
The error that Foucault makes is to let sensitivity to the costs of
constituting the other as object ossify into an inculpation of all formalized
knowledge of marginalized others, as though the speaker's benefit precluded
any gain accruing to those represented, or indeed any deficit befalling the
speaker - be it that exacted by the academic system, or the price of persecution
(Argentina post-1966), or the price, even, of success (Eribon's biography
suggests the difficulties encountered by Foucault in living up to the public's
expectations). This was certainly not always the case with Foucault. As
Megill points out, Mental Illness and Personality talks of closing the gap
between patient-as-object and doctor. Phenomenological psychology seeks to
place itself at the centre of the experience of mental illness by entering the
consciousness of the ill person (Megill, p.201). Early caveat apart, the theme
of guilt, and more especially that of inculpation, pervades his texts. Histoire
de la folie details the two great forms of the experience of madness known to
the Classical Age. For the law, the madman is innocent; in the world of
internment, on the contrary, madness cannot be divorced from will and the
madman is thus guilty. Madness is therefore linked, in the latter view, to an
ethical choice and to freedom. But it is important to bear in mind that
madness is only the empirical form of unreason; and the madman, in his
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animality, a figure precisely of inhumanity who reveals the unreason which
always threatens man. Whence the paradox of the Classical experience of
madness. Madness is at once enveloped in the moral experience (and
potentially guilty one) of an unreason which the seventeenth century proscribes
in internment; but it is linked also to the experience of an (innocent) animal
unreason which forms the absolute limit of reason, and the scandal of the
human condition. Later, the text rounds on nineteenth-century psychiatry for
introducing madness into 'the game of culpability' (p.346), for organizing the
madman's culpability into a conscience by placing him in a field of perpetual
judgement so that, through remorse, he might return to an awareness of his
status as responsible (bourgeois) subject. In this later organization one again
finds two forms of madness, with two different connections to law: a guilty
madness abandoned to its perversion and which no determinism can excuse,
and a madness, on the contrary, whose heroism forms the mirror image of
bourgeois values. Only the latter will be given a droit de cite within reason.
Although Foucault describes the efforts of the new psychiatry as a double
movement of liberation and enslavement, the accent falls heavily on the latter.
The question remains, though, as to how far it is possible for any corpus of
knowledge to avoid the non-reciprocal gaze which Foucault says
psychoanalysis has inherited from earlier, objectifying practices. When, many
years after the skirmish which distanced him from Foucault, Derrida returns to
Histoire de la folie, he addresses precisely the question of guilt and
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condemnation." The incrimination of psychoanalysis found in that text he
links to Foucault's separatist rhetoric of 'age', 'epoch' and 'episteme'. What
interests Derrida is not the age described by the book, but the age describing;
not a psychoanalysis objectified and reduced to that about which one speaks
(a describable phenomenon on the other side, from another age, the object of
a history), but a psychoanalysis from which one speaks. All of which would
be enough to cast doubt on the very possibility of an age of psychoanalysis, on
the possibility of a temporal division between the guilt of the time of
psychoanalysis and the innocence of the time of the denunciation of
psychoanalysis and, finally, on the possibility of a psychoanalysis (as though
there could only be one).
The discourse of conscience, regrets, guilt and remorse is internalized
by Pierre Riviere and animates his account throughout, but the attribution of
guilt finds its most totalizing expression in Discipline and Punish, with
Foucault's understanding of 'the carceral' - Western disciplinary society - as
a species of self with powers to constitute the other, ex nihilo and unfailingly,
as subject subjected. I am persuaded that, despite the belligerence of 'Mon
corps', he subsequently took to heart Derrida's observation that his efforts
could not but constitute a project or order which risked repeating the act of
appropriation perpetrated against madness. As a result, and as we suggested
in Chapter two, Discipline and Punish does not even attempt to restore the
truth of the prison experience, fearful of that tendency characteristic of the
70 Jacques Derrida, "'Etre juste avec Freud". L'histoire de la folie a )'Age de la
psychanalyse' .
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medical world to 'thingify [chosifier] the other', as he puts it.71 Foucault turns
away utterly from what the inmates might have to say for themselves, in
favour of analysing the disciplinary machinery that elicits the content and form
of that speech, and as though the oppressed subject 'could seemingly speak for
himself (Spivak, In Other Worlds, p.208). Rather than any representation of
the being and meaning of others, his work targets the social machinery, the
'political technology', of projections and orders. The indictment of
disciplinary society, which covers the Enlightenment and the European human
sciences, secretes a sort of a priori fear of representing others, the trauma of
which is expurgated through the attention lavished on the detail of the
disciplinary machinery (none of which prevents him campaigning in the same
period on behalf of the politically marginalized such as the Vietnamese boat
people). In a later interview, Foucault alludes to the theme of guilt but sides
uncharacteristically with intellectuals: 'an intellectual is one who is guilty,
Guilty of a little of everything: of speaking, of remaining silent, of doing
nothing, of mixing in everywhere. In short, the raw material for a verdict, a
sentencing, a condemnation, an exclusion' (Foucault, 'The Masked
Philosopher', in Foucault Live, p.194). Notwithstanding this late recantation,
the price one pays for technological pointillism is a canvas of human sameness,
where diversity and novelty belong to the technologies rather than to the
human beings. One therefore misses the point by saying that Foucault barely
touches on non-Europeans; he does not touch much on Europeans either.
There are very few people in Foucault (likewise in Young), and you seldom
71 Foucault, 'Medicine et lutte des classes', La Ne/, 49 (1972), 67-73 (p.68).
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learn if they have a sad countenance or, as in Mauss, walk differently. n The
generational dimension is undeniably important here. If the preceding
generation was humanist and subject-centred, then parricide meant talking
systems. But the price of this homicide is an exploration of otherness which
studiously decolonizes itself, divests itself of others.
There are, however, notable exceptions to this rule - a series of
newspaper articles by Foucault on the Iranian revolution. I shall concentrate
on two articles published in the French press, though there were some fourteen
items (letters and interviews among them) all told, the majority of which
appeared in the Italian newspaper La Corriere della sera," It is worth
dwelling on the two pieces for what they tell us about Foucault's deliberate
eschewal of the model of constitution. One should quite properly bear in mind
questions of genre and convention at this juncture. A first-person account
aimed at the newspaper market could not involve the depth and rigour
demanded of a major academic work. Furthermore, there is certainly a sense
in the early pieces written before the Shah's overthrow of a tangible personal
investment on the part of Foucault, a sheer indignation at the corruption and
violence of the Shah's regime. However, we shall have cause to remark.
curiously, on a certain philosophical rather than journalistic tone adopted in
these dispatches, a tone and a tum which are not without significance. In the
first piece, 'A quoi revent les Iraniens?', Foucault is not interested in any
72 The exceptions are, of course, Herculine Barbin and Pierre Riviere, though the issue of
representation is sidestepped somewhat by allowing them to represent themselves, which is not
without its problems.
73 All the items can be found in volume three of the Dit« el ecrits.
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Western dispositif constructing the Iranians and remains sceptical of the
standard Western line (the Iranians know what they don't want, but not what
they want)." He therefore decides to travel to Teheran and Qom. His focus
is clearly on the socio-historical moment of crisis and the great (international)
forces in play. But it is also on individual Iranians' relationship to the crisis.
Government and governmentality. He pointedly and selflessly canvasses
people's opinions and his report, which synthesizes the testimonies of many,
represents a studious attempt to be colonized by others. A significant majority
of those questioned reply that they seek 'Islamic government' and Foucault sets
about exploring what this might mean in a largely muslim, but not Arab (and
not Sunni), country like Iran. The picture he paints is that of a tradition of
religious tolerance. That Shiite Islam awaits the return of the imam, does not,
he explains, prevent the desire for good government in the interim. No-one in
Iran understands by 'Islamic government' a political regime presided over by
the clergy. Rather, it designates a utopia and an ideal. Foucault is sceptical
about a list of things which he is informed are objectives of Islam (including
common ownership of land and natural resources; respect for minorities, where
they do not harm the majority; different, but not unequal, rights for men and
women, since they have different natures), noting that they are remarkably
similar to the tired bourgeois and revolutionary formulae of the West.
However, he seems to accept the response that the Koran had enunciated these
formulae well before Western philosophers, and that if the Christian, industrial
West has lost sight of them, Islam will not. And this is really where he wants
74 Le Nouvel Observateur, 16 October 1978, pp.48-49.
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to get close to the specificity of Iran, which he says manifests itself in two
particular ways. First, the wish to accord the traditional structures of Islamic
society - the political forums lodged in the mosques and religious communities
to resist the Shah - a permanent role in political life. Second, and inversely,
the dream of introducing a spiritual dimension into political life. It should be
noted that Foucault does pose the question of whether the political will is
sufficiently deep-rooted really to take a permanent hold or whether it will be
dissipated like a cloud when 'political reality' sets in. He ends the piece with
two questions. At the dawn of history, he writes, Persia invented the State and
confided the recipe for it to Islam: the ranks of the Caliphate were filled with
state administrators. But this same Islam spawned a religion which gave its
followers the wherewithall to resist the powers of that state. In this will for
an 'Islamic government', therefore, should one see a reconciliation, a
contradiction, or the threshold of something new? The second concerns Iran's
position in the geopolitical world order and gestures to a peculiar and very
special dimension which has long been lost to Europe: a 'political spirituality' .
Coming from Foucault, the final line ('I can already hear some French people
laughing but I know they are wrong') is as remarkable as this last sentiment.
In the second piece, some seven months later, there is a flight from
these systemic, institutional and individual questions of Iranian society into a
general libertarian discourse on singularities." Foucault argues that moments
of uprising are an irreducible element which both belong to history and in a
certain way escape it. Just because there may be established forms, like
75 Foucault, 'Inutile de se soulever?', Le Monde, 11 May 1979, pp.I-2.
376
religion or 'revolution', ready to receive, order, legitimize, and ultimately
appropriate such moments, one should not deny their validity. It is not a
matter of judging them by the overall outcome, by the final system within
which they are subsumed, 'disqualifying the fact of the uprising because today
there is a government of Mullahs' (p.2). One must instead show what is
precisely irreducible in such a movement, what is disturbing for any despotism.
The final three paragraphs, which are not about Iran, touch on general
questions concerning the rights of individuals, power, and the morality of
intellectuals. No one, he argues, has the right to pronounce 'Your revolt is
useless, things will always be the same' to he who risks his life in the face of
a great power. It is in rebelling that subjectivity - that of ordinary people -
is introduced into history. 'Another principle: the power exercised by one man
over another is always perillous.' Not because power is evil; rather, because
it is infmite. Finally, to the strategist who dismisses a particular act of revolt
or a death as insignificant in the grand scheme of things, be that strategist a
politician, a historian, a supporter of the Shah or of the Ayatollah, he opposes
his own, 'antistrategic' morality: 'be respectful when a singularity rises up in
revolt, intransigent when power infringes the universal'. The final lines
synthesize the impression that there is a distancing taking place from both the
immediately historical and political.
The first piece can be criticized because Foucault was too uncritical,
because he did not know enough about Iran and the character of Shiite Islam,
and allowed himself to dream. The second, because it takes refuge in a
simplistic libertarianism. To say, as Foucault does, that the man who revolts
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is 'finally inexplicable', may be a truism. But to valorize this singularity qua
singularity is to forget that a singularity cannot but impinge on the path of
another singularity and another... and that this contact with a system, with an
economy, with law, with others, this difficult political, sexual, economic,
ethical contact, which is not an option, a take-it-or-leave-it, is the 'intense and
complex' text (to borrow his adjectives) for the intellectual. Ironically, it is
as though Foucault can only be respectful of a singularity by turning to a
general discourse on singularities which purges all the perillous, awkward
impurities of Iranian history and society from its weave. What counts is the
rigour with which one handles the shuttling between the specific and the
general, not the mere stating of the problematic, the rigour with which one
relates the 'system' of Iran to particular instances of it, the respect one accords
antinomies. What remains unsatisfactory in 'Inutile de se soulever?' is not the
shift into abstraction per se; it is the lauding of a form of analysis which seeks
not the 'deep reasons' of the Iranian uprising but the way in which it was
'lived', which tries to understand what was going on 'in the heads' of those
men and women when they risked their lives, yet which then takes the
irreducible movement of revolt as a given, an inexplicable given, on the basis
of which the philosophical antistrategist can elaborate his discourse."
Yet as Young says, following Derrida, following Levinas, the condition
of being constitutively unable to capture the absolutely-other, to let the other
76 Cf. Vincent Descombes' important critique of the uneasy yoking together in Foucault
of philosophy and a concern with current events. The Barometer 0/Modern Reason: On the
Philosophies of Current Events, trans. by Stephen Adam Schwartz (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.3-22.
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remain in a state of singularity, is the fate of any concept, and even of
language itself, for both must by definition invoke forms of generality. What
counts is the rigour with which one thinks the relation of words and concepts
to the tradition of which they are a part, which is why The Order of Things,
for all its faults, remains an important work. One may query the absolutism
of the difference between Aldrovandi and Buffon, but their respective
'systems' are traced with admirable meticulousness. Even if he dissents from
Aldrovandi's knowledge, the respect Foucault accords it lies less in his
relativist conclusion and more in the patient and painstaking expose of its
system.
On the other hand, one must question the potential for determinism
which attends a thought premised on the idea of constitution or projection, with
its beautiful and satisfying theoretical constructs. Thus Said:
The challenge to Orientalism and the colonial era of which it is so
organically a part, was a challenge to the muteness imposed upon the Orient
as object. Insofar as it was a science of incorporation and inclusion by
virtue of which the Orient was constituted and then introduced into Europe,
Orientalism was a scientific movement whose analogue in the world of
empirical politics was the Orient's colonial accumulation and acquisition by
Europe. The Orient was therefore not Europe's interlocutor, but its silent
other. (Said, 'Orientalism Revisited'. p.17)
'The muteness imposed upon the Orient as object'. To impose muteness
suggests an a posteriori fate which befalls an already existing entity - just
what Said is trying to deny. But once one accepts this model of constitution,
intractable difficulties ensue. Young addresses this same point. As he says,
Said wants to argue that the texts of Orientalism '''can create not only
knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe'" (Young, White
Mythologies, p.129). However, the problematic phrase 'the very reality'
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implies that an indigenous population is fundamentally living someone else's
reality, another's 'project': a fatally deterministic view which unavoidably
tends towards a denial of indigenous life. To dissent from this view is
precarious. If Europe constituted the Orient, if the latter is nothing but a
European construct, then how can we know that what Europe has constructed
is wrong, inaccurate, shameless deception? If we know that it is wrong, this
can only be because we have access to some kind of true 'Orient', the reality
of which would refute the chimerical version of it. And if we have such
access to the real Orient, does this presuppose that we have not only given the
European construct the slip, but any construct whatsoever, and that we
therefore claim to know the objective Orient, objectifying it in the process in
fact just like the Orientalists of the past? Again, as so often, the problematic
is phenomenological. Apropos of Husserl' s concept of constitution,
Sokolowski speaks of the need to retain both the dependence of reality on the
subject and its transcendence towards subjectivity (Sokolowski, p.197). To
avoid the dualism, one needs to be far more circumspect in the powers one
assigns to the 'project'. Foucault's model of power from Discipline and
Punish looms large here. Not reality versus ideology, he says; power produces
du reel. Du, the partitive. The French, though difficult to translate, is
certainly less ambiguous than the English translation's 'power produces
reality', which smacks of a totalizing understanding. Du suggests some, not
all. In other words, one refuses the dichotomy: the Orient versus 'the Orient';
but rejects also the totality and plenitude of the projected 'Orient', with the
attendant lamentations according to which we knowers will only ever have
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access to our own ideological constructions of the other. Rather, one enters an
economy of knowledge and truth, where rigour, evidence (empirical or
otherwise), historical understanding, and probity must compete.
It is therefore not a question of abandoning (as though that were
possible) the constitution metaphor and returning to the realists' position
against which Nietzsche rails. But neither is it a matter, again as Nietzsche
warns, of a simple nominalism:
How foolish it would be to suppose that one only needs to point out [...J this
misty strand of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real,
so-called 'reality.' We can destroy only as creators. - But let us not forget
this either: it is enough to create new names and estimations and probabilities
in order to create in the long run new 'things.' (Nietzsche, The Gay Science,
p.122)
Daniel James' analysis of Juan Domingo Per6n' s discourse of the 1940s and
1950s shows convincingly that Per6n in a very real sense 'constituted' an
Argentine working class, in the sense that he returned to a heterogeneous mass
of people a language that was familiar to them, a way of addressing and
relating to others which was their own." In the process he was able to foster
an awareness of a common condition and fate (not least by means of a clever
harking back to the injustices and prejudices of the notorious decada in/arne),
which is not to claim that this activity created a Peronist working class ex
nihilo. One can also see how this constitution bas both a positive and negative
valence, empowering the working classes, empowering Peron's brand of
populist-authoritarianism.
Where Europe is concerned, it is thus not a matter of celebrating
77 Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class,
1946-1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.38.
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naively what Husserl regards famously as the unity of a 'spiritual life', 'a
spiritual shape'. 78 However, nor is it a question of simply standing Husserl on
his head. What is lacking in Young is any attempt to think Europe plurally,
to evaluate Europe in different ways. There is little attempt to conceive of
Europe as anything other than malevolent, which undoubtedly harbours a good
deal of truth, particularly with respect to the period of colonization. Applied
to the present, though, to the question of 'decolonization', it is less easy to see
how one could begin to valorize others, to restore historical and cultural
sovereignty to them, without drawing on a whole series of values, institutions,
rights, and assumptions towards the establishment of which Europe has made
a not insignificant contribution. Without ceasing to be the creditor, Europe
shoulders the burden of guilt, becomes the debtor, is asked to repay. Like
Europe, Young's discourse is guilt-edged. It has an edge to it - inculpatory
- which gives it the edge over others. Decolonization is a project of
inculpation whose end would be the final purging of guilt, disculpation.
European thought repays its moral debt through decolonization, by recognizing
the abuses perpetrated by its constitutionalist powers. But what if, as we have
suggested, one cannot decolonize thought, one cannot cease constitutionalism?
Might it be that the failure to realize this is what lends Young's discourse (and
Foucault's to a certain extent) its edge, its gilt edge? To gild:
1. Cover with a thin layer of gold, esp. as gold leaf. OE. b trans! Smear
(with blood). [...] Esp. of the sun: cover, tinge, or adorn with a golden
colour or light. [...] 4. Supply with gold or money; make reputable or
attractive by supplying with money. Now chiefly as passing into sense S.
[...] S. Give a (specious or illusory) brilliance or lustre, esp. by the use of
7. Edmund Husserl, 'Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity', Appendix I in The
Crisis, pp.269-299 (p.273).
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favourable or complimentary speech. (NSOED)
The brilliance which radiates from Young's dissenting, disjunctive ecriture
(brilliance in all senses: the book has a cleverness which we should not deny),
which precisely gives it a cutting edge, is simultaneously what makes it a safe
bet, a reliable security.
Positing a drastically undifferentiated 'Europe', Young approximates
what Barthes calls a 'political writing', where writing is charged with the task
of joining 'the reality of acts and the ideality of ends'. The mission of writing,
Barthes says,
is fraudulently to identify the original fact with its remotest avatar by lending
the justification of an action the caution of its reality. This. fact about
writing is, by the way, typical of all authoritarian regimes; it is what might
be called police-state writing: we know, for example, of the eternally
repressive content of the word 'Order'. (Barthes, Writing Degree, pp.31-32;
trans. mod.).
One thinks of the semantic network in Foucault surrounding the necessity of
disorder, the attempt to break or de-prescribe the link between origin and
avatar, along with the 'fraudulent' use of the word order on the other hand to
persuade us of the existence of such coincidence in the past. To that extent,
'power, or the shadow cast by power, always ends up creating an axiological
writing, in which the distance [trajet] which usually separates fact from value
is suppressed within the very space of the word, which is given at once as
description and as judgement' (Barthes, Writing Degree, p.26; trans. mod.).
Young's writing at times 'intimidates', as Barthes would say. It is at once
language and coercion. And what it tries to intimidate us with is our own
appurtenance to Europe. Which is to think Europe univocally, suppressing the
trajet between fact and value, the movement of and within Europe. And
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because one thinks Europe univocally, one is seduced by the possibility of
putting an end to it.
We might say, on the question of economics, that dissolution,
decentralization and decolonization do not necessarily lead to equitable trade,
as Paul Kennedy makes amply clear in his Preparing for the Twenty-First
Century. There is also the much more unpleasant question, the Nietzschean
question, of whether it is even possible to have something like a gift economy
working at an economic, rather than simply academic, level. 79 How far would
European academics working on gift economies go with their gifts? And how
far would an egalitarian, redistributionist economics redistribute away the
conditions which make academic work on gift economies possible? The
discourse of disjuncture and the praise of disorder posit the break while failing
both to expatiate on the future order and to think the nonrandomness of the
passage between systems. It is true that without the imagination of another
possible order one would not even begin to think the passage. But the failure
to think the transition marks this discourse out as Utopian, as idealist and
multilateralist. Like language, equality must be born in one fell swoop, d 'un
coup; its constitution seemingly the outcome of random accident. But if
chance, as we said in the last chapter, opens up the horizon of possible
alternatives, it cannot account for the work which is done, and the strength and
79 Nietzsche's political attitude towards Europe is characteristically stark. He saw it as
suffering from a general paralysis of will caused by a senseless sudden attempt at class and
race mixture. The main exception was Russia, where the will was waiting menacingly. The
. rest of Europe would have to resolve to acquire a single, terrible will of its own since the next
century would bring with it 'the struggle for mastery over the whole earth - the compulsion
to grand politics' (Nietzsche, Beyond, p.l38). Elsewhere he foresees a kind of 'European
league of nations' when the process of democratization gains pace (Nietzsche, Human, 11,292).
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power which are necessary, to build and sustain an effective social order.
Nietzsche coins a bad word for a bad thing, misarchism:
The democratic idiosyncracy against everything which rules and wishes to
rule, the modern misorchism (to coin a bad word for a bad thing), has
gradually but so thoroughly transformed itself into the guise of
intellectualism, the most abstract intellectualism, that even nowadays it
penetrates and has the right to penetrate step by step into the most exact and
apparently the most objective sciences. (Nietzsche, "'Guilt"', pp.91-92)
What the Utopian discourse neither can nor wants to think - and it is from this
position that it derives its creativity, that it drives politics without having to
suffer the slings and arrows of polity - is the work, the working, the being-in-
the-polis, of its ideas. We might say of this discourse (whose extension today
is in proportion to the denials of its extension) what Sheldon S. Wolin says of
Foucault, namely, that it 'consistently confuse[s] politics with the political'
('On the Theory', p.198), that it fails to see the constitutive slippage between
the practice of a theoretical project(ion) and the practice of politics."
In contrast to The Order of Things, the genealogies' unnuanced
reproach to the nineteenth-century reformers, of prisons and asylums alike,
harbours a negative teleology and a naive libertarianism. There is a sense in
which Foucault expects Tuke and Pinel to stand outside their time - and in
effect they are condemned for not managing this, for belonging all too clearly
to the nineteenth century. Which is tantamount, and this is one of the costs of
a project aiming at a 'history of the present', to condemning that entire century
(save Nietzsche) and the entire 'West' during that century on the grounds that
it was not another, future time, without ever specifying what the precise nature
10 The Wolin article is among the best on Foucault. I shall return to the theory/practice
debate in the final chapter.
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and values of more acceptable penal and clinical institutions might be. By thus
attributing an overwhelmingly negative value to Europe. he paves the way for
those later, undialectical criticisms of his own Eurocentrism. Although he cites
Baudelaire's dictum 'You have no right to despise the present', this does not
prevent him from showing every sign of despising a good part of the past."
'Casting our minds back to an earlier reference left in abeyance, we may say
by way of further comparison and by way of conclusion that the interest of
Kenneth Clark's book lies in its more economic consideration of the
relationship between Western Europe and civilization. Clark is keenly aware
of the horrors of urban poverty and the 'dismal' countermeasures of
bureaucracy and regimentation found in so-called civilized nineteenth-century
Europe. However, he tries to understand this abject poverty as far as possible,
as far as impossible, with a split conscience divided between the late twentieth
and the nineteenth centuries. Thus:
Poverty. hunger. plagues, disease: they were the background of history right
up to the end of the nineteenth century, and most people regarded them as
inevitable - like bad weather. Nobody thought they could be cured: St
Francis wanted to sanctify poverty, not to abolish it. The old Poor Laws
were not designed to abolish poverty but to prevent the poor from becoming
a nuisance. (Clark, p.323)
A Foucaultian cynicism is in attendance but so too a perhaps less teleological
understanding of being- in- the-world, which allows space for Clark's claim that
the early reformers' struggle with industrialized society illustrates the greatest
civilizing achievement of the nineteenth century, humanitarianism, without
81 Dennis Potter, whose The Singing Detective explores both the institutional and the
individual- the gold-fish bowl gaze and alienating, scientific idiom of the medical authorities,
versus the well-spring of personal memories, their scars and pleasures - remarked of the past
that one should view it with equal parts of affection and contempt.
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which we might say that there could be no Foucaultian cynicism. Speaking of
the abolition of slavery in 1835, Clark says:
One must regard this as a step forward for the human race, and be proud, I
think, that it happened in England. But not too proud. The Victorians were
very smug about it, and chose to avert their eyes from something almost
equally horrible that was happening to their countrymen. (Clark, p.324)
We could properly take issue with the generalization 'a step forward for the
human race'. Nonetheless, at the same time as these few lines articulate some
of the concerns of Histoire de la folie and Discipline and Punish, they
rehearse, perhaps better than Foucault's texts (since they reject simple
inculpation), the attempt to go beyond good and evil, which is not a once-and-
for-all step and which would not involve any simple comprehension of the




SEXUALITY: A RUSE OF THE LOGOS THAT PRESIDES QVER
THE WORLD?
Introduction
The foregoing chapters have largely dealt with the ordering and
distribution of energies (conceptual, subjective, enunciative), postulating the
dehiscence in La Volante de savoir of a certain conceptual rigidity present in
the earlier work. At least at the theoretical level, something of the interplay
between Apollo and Dionysus makes itself felt (Chapter four), the necessity of
which is then exemplified (Chapter five). In this chapter, the concern is with
the distribution of sexual energies; the focus, the three published volumes on
sexuality (thus including a reprise of La Volome). Constitutionalist powers are
once more under scrutiny, this time with regard to their possible abstracting,
rationalizing impulse, especially in relation to human beings. Chapter four has
already militated on behalf of abstraction, claiming that it holds the key to an
understanding of Foucault's notion of power. But what about his treatment of
sex and sexuality?
The first part of the chapter highlights the function fulfilled by
abstraction in the early polemics Foucault conducts against certain powerful
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claims for nature. The bulk of the chapter addresses more fully the repression
of the chthonian in Foucault's work on sexuality. This theme is dealt with in
the final sections in relation to volumes two and three on sexuality, which, as
is widely appreciated, discover a new role and value for humanitas. But can
this retour au sujet, the discovery of both the individual and the spectrum of
his emotions (in question is the Greek male), the exploration of the individual's
self-constitution as a subject of sexuality, be construed as marking an
epistemological coupure with respect to the early work, bringing in its wake
a concomitant shift in the tenor and tone of Foucault's writing? Chapter one
pointed to the thematics of mente concipere and to the Galilean, Leonardian
understanding of ragioni. We shall see something similar at work in
Foucault's writings on sexuality and have cause to question two things: firstly,
the extent to which philosophy is drafted in, in classical fashion, to represent
social life; secondly (and it is a familiar question), the extent to which reason
lies in things themselves (in accordance with a Stoic-inspired view of logos as
that which presides over the world) or belongs, rather, to the narrative
narrating (as a particular ruse of logos).
The function of abstraction in the pre-sexuality work
abstraet v. LME [OFr., or L abstrahen, f. as ASS- +
trahere draw.] 'I V.t. Separate, disengage, from. LME. 2
v.I. Withdraw, take away; euphem. steal. LIS. b V.t. Esp.
Chem. Extract, distil. E17-E18. 3 V.I. Summarize, abridge.
Ll6. 4 v.t. Separate in mental conception; consider
abstractly. E17. S v.refl. & i. Withdraw oneself, retire
from, (lit. &fig.). M17.
abstraction [...] 2 A state of withdrawal from wordly
things or things of the senses. LME [...]
We recall that the Chapsal interview from 1966 performs a deft trick.
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Vaunting the idea of system, it at the same time turns the conventional
association made between system and abstraction on its head. The charge of
abstractness, Foucault says, pertains to humanism; it is the latter which has
successfully managed to cut off the 'human heart', the 'human being',
'existence' from the real, scientific and technical world. The work of his own
generation purports to show that thought, life and even 'our most everyday
way of being', form part of the same systematic organization as the scientific
and technical world. It should be noted that Foucault is not simply proposing
here a scientific, technical description of a world which would be other than
those things; the world itselfis systematic. This (structuralist-informed) view
represents, at root, a challenge to the text of the natural attitude. As Jonathan
Culler puts it: 'We speak of people as having minds and bodies, as thinking,
imagining, remembering, feeling pain, loving and hating, etc., and do not have
to justify such discourse by adducing philosophical arguments. 'I We might
profitably construe Foucault's work as an effort to disrupt this natural attitude,
. to query the quality of possession implied by 'having' and in so doing contest
the 'world picture' (though the obvious question concerns the extent to which
Foucault's ecrtture corresponds to the world or paints a particular, technico-
scientific picture of it).
With respect to a slightly different, though not unrelated, subject matter,
Foucault writes convincingly in a later piece, his 'Introduction' to
Canguilhem's On the Normal and the Pathological, of the constant concept-
I Structuralist Poetics; Structuralism. Linguistics and the Study of Literature (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p.140.
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forming activity of human beings:
That man lives in a conceptually architectured environment does not prove
that he has been diverted from life by some oversight or that a historical
drama has separated him from it; but only that he [...J has a relationship with
his environment such that he does not have a fixed point of view of it [...J.
Forming concepts is one way of living, not of killing life; it is one way of
living in complete mobility and not immobilizing life. (p.xviii)
To conceptualize, to abstract, is not to be opposed to life. In this regard,
Foucault is allied to Derrida, whose concern about philosophical abstraction
could not be a doubt about abstraction itself; merely about a practice of
abstraction. Derrida questions philosophy's tendency to think what a concept
means in itself by abstracting the word from 'every context and from every use
value, as if a word were ruled by a concept outside of every conceptualized
functioning and at the limit outside of every sentence'.' Keeping this
important caveat to the fore, I should like to turn to Foucault's practice of
abstraction.
The question of abstraction is central to The Birth of the Clinic.
Foucault wants to show how the modern (European) way of representing
disease was not the first way and that it will doubtless not be the last. It was
preceded by a classificatory medicine of species which Foucault divides into
three aspects, what he calls the primary, secondary and tertiary spatializations
of the pathological. His endeavour, and I think it is persuasively realized,
consists in linking (precisely not cutting) the abstract dimension of medicine
to other, more social facets. The first spatialization deals with the structure of
disease itself. Here disease is perceived fundamentally 'in a space of
projection without depth, of coincidence without development. There is only
2 Jacques Derrida, 'Envoi'. in Psyche. pp.109-143 (p.l14).
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one plane and one moment' (p.6). This flat surface of simultaneity constitutes
a space in which analogies defme essences, in which the very form of the
similarity betrays the rational order of the diseases, the principle of their
creation, the general order of nature. In this essentially theocentric world, the
order of disease imitates the world of life; 'the same structures govern each,
the same forms of division, the same ordering. The rationality of life is
identical with the rationality of that which threatens it' (p.7). We shall see this
theme later in a different guise,pushed back into Graeco-Roman times. For
the Classical Age, though, in order to know the truth of the disease, the doctor
must 'abstract the patient', consider him an external fact to be taken into
account only by placing him in parentheses.'
In the secondary spatialization, disease meets the body, its essence is
articulated upon the 'thick, dense volume of the organism and becomes
embodied within it' (p.10). Foucault stresses that the presence of disease in a
particular organ does not suffice to define it; diseases 'travel' throughout the
body according to the doctrine of sympathies and thus have an essential
existence independent of the body. What links the disease to the body of the
patient, therefore, is 'quality' and a qualitative gaze capable of distinguishing
between the convulsions of an epileptic suffering from cerebral inflammation
and those of a hypochondriac suffering from congestion of the viscera. Hence
3 The doctor, too, is bracketed out. The following offers an excellent example of the logic
Foucault will later apply to argue that the Classical Age knew not man: 'In the rational space
of disease, doctors and patients do not occupy a place as of right; they are tolerated as
disturbances that can hardly be avoided: the paradoxical role of medicine consists, above all,
in neutralizing them, in maintaining the maximum difference between them, so that, in the void
that appears between them, the ideal configuration of the disease becomes a concrete, free
form, totalized at last in a motionless, simultaneous picture, lacking both density and secrecy,
where recognition opens itself onto the order of essences' (The Birth, p.9).
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the individual sufferer of disease reappears: 'The patient is the rediscovered
portrait of the disease; he is the disease itself, with shadow and relief,
modulations, nuances, depth; and when describing the disease the doctor must
strive to restore this living density' (p.l5). (This portrait would be in-traction,
to 'trace' or 'draw' in the patient.) Tertiary spatialization on the other hand
designates, broadly speaking, the socio-political, institutional dimension - those
gestures by which a disease is isolated or distributed throughout society, the
ways in which it becomes a locus of politics or economics. One thus sees the
formation of a collective, historico-geopolitical conscience of disease:
The locus in which knowledge is fonned is no longer the pathological garden
where God distributed the species, but a generalized medical consciousness,
diffused in time and space, open and mobile, linked to each individual
existence, as well as to the collective life of the nation. (p.3I)
In sum, it is because this 'locus' assumes national proportions, because this
consciousness is generalized, and because Foucault's concern is to show how
the three spatializations interact, that the portrait of the individual, 'with
shadow and relief, modulations, nuances, depth', necessarily falls away; it is
simply not within the remit of the book, as its subtitle makes abundantly clear,
to 'strive to restore this living density', and for this reason the charge of undue
abstraction is strictly speaking impertinent.
On the face of it, The Order of Things too has little time for 'man' and
still less for the 'human heart'. Instead, and provocatively, man becomes that
'empirico-transcendental doublet'. This does not mean, though, that the heart
disappears, for it is in effect taken up figuratively. Describing the modem
episteme and reversing the usual spatial metaphor of the relationship between
man (the external container) and heart (the internal content), Foucault
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frequently uses the expression au coeur de, 'at the heart of, to designate the
place where man is to be found. Thus, on the relationship between historicity
and the thought of finitude: 'The more man makes himself at home [s 'installe]
at the heart of the world, the further he advances in his possession of nature,
the more strongly also does he feel the pressure of his finitude, and the closer
he comes to his own death' (The Order of Things, p.259). Hence, the search
for man's being will not culminate in his heart; it will emerge from the 'very
heart' of empiricity, and by way of an analytic of finitude (p.315). Again: the
discovery of finitude is lodged not in the thought of the infinite, but at the very
heart (au coeur meme) of those contents construed by a finite thought as
concrete forms of finite existence. The heart of the matter for Foucault lies in
the part played by the thought of finitude in a modem understanding of man:
No doubt, at the level of appearances, modernity begins when the human
being begins to exist inside his organism, in the shell [coquille] of his head,
in the annature of his limbs, and in the whole nervure of his physiology;
when he begins to exist at the heart of [au coeur de] a labour the principle
of which dominates him and the product of which escapes him; when he
lodges his thought in the folds of a language so much older than himself that
he cannot master its significations, even though they have been called back
to life [ranimees] by the insistence of his words. But, more fundamentally,
our culture crossed the threshold beyond which we recognize our modernity
the day fmitude was thought in an interminable reference to itself. (p.318;
trans. mod.)
Foucault observes that it is true that finitude is always designated on the basis
of 'concrete' man, but adds that this man - with his corporeal, labouring and
speaking existence - is possible only as a 'figure' of finitude. And really, it
is this necessarily abstract, archaeological 'man' which is his concern. To
accuse of undue abstractness a text which treats of the formal mutations in
three highly complex areas of thought would represent a failure to respect the
philosophico-epistemological, always understood that the latter would not
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constitute an autonomous domain."
The commentaries that Foucault provides on Velazquez's Las meninas
and Cervantes' Don Quijote, works which one would expect to have more
bearing on human hearts, do in fact palliate the formalism. In the case of the
knight of the sad countenance, Foucault's nominally Hegelian discourse
produces expressions like that of Don Quijote as 'the painstaking pilgrim who
breaks his journey before all the marks of similitude. He is the hero of the
Same' (p.46; trans. mod.). Yet Foucault remains faithful to the novel's bathos.
He recalls how the poor hidalgo, embarked on a hopeless journey which,
nourished by books of chivalry, becomes a 'quest for similitudes', can tum
sheep, serving girls and inns into armies, damsels in distress, and castles
respectively. An always frustrated resemblance, then, which turns Don
Quijote's trials into a source of derision at the same time as it exposes the
hollowness of chivalric tales. Likewise, the analysis of Las meninas works by
transgressing the line between art (represented by the canvas in the painting)
and reality (here the spectator's position), taking seriously the gaze of the
painter who is represented in the picture by speculating on his thought process
and his next move. It is this play of gazes, light, mirrors and positions which
he traces painstakingly by following the painting's lines of sight and light,
recounting them in an uncomplicated prose. The complexity of the
commentary derives not from any obtuse jargon; it stems from the formal
paradox that the picture, as a representation of Classical representation, cannot
4 Vincent Descombes argues that Foucault must take his share of responsibility for this
disparagement of philosophy. Descombes, The Barometer of Modern Reason.
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represent the act of representing. If it is true that in measurement, the observer
displaces the world, while in colour. the world displaces the observer by virtue
of its basic energy. Foucault's geometrical approach to Las meninas does make
room for the room's colours to strike us.S
Merquior maintains that Foucault's Nietzschean strand of formalism
which animates The Order of Things comes to him by way of Bataille
(Merquior, From Prague, p.197), a question Foucault prefers to frame in terms
of a much larger bataille:
At a time when we were being taught the privileges of meaning, of the lived,
of the charnel, of originary experience, of subjective contents or of social
significations, to come across Boulez and music was to see the twentieth
century from an unfamiliar angle: that of a long battle [batail/e] around 'the
formal'. (Foucault, 'Pierre Boulez', p.St)
The question of formalism extends to diverse forms of art and thought across
many countries, and formalism becomes the 'great adversary of academic and
party dogmatisms'. one of the major cultural characteristics of the twentieth
century (p.51). (Foucault's interest in the nouveau roman and his participation
in the Tel Quel group remind us of the broader context of the formalist turn.)
Now, Foucault himself describes The Order of Things as formalist, but he
believes it wrong to see in this general index of our experience the sign of a
'drying up, of a rarefaction of thought incapable of re-apprehending the
plenitude of contents' (The Order, p.384; trans. mod.). Notwithstanding such
a necessary caveat, the book's miscalculation is not its formalism per se; it lies,
rather, in extrapolating from particular experiences and experiments of
5 In a round table discussion on the nouveau roman directed by Foucault, Jean-Pierre Faye
argues that when it comes to measurement versus colour Robbe-Grillet wants nothing to do
with the latter. 'Debat sur Ie Roman', Tel Quel. 17 (Spring 1964). 12-54.
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formalism a general claim for its constituting a necessarily positive force of
social change throughout the whole of European culture.
In contrast to the abstract body of The Order of Things and the medico-
philosophical, Leonardian body of The Birth of the Clinic, both faceless objects
of speculation, Discipline and Punish presents the body in its all too raw lived
immediacy. There, in the opening scene of Damiens' execution, Foucault
restages explicitly the return of the '''bloody heads" and other white forms, that
Hegel wanted to efface from the night of the world'. 6 The literal and
rhetorical disarticulation of a live body ('the four horses gave a tug and carried
off the two thighs after them' [p.5]) is carried out against a tableau vivant of
human emotions, those of Damiens (,"My God, have pity on me! Jesus, help
me!''') and those of the onlookers ('The spectators were all edified by the
solicitude of the parish priest of St Paul's who despite his great age did not
spare himself in offering consolation to the patient' [p.3]). But as we have
seen, a new technology of punitive power grips the body ever more tightly in
a disciplinary dressage. From this juncture, Foucault will never resort to the
discourse of a natural body nor hold out the possibility of an untechnologized,
undisciplined corpus. Neither here nor in La Volonte is it a matter of
recapturing a natural body. His interest in Sade, he explains, bears mainly on
Sade's questioning of the sovereignty of the ego, rather than on the liberation
of Eros," Even when Histoire de la folie speaks of art and literature setting
6 A phrase used by Foucault in a favourable review of Andre Glucksmann's Les Maitres
penseurs. Foucault, 'La Grande Colere des faits', Le Nouvel Observateur, 9 May 1977, pp.84-
86.
7 Foucault, 'An Historian of Culture', in Foucault Live, p.83.
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free new images of madness at the end of the eighteenth century which were
no longer those of cosmic struggle characteristic of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, but which had become centred on the 'unmediated dialectic of the
heart' (la dialectique sans mediation du coeur), he remains sceptical of both
nature and the principle of interiority.8 The birth of sadism which Foucault is
describing here is not, he insists, a name given to a practice as old as Eros; it
is a cultural fact appearing at the end of the eighteenth century whereby
unreason now becomes delirium of the heart, madness of desire. Madness is
thus no longer that which brings man closer to the Fall or to animality; it is
situated, rather, precisely in man's alienation from himself and from the world.
And it is in this anti-phusis that madness finds its space; 'it is immediacy lost
in the infinity of mediations' (p.393). The notion of milieu thus comes to
occupy the place formerly taken by animality: now animality belongs to nature,
and it is in escaping from the immediacy of animal life, in the formation of a
milieu, that man opens himself up to the possibility of counter-nature and
madness.
The prejuge de nature
As one might expect from a constitutionalist, Foucault is deeply
suspicious of nature, leastwise the claim to nature (the difference is
significant). Here I shall provide a brief overview of the theme of nature as
it presents itself in the genealogical works up to and including Discipline and
• Histoire de la folie, p.381. The English translation's 'a dialectic lacking the heart's
mediation' (p.210) suggests almost the precise opposite.
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Punish, before moving in the following section to a more extended discussion
of Foucault's history of sexuality.
The first thing to be said is that Foucault's energies are directed against
the Enlightenment's divinization of nature. For Foucault, that which fills the
canvas is not nature, but the social. In addition, and most obviously, Foucault
sets himself against the Enlightenment approximation of nature and truth,
against the Goethian desire to claim nature as the ultimate sanction for all his
judgements," Histoire de la folie represents a great exercise in the
hermeneutics of suspicion vis-a-vis the claim to nature or what he calls in the
early essay on the history of psychology the prejuge de nature (' La
Psychologie de 1850 a 1950', p.122). The text deals with the movement in the
second half of the eighteenth century to cure madness by exposing the insane
to nature. Nature becomes paradoxically a curing 'technique'. However, this
therapeutic practice presupposes a mediating wisdom which separates out
nature's violence from its truth. In other words, one does not wish to unleash
savage, unfettered natural desire, but to cultivate the tea-and-cucumber-
sandwiches enjoyment of nature. The latter pleasure has no need to repress
desire, since it offers up a satisfying plenitude and thus disarms the madman's
potentially delirious imagination. The liberation of the insane is facilitated by
nature in a further sense, namely, by a system of natural obligations (adjusting
to the rhythm of days and seasons, the necessity to feed and shelter oneself)
which provide the madman with a necessary though gentle structure by which
to regulate his behaviour. Not repression of madness, then, but the work of
9 The point about Goethe is made by Kenneth Clark, Civilisation, p.193.
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natural powers to release the essence of madness. A tremendous portage thus
operates, neatly separating out nature's qualities and presenting 'an immediacy
[immediat] in which nature is mediated by morality' (Histoire de la folie,
p.358). As a consequence, madness comes to form part of a pathology and
this, for Foucault, is the great lie, since this transformation does not represent
the advent of the truth of madness, but the reduction of the Classical
experience of unreason to a strictly moral perception of insanity.
There remains a doubt concerning Foucault's tendency to allow his
opposition to certain claims to nature to cloud his view of nature itself.
Because in such prejuges nature would be the donnee, the given and the fact,
Foucault is inclined to recoil from it, often at the expense of simplification.
Whoever thought that life and nature provided a 'reassuring stability'?
'Effective' history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and
nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy
toward a millennial ending. [...] This is because knowledge is not made for
understanding; it is made for cutting. ('Nietzsche', p.88)
Would not nature itself deprive itself of that stability, deprive itself of the
reassuring itself? This bears on questions of the gift and the giving, on the
giving of the given, on questions of the dif/erance, rather than abolition, of
nature."
10 'The history of this concept of nature [first of all as phusis] has an essential relation to
the gift. And this in two ways: Naturizing, originary, and productive phusis, nature can be on
the one hand the great, generous, and genial donor to which everything returns, with the result
that all of nature's others (art, law [nomos. thesis], freedom, society, mind, and so forth) come
back: to nature, are still nature itself in differance; and, on the other hand, let us say after a
Cartesian epoch, nature can be the order of so-called natural necessities - in opposition,
precisely, to art, law (nomos), freedom, society, history, mind and so forth. So the natura1 is
once again referred to the gift but this time in the fonn of the given. We cannot go beyond
this outline beret·] One may also ally the concept of production with that of phusis. Like
that of labor or work, the concept of production can sometimes be opposed to the derived
(post-'Cartesian') sense of naturality and sometimes as well to the value of the gift: The
product is not the given, and producing seems to exclude donation. But is not the pheuin of
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Nevertheless, the same attempt to avail oneself of nature recurs in The
Birth of the Clinic. Foucault charts (though is deeply sceptical of) the project
of the new clinic in the final years of the eighteenth century in France to wrest
medical instruction from the '''Gothic universities and aristocratic academies'" .
Not an esoteric, bookish learning, then; the new clinic would be a 'temple of
nature' at the altar of which - the patient's bedside - one would learn 'that
form of truth open to all that is manifested in everyday practice' (The Birth,
p.70).11
In Discipline and Punish, techne usurps the place of nature as the
mediating force. The Rousseauistic theme of the uplifting powers of nature is
lost, in favour of a constraining technology of power which 'fabricates'
individuals. It is worth repeating that purple passage in which Foucault
discourses on the soul as the effect and instrument of a political anatomy:
This real, non-corporal soul is [...J the element in which are articulated the
effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of
knowledge [...J. On this reality-reference, various concepts have been
constructed [Mt11 and domains of analysis carved out [dkoupiJ: pysche,
subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific
techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism. But let there
be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of knowledge,
philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted for the
soul, the illusion of the theologians. The man described for US,whom we
are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a SUbjectionmuch more
profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence,
which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body.
The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the
prison of the body. (pp.29-30; trans. mod.)
phusis first of all the donation of what gives birth, the originary productivity that engenders,
causes to grow or increase, brings to light and flowering? Is it not what gives form and, by
bringing things into the phenomenality of the light, unveils or develops the truth of that which
it gives? Of the very thing it gives and of the fact that it gives? In this donating production.
fortune (fate, chance. luck,fors. fortuity) and necessity are not opposed; on the contrary they
. are allied' (Derrida, Given Time: I, pp.l27-128).
II A very traditional concern this and one currently being rehearsed in the British
government's toying with the idea of training teachers in situ.
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The soul is not the abstraction; 'psyche', 'subjectivity', 'personality', and
'consciousness' are themselves the concepts cut off from their respective
processes of constitution. Foucault would say that the reduction and
abstraction of both the body and the soul are perpetrated by the apparatus of
punishment itself. However, as we suggested in Chapter two, there is a
complicity to be divined in the great act of faith which assumes that between
the project and the reality, no slippage or remainder; likewise in the schema
between a Classicism which belongs to the dispositto of the technology and an
older Apollonianism lodged in the recit of the former. An Apollonianism
which, privileging the visual, takes place at the cost of, as Norman O. Brown
writes in Love's Body, 'putting to sleep the rest of the life of the body' .12 An
Apollonianism which invests the machinic system with all those ex nihilo
powers formerly reserved to God and the sovereign. One may well view the
atomization of the body in Joyce's Ulysses (which literally deals with an organ
per chapter) as the ultimate abstraction of human form. But it can also be
. viewed as a counter-catechism, combatting what Declan Kiberd calls' a century
of coy evasion', where what counts is the way in which characters experience
their own bodies," And this last dimension is tellingly absent from Discipline
and Punish.
The embrace of self(-constitution): The Useof Pleuures
But is this dimension absent from his writings on sexuality? The best
12 New York: Random House, 1966, p.12!.
13 'Introduction' to James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Penguin, 1992).
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part of this chapter will be devoted to exploring the possibility that there is a
heavily abstracting force at work in those texts, one closely bound to the
fortunes of constitutionalism.
It should be said from the outset that it is perhaps unfair to ask the first
volume on sexuality to probe individual pleasures and pains since it manifestly
does not operate at that level, concerning itself instead with populations,
apparatuses and regimes - even if, ultimately, self-fulfillingly so. There is a
dramatic shift of emphasis, though, in the second volume on sexuality, The Use
of Pleasures, a veritable return of the repressed (in the shape of the
individual)." A significant change in historical period, too, as Foucault turns
to Greek and Roman thought of antiquity, though constant allusions to the
Christian pastoral make it abundantly clear that he keeps one eye on the
present. The general difference between the first and second volumes is that
Foucault will not seek to evacuate sentiment from the human being by
displacing what he refers to in the context of Christian morality as the
'mysteries of the human heart' onto the machinery of 'sexuality'. Instead such
mysteries will be economized, a more proactive individual drawn back into the
equation of forces. The choice of Graeco-Roman antiquity also means, it
should be said, that Foucault can treat of the Western principle of interiority
without apparently capitulating to its modern (Christian, Rousseauist, Kantian)
testamentary tradition. IS
14 The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality. Volume 2, trans. by Robert Hurley (New
York: Vintage Books, 1986) (first publ, as L 'Usage des plaisirs. Htstoire de la sexualite 2
(Paris: Editions GalIimard, 1984». I shall add the '5' to the English title.
15 On the principle of interiority in the European tradition, on the inscription of the law
'in the depths of the heart', see Jacques Derrida, 'Admiration de Nelson Mandela ou Les lois
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His 'project' is now to look at sexuality as an 'experience'. This does
not augur the return of a sentimental humanism. Experience is understood as
the 'correlation' between domains of knowledge, types of normativity and
forms of subjectivity. How did it come to pass that modem individuals were
led to exercise a hermeneutic of desire and to view themselves as subjects of
a 'sexuality'? He will also draw into the frame, and this is new, the
individual's relationship to himself, his part in the process of self-constitution.
There are two kinds of individual at stake here: the individual in general and
the particular individual 'Foucault'. In the case of the latter, Foucault picks
up the thread of 'Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu' apropos of the exercise of
thought as a 'modifying test of oneself in the game of truth', an 'exercise of
self (p.lS). Justificatory, the tone of the new book is also more personal than
we are accustomed to. James Miller sees in it the end of an essential trajectory
of askesis, of self-fashioning, which finds its complement in Foucault's
lifestyle of the time, a Nietzschean project of going beyond all codes.
However, if one is looking for precedents, the idea of self-examination and the
genre of the essay suggest Montaigne before they evoke Nietzsche. We might
also cite the final words of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations:
The Delphic motto, 'Know thyself!' has gained a new signification. Positive
science is a science lost in the world. Imust lose the world by epocbe, in
order to gain it by a universal self-examination. 'Nolt foras ire.' says
Augustine, 'in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veri/as. ,16
Derrida is more circumspect than Miller about this retour au sujet,
de la reflexion', in Psyche, pp.453-475 (p.465).
16 A footnote reads: 'Do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the
inner man. - De vera religione, 39, n.72.'
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viewing it as sitting uneasily with Foucault's wish to place himself under the
sign of Heidegger, especially in the light of twenty-five years of silence on the
question of subjectity in Heidegger's texts." By the same token, while not
strictly Derridian, Foucault's 'Introduction' is reminiscent of Derrida's
differance. Casting off the partage trope, this text will operate a push-pull
between continuity and rupture. Rupture: in the modem European era the
question of sexuality has been placed under the sign of law and prohibition;
not so in Greek and Roman antiquity. Continuity:' one could trace the
persistence of themes, anxieties, and exigencies that no doubt marked Christian
ethics and the morality of modem European societies, but which were already
clearly present at the heart of Greek or Greco-Roman thought' (p.IS; trans.
mod.). Differance: the existence of such common themes and principles means
neither that they occupy the same place nor that they have the same value
(p.21).
The text may also clearly be read as the emendation of Discipline and
Punish, particularly the section of the Introduction called 'Morality and
Practice of Self. It argues that morality can be understood in three ways.
First, as a set of values and rules of action, as a prescriptive moral code.
Second, as individuals' behaviour vis-A-visthese rules (acceptance, resistance,
etc.). Third, as the manner in which one ought to conduct or constitute oneself
as a moral subject in relation to the code. In short, the work of the self on the
self, the relationship to the code and to one's own behaviour (all but absent
from Discipline and Punish), are fmally accommodated. As a result, it
17 Jacques Derrida, 'Desistance', in Psyche, pp.S97-638 (p.613).
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becomes possible for Foucault to construe conjugal fidelity both as a strict
respect for the law and as the mastery of desire, the hard fight one carries to
temptation. The departure from Discipline and Punish is emphasized by
Foucault's characterization of the soul. While not plural, the soul does now
possess 'contradictory movements':
What makes up the content of fidelity in this case is that vigilance and that
struggle. In these conditions, the contradictory movements of the soul -
much more than the carrying out of the acts themselves - will be the prime
material of moral practice. (p.26)
There is thus room for a positive valorization of relationships. He
speaks of the intensity, continuity and reciprocity of feelings for the partner
which may lie behind conjugal fidelity. Likewise, he understands the 'mode
of subjection' more plurally. One may submit to the practice of fidelity out
of allegiance to the group that accepts it; or because one regards oneself as heir
to a spiritual tradition; or, again, because one wishes to endow one's personal
life with brilliance, beauty, or nobility. In any event, while the first and
second aspects of morality (the code and behaviour towards the code) are
important, there is also
a certain relationship with the self; the latter is not simply 'self-
consciousness', but the constitution of oneself as a 'moral subject'. whereby
the individual circumscribes that part of himself that constitutes the object
of his moral practice, defines his position in relation to the precept he
follows, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral
goal; and, to do this, he acts upon himself, undertakes to know himself,
controls himself, tests himself, perfects himself, transforms himself. (p.28;
trans. mod.)
Note that self-consciousness (though still implicated) is not the stake: it is not
a question of coming to cognizance of what is, but of constituting oneself as
an on-going project. The important point is that antiquity is oriented more
towards forms of subjectivation and practices of the self than towards the code,
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with its strict opposition permitted/forbidden. And this is what interests him,
especially insofar as it contrasts with our own time. The sexual austerity found
in the Christian pastoral may have its roots in ancient Greece but the
temperance demanded in the latter does not refer to the code. It refers, rather,
to an 'ethics' understood as 'the elaboration of a form of relation to self that
enables an individual to constitute himself as a subject of moral conduct'
(p.251; trans. mod.).
According to texts of antiquity, moral reflection is not aimed at the
sexual act, nor the desire hehind it, nor the pleasure derived from it. It hears,
instead, on the force with which one is transported by those pleasures and
desires. Consequently, what counts in the use of pleasures is prudence, need,
the right moment, the status of one's partner, temperance. Two points merit
special mention: 1. Foucault's account of the relationship to oneself, acquiring
something of the complexity formerly denied it, echoes Nietzsche on the will.
Foucault:
To constitute oneself as a virtuous and moderate subject in the use one
makes of pleasures, the individual has to institute a relationship with the self
that is of the 'domination-submission', 'command-obedience', 'mastery-
docility'type. [...] This is what could be called the 'heautocratic' structure
of the subject in the moral practice of pleasures. (p.70; trans. mod.)
Foucault will even attribute a Nietzscheanism to Plato. Whereas other thinkers
begin with the question of conduct, in search of delimiting good from bad
love, Plato, Foucault claims, at least provisionally rejects this question and.
'beyond the division of good and evil', poses the question of knowing what it
is to love. 2. The role of economy. Diet and regimen were important
influences on sexual practices in both antiquity and the Christian era. But
407
whereas the latter tends to dictate when sexual activity may take place
according to the binary line of the permitted and the forbidden, the former was
more concerned with degree, with economy, with measure understood as
gauging, judging, comparing, regulating (the normativity of the Christian era
is already present, however liberally applied) and as moderation, temperance,
proportion. A properly designed regimen included '''exercises [ponoi], foods
[sitia], drinks [pola], sleep [hypnoi], and sexual relations [aphrodisia]" -
everything that needed to be "measured'" (p.101).'8 Regimen needed to
'establish a measure' (p.102), a 'just measure' (p.102; trans. mod.), for the soul
as well as the body.
Foucault deals with the question of economy at some length.
particularly in relation to Xenophon's Oeconomicus. In Xenophon's analysis
of the small landowning class, oikos comprises more than just the house; it
defines an entire sphere of activities connected to a lifestyle and an ethical
order. The principal merit of such activity lies in the practice of commanding:
, 'To manage the oikos is to command, and being in charge of the household is
not different from the power that is to be exercised in the city' (p.1S3). (Note
the analogical level of thought, which we shall have cause to question later.)
Into this framework of an art of 'economy' Xenophon introduces the problem
of relations between husband and wife. Whereas the role of the former is that
of sower, harvester, producer outside the house, the latter's function is to
preserve, store and order things in the home. To facilitate this partnership, the
gods endowed each with particular qualities (endurance, bravery for men,
18 The quoted words are from Hippocrates, Epidemics, VI, 6, 1.
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natural fear and mindfulness for women), though both were equipped with
memory and diligence:
Hence each of the two marriage partners has a nature, a form of activity, and
a place, which are defined in relation to the necessities of the oikos. That
they remain thus is the will of the 'law,' the nomos - i.e., the regular custom
that conforms exactly to nature's intentions, assigns each person his role, and
defines what is good and fine to do and not to do. (p.IS8)
To modify this distribution of traits and activities is to challenge the nomos,
to go against nature and abandon one's place, to disturb the 'natural'
opposition between man and woman vital for the order of the oikos.
Finally, then, the importance of all these questions of self-mastery,
command, temperance, etc. crystallizes in the matter of sexual relations
between males. For the Greeks did not view such relations as in themselves
contrary to the nomos. The important thing was that there should be a
difference in age and status between the two males and that the older man
should apply the above principles to his conduct with boys. If he could do this
and preserve the boy's honour at the same time, then there was no obstacle to
him maintaining that relationship with himself which would allow him to
constitute himself as a reasonable subject of moral conduct. 19
Gaudium el poleslas sui: The Care of the Self
Rather than treating the problems thrown up by the second volume in
isolation, it would seem more sensible to look at the third volume on sexuality,
19 Foucault has been criticized on this point for his blanket view of Greece. David Cohen
argues persuasively that Athens, for one, manifested a profound ambivalence towards male-
male relations, recognizing their existence while worrying about the corruption of the would-be
future leaders of the polis. 'Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens', Past and
Present, 117 (1987), 3-21. He is particularly interesting on the possibility that the love of boys
in Athens is the outcome of a fundamentally agonistic (male) sexuality, young women being
simply unavailable for such sport (p.l2).
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before then taking the two volumes together. Again, one should not
underestimate the sea-change that the book represents - The Care of the Self
can be read as a long-neglected Affairs of the Heart," It deals with
philosophical, medical and literary texts from the Graeco-Roman world
principally of the first two centuries A.D., staging its argument in miniature in
the opening analysis of Artemidorus' Key to Dreams, which dates from the
second century. Although Artemidorus organizes his analysis of sexual dreams
around the distinction between three types of act - those which conform to the
law, those against it, and those against nature - there is still nothing in his text
suggestive of a 'permanent and complete grid of classifications between
permitted and prohibited acts' (The Care, p.3S; trans. mod.), between what is
natural and what is contrary to nature. Rather, what counts is the manner or
'style' in which the individual acts and the relation he establishes between
sexual activity and the other aspects of his familial, social, and economic
existence (is the man active or passive? what is his social status vis-a-vis his
partner?).
As Foucault observes, parallels abound with the experience of the
aphrodisia formulated in the texts of the Greek classical age. By the same
token, philosophical and medical thought of the first two centuries witness (and
this is disputed by at least one critic) a new moral severity, which manifests
itself in a mistrust of sexual pleasure, a valorization of marriage, and a
devaluation of the love of boys. And yet this new severity does not take the
20 The Care of the Self TheHistory o/Sexuality: Volume 3 (London: Penguin, 1986) (first
publ. as Le Souci de sot. Htstoire de la sexuallte J (Paris: Editions Gallimard. 1984». Affairs
is the title of a Graeco-Roman treatise to which Foucault refers.
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form of a demand for sexual legislation. It is not a matter of interdiction but
of a heightened relation to oneself by which 'one constituted oneself as the
subject of one's acts' (p.4l). The theme of the 'culture' or 'care' of the self,
already familiar to Plato's Greece, is now taken up by Imperial philosophy and
placed 'at the heart of its 'art of existence'.
Foucault is concerned to point out that this care of the self is not a
thinly-disguised individualism. It represents, first and foremost. an
intensification of social relations since it is a social practice which calls on the
guidance and expertise of others. The subsection which includes these
sentiments (number 2, pp.50-54) is a release of all the affairs of the heart
hitherto suppressed. He recounts Seneca addressing a letter of consolation
from exile to his mother so that she might better cope with her son's
misfortune. Then there is the young provincial relative to whom Seneca
addresses a long moral essay on tranquillity of mind. I cite a passage here by
way of comparison with the famous lines from Discipline and Punish apropos
of the body as the prisoner of the soul:
His correspondence with Lucilius deepens a preexisting relationship between
the two men, who are not separated by a very great difference in age, and
tends little by little to transform this spiritual guidance into Q shared
experience. from which each derives a benefit [profit] for himself. In the
thirty-fourth letter, Seneca, who is able to say to Lucilius: 'I claim you for
myself; you are my handiwork,' immediately adds: 'I am cheering on one
who is in the race and so in tum cheers me on.' And, already in the next
letter, he alludes to the reward [recompense] of perfect fritmdship in which
each one will be for the other that constant help which will be the subject
of letter 109: 'Skilled wrestlers are kept up to the mark by practice; a
musician is stirred to action by one of equal proficiency. The wise man also
needs to have his virtues kept in action; and as he prompts himself to do
things, so he is prompted by another wise man.' The care of the self appears
therefore as intrinsically linked to a 'soul service,' which includes the
possibility of Q round of exchanges [jeu d'echanges] with the other and a
system of reciprocal obligations. (pp.53-54; my emphasis)
Here the soul acquires a much more positive value. The emotive lexicon, the
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stress on reciprocity, and the economic theme of this mutuality represent the
closest Foucault gets to a 'gift' economy. The 'soul supplement' of Discipline
and Punish is now reinvested in a mutually beneficial play of human
exchanges.
The parallel with Discipline and Punish continues. Here, in the first
and second centuries after Christ, one already encounters the theme of self-
examination, the individual is already being asked to testify to his faults and
receive his 'portion of praise and blame' (p.61; trans. mod.). Foucault even
remarks that this examination of one's own conscience looks at first like a
courtroom scene, as Seneca's metaphors ('to appear before the judge', 'plead
one's cause') suggest." However, he adds that Seneca uses another, more
appropriate comparison: the image of administrative control, and the activity
of an inspector or speculator. The relationship of the subject to itself, he says,
has rather more the air of an act of inspection in which the inspector aims to
evaluate a piece of work. An altogether more fitting analogy since the self-
examination does not bear on infractions and does not lead to the question of
culpability. It is not a matter of guilt or even remorse, but of committing to
memory the best methods and the most rational behaviour for achieving one's
aims. In short, Foucault is trying to fend off any suggestion that there is a bad
conscience in play here, the advent of which he had previously ascribed to the
post-Renaissance. The older, Graeco-Roman relation to self still emerges from
an ethics of control but if the juridical scene is present, it is in terms of a
21 Foucault observes that these elements seem to point to a caesura in the subject. whereby
it is at once the judge and the accused.
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juridical model of possession in which the self itself. rather than the carceral
system, takes possession (ofitselt). Foucault, following Seneca: 'One "belongs
to himself," one is "his own master" [...]; one is answerable only to oneself,
one is sui juris; one exercises over oneself an authority that nothing limits or
threatens; one holds the potestas sui' (p.65).
This Graeco-Roman setting furnishes Foucault with the material to
correct the imbalances of his work on power. It offers him the example of a
relatively widespread social practice in which, firstly, power plays a more
positive, less demonic role and secondly, individuals can intervene to their own
benefit. At the same time, Foucault recuperates another devalued dimension,
that of pleasure. The pleasure evoked in La Volonte de savoir takes the form
of a mischievous delight in hearing others speak of their sexuality, an
incitement to discourse in which solemn powers of divinatio and eruditto ride
on the back of titillation. In The Care 0/ the Self, the link between power and
pleasure is otherwise. The experience of self that comes from possessing
oneself is not simply that of a force overcome or of a sovereignty which is
exercised over a rebellious power; it is 'the experience of a pleasure that one
takes in oneself (p.66). This kind of pleasure, gaudium, is the kind to which
one should aspire since it is not caused by anything beyond our control; it is
thus to be opposed to voluptas - pleasure which has its origin elsewhere and,
being outside our control, is therefore precarious.
In Part Three, 'Self and Others', the title of which indicates Foucault's
. attempt to address the sociality of the self, there is an especially significant
chapter called 'The Political Game'. It deals with the problem posed by the
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political disenfranchisement of the Greeks after the collapse of the city-states
which began in the third century B.C.. Foucault discusses the withdrawal of
the traditionally dominant classes from public life and argues that rather than
see this retreat towards a heightened concern for oneself as a shunning of civic
and political life, one could instead view the cultivation of the self as a means
of defining a relation to self that could be carried over into the public sphere
as a model for the exercise of political power. We may summarize the main
tenets of this new ethic, which will be the subject of criticism in due course,
in four points: 1. The exercise of political activity should not depend on the
individual's status but rest on a personal act of commitment freely entered into
and based on judgement and reason; 2. In exercising power one is always the
ruler and the ruled: 'In the fact that a man is one and the other at the same
time [...] Aristides sees the very principle of good government' (pp.87-88).
This dovetails closely with Foucault's idea of 'governmentality' developed in
a series of lectures from 1978179 in which he uses the idea of government to
bridge the gap between the micro- and the macro-levels of political analysis
and also, as Colin Gordon observes, to span the interface between the exercise
of power and that of freedom." Defining government as the conduite de la
conduite, Foucault pinpoints an intimate connection between the growth of
reflection on the art of government in the early modem period and conscious
meditation on the notion of governing oneself. He still speaks of two
contrasting types of power in modem societies: the mode of the polis,
22 'The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and
Government', in Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, ed. by Scott Lash and SamWhimster
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.293-316.
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functioning according to principles of universality, law, citizenship, etc.; and
the mode of 'pastoral power', which valorizes above all else the need for what
Gordon refers to as exhaustive and individualized guidance of singular
existences. While one can perceive a mellowing of his position in regard to
this second form of power, the cynicism of disciplinary power still underwrites
the pastoral.
3. Knowing how to conduct oneself, attending to one's own ethos, is
a prerequisite for leading others: 'The rationality of the government of others
is the same as the rationality of the government of oneself (p.89). Here
Foucault rejoins the theme of subject-positions which we examined in Chapter
three. This time one does not slip neatly into a position; it is necessary to
perform work on oneself, and it is this labour that makes the functions one
fulfills potentially enlightening. The following passage rewrites his former
position in terms of a labour he had previously ignored:
Such a modeling of political work - whether it concerned the emperor or a
man who exercised an ordinary responsibility - shows clearly how these
forms of activity became detached from status and appeared as a function to
fill; but - and this is not the least important consideration - that function
was not defined in terms of laws belonging to an art of governing others, as
if it were a question of a 'profession' with its particular skills and
techniques. It was to be exercised on the basis of the individual's 'retreat
within himself; that is, it depended on the relationship he established with
himself in the ethical work of the self on the self. Plutarch says this to the
prince who is not yet educated: as soon as he takes power, the man who
governs must 'set his soul straight' and properly establish his own ethos.
(pp.91-92)
The mention of Plutarch's view deserves comment. First, it is interesting that
Foucault's recourse to Plutarch, which is extensive throughout the book,
matches the Enlightenment's predilection for that same philosopher. As
Kenneth Clark says, Enlightenment morality was to be built on two
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foundations: the doctrine of natural law, and the stoic morality of ancient
republican Rome. Plutarch's Parallel Lives 'was almost as widely read in the
eighteenth century as the Roman de la Rose had been in the fifteenth and had,
through example, an equal influence on conduct' (Clark, Civilisation, p.1S3).
Second, it reminds us of Foucault's commentary on Velazquez's Las
meninas. In fact there is gentle irony in the path of criticism not taken by
Foucault in respect of Las meninas. Joel Snyder (challenging Foucault and
John Searle) demonstrates convincingly that applying the law of reflection. first
given geometric expression in Euclid's Catoptics, to the represented space of
Las meninas, reveals the source of the mirror image to be the canvas standing
before the artist in the painting; not, then, the 'real' bodies of the sovereigns
as Foucault claims.P Snyder is in this sense even more formalist than Foucault
in following through the logic of the painting's composition in a manner which
recalls the painstaking care of the painter's labour. On the other hand, Snyder
adds a sociohistorical dimension, recalling the genre of Spanish texts devoted
to the education of princes, the espejo de principes. These texts, which
indicated ideals or norms of conduct, were works of art that provided guidance
for the production of the work of art that was the self. In this tradition the
mirror can reflect only images existing in and through art, which is why the
mirror inLas meninas reflects an exemplary, ideal (canvas) image of Philip IV
and Maria Ana. Velazquez simply transforms the literary figure into a visual,
syUeptic pun since the mirror reflection is both the reflection of the hidden
23 Joel Snyder, 'Las Meninas and the Mirror of the Prince', Critical Inquiry, 11 (1985),
539-572.
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portrait, and, as an allusion to the mirror of the prince, a figurative reflection
of exemplary monarchs. On the subject of the interrelatedness of art and
ideality in Spanish Renaissance thought, Snyder writes:
Art represents nature, but it is also responsible for perfecting it: by means
of education and the inculcation of the proper ideals, art completes the work
initiated by nature. A natural prince is an imperfect one, whereas a prince
who aspires to Christian virtue must be 'cultivated' - and the process of
cultivation is preeminently the process of art. (p.561)
So, a portrait of the Infanta but also of her culttvation. We may extrapolate
from this that Foucault's preference for the play of floating 'abstract
designations' (his expression), as against an examination of the figures
represented in the painting, overlooks something that was staring him in the
face: the cultivation of an individual - of a soul or heart even - both by herself
and by tradition; 4. The importance accorded the problem of oneself entails a
new ethics of self-mastery in which certain forms of equality and reciprocity
are demanded. The last two chapters of the book, 'The Wife' and 'Boys',
explore these forms in relation to this question of the care of the self and we
shall return to them in due course.
The constitution of individualism
It is time now to consider the first problematic aspect of Foucault's
history, namely, the question of the extent to which he has transposed a
peculiarly modem form of individualism onto antiquity and the part played by
constitutionalism in this transposition. In this respect, there exist two powerful
critiques of Foucault's work on Graeco-Roman sexuality, the one dealing,
broadly speaking, with the socio-sexual, the other targeting the philosophico-
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spiritual. This section is endebted to both critiques and it begins with the
former.
Maria Daraki accuses Foucault of missing the point of ancient Greece
by playing up the importance of the individual at the expense of the group."
If Greece witnesses a blossoming of the individual, this citizen is subordinated
to the city, to one of the highest societies ever observed, which entails a very
different self-construction of the subject from that depicted by Foucault. The
figure of a man who by dominating himself achieves domination over others
she argues is an invention of Foucault's, at odds with the model of isonomia
which requires that one citizen could not be subject to another's power.
Foucault's man is a fusion of two variants: the man of self-mastery, who must
dominate himself to the extent that no one else dominates him; and the ascetic
or 'divine man' (theios aner). By means of askesis this man will strive to tear
himself free of his body in order to coincide with his soul alone. He will also
remain outside of all use of pleasure, enjoying in return an incomparable social
prestige which qualifies him for a role as public counsellor in political affairs.
These abstainers 'represent the only figure of the "superior man" whose
authority was accepted in the cities without any conflict with the egalitarian
ideal'. Foucault simply amalgamates the two, taking from the temperate man
the right to the 'use of pleasure', and from the abstainer the superiority he
enjoys. The result is the man who by dominating himself dominates others
24 'Michel Foucault's Journey to Greece', Telos, 67 (Spring 1986), 87-110. I have found
no satisfactory rejoinder to Daraki's piece. It is unsatisfactory to mention it en passanl and
claim that its critique is 'methodological', as does Ed Cohen, 'Foucauldian Necrologies: "Gay"
"Politics"? Politically Gay?', Textual Practice, 2:1 (Spring 1988), 87-101 (p.94).
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(Daraki, p.98).
The significance of this 'invention' comes to a head precisely in the
section of the book called 'Self and Others' which we alluded to above. It is
not the case, Daraki argues, that the Greeks withdrew into themselves so as to
transfer the wisdom and skills acquired through the government of oneself to
the government of the polis. Furthermore, to extend to Roman functionaries,
as Foucault does, his claim that one is in any case always in a certain sense
both the ruler and the ruled is to miss the tyrannical power of the Romans.
Daraki criticizes Foucault for preferring to the many accounts of a despotic
Roman hand the testimony of a minor flatterer, Aristides, who saw Roman rule
as 'the very principle of good government'. The drama of the withdrawal
within oneself is due to the loss of security which had hitherto been provided
by the Greek city. If one is interested in the manner in which one constitutes
oneself as subject, then one should see that the entire process of human self-
construction in Greece is dominated by the alacrity with which men adapt to
this society: 'That is why the collapse of the city triggered a long-lasting
drama: the incompatibility between a model which formed men and a new
society which rendered ancient man maladapted' (Daraki, p.99). Thus. when
Plutarch says that the political act must be a 'choice' and a 'personal act', it
is not, as Foucault maintains, because such a possibility really exists, but
because Plutarch is waging a tragic struggle to preserve a link between ethics
and politics which has in fact already been severed. Foucault's entire analysis
of this 'political game' is built on the denial of the non-coincidence (note that
she does not say non-relation) of moral and political action, and on his failure
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to appreciate that the drama which subtends it is the fact that being under
potentia aliena is precisely what causes a man no longer to be a man.
Daraki then argues that if Foucault succeeds in bracketing out homo
politicus, he inflates the political import of homo sexualis by establishing an
isomorphism between the sexual and the political domains. This is done by
conflating the use of pleasure from the temperate man with the superiority over
others from the abstainer. Foucault immerses the temperate man into the
semantic context of the abstainer 'to present simple self-mastery in terms of
asceticism' (Daraki, p.l00) and also render it synonymous with virile activity,
which, as a way of being active towards oneself and towards others, becomes
a social virility, establishes the temperate man in a position of social
superiority. Sexual virility is construed likewise in terms of being active, in
the precise sense of penetration. This model has its traditional alignments:
active-masculine-subject-penetrator versus passive-feminine-
object-penetrated." By virtue of the virility, activity and domination over
others which all three ostentate, Foucault manages to fuse together moral,
social, and sexual conduct into what Daraki calls the 'incredible structure of
triple virility', a modem Western virility which confers upon the act of
penetration a dignity equal to that of the moral act, and renders it isomorphic
with social domination.P But in Greece 'sexual activity is called aphrodisia,
while askesis implies asceticism. As soon as one can play with words and
l5 Aside from the obvious problem of how it is possible to construe anybody's participation
in sexual intercourse as passive, there is also, as Moi says of Beauvoir, no appreciation of the
positive aspects of passivity (the latter never understoood as inertia).
26 See Foucault, The Use of Pleaswes, p.21S (cited by Daraki, p.lOl).
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write that "the physical regime of aphrodisia" is "at the same time" an askesis
(2.126), everything becomes possible' (Daraki, p.102).
The other source of dispute concerns the love of boys. Foucault argues
that there is an inherent antinomy in the pederast relation, an incompatibility
between sexual passiveness and political activity. In fact, Daraki says, there
is no continuity between the two realms. Greece knew an ancient tradition of
ritual prenuptial homosexuality - for girls as well as boys - an initiatory
tradition 'that relates to a global system, prior to that of politics and centered
perhaps on the "sexual," but a "sexual" permeated with the religious, different
from ours and from that of Greek polis' (Daraki, p.103). Moreover, the only
form of the love of boys which was viewed favourably by the Greeks was its
spiritualized form, which completely curtailed the sexual:
Foucault says this but he regards it as a 'historical paradox' (2.245), whereas
it is a matter of a historical readjustment. But had Foucault admitted this
he would also have had to admit that the separation between the sexual and
the political is the very key to a 'history of sexuality' in ancient Greece.
(Daraki, p.l04).
So much for the social self and the accuracy of the historical account.
But what of the philosophico-spiritual self? For Foucault does not deal
exclusively with the social text. A consideration of the second, philosophical
criticism aimed at Foucault imposes itself.
This critique belongs to Pierre Hadot and its importance is especially
significant since Foucault himself draws heavily on Hadot's Exercises spirituels
et philosophie antique for his formulation of notions like philosophy as a style
of life. Yet Hadot argues that Foucault's 'techniques of the self' are too
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centred on a modem conception of the self." Specifically, Foucault is inexact
in his presentation of the Graeco-Roman ethic of pleasure apparently taken in
the self. Foucault cannot speak of gaudium as "'another form of pleasure'"
since Seneca's twenty-third letter, from which Foucault quotes, explicitly
contrasts voluptas and gaudium. The Stoics set store by the word gaudium
'precisely because they refused to introduce the principle of pleasure into moral
life. For them happiness did not consist in pleasure but in virtue itself, which
is seen as being its own reward' .28 Secondly, the Stoics did not find joy in the
'self but, as Seneca puts it, '''in the best part of the self", in that part most
likely to lead to virtue, in perfect reason, which finally means divine reason
since human reason is only perfectible reason.
The 'best part' of the self is ultimately a transcendental self. Seneca does
not find joy just in 'Seneca', but by transcending Seneca, by discovering that
he has a reason in himself, a part of the universal Reason which is within all
men and the cosmos itself. (Hadot, p.226)
This being so, the psychic content of such exercises is significantly different
from Foucault's rather modem image of self-fashioning, in that the essential
element is the feeling of belonging to 'the Whole of the human community,
belonging to the cosmic Whole' (Hadot, p.227). Equally, the point is not to
forge a spiritual identity but to free oneself from one's individuality, to raise
oneself to universality. In short, to the movement of interiorization which
Foucault traces correctly one must needs add a type of exteriorization, 'another
way of being-in-the-world which consists in being aware of oneself as a part
27 Foucault himself says something similar but apropos of the absence of a Greek subject
rather than self (,The Return of Morality', in Foucault Live, p.330).
28 Pierre Hadot, 'Reflections on the Notion of "The Cultivation of the Self". in Michel
Foucault: Philosopher, ed. by Timothy J. Armstrong, pp.22S-232 (p.226).
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of Nature, as a particle of universal Reason'.
In this there is a radical transfonnation of perspective, a universalist and
cosmic dimension which Foucault, it seems to me, did not sufficiently stress:
interiorisation is going beyond the self in a way which leads to
universalisation. (Hadot, p.230).
Would always be leading to, Derrida would say. In any event, Hadot fears that
Foucault's version of the cultivation of the self is too purely aesthetic, a new,
late twentieth-century form of dandyism, probably conditioned, Hadot
speculates, by the thoroughgoing modem hostility to anything that smacks of
universalism.
The criticism is telling, as we shall attempt to demonstrate. Taking
Lois McNay to task for criticizing the elitism of Foucault's focus on the
aesthetic stylization of the self, Judith Still argues that in any society in which
basic subsistence needs are met, this self-fashioning can be found in all walks
of life:
Whether or not we approve of the way in which members of the working
classes style themselves, surely we can agree that there is a regimen within
which selves are constructed. For example, the machismo of the working
man in certain times and places involves a certain relation to the body. and
to the family. This may not be as self-consciously artful as that of the
transvestite, for instance, but the degree to which self-construction is figured
by the self without reference to nature is not dependent on economic, social,
or even educational privilege."
The question of elitism is not insignificant. Foucault's notion of self-
constitution emerges from a Stoic context and is defined as a primarily
aristocratic ideal. On the other hand, he patently thought it could be extended
to diverse styles of modem life, first and foremost to gay culture." However,
29 Judith Still, '''What Foucault Fails to Acknowledge ...": Feminists and The History of
Sexuality', History of the Human Sciences, 7:2 (1994), ISO-IS7 (p.154).
30 The question of style and freedom has a phenomenological precedent. When Merleau-
Ponty writes 'I am a psychological and historical structure. With existence I received a way
of existing, a style', he can still maintain that he is free, not in spite of these motivations, but
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while it is possible to be broadly in sympathy with the idea that we are not cut
from cloth once and for all, what remains suspect, above and beyond the issue
of who can and who cannot, is the question of whether anyone can profitably
be said to 'construct' their own self. Compare Husserl: 'The ego is himself
existent for himself in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he is continuously
constituting himself as existing' (Cartesian Meditations, p.66). For Husserl,
this activity is cognitive, intentional, and it will give on to an Ego which
shows, despite convictions that come and go, 'an abiding style with a unity of
identity throughout all of them: a "personal character'" (p.67). But there is
evidently more at stake in Still's defence of Foucault than intentionalism. To
self-fashion, to style the self. This is different from 'constructing' a self.
Upon what (dare we say 'foundations'?) does one construct? And why
'construct' rather than 'posit', 'project' or 'imagine'? We recall Kant's
metaphorics of the building trade and the transcendence of the subject implied
therein. Has anyone in the history of the universe ever constructed anything
themselves and much less without reference to nature? And if that with which
they are to work is not given by nature but, rather, by society and by culture,
then does a subject, an '1', ever himself 'construct' (himself)? We do not
escape so easily from Nietzsche's warning regarding the hidden mythology of
language. In the words of Cortazar's narrator Michel Robert (whose name
sends us to France but also to the book of language):
No one will ever know how this is to be told, whether in the first or second
person, using the third-person plural or continually inventing forms that will
be of no use at all. Whether one could say: I they saw the moon rise, or: the
with the help of them (Phenomenolog;e.p.S 19).
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back of my our eyes is hurting, and above all like this: you the blond woman
were the clouds that keep racing by in front of my your our your their faces.
To hell with itl."
The Judeo-Christian tradition of creationism and Hegelian idealism also
both loom large, though in this case the subject would be simultaneously
subject and object of his own production. Although in the process he would
lose his wholeness - what powers are his in the kingdom of confidence! The
slave could be master for a day:
The slave-worker represents human freedom not so much because he
manipulates things, but because he establishes an idea of what he wants to
make and then produces in the world a material artifact that represents that
idea. The slave-worker in that way derives a sense of his powers, a
confidence that his subjectivity can be the basis for the order of the world."
The self swells and expands as it sucks in and subsumes within itself the
centrifugal energies of tradition and alterity. And this self which one would
care for and cultivate, tend to, like a delicate organism, in the most physical,
material, corporeal manner possible (the semantics of the second and third
volume want to convince you of the physical character of this labour) - this
self threatens to be the greatest abstraction of them all, fetish feted never
fettered.
On the surface of things, the idea of the constitution or construction of
the self appears diametrically opposed to the model which subtends Foucault's
earlier genealogies. In these, the machinery of state institutions casts its light
over the marginalized housed within its walls to produce an image of
delinquents and madmen. In the later volumes, malevolent institutions recede
31 Julio Cortazar, 'Las babas del diablo', in Ceremonias (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1983;
repro 1990), p.20 I.
32 Mark Poster, Foucault, Marxism and History, pp.5 }-52.
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in importance, leaving individuals to constitute themselves. Yet the contrast
is relative. For in the later work, the powers and pleasures of projection rest
with the individual, who literally projects the self he would like to be and
grafts to make the reality conform to that projection." The individual becomes
the director, producer and actor of the 'movie' which is himself. The huge
denial of human subjectivity which characterizes Foucault's early texts never
abolished the functions and power of subjectivity. These were simply
transposed onto the armature of disciplinary disposittfs themselves: theirs was
the will to know. In the late work, the will migrates back to a more familiar,
individual housing and a massive voluntarism sets in.
One of the best appropriations of Foucault's work (though in truth its
connections with Foucault are often tenuous) is to be found in the efforts of
Rose and Miller to think through the logic of governmentality, an endeavour
mentioned here because it bears directly on the question of individualism. In
the broadest terms, they argue that modem capitalist economies have become
adept at harnessing the energies of self-constructing individuals." The worker
is thereby construed as an individual 'actively seeking to shape and manage his
or her own life in order to maximize its returns in terms of success and
33 The periodization I have implied with the use of 'early' and 'later' is dislocated by
Foucault's introduction to Binswanger's Le Rive et I 'existence. Paraphrasing Foucault, Gary
Gutting writes: 'Imagination is a free projection of myself into a world that I constitute and
pervade and that, consequently, expresses my existence.' Michel Foucault's Archaeology of
Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; repro 1991), p.61. The
parallel with existentialism is inviting. Judith Butler reminds us that 'For Beauvoir, to become
a woman is a purposive and appropriative set of acts, the gradual acquisition of a skill, a
"project" in Sartrian terms, to assume a culturally established corporeal style and significance'
(cited in McNay, p.71).
34 Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, 'Governing Economic Life', in Foucault's New Domains,
pp.7S-IOS; originally in Economy and Society, 19:1, February 1990.
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achievement'. Productivity, quality and innovation all improve as the
enterprise's desire for betterment is made to coincide with the individual's
desire for creativity, autonomy and self-fulfillment:
Psychological consultants [...] have invented a whole range of new
technologies in order to give effect to these programmes, techniques for
promoting motivation through constructing a regime of values within the
firm, for reducing dependency by reorganizing management structures, for
encouraging internal competitiveness by small group working, for stimulating
individual entrepreneurship by new forms of staff evaluation and reward.
The 'autonomous' subjectivity of the productive individual has
become a central economic resource. (p.l 00)
The advantage this has over the self-made man lies in the immediacy of
recognition and reward, in the approving gaze of the (institutional) other. A
positive hysterization, then (it would be naive to believe that sexuality did not
pervade this scene.)" And the marvellous thing about the above is that it
works - though without ever removing us from the classical liberal dilemma
which pits individual freedom against common good.
In The Care of the Self, Foucault squares up to the question of
individualism, doubtless to preempt criticisms, arguing that it can cover three
things: 1. The absolute value accorded to the individual's singularity and his
independence vis-a-vis institutions and groups; 2. The valorization of private
life; 3. The intensity of one's relation to oneself, the manner in which one
takes oneself as an object of knowledge and a field of action, so as to
transform, correct and purify oneself. Though the three may be connected, he
says, such connections are neither necessary nor constant. He then supplies
three examples of how this is so. The first two are highly dubious, the third
JS The parallels with contemporary academe (Research Assessment Exercise and the
question of 'output', the system of 'bidding', 'staff development') are obvious.
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less contentious. The first example takes those societies or social groups - he
cites the case of military aristocracies - in which the individual asserts his self-
worth by means of actions that set him apart from others, without his having
to attribute any great importance either to his private life or the relations of
himself to himself. A slippage has already occurred. That the connections are
not necessarily of 'great importance' is different from saying they may not be
necessary tout court. It would be very difficult to conceive of such assertions
of military prowess without also conceiving of an individual's work on himself
- his self-discipline, mastery of his energies, the balance between courage and
judgement. His second example is of societies - nineteenth-century Western
bourgeois typically - in which private life is highly valued in terms of family
relations and the running of a home and patrimony, but in which, for this very
reason, individualism is weak and the relations to self largely undeveloped.
Again, this would seem to contradict those histories which see in the nineteenth
century a close link between the rise of the family and the rise of
individualism. The last example comes from the Christian ascetic movement
of the first centuries which accentuated the relations of oneself to oneself while
disqualifying the values of private life and rejecting the singularity of the
individual. This would appear to be more convincing (though still not
absolute) given the physical removal of the individual from private civil
society and the submission of oneself to a higher being. In sum, though, this
discussion is haunted by the partage, as if it were possible to hold apart. to
abstract one from another, the three respective dimensions. It is highly
debatable whether the cultivation of the self which Foucault claims took hold
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in the Imperial epoch can be, as he argues, cut off, abstracted, from the other
two dimensions of individualism, whether an overflowing of conceptual and
lived boundaries can be prevented.
Apollonianism and La Volonte de savoir
This final part of the thesis will look, above and beyond the question
of the abstraction of the individual, at another form of abstraction which
pervades and sets the tone of Foucault's history of sexuality. This abstraction
is closely bound to a fmal twist in the fate of constitutionalism and also to the
fortunes of philosophy itself. I shall preface my remarks on the final two
volumes on sexuality by returning at some length to La Volante de savoir.
First, though, it is appropriate to allow space for another powerful criticism of
Foucault's work on sexuality.
Camille Paglia maintains that for all the talk of corporeality in
Foucault, there is still something like a coy evasion of the body. The strained
dichotomy Foucault effects between the terms 'sex' and 'sexuality' is part of
a sanitized, constipated sex theory incapable of dealing with 'the complexity,
multiplicity, and daily flux of thought, desire, dream, fantasy, mood, sensation,
and action' (Paglia, 'Junk', p.180). Her fundamental criticism is that Foucault
follows the path of social constructionism at the expense both of a
consideration of nature and of scientific research (into such things as genetics,
brain chemistry, and their relation to sex differences and personality traits).
The constructionist path carries him into false abstraction and rationalism, into
an Apollonianism with very precise national roots. For Paglia Foucault merely
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perfects the WASP alienation of mind and culture from emotion. 'Everything
is rigidly schematic, overdetermined, reducible to chart form. Contradictory
evidence is never admitted. Foucault represents the final decadence of Westem
Apollonianism, a cold, dessicated fetishism of pure IQ divorced from humor.
compassion, ethics, eroticism, wisdom' (Paglia, 'Junk', p.224).
It will have become obvious that, excesses apart, we lend this opinion
a certain credence. That said, it remains the case that the article from which
it is drawn contains no analysis as such of Foucault's work on sexuality, it
affirms without substantiating. In fact, much of the piece is devoted to
acolytes of Foucault, not to his work itself. It remains to be seen, then. in
what respect her judgement is well founded.
Perhaps the first step we should take is to recap on what she
understands by Western Apollonianism and on the character of the Dionysian
principle, or what she prefers to call the chthonian. In order to do this. I tum
to her book Sexual Personae in which she expounds on the competing
principles at greater length." Apollonianism is a constructing, geometric,
objectifying quest for form, in which name and person occupy an important
part:
The west insists on the discrete identity of objects. To name is to know; to
know is to control. [...] The west's greatness arises from this delusional
certitude. Far Eastern culture has never striven against nature in this way.
Compliance, not confrontation is its rule. Buddhist meditation seeks the
unity and harmony of reality. Twentieth-century physics, going full circle
back to Heracl itus, postulates that all matter is in motion. In other words,
there is no thing, only energy. But this perception has not been
imaginatively absorbed, for it cancels the west's intellectual and moral
assumptions. (Paglia, Sexual Personae, p.')
36 Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertil; to Emily Dickinson
(London: Penguin, 1992).
430
I tried to show in Chapter four that, at a theoretical level, La Volante de savoir
subscribes to an anti-Apollonianism. This does not, however, make it
chthonian as Paglia defines it:
What the west represses in its view of nature is the chthonian, which means
'of the earth' - but earth's bowels, not its surface. Jane Harrison uses the
term for pre-Olympian Greek religion, and I adopt it as a substitute for
Dionysian, which has become contaminated with vulgar pleasantries. The
Dionysian is no picnic. It is the chthonian realities which Apollo evades, the
blind grinding of subterranean force, the long slow suck, the murk and ooze.
It is the dehumanizing brutality of biology and geology, the Darwinian waste
and bloodshed, the squalor and rot we must block from consciousness to
retain our Apollonian integrity as persons. (Paglia, Sexual Personae, pp.S-6)
For its part, Judeo-Christianity, like the Greek worship of Olympian Gods, is
a 'sky-cult', a manifestation of the shift away from 'earth-cult', or female
'belly-magic', to male 'head-magic' which she views as a defensive move by
men, denied access by virtue of biology to the all-powerful veneration of
fruitful nature. The dichotomy between the Apollonian and the chthonian is
thus firmly gendered. The former is the harsh, phobic male principle, 'coldly
cutting itself off from nature by its superhuman purity' (p.12); the latter is the
female principle, bound by the body's cycles to nature.
Now let us return to consider further Foucault on sexuality. The first
thing to be clear about apropos of La Volante is what it takes its subject matter
to be. Foucault claims that its objective is 'to define [determiner] the regime
of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality
in our part of the world' (The History of Sexuality, p.ll). 'To define'
(determiner). Let us spare our indignation at this Apollonian verb. All
academic work takes place at least partly under the sign of Apollo. Paglia
.herself says that one should honour the chthonian but not yield to it. Derrida
would say that even to think and utter 'the chthonian' is already to be beholden
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to Apollo. But let us return to the regime that Foucault evokes. An early part
of the burden of it was carried by the confession, which was responsible for
inciting individuals to speak of their sex, down to the slenderest (and most
succulent) detail, as though it constituted an index to their inner moral truth.
Foucault narrates the gradual spread of the confession which took place under
the aegis of the Counter Reformation, arguing that procedures of confession
then widened their domain, that a 'great archive' of the pleasures of sex was
gradually constituted by medicine, psychiatry and pedagogy.
In Foucault's parlance, 'sexuality' is situated at the point of intersection
of a technique of confession and a scientific discursivity as a would-be
embodiment of the truth of sex. This is why he can say that the history of
sexuality 'must first be written from the viewpoint of a history of discourses'
(p.69). These discourses have led us to direct the question of who we are to
sex:
Not so much to sex as nature (an element in the system of living things, an
object for biology), but to sex as history, as signification and discourse. We
have placed ourselves under the sign of sex, but in the form of a Logic of
Sex, rather than a Physics. [...] The West has managed not only, or not so
much, to annex sex to a field of rationality. which would not be all that
remarkable an achievement, seeing how accustomed we are to such
'conquests' since the Greeks, but to bring us almost entirely - our bodies.
our minds, our individuality, our history - under the sign of a logic of
concupiscence and desire. Whenever it is a question of knowing who we
are, it is this logic that henceforth serves as our master key. (p.78)
A 'Logic of Sex', 'annex[ing] sex to a field of rationality'. These phrases will
shortly assume importance for us. In this particular instance, though, if
Foucault is interested in an 'analytics' of sexuality and power, if his discourse
itself operates as an abstract 'logic' of sex, it is because he follows the object
of his study. He is simply not interested in describing sexuality as a 'stubborn
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drive'. In an interview from 1982, Foucault responds to the question as to
whether he believes in innate sexual predisposition or social conditioning with
the lawyer's retort: 'On this question I have absolutely nothing to say. "No
comment. ," It goes beyond his expertise, he says, and is not the object of his
work." The book's subject matter concerns instead the 'techniques',
'mechanisms', dispositifs which, he says, went into the 'very production' of
sexuality:
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power
tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries
gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical
dispostttf: not a furtive reality [realite d'en dessous] that one struggles to get
a grip on. (pp.lOS-l06; trans. mod.; my italics)
It is the name that can be given to a historical apparatus. This is not the name
given by Foucault; this is what a post-Enlightenment Apollonianism has
produced. In any event, and as he says in The Use of Pleasures: '''sexuality''
- the quotation marks have a certain importance' (p.3). The question of
naming is vital and in this Foucault remains close to the Nietzsche of Beyond
Good and Evil.
Notwithstanding what has been said above, it should be noted that there
is a tendency in La Volont« - a familiar tendency - to accord the name too
much power. In short, something of the totalizing drive of the incitements,
plans and projects to which he alludes migrates into Foucault's own
deployment of 'sexuality' in his narrative. Two examples of this, the one
religious, the other lay, will be of assistance. First religion. Here he cites an
early injunction to confess: .
37 Foucault, 'Sexual Choice, Sexual Act', in Foucault Live, p.212.
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'Examine diligently, therefore, all the faculties of your soul: memory,
understanding, and will. Examine with precision all your senses as well.
[...]. Examine, moreover, all your thoughts, every word you speak, and all
your actions. Examine even unto your dreams, to know if, once awakened,
you did not give them your consent... And finally, do not think that in so
sensitive and perilous a matter as this, there is anything trivial or
insignificant.' (p.20; trans. mod.)"
As Foucault says, sex was taken charge of by a discourse that 'aimed to allow
it no obscurity, no respite' (p.20). Thus, by the seventeenth century the
scheme (projet) for transforming sex into discourse, which began in the
monasteries, was made into 'a rule for everyone' (p.20). Almost immediately,
however, he is forced to concede the virtuality of this grip on sex, to
acknowledge that the vast majority of the population, who only rarely attended
church, would have escaped such prescriptions. Yet this does not deter him:
the important point no doubt is that this obligation was decreed, as an ideal
at least, for every good Christian. An imperative was established: [...] you
will seek to transform your desire, your every desire, into discourse. Insofar
as possible, nothing was meant to elude this dictum. (pp.20-21 )39
But as he passes from the seventeenth-century pastoral to its 'projection' in
literature, ideality becomes factuality. The fact of recounting the strangest of
sexual practices, which at the end of the nineteenth century marks the
anonymous text My Secret Lifo, had been lodged 'in the heart of modem man
for over two centuries (p.22). Better still - for what matters is the process, not
the individual - the truthful confession was inscribed 'at the heart of the
procedures of individualization by power (p.59).
Foucault then repeats the scheme in a lay context, that of the emergence
31 Quoting Paolo Segneri, L'Instruction du penitent (French trans. 1695), p.30 I.
39 The translation could be slightly misleading. Foucault says 'chercher , faire de son
desir, de tout son desir, discours' (pJO). The word 'transfonn' risks suggesting the mutation
from one form (desire) to another (language), whereas the French maintains the distinction
between the two. I shall comment on this difference shortly.
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in the eighteenth century of a political, economic, and technical incitement to
talk about sex, the better to manage and regulate it. Sex came to lie 'at the
heart of the problem of population. Again, Foucault turns to plans and
projects - this time largely architectural. Educators designed 'projects', others
'outlines for reform, and plans for ideal institutions'. In eighteenth-century
secondary schools,
the space for classes, the shape of the tables, the planning of the recreation
lessons, the distribution of the dormitories (with or without partitions, with
or without curtains), the rules for monitoring bedtime and sleep periods - all
this referred, in the most prolix manner, to the sexuality of children. (p.2S)
A footnote cites the Reglement de police pour les Iycees (1809) which includes
such articles (of faith) as number 69: "The masters will not retire except after
having made certain that every student is in bed. "' Many a slip... What
Foucault does, and we have seen this in Discipline and Punish, is to blur the
intentions of such projects with the reality of their results. To this end he
speaks of psychiatry 'annexing' 'the whole' of the sexual perversions as its
own province (p.30), of all the social controls at the end of the nineteenth
century which 'screened' people's sexuality - 'undertaking to protect, separate,
and forewarn, signalling perils everywhere, awakening people's attention,
calling for diagnoses, piling up reports, organizing therapies' (pp.30-31). Here
the trope of enumeration itself rhetorically 'piles up' measures, persuading us
of the sheer extent of the incitements to speak of sex, which were 'orchestrated
from all quarters, apparatuses everywhere for listening and recording,
procedures for observing, questioning, and formulating' (pp.32-33),
And yet, as with the confession, he concedes that for a long time the
working classes escaped the apparatus of sexuality, which first took hold in the
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bourgeois or aristocratic family. Only around the 1830s did the organization
of the conventional family surface as a key to political and economic control.
Only at the end of the nineteenth century, with the development of jwidical
and medical control of perversions, did the apparatus of sexuality 'spread
through the entire social body' (p.122). The above expressions lend weight to
Baudrillard's criticism, noted in Chapter four, according to which Foucault's
discourse appears to mimic the pervasiveness of the 'sexuality' it describes.
Power of the recit. As Foucault says of Jules Verne's unwitting heroes, their
function is 'to reduce (fabulous) reality to the pure (and fictive) truth of the
recit' ('L' Arriere Fable', p.10). The occasion will present itself to say more
about this very classical ruse of historiography in relation to the second and
third volumes on sexuality. For now, suffice it to say that La Volonte is not
unambiguously constitutionalist.
The text throws up an interesting question concerning that opposition
between nature and culture the undermining of which always lies at the heart
of constitutionalist theories. Despite his wish to think the inescapable
constitution of sexuality, Foucault nonetheless articulates a separation between
sex and discourse, the two apparently having different forms. He writes, for
instance, of the 'putting into discourse of adolescent sex' (p.28). The French
'mise en discours' echoes the expression mise en scene, suggesting a staging
or highlighting, an arrangement or stylized performance of sexuality. Yet not
without first taking for granted the existence of an adolescent sex which it is
possible to put into discourse. Similarly, when Foucault speaks of the
persecution of peripheral sexualities, the existence of such forms is not in
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doubt. His argument is altogether more concerned with the social machinery
which organizes sexual behaviour into an unbending system of classification.
The particularity of nineteenth-century law consists in its fostering of what he
terms a new 'specification' of individuals. Thus, to take the case of
homosexuality, if sodomy had formerly been a category of forbidden acts and
the perpetrator simply the juridical subject of them, the nineteenth-century
homosexual becomes 'a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood'.
This example rehearses the Nietzschean scheme of the birth of modem
consciousness from Discipline and Punish. With regard to the homosexual,
Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality.
It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it
was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; [...] The sodomite bad
been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species. (p.43)
In short, nineteenth-century essentialism and causalism do not aim to exclude
these 'thousand aberrant sexualities'; their energies go towards making them
into a principle of classification and intelligibility, into a 'natural order of
disorder', towards 'the specification, the regional solidification of each one of
them' (p.44). A massive Apollonian effort by the West to bring these
perversions into existence qua perversions.
The implantation of perversions is an instrument-effect: it is through the
isolation, intensification, and consolidation of peripheral sexualities that the
relations of power to sex and pleasure branched out and multiplied, measured
the body, and penetrated modes of conduct. And accompanying this
encroachment of powers, scattered sexualities rigidified, became stuck to an
age, a place, a taste, a type of practice. (p.48; trans. mod.)
However, and this is the important point, it should be clear that
Foucault is certainly not saying that power, simply and ex nihilo, 'produced'
. these sexualities, as though nothing like them existed before the nineteenth
century. We must concede that it does look, in the following, as though the
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constitution trope is too symmetrical:
The manifold sexualities - those which appear with the different ages
(sexualities of the infant or the child), those which are determined by
particular tastes or practices (the sexuality of the invert, the gerontophile, the
fetishist), those which, in a diffuse manner, invest relationships (the sexuality
of doctor and patient, teacher and student, psychiatrist and mental patient),
those which haunt spaces (the sexuality of the home, the school, the prison)
- all form the correlate of exact procedures of power. (p.47; trans. mod.)
But Foucault adds - and in a more dialectical vein than is the case In
Discipline and Punish - that these polymorphous conducts 'were actually
extracted from people's bodies and from their pleasures; or rather, they were
solidified in them; they were drawn out, revealed, isolated, intensified,
incorporated, by multifarious power devices [dispositifs1' (pp.47-48). In other
words, the object and the process, while still correlative, maintain a provisional
autonomy. A provocative later formulation invites a similar reading. Here,
Foucault writes of certain cherished notions (causality, the unconscious, the
truth of the subject) finding an opportunity to deploy themselves in the
discourse of sex. Not however, he continues, 'by reason of some natural
property inherent in sex itself, but by virtue of the tactics of power immanent
in this discourse' (p.70). We might read this as affirming that it is not
exclusively by virtue of some natural property in sex that the above notions
find their space. There is always a more, a supplement. In any case, it would
be strictly speaking meaningless to detach the natural properties of sex from
the 'tactics of power', as though the being of the body in no sense lent itself
to such an apparatus.
Despite the nominalism, the truth of sexuality cannot be evacuated from
the scene. Although Foucault states that his concern is with the 'will to
knowledge' rather than with the truth of sex, in fact there is nothing Foucault
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utters apropos of the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure which is not
determined in some measure by the conviction that that regime is
fundamentally wrong about human sexuality. Foucault himself says that the
analysis of sexuality does not necessarily imply the elision of the body,
anatomy, and a certain 'biological minimum'. He envisages a "'history of
bodies" and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in them
has been invested' (p.152; trans. mod.). This materiality is not that of sex in
itself. Sex is, rather, 'a complex idea that was formed inside the apparatus of
sexuality' (p.152). The notion of 'sex' - and the quotation marks again
highlight the importance of naming - made it possible 'to group together, in
an artificial unity [what knowledge licenses this adjective?], anatomical
elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it
enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an
omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere' (p.154). Again,
he calls 'sex' the 'most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in
an apparatus organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality,
their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures' (p.155). Although he does not
use the terms, the semantics plainly pit Apollo against Dionysus. Apollo:
artificial unity, speculative, ideal, apparatus organized by power; Dionysus:
bodies, materiality, forces, energies, sensations, pleasures. Paglia:
Dionysus is identification, Apollo objectification. Dionysus is the empathic,
the sympathetic emotion transporting us into other people, other places, other
times. Apollo is the hard, cold separation of western personality and
categorical thought. Dionysus is energy, ecstasy, hysteria, promiscuity,
emotionalism - heedless indiscriminateness of idea or practice. Apollo is
obsessiveness, voyeurism, idolatry, fascism - frigidity and aggression of the
eye, petrifaction of objects. Human imagination rolls through the world
seeking cathexis. Here, there, everywhere, it invests itself in perishable
things of flesh, silk, marble, and metal, materializations of desire. Words
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themselves the west makes into objects. [...] Apollo makes the boundary
lines that are civilization but that lead to convention, constraint, oppression.
Dionysus is energy unbound, mad, callous, destructive, wasteful. Apollo is
law, history, tradition, the dignity and safety of custom and form. Dionysus
is the new, exhilirating but rude, sweeping all away to begin again. Apollo
is a tyrant, Dionysus a vandal. Every excess breeds its counterreaction.
(Sexual, pp.96-97)
It is our contention that Foucault would warm to this schema, while situating
his own contribution as an uncovering of the work of Apollo and therefore an
unbounding of Dionysian energy. But the first volume on sexuality, since it
is fixated upon the grip of power and since it has vowed to remain at the level
of 'sexuality' understood as regime or dispositif; can only gesture to the body's
pleasures, sensations and materiality, without really transporting us towards
them.
Foucault's nominalism has one obvious benefit. It suggests that a less
rigid implantation of sexuality in the future might permit the Dionysian to
emerge. Equally, it has its problems. Firstly, once more there is no positive
valuation of the Apollonian. It is not necessary to concur with Paglia's
apparently wholly positive valorization of the social - in her contention that
the rapist is created not by bad social influences but by a failure of social
conditioning - at least to entertain the possibility that it is the loosening of
social constraints and of the rule of law which leads to a brutal use of sex-as-
power (the case of wartime rape being a prime example). Secondly, and in
terms of the accuracy of the historical record, it is possible that, since the thing
is not simply constituted in discourse, Foucault commits a vital error in
believing nineteenth-century sexualities ever really rigidified. In other words,
perhaps the Dionysian has already surfaced, has already left its traces.
Foucault's own Apollonianism would be the gesture by which he himself
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captures the word and contents of a hundred and fifty years' worth of
understanding of 'sexuality'.
'Problematization' and philosophy: a ruse of tbe logos that presides over
the world
Strictly speaking, despite the reinstatement of a meaningful disquisition
on the individual in the final two volumes on sexuality, it remains the case that
the vagaries of the human heart are still less important than the process of
constitution. The question of the truth of what one is has its place, Foucault
says, 'at the heart of the constitution of the moral subject' (p.68). Constitution
as state but also as process. In this penultimate section of the chapter, we shall
draw attention to a certain philosophical constitutionalism which represents the
most classical of historiographical schemas. This is related to Foucault's use
of the word problemattzation as a guiding methodological tenet which
announces itself as precisely different from other historiographical approaches
but which may be viewed, rather, as an arch-traditional prejudice of
historiography.
In Part four of The Care of the Self, 'The Body', we loop back to
Foucault's discourse on constitution from The Birth of the Clinic. Attention
to the body's constitution, its humours and well being, forms an integral part
of the care of the self, which is itself essential to one's constitution (in both
senses) as a moral subject. This attention is directed by medicine, which,
together with rhetoric and philosophy, was considered essential learning for a
cultivated man. Medicine contributed to a reflective mode of relation to
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oneself, to one's body, to one's activities, to food and to the environment.
Rather than depending overly on physicians, a working knowledge of medicine
would assure the individual's ability to practise his own regimen. Now, in
Foucault's account we may safely assume that the literature of regimen. with
its emphasis on the correct food to eat, the proper quantity, the season of the
year (winter) appropriate for honeyed wine, faithfully transcribes genuine
preoccupations of the times. Hence, one would not especially object to the
traditional scheme that unites 'everyday life'-'letters'-'testify to' in the
following: 'The evocations of their everyday life that one can find in the letters
of Seneca or in the correspondence between Marcus Aurelius and Fronto testify
to this mode of attention to the self and to one's body' (The Care, p.103).
Here the correspondence is delivered, its message received and its 'evocations'
duly assert the truth of 'everyday life'.
However, it shall be our contention that it is this willingness to allow
the philosophico-medical 'project' to represent and even stand in for social
practice which is largely responsible for the abstraction that pervades both The
Use of Pleasures and The Care of the Self.40 Indeed, even when Foucault
suggests that philosophical inquiry takes its cue from actual human behaviour,
this insight is still derived from philosophical texts (see The Care, p.149).
This tendency does not, to be sure, go unchecked. On the subject of conjugal
relations, he writes that the few texts he has analysed cannot represent 'the
40 An additional difficulty has been highlighted concerning the fact that many of the Greek
texts to which Foucault refers often survive only through collections made much later
(occasionally as late as the eleventh century). Do they. then, represent exclusively the period
of original composition? See Phil Bevis, Michele Cohen and Gavin Kendall, • Archaeologizing
Genealogy: Michel Foucault and the Economy of Austerity'. in Foucault's New Domains,
pp.193-215 (p.198).
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actual practice of marriage in the first centuries of our era', They have to be
taken 'in their partiality', for what they disclose of 'certain doctrines' and 'a
few limited milieus' (pp.162-163), What is more, in criticizing Foucault, are
we suggesting that philosophy is outside the real? Is it not the case, rather,
that every historiography, in its reliance on texts, is constitutively bedevilled
by the same fate? Foucault himself preempts my criticisms:
Of course, it is not in texts like these [those of Pliny and Statius] that one
should look for a representation of what matrimonial life may have really
been like in the period of the Empire. The sincerity they display does not
have the value of evidence. They are texts that go out of their way to
proclaim an ideal of conjugality, They should not be taken as the reflection
of a situation, but as the formulation of an exigency, and it is precisely on
this account that they form part of reality [du rtie!]. (p.80tl
It is not matrimonial life in the flesh that we know; it is the fact that people
worried themselves on the subject. The manoeuvre is rather Cartesian: one
cannot doubt that the ancients were vexed by this matter, therefore this
vexation provides the basis upon which to establish the existence of the thing
under consideration (that is, matrimonial life).
There are good reasons for believing that this question of representation
lies at the root of Foucault's use of the word 'problematization' which assumes
such importance in his late works. The second chapter of the Introduction to
The Use of Pleasures is entitled 'Forms of Problematization', Part I of the
book is called 'The Moral Problematization of Pleasures'. Why was sexuality
constituted as a moral domain? Why the problematization?
But, after all, this was the proper task of a history of thought. as against a
history of behaviors or representations: to define the conditions in which
human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do. and the world in
which they live. (The Use, p.IO)
41 Such a position directly contradicts the archaeologist's stance, which precisely does not
treat discourse as the sign of something else (The Archaeology, p.13S).
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The stakes are high. In the interview 'The Concern for Truth', Foucault links
the idea of problematization to that of truth. First, he reinterprets his own
work precisely in terms of problematization, saying that this notion has served
as the common thread in the work done since Histoire de la folie, though he
did not immediately grasp this fact. Second, he binds his definition closely to
the question of truth:
Problernatization doesn't mean the representation of a pre-existent object, nor
the creation through discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It's the set of
discursive or non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the
play of the true and the false, and constitutes it as an object for thought
(whether under the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political
analysis, etc.). (p.296)
In The Use of Pleasures truth remains to the fore. He writes that his change
•
of direction has perhaps allowed him a better perspective on his enterprise of
a history of truth:
It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their
• ideologies,' but theproblemanzations through which being offers itself to
be, necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which these
problematizations are formed. (p.ll)
While we can readily concede his observation about texts and reality, the
attempt to lift problematizations out of the realm of ideas, ideologies and,
worse still, representations, is one part terrorism to two parts naivete.? Or
42 Elsewhere, 'problematizing' amounts to not answering the question. Foucault is asked
(he has just said that in Discipline and Punish it is only a matter of bad literature) how one
distinguishes good from bad. 'Exactly. That's just what will have to be considered one day.
We will have to ask ourselves just what it is this activity that consists of circulating fictions,
poems, and narratives in a society' (Foucault, 'On Literature', in Foucault Live, p.ll3). I
disagree with Christopher Norris' view that this idea of problematization represents Foucault
shifting ground with regard to 'poststructuralism and kindred forms of modish ultra-relativist
doctrine'. That Foucault or anyone could 'abandon' the 'main tenet of poststructuralist
doctrine - i.e., the claim that thought is constituted through and through by the codes,
conventions, language-games or discourses that make up a given cultural order' - strikes me
as trusting in Foucault's capacity somehow to write history as it had never been written before.
Christopher Norris, '"What Is Enlightenment?": Foucault on Kant', in The Truth About
Postmodemism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp.90-91.
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perhaps 'territorialism'. Derrida notes the etymology and meaning of the word
problem:
problema can signify projection or protection, that which one poses or
throws in front of oneself, either as the projection of a project, of a task to
accomplish, or as the protection created by a substitute, a prosthesis that we
put forth in order to represent, replace, shelter, or dissimulate ourselves, or
so as to hide something unavowable - like a shield (problema also means
shield, clothing as barrier or guard-barrier) behind which one guards oneself
in secret or in shelter in case of danger. Every border is problematic in
these two senses. (Aporias, pp.1l_12)43
Note the work done by the word domain in this next passage from Foucault.
The organization of problematizations into a delimited area - more than afield,
it is the constitution of a sovereign territory (and we recall from The
Archaeology the role and function, the aletheia-effect, of expressions like the
'mapping' of discursive 'formations' and 'domains'):
The domain I will be analyzing is made up [constitue:J of texts written for
the purpose of offering rules, opinions, and advice on how to behave as one
should: 'practical' texts, which are themselves objects of a 'practice' in that
they were designed to be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested out, and
they were intended to constitute the eventual framework [armature] of
everyday conduct. These texts thus served as functional devices [operateurs ]
that would enable individuals to question their own conduct, to watch over
and give shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects. (The Use,
pp.12-13)
While the link between text and practice is undeniable (again Foucault is trying
to move beyond theory), here the role of texts is more than supplementary to
the real. They prescribe and constitute a 'domain', and to that extent would
represent what Derrida calls a 'problematic closure'":
43 Derrida is contrasting the notion of problem with that of aporia. In the aporia, 'there
is no longer any problem'. This is not because all the solutions have been given, but because
the aporia removes security, 'because one could no longer even find a problem that would
constitute itself and that one would keep in front of oneself, as a presentable object or project,
as a protective representative or a prosthetic substitute, as some kind of border still to cross
or behind which to protect oneself (p.l2).
44 Elsewhere, Derrida writes that aproblem always sketches out the lines of a construction.
Jacques Derrida, 'Cinquante-deux aphorismes pour un avant-propos'. in Psyche, pp.SQ9·S18
(p.510).
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The problematic closure assigns a domain, a territory, or a field to an
inquiry, a research, or a knowledge. All of this is ordered in relation to a
thematic object, more precisely to an entity, to a modality of the entity
whose identification is presupposed by the unity of this space, which in
principle can be closed. (Aporias, p.40)
So, rather than claiming that philosophy does not represent or form part
of the real (which is not our contention), it is necessary to question the extent
to which philosophy has been drafted in to represent social practice. We recall
that Foucault insists on two things concerning the cultivation of the self: first,
that the injunction to cultivate the self was widespread and, further, not simply
doctrinal, by which he means that it impregnated behaviour and lifestyles,
formed a 'social practice' and occasionally even gave rise to institutions;
second, that the phenomenon concerned only those social groups (decidedly
few in fact) for whom such cultivation, by virtue of their privileged position,
could have a meaning. And in fact Foucault claws back even this concession
by saying that, for the philosophers, the idea of caring for oneself is a principle
which holds for all. We are thus presented with the most classical of schemas,
as though the author had at his disposal seven or eight school manuals which
contained the knowledge that constitutes [the] culture [of antiquity]: a
handbook of practical medicine (with notions of various illnesses and
conditions), a rudimentary psychological treatise (generally accepted
propositions about love, hatred, fear, etc.), a compendium of Christian and
Stoic ethics, a logic, an anthology of proverbs and maxims on life, death,
suffering, women, etC.45
With Foucault, the manuals are not the code; they are veritably the text. But
the text-as-Life in the narrowest and most traditional understanding of text,
where narrowness bestows the most extensive reach possible, in line with the
Hegelian presupposition according to which the full consciousness and spiritual
45 Adapted from Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p.142, who paraphrases Barthes' discussion
of Balzac and cultural vraisemblance in SIZ.
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essence of an epoch is contained in its philosophy, and philosophy reflects the
entire manifold of the age."
Supposing our criticism to be pertinent, what importance do we accord
it? It can be argued that it is by projecting the content of philosophico-medical
debate over social practice that Foucault effects a rationalization - here of
sexuality - which again distances his writing from Nietzsche. That such
medico-philosophical discourses are penned by men of the social elite and
heavily premissed on elite male sexuality is not, strictly speaking, the issue.
Foucault is the first to acknowledge as much and in any event it is hard to
imagine how one could recover different, say female or lower class,
testimonies. The point is not to conclude that we have 'partial' texts or
'fragments', as though we accept the truth of these texts and bemoan only their
scarcity. The question concerns, rather, the degree of circumspection one
brings to bear on such texts, the awareness one demonstrates concerning what
they leave unsaid. To write a history is often, as Foucault taught us, to fight
against repeating the exclusions perpetrated by the contemporary official
versions.
To illustrate the problem, let us take two chapters from the section of
The Care on 'The Body', beginning with the one called 'Galen', which deals
with the aphrodisia and the body. Nature, in Oalen's view, was caught
between her desire to construct an immortal work on the one hand and the
ephemerality of the human material at her disposal on the other. In order,
therefore, to make humankind endure beyond the death of the first man and
46 See Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos, p.l.
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woman, Nature must contrive the means to ensure the furtherance of the
species. 'In short,' Foucault writes, 'something ingenious (sophisma) is needed
[...]: a ruse of the logos that presides over the world'. This ruse brings three
elements into play: the organs with which animals are endowed for the
purposes of fertilization; a capacity for pleasure that is extraordinary; the
longing (epithumia) to make use of these organs - 'a marvelous, inexpressible
(arrheton) desire' (p.l06). The 'sophism' of sex therefore resides partly in
'carefully planned mechanisms'. And even if it resides also (though Foucault
does not use the word) in a sort of punctum which exceeds these mechanisms,
Nature herself has planned for this too, placing this principle of an
extraordinary dynamis in the body and soul of every living creature. Foucault
writes:
Hence the wisdom of the demiurgic principle, which, knowing very well the
substance of her work and consequently its limits, invented this mechanism
of excitement - this 'sting' of desire. [...] So that, experiencing this sting,
even those animals that are incapable of understanding the purpose of Nature
in her wisdom - because they are young, foolish (aphrona), or without
reason (a/oga) - do in fact accomplish it. By their intensity the aphrodisia
serve a rationality which those who engage in them do not even need to
know. (p.106)
Parallels with natural selection aside, we should question this account (again,
it is not a matter of challenging whether or not Galen and his kind thought
thus; it is a question of the sufficiency of Galen's account and of Foucault's
motives in following him).
Galen's highly rationalistic account would appear to conform to the
main lines of that tradition which sees Nature or the demiurge as a female
principle orchestrating the universe. Thus, even if many of the mechanisms
described here touch on the base and the bodily, there lies behind them an
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informing design of supreme sophistry. Again, though, as Foucault says, this
'order of demiurgic providence' is but one plane on which the aphrodisia
appear. Equally, Galen explores the corporeal plane, especially the anatomical
location of the processes of the aphrodisia, and the pathological plane (having
to guard against a debilitating expenditure in the sexual act, for example).
From the chapter 'The Regimen of Pleasures', let us select the first of
four variables, the auspicious occasion for procreation, which are singled out
by the medical regimens of the Imperial epoch (the remaining three are: the
age of the subject; the time frame; individual temperament). Foucault
postulates that these medical regimens in fact take up a very traditional theme,
which certainly dates back to Aristotle and Plato. Namely, that noble offspring
could only be engendered if one took a certain care in the procreative act
(otherwise the disorders of conception would be reflected in the progeny):
A passage from Athenaeus, cited by Oribasius, is very explicit on this point:
those who intend to beget children must have body and soul in the best
possible condition. Inother words, the soul must be tranquil and completely
free of pain, of worries accompanied by fatigue, and of any other affliction;
and the body must be healthy and not spoiled in any way. An immediate
preparation is necessary as well: a period of restraint during which the sperm
accumulates and gathers strength, while the urge acquires the necessary
intensity (too-frequent sexual relations prevent the sperm from reaching the
degree of elaboration at which it becomes fully potent). A rather strict
alimentary diet is recommended: no food that is too hot or too moist, just 'a
light meal which will give the impetus towards coitus, and which should not
be overloaded with too many ingredients'; no indigestion, no drunkenness;
in short, a general purification of the body that will ensure the quietude
necessary to the sexual function. It is in this way that 'the farmer sows only
after having first cleansed the soil and removed any foreign material.'
(pp. 125-126)
One senses that the above would effectively rule out 99% of all sexual
couplings and that if the Romans had not arrived first, the Greek world would
in any case have gone into terminal population decline. Furthermore, we note
the figurative language of 'purification', 'cleans[ing] the soil' and 'remov[ing]
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any foreign material'. This last metaphor, which comes from Soranus, is
particularly instructive, since its telluric strain contrasts starkly with the
foregoing blend of Stoic voluntarism. In fact, although the entire passage puts
in play the body, its processes and physiology, it is the mind that rules. Not
because the mind is primary, but because it is the commander, the farmer,
close to nature but organizing, managing and commanding the use of nature's
powers. Again, we must insist that the point is not to reverse the scheme and
declare the Greeks and Romans to be helpless victims of their bodies. But one
should be more suspicious than Foucault apropos of this head-cult.
In this respect, the final chapter of the section on the body, 'The Work
of the Soul', is telling, if a little misleading, since it gives the impression that
only now is the spiritual dimension to be explored, whereas in reality it has
been at work throughout." It is the soul, Foucault declares, that constantly
threatens to carry the body beyond what is proper and contravene natural
dispositions. In order to assign the body an appropriate regimen (in keeping
with the body's nature), the soul must work on itself to eliminate its own
illusions and master its own desires. It is not a question of eliminating desire,
since desire is natural, but of keeping it in proportion. (We note that Foucault
is content to let this notion of a natural desire go unchallenged.) One must
therefore apply an ethical regimen to oneself to achieve this. As Foucault is
himself aware, in this Stoic-inspired ethic the voluntary submission of the soul
to the body is not, of course, a celebration of the primacy of the body. Rather,
47 N.b. the opening sentence: 'The regimen recommended for the sexual pleasures seems
to be centered entirely on the body. [...] And yet the soul has its part to playas well' (p.133).
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it obeys
a rationality that has presided over the natural order and has designed, for its
own purposes, the mechanics of the body. It is from this natural reason that
the doxai risk leading the soul astray by creating extraneous desires; it is to
this reason that the reasonable medical regimen, based on the true knowledge
of living creatures, must be attuned. (pp.13S-136)
Here Foucault is alive to the importance in Stoic thought of Nature as the
ultimate power. And again, in a phrase much more expressive of Foucault's
own view, in that it is adduced by way of summation and in order to establish
a clear difference from modem attempts at a hermeneutics of the subject's
desire: 'the regimen of the aphrodisia, the regimen of their distribution, as
proposed by medicine, need be nothing more nor less than the form of their
nature present to thought, their truth inhabiting conduct as its constant
prescription' (p.l43; trans. mod.).
To sum up. The section of The Care of the Self devoted to the body
is physiologically explicit, it does not shy away from describing the body's
primal functions and fluids, the blood and ooze of which Paglia writes (there
is, for instance, a lengthy description of ejaculation, another of menstruation).
Yet the preceptual tone that attends those passages from antiquity which
Foucault invokes and the concern for the rational conduct of the individual and
his economy, should make us pause to ask what it might be that stands over
and against this conduct, and against which one proselytzes so insistently. I
am not suggesting that Foucault agrees with Soranus on the need for women
to be sober during coitus if the offspring is not to emerge misshapen. But
something of the cool abstraction and mentalism of such passages sticks to
Foucault's own narrative and it would be necessary to ask what other, perhaps
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less considered, considerations, are operative in the sexual scene, over and
against Plutarch's considerations of religion, exercise, eating, and digestion.
Foucault's preparedness to embrace the idea of demiurgic nature and the logos
that presides over the world arguably serves two purposes: firstly, it allows him
to hold at bay another, chthonian nature; secondly, it permits him to gather the
demiurgic principle and its ruses of the logos (which have precisely been
divined by men) if not under the absolute control, at least under the operational
control, of the self. And in so doing it becomes apparent that one has a
reprise, another take, a taking again, a further grasping, of something already
at work in The Order of Things, and which is precisely the notion, the
conviction that 'there is order', order that is categorical, rational and perhaps,
even, pure. Have we even begun to understand the logic, the reason, the logos
behind Foucault's 'journey' to Greece?
The rationalization of sexuality which we discern in Foucault is not
without its irony, for at least three reasons, one of which will impose itself
here (and allow us to finish with The Care), the remaining two carrying us into
the final section. Firstly, The Care of the Self seems to provide its own self-
reflexive, ironic comment on the danger of rationalization. This moment,
which comes towards the end of the book, is the culmination of Foucault's
genealogy of the simultaneous formation in the West of an ontological and
ethical privilege accorded to conjugal relationships and a concomitant negative
change in the attitude towards the love of boys." He suggests that the
48 Daraki reserves her praise of Foucault for his section in The Care of the Self on 'The
Wife'. She sees in it a kind of hymn to the dual relationship, where reciprocity comes to the
fore and mastery over others cedes to the valorization of others (Daraki, p.107).
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principle of the dominion of oneself over oneself increasingly means that
conjugal fidelity comes to conform better than other sexual liaisons to the ethos
of this relation to oneself. Plutarch's Dialogue on Love is crucial here but we
shall briefly follow Foucault's pursual of this same debate in a slightly later
text called Affairs of the Heart, attributed to Lucian. The work stages a
dialogue between Theomnestus and Lycinus in which the latter himself
recounts a previous dialogue on the same theme between Charicles and
Callicratidas. This anterior dialogue mobilizes two themes, Foucault says, the
role of nature and the place of pleasure. In short, and to condense a lengthy
debate into the barest outline, Callicratidas argues on both counts that the love
of boys wins out by virtue of its spiritual superiority. Rather than imparting
life, the disciple-master relationship, which is properly a philosophical
relationship, imparts the more elevated 'techniques' and 'knowledges'
concerning how to conduct a wise and noble life.49
If, in view of the strongly marked difference between the erastes and
the eromenos, Charicles does not see in the love of boys the equal exchange
of enjoyment which characterizes the love between opposite sexes, a charts
which legitimates that relationship and marks it out as natural (the essential
element being the fact that both husband and wife are active subjects),
Callicratidas tries to demonstrate that pleasures of conversation, the sharing of
feelings, the care given to a lover suffering illness, all attest to a higher, more
49 Foucault stresses that, differences apart, this debate between the love of women and the
love of boys is fundamentally different from modem debates. It is not 'the conflict of two
forms of sexual desire struggling for supremacy or for their respective right to expression'.
Not, then, about a natural or biological drive. 'It is the confrontation of two forms of life, two
ways of stylizing one's pleasures, and of the two philosophical discourses that accompany these
choices' (p.2lS).
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laudable bond in which equality is so perfect, reversibility so complete that the
role of the erastes and that of the eromenos can no longer be distinguished
(especially since in time the beloved slips naturally into the role of giving love
in return). However, Foucault says, Callicratidas' discourse is double-edged.
For his guiding concern seems to be to adapt male love to the descriptive and
prescriptive ideal of marriage. Moreover, Foucault notes, while the love of
boys is defined as the only love to combine virtue and pleasure, this pleasure
is not sexual pleasure. Thus, although it is this noble argument that ensures
Callicratidas' triumph in the debate, the victory is a Pyrrhic one.
The self-reflexive moment comes in an important twist. We recall that
the debate between Charicles and Callicratidas is but an intradiegesis within the
larger debate involving Lycinus and Theomnestus. On hearing the former's
account of the anterior debate, Theomnestus responds with thinly-disguised
irony. Pederastic love won because it was linked to philosophy, to virtue, and
to the elimination of physical pleasure, but is one really expected to believe
that this is truly the way in which one loves boys? Evoking all those tactile
and sensuous pleasures hitherto banished, Theomnestus reinstates physical
contact - the kisses, caresses, and the gratification - as the real reason one
loves boys. This is a crucial moment and leads Foucault to the following
musings. Theomnestus' spicey description is a reminder that, for the latter,
it is not possible - without resorting to violence - to keep the aphrodisia
outside the domain of love and its justifications. Pseudo-lucian's irony is
not a way of denouncing this pleasure which one can take in boys, a pleasure
he evokes with a smile. It is a fundamental objection to the very old line of
argument of Greek pederasty, which, in order to conceptualize, formulate,
and discourse about the latter and to supply it with reasons, was obliged to
evade the manifest presence of physical pleasure. He does not say that the
love of women is better. But he demonstrates the essential weakness of a
discourse on love that makes no allowance for the aphrodisia and for the
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relations they engage. (p.227)
Theomnestus' irony, scepticism and worldliness carry a strategic weight. They
could pass for the message of the twentieth-century book which gathers them
up and places them in such a significant, and final, position. Care of the self
and respect for others, the stylization of one's conduct - fine, but let us not
exclude the aphrodisia from the domain of love and its justifications. But
Theomnestus' intervention is doubtless doubly ironic. For its explicit criticism
of an over-rationalistic philosophical discourse on love is mobilized by an
enveloping discourse - Foucault's own - which perpetrates a similar
rationalization of sexuality. If Foucault had widened his compas in generic
terms, he would have found that the Greek authors' reticence on lovemaking
techniques and positions is not matched, for instance, by vase painting of the
same era, 'where a wide variety of sexual practices is explicitly depicted' .so
Demiurge
The theme of a stifling, constricting rationality pervades Foucault's
writings. In fact it is difficult to overstate the importance of this theme and
this condemnation in Foucault." It is thus not without irony (and this is the
30 Bevis, Cohen and Kendall, 'ArchaeoJogizing Genealogy', p.196. They in turn take this
evidence from G.E.R. Lloyd, 'The Mind on Sex', The New York Review of Boob, March 13
1986, 24-28. Their general argument is that Foucault's tale of sexual austerity is programmed
by his monolithic understanding of an austere Christianity which, they contend, is made into
the parent of psychoanalysis.
31 See, for instance, Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.13; 'Politics and Reason',
in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp.57·S5 (first publ. as 'Omnes et Singulatum: Towards a
.Criticism of Political Reason', in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values II, ed. by Sterling
McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981), pp.225·254); and 'Structuralism
and Post-Structuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault', trans. by Jeremy Harding, repro
in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp.l7-46 (first publ. in Telos, 55 (Spring 1983), 195-211).
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second reason we alluded to) that the object of so much critical energy should
mark his own production at every level and in such an insistent manner. The
third reason relates to phenomenology. If the transcendental subject of
phenomenology represents perhaps the exemplary abstraction for Foucault, it
remains the case that no-one contributed more than Husserl to questioning the
as he saw it misguided rationalism of European philosophy since the
Enlightenment, though Husserl did not subscribe to the belief that rationality
as such was evil." (Of course, this questioning of excessive cerebrality is
already a Romantic theme before Husserl: the heart opposed to reason,
spontaneity versus reflection. It is also easily gendered.) Husserl considered
that philosophy had taken theories of the mathematization of nature too much
to heart, constantly repeating the idealist geometrical projections which at one
time lent valuable insights, but which now, taken literally, threaten to squeeze
out the texture and diversity of the life-world. Let us say that Foucault's
constitutionalist faith, his belief in the capacity of the philosophical text to
. stand in for the real, does not exempt him from Husserl' s critique of
naturalism:
an idealizing, mathematical method of finding exact world-laws (including
natural laws) or of arriving at laws for human beings and animals as
psychophysical beings, for their souls, their personal being and activity. as
well as for their bodies.53
To allude to the aphrodisia is still not necessarily to embrace the
chthonian, in its bodily and psychological complexity, and it is perhaps in the
52 See Husserl, 'The Vienna Lecture', in The Crisis, p.290.
53 Edmund Husserl, 'The Attitude of Natural Science and the Attitude of Humanistic
Science. Naturalism, Dualism,and Psychophysical Psychology', Appendix III to The Crisis,
pp.315-334 (p.316).
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work on sexuality that Foucault's antagonism towards Freud is most damaging.
To be sure - and clawing back Foucault's notion of discourse as act -, it is
necessary to appreciate that Foucault's conceptual and semantic system
represents a rejection of the discourse and world of someone like Norman O.
Brown (Paglia's mentor), that is, a refusal of depth-symbolism, particularly in
its psychoanalytic and Christian guises. Again, a long-standing and
understandable suspicion of nature, of the claim to nature, makes itself felt.
But this refusal risks deadening our sense of truth. As Norman O. Brown
remarks, without an understanding of the seamy side of sexuality there is no
understanding of politics. 54
Perhaps what is really at stake in the question of nature, as Foucault
knew only too well, is power and control. If Foucault was alive to the prejuge
de nature, his exposes of the attempts by culture to pass itself off as nature
imagine a related ruse, that of the demiurgic logos, for the ruse of 'sexuality'
and dispositifs is infinitely more comforting than that of daemonic nature. For
a parallel, Foucaultian expression of this transference of power onto the social.
notice in the following passage from McNay (and Butler) how the
deconstruction of the most classical binary opposition remains at the first stage.
that of a reversal of the terms:
Foucault's radical idea of sex as a regulatory construct disrupts binary
distinctions between the natural and the cultural contained in the sex/gender
distinction. Gender is not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription
of meaning on a pregiven sex, but rather gender must also designate the
apparatus of production whereby the sexes are themselves established. As
Judith Butler puts it, 'gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is
also the discursive/cultural means by which "sexed nature" or "a natural sex"
54 Love's Body, p.l l. He is thinking of the unconscious hostility between the sexes; taboos
which prescribe sexual separation; the castration complex.
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is produced and established as "prediscursive", prior to culture'. (McNay,
pp.29-30)SS
The two do not articulate a new, scandalous economy; instead gender, as
culture, is the name of the machine of production. Gender is that which gives.
One does not cut into nature; one cuts, abstracts nature. David M. Halperlin
suggests that we compare the debate between Charicles and Callicratidas to that
between the vegetarian versus the omnivore. In both debates it is a question
of object-choice, not natural predisposition: 'It is a quarrel that springs not
from fundamental differences in kind among human beings but from the
dissimilar values, ideals, and preferred styles of life["')which otherwise similar
human beings happen (for whatever reason) to have espoused. ,56 To stymie
the claim of nature is to build the future oneself. The great Soviet dream.
Only this time the legislative and executive constitutionalist powers accrue to
the individual. And it perhaps here that constitution joins the semantic
hinterland of a modem understanding of 'invention'. Hence the classical
opposition between truth as revelation and truth as production in Foucault's
musings on Baudelaire's fashioning of the self: 'Modem man, for Baudelaire,
is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden
truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. 57 It is perhaps worth bearing
in mind that demiurge combines what in modem terms we would call the
55 She quotes from Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
(London: Routledge, 1990), p.7.
56 'Historicizing the Subject of Desire: Sexual Preferences and Erotic Identities in the
Pseudo-Lucianic Erates', in Foucault and the Writing of History, pp.19-34 (p,31).
57 Foucault, 'What Is Enlightenment?', in The Foucault Reader, pp,32-S0 (p.42). I am
indebted to Christopher Norris' piece '"What Is Enlightenment?": Foucault on Kant', for
suggesting the following excerpts from Foucault.
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divine and the technical, creationism and production, demtourgos 'craftsman',
'artisan', from demios 'public' and -ergos 'working': 'In Platonic philosophy,
the fashioner of the world. In Gnosticism etc., the being subordinate to the
supreme being, who is responsible for the existence of the world' (NSOED).
As history would have it, the word also bears the trace of a powerful
constitutionalist: '1 Gk Hist. A magistrate in certain Greek States and in the
Achaean League' (NSOED). But of course in Baudelaire, as Foucault
acknowledges in passing (and in fact in magistrates too: what else does a
magistrate do if not wage war on man's baseness?), there is the struggle
precisely against '''vulgar, earthy, vile nature''', man's 'indispensable revolt
against himself, the "'doctrine of elegance" which imposes a discipline 'more
despotic than the most terrible of religions' (p.4l). In Baudelaire, at least, one
does not dispense with nature; one fights it. Which is why we should refuse
the opposition implicit in Foucault's statement on Sartre apropos of the choice
that confronts us all: 'From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that
there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work
of art. ,58 I agree with McNay that Foucault's notion of aesthetic choice does
not deal well with the involuntary and biological dimensions to sexuality, with
certain desires and biological phenomena which 'cannot be overcome or
transformed simply through a conscious act of self-stylization' (McNay, p.80).
To suggest that nature is not so easily abstracted is not to advocate a
return to an organic communion with nature, to a Wordsworthian lore of
51 Foucault, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress'. in The
Foucault Reader, pp.340-372 (p.351).
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Nature:
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous fonns of things:-
We murder to dissect. (Cited in Clark, p.196)
The celebration of nature is always figurated, there is no zero degree. When
Kenneth Clark remarks that 'the universe so vividly described in the Book of
Revelation is queer enough; but with the help of symbols not beyond
description. Whereas our universe cannot even be stated symbolically' (Clark,
p.244), he under- and overstates the matter. Is there even one universe which
could be stated symbolically? On the other hand, this universe, if there is one,
can be stated symbolically; it is just that the symbolizations will be plural and
conflicting.
'- Bruno, it hurts here - Johnny said after a while, touching the
conventional place of the heart. ,59 Foucault was perhaps right to fight shy of
what the narrator in 'El perseguidor' calls las frases baratas, the cheap
expressions of the discourse of the heart. The difficulty always remains,
though, as to what to substitute in its place. If we speak too easily of people
as 'having' minds and bodies, 'as thinking, imagining, remembering, feeling
pain, loving and hating', is the problem solved by saying that they 'construct'
rather than 'imagine'? What, for instance, is at stake when Culler says that a
description such as 'he was small, green and demographic' violates first-order
vraisemblance and requires us to 'construct' a 'very curious world indeed'
(Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p.l41)? Why does it not compel us to
'imagine'? In fact, there is a lyrical moment in Foucault's writings where
59 Julio Cortazar, 'El perseguidor', in Ceremonias, p.2S3.
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nature is not demonized, a moment tellingly bound to imagination. It comes
from the anonymous interview 'The Masked Philosopher', as though it could
only be spoken incognito. Note that nature, here, fulfills the function of
imagination and creation, non-judgemental and presumably similarly devoid of
responsibility and guilt. The creative, inventive work of the demiurge, not the
constitutionalist labour:
I can't help thinking of the critic who would not try to judge, but bring into
existence a work, a book, a phrase, an idea. He would light the fires, watch
the grass grow, listen to the wind, snatch the passing dregs in order to scatter
them. He would multiply, not the number of judgments, but the signs of
existence; he would call out to them, he would draw them from their sleep.
Would he sometimes invent them? So much the better. The sententious
critic puts me to sleep. I would prefer a critic of imaginative scintillations.
He would not be sovereign, nor dressed in red. He would bear the lightning
flashes of possible storms. (,The Masked Philosopher', in Foucault Live,
p.196)
This is a pale imitation of the sublime, of Byronic not Wordsworthian nature.
For here, paradoxically, the 'savage incomprehensible power outside ourselves'
(Clark, p.218) is invented by the critic.
What takes Foucault close to the condition of what he himself calls a
'founder of discursivity' is the constructivist, demiurgic, would-be creationist
streak in his own writing. Foucault does not rely on that stock of received
knowledge the citation of which would assure a text its cultural vraisemblance
(we recall the tremendous disavowal of the doxa in The Order of Things);
instead he names. A comprehensive study of Foucault's lexicon, which is
beyond our remit, would repay attention. It would discover precious constructs
like the "'heautocratic" structure of the subject', and stumble across the
'determination of the ethical substance' (The Use, pp.70, 26). The use of
quotation marks and italics is telling: they signal the unheard of (you will not
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have come across this before, we shall call it X) in respect of a supposedly
extant phenomenon (I merely name what is already there). It would reveal
rulesaplenty: the 'Rule of immanence', the 'Rule of continual variations', the
'Rule of double conditioning', the 'Rule of the tactical polyvalence of
discourses' (The History of Sexuality, pp.98-100); each and every page of The
Archaeology of Knowledge, which is about nothing if not naming regularities,
setting to work a whole series of notions belonging to a 'bizarre machinery',
a 'strange arsenal'. (If archaeology 'is not in search of inventions' (p.l44); it
nonetheless has a productive capacity of its own. Does the machine work and
what can it produce, he asks. 'And now a suspicion occurs to me. I have
behaved as if I were discovering a new domain, as if, in order to chart it, I
needed new measurements and guide-lines' [TheArchaeology, p.136]). In the
procedures by which the rituals of confession in the modem Occident come to
function within the norms of 'scientific regularity' (at stake is the link between
constitution and science, sciemia sexualis as construct rather than natural
, attitude), it would find postulates (' the postulate of a general and diffuse
causality'), principles ('the princtple of a latency intrinsic 10 sexuality') and,
above all, the semantic work of nouns denoting verbal action: 'a clinical
codification of the inducement to speak', 'the medicalization of the effects of
confession' (The History of Sexuality, pp.65-67).
So much of this discursive work operates in the aporia between the
transitive and the intransitive. The suffix -ize: 'Forming trans. and intrans. vbs
w. the sense "bring or come into some specified state'" (NSOED). Thus: a
'hysterization of women's bodies', a 'pedagogization of children's sex', a
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'socialization ofprocreative behavior' , a "psychtatrization ofperverse pleasure'
(The History of Sexuality, pp.104-105). Do these 'unities' come into being in
the eighteenth century, taking on a 'consistency' and gaining an 'effectiveness
in the order of power, as well as a productivity in the order of knowledge', or
are they brought into being by the discourse that names them? In The Care
of the Self, we are presented with 'a "physiologization" of desire and pleasure' ,
with the 'animalization of the epithumia', with the '''conjugalization'' of sexual
relations', with the three fundamental traits of an ethics of conjugal existence,
which are 'a "monopolistic" principle', a 'requirement of "dehedonization''',
and a 'procreative finalization', and lastly, with the '''juridification'' of marital
relations and sexual practices'. Foucault's writing evokes the impression of a
self-generating, but well ordered, world or system. One finds 'the construction
of an autarchic universe which fabricates its own dimensions and limits, and
arranges within these its own Time, Space, population, set of objects and
myths '.60 The abstract principles and categories of Kant's philosophical
system enter Foucault's writing-machine and emerge, reprocessed, as at one
and the same time principles of historiography and principles of the world.
The machine's great power - and it must needs use poetic licence - lies in its
capacity to process and reveal the nonrandom constituent parts of the natural
attitude; the danger (if we can say this of a writing-machine and if it can be
singular), in its will to produce the phenomena it hopes to save, and with them
the blank, indifferent, virgin domain whence they came:
The danger, in short, is that instead of providing a basis for what already
60 Barthes on Balzac and Michelet, Writing Degree, p.3S (trans. mod.).
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exists, instead of going over with bold strokes lines that have already been
sketched, instead of finding reassurance in this return and final confirmation,
instead of completing the blessed circle that announces, after innumerable
stratagems [ruses] and as many nights, that all is saved [sauve], one is forced
to advance beyond familiar territory, far from the certainties to which one
is accustomed, towards an as yet uncharted land and unforeseeable
conclusion. Is there not a danger that everything that has so far protected the
historian in his daily journey and accompanied him until nightfall (the
destiny of rationality and the teleology of the sciences, the long, continuous
labour of thought from period to period, the awakening and progress of
consciousness, its perpetual resumption of itself, the uncompleted, but
uninterrupted movement of totaJizations, the return of an ever-open source,
and finally the historico-transcendental thematic) may disappear, leaving
[degageant] for analysis a blank, indifferent space, lacking in both interiority
and promise? (The Archaeology, pp.38-39tl
61 In fact many of my criticisms are already articulated by The Archaeology itself. See the
'Conclusion' (p.199) where Foucault stages objections to his methodology (without ever really




In the Introduction he composed for the reprinted seventeenth-century
grammar by Arnauld and Lancelot, Foucault asks: why a general and reasoned
grammar?' He answers: because classical grammarians thought it possible to
found a universal grammar by finding in particular instances of language
(mostly French and Latin) the reason or necessity at work in grammar as a
whole. The more reasoned a grammar, the more it will approximate to a
general grammar. The generality sought by the classical grammarians is not
that of language in general (the project of modem linguistics); it is that of the
reasons at work in any language. In grammar, as in logic, thought owes its
very being to the existence of rules. The rule is not a prescription from
outside; it is a 'condition of existence' (p.739):
Grammar could not act like the prescriptions of a legislator finally giving to
the disorder of words their constitution and their laws; nor could it be
understood as a set of recommendations offered by a vigilant proof-corrector.
It is a discipline which enunciates the rules according to which a language
must necessarily organize itself in order to be able to exist. (p.740)
Neither the law of the legislator nor the ideal or exemplary instance demanded
by the proof-corrector; grammar is the form and the 'internal law' which allow
a language to be what it is.
Is it legitimate to see in these words, written on the Classical age but
I 'Introduction', in Dits et ecrits, I, pp. 732·752 (first publ, in Antoine Arnauld and Claude
Lancelot, Grammaire generaie et raisonnee (paris: Paulet, 1967), pp.iii-xxvii).
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written from the age of archaeology, the choreography of a dance, at once
classical and modem, performed with radiance and precision throughout
Foucault's work? The rule would not be a constitution from outside; regularity
would be the ether out of which things 'themselves' (the insane, disciplined
subjects) emerge. Even if the rule is precisely unnatural, the fruit of human
constitution and power, even if the code were unexpectedly interrupted by the
aleatory, involuntary strokes of inspiration of a momentarily distracted scribe
(as Foucault says of the nucleus of the cell), there is a persistent sense that
between the great epistemological upheavals, those 'immense reorganizations
of a culture', a force of regularity and order presides - one belonging in some
measure to the recit recitant. As Foucault says of the double meaning of the
word grammar for the grammarians of Port-Royal: there is a grammar which
is 'the immanent order of every word uttered', and a grammar which is 'the
description, the analysis and explication - the theory - of this order' (p.740).
It goes without saying that the approach adopted here to Foucault's
writings is manifestly not the only way of cutting into, of cutting up his
oeuvre. My occasional recourse to literature doubtless testifies, not only to an
indulgence quite in keeping with the spirit of Foucault, but to my distance
from important institutional and disciplinary positions ('history', 'sociology',
'psychology'). My propensity for choosing to illustrate and/or rebut points by
means of Latin American exempla bears witness to an institutional position
within the discipline (if one can ever simply be 'within' a discipline) of
Hispanic and Latin American Studies. It is necessary to state that 'Latin
America', which is here neither created nor simply summoned up, functions
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also strategically as a place whose writing, culture, politics and economics
allow a purchase on certain pervasive assumptions in Foucaultian thought and
Critical Theory alike. Most significantly, 'Latin America' exemplifies the
push-pull of a writing and a thought inscribed between the particular and the
general in a difficult cultural economy.
However, the decision to begin the thesis with the notion of mente
concipere and end it with a no less powerful ruse of the logos does, I think,
highlight the fact that the methodological continuity between the work on
epistemes and the final two published volumes on sexuality is profound, the
suggestion that a philosophical Rubicon divides them, aberrant. Further, it
underscores a conviction that constitutionalist thinking is accompanied at every
step by those things - order, law, nature, science - it might believe to have left
behind. I submit that only by rethinking such things, without thinking them
non-constitutionally, does one hold out the possibility of understanding powers
plural - powers earthly, powers bodily, powers constitutional. And it would
not be overstating the case to claim that there is perhaps no greater principle
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